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ABSTRACT 
Centring on Peer Gynt's onion as a symbol of modern 
man's "dissolved" self, this thesis is a study of the 
changing concept of "self" and its effect on the develop- 
ment of dramatic technique from Ibsen's Brand and Peer 
Gynt, through Strindberg's "dream plays, " to the plays of 
the three most influential post-war British playwrights, 
Beckett, Osborne, and Pinter. 
The aim of this comparative study is not to "prove" 
direct influence, but to demonstrate affinities and to 
trace the continuing process of the "dissolving self" 
from Brand's monumental concept of man as a being essen- 
tially divine, to Beckett's tramps picturing themselves 
as worms in a God-forsaken universe, and from Peer Gynt's 
uncentred onion self, which still adds up to a tremendous 
personality, to Pinter's "classic female figure" who is 
divested of personality as well as of self. 
The philosophical dissolution of man's essential God- 
given self and the redefinition of the human personality 
in existentialist terms as simply the sum of one's actions, 
habits, or roles, has its corollary in dramatic technique, 
of which the most radical example is Strindberg's A Dream 
Play, where the Dreamer's self is projected on stage, not 
as one indelible personality, which is still the case in 
Peer Gynt, but as a motley gallery of "dream characters, " 
each representing one aspect of the Dreamer's 
(the poet's) 
discontinuous self. 
Beckett's Krapp, spooling back the tapes of his 
former selves in search of his quintessential "I" and 
discovering that the "self" is merely a string of dis- 
carded habits; Osborne's Archie Rice playing 
for time 
against the inevitable annihilation of his inauthentic 
comedian's mask by "the man with the hook"; and Pinter's 
stupefied Stanley Webber being "crowned" by his perse- 
cutors with a bowler hat, the symbol of conformity, and 
hence of non-identity, are all modern counterparts of 
Peer Gynt, the "Emperor of Self. " 
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A Note on Translation 
The passages quoted from the works of Ibsen and 
Strindberg are, unless otherwise specified, in my own 
translation. I am, however, heavily indebted to other 
English versions, which I have acknowledged in the 
Selected Bibliography. 
In my translation of ibsen's verse in Brand and 
Peer Gynt my main aim has been to render the meaning 
and the spirit of the original text as faithfully as 
possible, while I acknowledge that my attempts to 
reproduce some of the poetic flavour of Ibsen's verse 
in its colourful variety of rhymes, metres, and moods, 
are helplessly inadequate. 
In the case of Kierkegaard's works I have supplied 
footnote references both to the standard Danish edition 
and to the Oxford English versions. But having worked 
from the original text I have not always followed these 
translations. 
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Introduction 
Ibsen has been called "the father of modern drama, " 
Strindberg "the first modern dramatist. " Gunnar Ollen 
maintains that Strindberg after the crisis of Inferno 
redirected the modern theatre even more radically than 
Ibsen, pioneering techniques that led to "dramatic 
expressionism" and "the theatre of the absurd. "-He points 
to "the break up of the concept of the ego, " "the incur- 
sions into the universe of dreams, " and "the explosion 
of the concepts of time and place of the naturalistic 
theatre, " as innovations which opened up fresh prospects 
for dramatic art. 
1 His. claim is supported by Martin 
Esslin who cites To Damascus, A Dream Play, and The Ghost 
Sonata as "direct sources of the Theatre of the Absurd. " 
"In these plays, " Esslin maintains, "the shift from the 
objective reality of the world of outside, surface 
appearance to the subjective reality of inner states of 
consciousness--a shift that marks the watershed between 
the traditional and the modern, the representational and 
the Expressionist projection of mental realities--is 
finally and triumphantly accomplished. "2 
However, these innovations are anticipated by Ibsen, 
who is not just the father of modern realistic drama, 
but is also the creator of Peer Gynt. "Thirty years 
before Freud, " Ronald_Gaskell reminds us, "Ibsen demon- 
strates how little of our life is conscious and how 
largely the unconscious, restless and dynamic, directs 
our lives. The trolls, the Boyg, the Green Woman, the 
Strange Passenger, project on to the stage the whole 
army of desires, fears, cravings, apprehensions, that 
make up-'the Gyntian self. ' Indeed, if Surrealism and 
Expressionism in the theatre can be said to have any- 
single source', that source is undoubtedly Peer Gynt. "3 
The most profound and radical innovation in Peer 
Gynt, one which lies behind the changes in style and 
technique, is the innovation which Rolf Fjelde calls 
"the dissolving self, " and which Gunnar Ollen, with 
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reference to Strindberg's plays, calls "the break up of 
the concept of the ego. " It is with Peer Gynt, not with 
Strindberg, that the concept of the fragmented, discon- 
tinuous human personality is introduced into modern 
drama. Its symbol is the onion which Peer peels, layer 
by layer, in search of his essential self, and which 
turns out to be but a multifarious collection of transi- 
ent "selves" without a permanent core. Ibsen does not 
proclaim, with some modern existentialists, that there 
is no God and hence no God-given self. Peer accepts that 
his life has a preordained purpose and that to be one's 
self is to fulfil "the Master's intention. " But he is 
still left with the problem of identifying his life's 
Bestemmelse (purpose). How, he asks the Button-Moulder, 
can one know what the Master intended? The answer is: 
One cannot know, one just has to guess. 
In his article "Peer Gynt, Naturalism, and the 
Dissolving Self" Rolf Fjelde argues that Peer Gynt marks 
the real watershed between the old and the new drama, 
for it reflects the transition from the traditional, 
essentialist picture of man, whose last great represen- 
tative was Hegel, to the modern, existentialist concept 
of man, first formulated in philosophical terms by 
Kierkegaard. The essentialist view of man, Fjelde 
explains, is based on the belief that man is born with 
a permanent identity, an immutable core of self, which 
is his eternal soul. This view is rejected by the 
existentialists, who maintain that existence precedes 
essence, and that a person's identity is an on-going 
process of self-definition through choice. 
4 
Brand reflects the essentialist picture of man in 
so far as Brand believes that man is made in God's image, 
and makes it his mission to restore fragmented, crippled 
mankind to "wholeness" that God may recognise man as His 
divine creation. But Brand's way to self-realisation is 
very similar to that advocated by Kierkegaard. Both 
teach that man is free to choose his mode of existence, 
and that selfhood is determined by the intensity of the 
8 
choice, not by the mode chosen. Only when a person 
commits himself absolutely to his chosen way or vocation 
can he become his true self, and a "whole" individual. 
But as man "has to realise himself freely, " Kierkegaard 
argues in Either-Or, "he must know what it is he would 
realise. " He must have a goal to strive after, a picture 
of his ideal self in whose likeness he has to form 
himself. But this ideal is not to be sought in the world 
without. It exists within each individual. If a person 
models himself on an ideal which is not within himself, 
his identity will be inauthentic. It will be nothing but 
a pose and a pretence. 
5 Brand's Herculean God is not the 
God of official Christianity and the Church. He is the 
-deification of Brand's uncompromising Will. He is the 
ideal in whose likeness Brand has chosen to form himself. 
Peer Gynt believes that the Gyntish Self is unique, 
immortal and ineradicable, but the Button-Moulder teaches 
him otherwise: "Now you were meant to be a shining button/ 
On the waistcoat of the world; but the loop gave way" (VI9 
219). Peer was born with tremendous possibilities, but he 
went "round about" and never ventured what Kierkegaard 
calls "the qualitative leap. "6 That is to say, he made no 
absolute choice of any vocation or way of life, and con- 
sequently failed to define his self. Like Kierkegaard's 
aesthete, Peer is "an existential possibility" that never 
becomes "an actuality. "7 Not that Peer is without a goal 
in life. He wants to become Emperor of the whole world. 
But Peer's Emperor dream is a fantastical ideal which 
cannot be realised in actual life. Peer lives ins Blaue 
hinein (this is how Kierkegaard describes the life of 
the aesthete), 
8 
and as the Lean One reminds him: "Most 
people's Seen ins Blaue/ Ends in the casting-ladle" 
(234). 9 
Peer's fantastical onion self will vanish without a 
trace in the Button-Moulder's ladle, because it has no 
authentic core of Trilled self which holds it together 
and anchors it in reality. 
In his cencorious review of the play, in which he 
declared that "Peer Gynt, is not poetry, " Clemens Petersen 
9 
cited as one of its grave poetic flaws "the lack of a 
strong and clear consequentiality in the action. " All 
of Act IV, he complained, "falls completely outside 
the real theme and mood of the play. "10 But the play's 
episodic structure and the lack of "consequentiality in 
the action" are precisely a reflection of Peer's frag- 
mented, discontinuous personality. Yet although Ibsen 
set out to portray a character whose uncentred self is 
simply an inventory of roles abandoned, he protested 
furiously against Clemens Petersen's suggestion that his 
characters were conceived as illustrations of concepts 
rather than as living human beings, and hence lacked 
dramatic vitality. "Tell me now, " he thundered in a 
letter to Bjornson, "is Peer himself not a personality, 
complete and individual? I know that he is. And the 
mother, is she not? "11 Viewed existentially Peer's "self" 
is an onion self, a self in unrelated parts. But as a 
dramatic character he is conceived as s, complete, fully 
rounded person, and as such is the unifying force that 
holds the episodic structure together. In Peer Gynt 
Ibsen dissolved the self, and by "self" we mean the 
identity Peer is searching for and fails to find, or 
rather, fails to achieve. But he has not done away with 
personality, that is to say, the distinctive character- 
istics, the Gyntian idiocyncrasies. which captivate the 
audience and made even the greyest of the villagers 
claim kinship with the legendary Peer: "Blood's never so 
thin/ We don't feel a little akin to Peer Gynt" (VI9 206). 
It needed Strindberg's original genius to properly 
dissolve the self in dramatic-technical. terms. Strind- 
berg was strongly influenced by Ibsen's quest 
for 
authentic selfhood in Brand and Peer Gynt. 
But the 
fragmented, discontinuous self he projects on the stage 
is altogether his own. Strindberg was both painfully and 
proudly conscious of his own "characterlessness. " He 
prided himself on the fact that his personality was made 
up of many "selves, " for the poet's multiple self is his 
true source of wealth. But there were also times when 
lo 
his "characterlessness" caused him acute misery because 
-he felt that he had no self apart from the characters he 
created. The Dreamer of A Dream Play is present only as 
the consciousness that "rules over them all" (XXXVI, 215). 
All the characters, including Indra's Daughter, are 
aspects of the Dreamer's manifold self. The action 
centres on the opening of the clover-leaf door, behind 
which the meaning of existence is thought to be hidden, 
but which, when opened, reveals Nothing. The scene is a 
parallel to the Onion Scene in Peer G, -y-nt, for the secret 
of the door is also the secret of the Dreamer's self. 
The Dreamer discovers, as did Peer Gynt, that the "self" 
is not a core of indelible essence at the heart of the 
onion, but the sum of its disparate variety of layers. 
God is no. longer a reality beyond man. He is only a 
facet of the poet's dream. Reality itself is a dream, 
an illusion, and there is nothing more authentic than 
the poet's dream, his artistic creation. 
The dream play technique of dissolving the Dreamer's 
self into a multifarious cast of "abstract, " single- 
feature characters is not entirely Strindberg's invention, 
although he claimed so himself. It is already partly used 
in Peer Gynt, where the mythical figures that only Peer 
sees: the trolls, the Woman in Green, the Boyg (whom Peer 
feels but does not see), the Strange Passenger, the 
Button-Moulder, the Lean One, are all dream characters, 
projections of the Gyntish Self. But Peer's world is not 
one of unbroken subjectivity. There is still a world 
without, in which other people exist. Peer, however, does 
his best to subject the entire globe, including other 
people, to the Gyntish Self, and finds it increasingly 
difficult to distinguish between reality and fantasy. 
It is not the purpose of my thesis to pursue the 
argument as to whether Ibsen or Strindberg has had the 
greater or the more radical influence on the development 
of modern drama. In his book Strindberg's Impact in 
France 192o-196o Anthony Srierling settles the issue as 
follows: "The reaction against Ibsen has paralleled the 
11 
reassessment of Strindberg who, though overshadowed 
during his lifetime, was to eclipse his former rival. 
The two Scandinavians have come to represent the opposite 
poles of drama and Ibsen has not appealed to the move- 
ments of Surrealism, Existentialism and Absurdism where 
Strindberg's position is paramount. This ascendancy has 
often been contrasted to the obsolescence of an anti- 
quated Ibsen. C... ] It was the Second World War which 
irrevocably raised Strindberg above Ibsen. "12 Swerling's 
book also contains a chapter on Samuel. Beckett, whose 
work, he finds, "yields evidence of excessive dependence 
on Strindberg's post-Inferno works. "13 I do not challenge 
Swerling's judgement of Strindberg's seminal influence 
on twentieth-century French drama, and can only regret 
that I shall not have the benefit of his forthcoming 
book on "Strindberg's Influence in England" for my 
present study. However, I do not accept his argument 
that Ibsen is irrelevant to the movements of Surrealism, 
Existentialism, and Absurdism, and his suggestion that 
Ibsen is antiquated and obsolescent. In my thesis I hope 
to show how Ibsen and Strindberg together have inspired 
the three most influential post-war British dramatists: 
Samuel Beckett, John Osborne, and Harold Pinter. The 
main theme of my study is "the dissolution of the self" 
and its effect on the development of dramatic technique. 
Ibsen dissolved the self philosophically and to 
some extent dramatically in Peer Gynt. Strindberg created 
a new dramatic form in A Dream Play to accomodate the 
modern vision of the discontinuous human personality. 
But the process continues in various ways in Beckett, 
Osborne, and Pinter, for the dissolution of man's 
eternal, God-given self has also led to a diminution of 
man's stature: from Brand who sees himself in the like- 
ness of an all-powerful Herculean God, to Beckett's 
tramps who picture themselves crawling on their hands 
and knees before their diminutive God-substitute Godot. 
1y study, therefore, is not only concerned with influ- 
ence, but also with the development of the British 
12 
dramatists from their Scandinavian forbears. In my 
comparison of the individual dramatists I have been 
content to point out the similarities rather than 
attempt to "prove" direct influence and ennumerate line 
to line correspondences, which is Anthony Swerling's 
approach, and which he claims has yielded evidence of 
"much which is tantamount to plagiarism. "14 I have 
approached each dramatist as an original artist, whose 
own work must be allowed to speak first for any 
comparison to be critically valid and useful. 
In the case of Beckett, who is also a significant 
novelist, I have studied the novels, especially Murphy 
and The Unnamable, as an introduction to the plays, for 
without the novels, Beckett's "picture of man" would be 
incomplete. Of his plays I have focused my attention 
mainly on Waiting for Godot--which may partly have been 
inspired by Strindberg's A Dream Play; an early draft of 
which is called "Vgntan" ("Waiting")--and on Endgame, 
which undoubtedly owes something both to The Dance of 
Death and The Ghost Sonata. The confined tower-like 
"hell" in which Hamm and Clov are condemned to cohabit 
and torture each other to the end, is reminiscent of, 
and very likely inspired by, the island fort which is 
the abode of Alice and'Edgar in The Dance of Death, and 
which is tellingly called "Little Hell. " Anthony Swer- 
ling, to whose chapter on Beckett I am much indebted, 
has recorded the parallels between Endgame and The Dance 
of Death in considerable detail. I have confined my study 
to the even closer affinity between Endgame and The Ghost 
Sonata (which Beckett saw twice in Roger Blin's produc- 
tion at the Theatre de la Gaiete-Montparnasse in 1949). 
I have also included a brief discussion of KrapD's Last 
Tape, which has been called Beckett's Peer Gynt. Old 
Krapp, spooling back the tapes of his former selves, 
discovers like Peer when he peels the layers of the onion, 
that every discarded self is a stranger to the next, and 
that the permanent, quintessential self he has been 
searching for is just another illusion. 
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John Osborne's Look Back in Anger is closely related 
to Ibsen's A Doll's House. Jimmy's quest for selfhood 
resembles Nora's in many respects. Both are trapped in a 
society that cannot produce "the miracle. " But whereas 
Nora has the courage to leave her doll's house and 
venture into the fearful unknown to search for her true 
self, Jimmy continues to play "bears and squirrels" 
because the world fails to provide him with good, brave, 
self-identifying causes. Jimmy, whose character is a 
paradoxical mixture of protest and inaction, has 
undoubtedly inherited some of Hedda Gabler's "boredom, " 
which so fascinated Osborne when he first-saw the play 
(in 1954 at the Lyric Theatre, Hammersmith, ' with Peggy 
Ashcroft as Hedda). In the Introduction to his adaptation 
of Ibsen's play Osborne gives a description of Hedda's 
character which, with a change of name, might almost be 
a portrait of Jimmy Porter. Miss Julie is another likely 
influence on Look Back in Anger. The relationship between 
Jimmy and Alison has many similarities with that between 
Jean and Miss Julie. In both cases the man is a plebeian 
who tries to vindicate his "inborn" nobility and better 
his social status by conquering an aristocratic woman, 
and in both cases the plebeian turns out to be a coward. 
while the aristocrat proves her true nobility by making 
the "sacrifice" he demands of her. The Entertainer is 
Osborne's Peer Gynt. Archie Rice, like Ibsen's hero, 
recognises with despair that he is all disguise and no 
authentic core, and that "the man with the hook" is 
waiting in the wings ready to collect bis irredeemable 
non-self. Inadmissible Evidence begins with a dream 
trial which is reminiscent of the banquet scene in 
Strindberg's To Damascus II. Bill tliaitland, like the 
Unknown, is on trial for the failure to be, which in 
Maitland's case, as in that of Strindberg's persona, is 
essentially a failure to love. Maitland recognises that 
his self-centred, loveless existence has been "irredeem- 
ably mediocre, " and resigns himself to the inescapable 
summons from the Law Society, Maitland's Button-Moulder. 
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Harold Pinter has acknowledged the influence of 
many writers, but Ibsen and Strindberg are not among 
them. Arthur Ganz propounds, however, that "Of all the 
major modern playwrights, Pinter seems in certain essen- 
tials most closely allied to one comparatively distant 
in time and very different in style, Henrik Ibsen. [... ] 
That there should be so marked a similarity between the 
first great modern playwright and the writer who has 
most recently assumed a place in the line of descent 
from him suggests not only a coincidence in personality 
but the extent to which the modern drama is a body of 
Romantic art. "15 In my study of Pinter I have selected 
the following major plays for closer analysis: The Birth- 
day Party, The Caretaker, The Homecoming, and Old Times. 
The similarities between Stanley's birthday party and the 
madhouse scene in Peer Gynt may be entirely fortuitous, 
but are nevertheless striking. Stanley, like Peer, builds 
his identity on an illusion. Peer lives on the illusion 
of future greatness, Stanley on the illusion of greatness 
frustrated. Stanley's dogged attempt to enclose himself 
in his own subjectivity and be "to himself enough" leads, 
as it did with Peer, to his losing his grip of factual 
reality. Stanley, like Peer in the madhouse, has a 
"breakdown" when he is-confronted with the terrifying 
consequences of his self-seclusion, and is similarly 
collected for annihilation by mysterious agents. Peer is 
unconscious, "beside himself, " when Begriffenfeldt 
crowns him "Emperor of Self. " Stanley is led out to the 
van that is to bring him back the "organisation" in a 
state of dumb stupor. Goldberg "crowns" him with a bowler 
hat which, like Peer's crown of straw, is a symbol of 
conformity and hence of non-identity. The Birthday Party 
is a dream play in the sense that the 
two strangers, 
while being "real" people, are also exteriorisations of 
Stanley's haunted mind, and precisely because they are 
real human beings with their own dark fears and tensions, 
they carry with them a more sinister atmosphere than do 
the mythical beings that haunt Peer Gynt. In my analysis 
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of The Caretaker I have indicated the parallel symbolic 
function of the lumber room in Pinter's play with that 
of the attic in The Wild Duck. Both rooms reflect in 
various ways the life-lies of crippled selves. The 
characters in The Caretaker are, like Hjalmar Ekdal, 
"survivors" precisely because they are capable of 
inventing "purposes" to justify their existence. The 
Homecoming provides the basis for a discussion of 
Pinter's view and treatment of women in relation to 
those of Ibsen and Strindberg. Whereas Ibsen's women are 
individuals, Pinter and Strindberg tend to see women as 
representatives of the female sex. Pinter's Ruth, like 
Strindberg's Lady, is woman in her traditional female 
roles of mother, wife, mistress, earth-mother, saviour. 
In the sexual battle she is also the vampire who devours 
the male ego. In Old Times the battle of the sexes 
assumes a pattern even more closely reminiscent of 
Strindberg in that the struggle between Deeley and Anna 
for the possession of Kate, like the fight between Laura 
and the Captain in The Father for the possession of the 
child, is not just a struggle for sexual dominance, but 
is a battle between two people for the recognition and 
affirmation of their individual identities. It would, 
however, be rash to suggest that there is any direct 
link between the two plays. No Pinter play relates 
directly to any Ibsen or Strindberg play in the sense in 
which Osborne's Look Back in Anger is directly related 
to Ibsen's A Doll's House. But the obvious similarities 
between Pinter's plays and those of Ibsen and Strindberg 
--whether these can be attributed 
to "a coincidence in 
personality" or to unconscious if unacknowledged 
influ- 
ence, or to a combination of both--place Pinter 
firmly 
in the line of descent from the Scandinavian masters. 
Chapter 1 
The Modern Ibsen 
Ibsen in Search of the Authentic Self 
Is Ibsen, "the father of modern drama, " still modern? 
The answer to this question obviously depends on what one 
considers modern in modern drama. In his seminal article 
"Peer Gynt, Naturalism, and the Dissolving Self" Rolf 
Fjelde argues that "if what is modern devolves into mere 
techniques of stagecraft, a matter of real brass doorknobs 
on unflappable, non-canvas doors, then Ibsen is simply 
the most literate veteran of a now-dated campaign (from 
Tom Robertson to Antoine) to bring scenic decor closer to 
verisimilitude. " But if modernity "involves a whole revo- 
lution in attitude toward reality, 'one which underlies and 
justifies the innovations in technique, " then our present 
theatrical age is still fundamentally the child of Ibsen, 
born, not with A Doll's House, but with Peer Gynt. For in 
Peer Gynt, Fjelde contends, quoting Wedekind, "Ibsen gave 
us a new world-view, a new picture of man, " and the conse- 
quences of this profound and far-reaching innovation, he 
claims, "are still unfolding in the two rival contemporary 
theatrical traditions. "1 Fjelde believes, in other words, 
that both the naturalistic and the anti-naturalistic 
lines of descent in modern drama can be traced back to 
"this most protean and enigmatic" of Ibsen's plays. 
2 
It is questionable whether Wedekind's original state- 
ment, which reads: "Ibsen gab uns eine neue Weltanschauung, 
eine neue Menschenschilderung, eine neue Seelenkunde, aber 
keine neue Dramatik, "3 carries the radical implication 
Fjelde attaches to his English rendering, but Wedekind's 
qualified tribute to Ibsen as dramatic innovator does 
not invalidate Fjelde's argument. 
Peer Gynt, Fjelde claims, mirrors the most conse- 
quential transition in nineteenth-century philosophy, 
the transition from an essentialist to an existentialist 
picture of man. Ibsen's formative years were profoundly 
17 
influenced by the philosophies of Hegel and Kierkegaard, 
which pervaded the intellectual atmosphere of the 
Northern countries during the mid-nineteenth century. 
Hegel is the last of the great essentialist philosophers, 
Kierkegaard the first of the contemporary existentialists. 
Both formulated a way to self-realisation which appealed 
. strongly to Ibsen, but the two ways were incompatible. 
The procrastinated, but unavoidable choice between them 
furnishes the philosophical tension of Peer Gynt. Ibsen 
chooses the existentialist way and levies a Kierke- 
gaardian judgement on Peer's unaccomplished life, and by 
inference, on the Hegelian speculative system. 
4 
The essentialist picture of man, Fjelde explains, has 
as its core the belief that man is made in God's image and 
consequently has a fixed identity which is his from birth 
as a rational soul, an innate, indissoluble essence of self 
that can be lost or saved, but not dismembered or destroyed. 
Iffarlowe's Dr Faustus laments: "All beasts are happy/ For 
when they die/ Their souls are soon dissolved in elements, / 
But mine must live still to be plagued in hell. "5 The 
existentialists, on the other hand, reject the notion that 
man is born with an innate essence, a soul given once and 
for ever. Their credo is that existence precedes essence6 
and that a person's identity is a matter of "choosing 
oneself continually, day by day, experience to experience, 
through an existential act of self-determining will. "7 
Hegel teaches that the essence of all reality, self 
and cosmos alike, is reason. He calls it Absolute Reason. 
For Hegel, the ultimate goal of self-realisation is, as 
Fjelde explains, "the condition of enlightened awareness 
of Absolute Reason, both inwardly and outwardly, as the 
ground of all that is. "8 Self-realisation in Hegelian 
terms is thus a reflective process, culminating in the 
awareness of self not as an individual existence but as 
an integral part of Absolute Reason. Kierkegaard rejects 
the concept of Absolute Reason and insists that it is 
impossible for the finite human mind to grasp the whole 
of reality as an intelligible, rational system, even 
18 
presuming that it is such. It follows for Kierkegaard that 
self-realisation begins and ends with the individual self, 
and since man cannot refer to an intelligible universe, he 
can only define himself by choosing himself. Whereas Hegel. 
comes to full self-realisation contemplatively, Kierkegaard 
urges that one can only realise one's self through a leap 
of irrevocable existential choice. If one fails to choose, 
one will be but "a self in unrelated parts, fragmentary, 
incomplete, disjunctive. " Peer Gynt's Onion Self is the 
inevitable penalty for his never having risked the quali- 
fying leap. 9 Fjelde propounds: "It is its pervasive and 
epochal sense of the dissolving self that makes Peer Gynt 
such a crucial document of the 'new picture of man' 
emerging in the European mind. 11l0 
Fjelde's observation that Peer Gynt reflects the 
transition from an essentialist to an existentialist 
picture of man opens up new and far-reaching perspectives 
which I think merit closer critical investigation. In the 
present chapter I shall examine more closely the changing 
concept of self in Brand and Peer Gynt on the basis of 
Fjelde's theory of the Dissolving Self. 
Two essential questions arise from Rolf Fjolde's 
article. He argues that the new existentialist picture of 
man emerges with Peer Gynt, without considering the fact 
that Peer Gynt is a sequel to Brand (as Ibsen himself has 
intimated in his remark that "after Brand came Peer Gynt, 
as though of itself"), 
11 
and cannot be fully understood 
except in relation to its companion piece. How does the 
"new picture of man" in Peer Gynt differ from the "old" 
one in Brand? The second question concerns the dissolution 
of the Gyntish Self. If the Gyntish. Self is an onion self, 
a self "in unrelated parts" without a structuring essence 
at the core, how can it dissolve? Is it not already 
dissolved? Or are we to understand--as Fjelde's suggestion 
that Peer's identity "has been, throughout the play, in a 
suspended state of dissolution, "12 seems to imply--that 
Peer is born with an essential self, a fixed identity, 
which then dissolves in the course of the play because he 
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fails to meet the existential requirement of absolute 
choice? I propose that the dissolution of the essential 
self is already in progress in Brand, and that the 
Gyntish Self is a non-self from the outset. 
Brand and Peer Gynt have traditionally been regarded 
as opposites. Brand is the morally noble, Peer the morally 
corrupt. Brand is the uncompromising idealist and a martyr 
for his faith, Peer the self-serving opportunist always on 
the run from responsibility and sacrifice. Brand is a man 
of unswerving will, Peer an inveterate practitioner of the 
"round about. " Ibsen has himself lent authority to the 
antithetical view of the two protagonists by declaring that 
"Peer Gynt is the antithesis of Brand, "13 and that "Brand 
is myself in my best moments--and it is equally true that 
by analysing myself I brought to light many of both Peer 
Gynt's and Stensgaard's characteristics. "14 It was not 
least with Brand and Peer Gynt in mind that Ibsen revealed 
in his address to the Norwegian students in 1874: 
In part, I have been inspired by something I felt on 
rare occasions and only in my best moments stirring within 
me, vividly alive, great and beautiful. I have been 
inspired by that which, so to speak, stood higher than my 
everyday self, and I have been inspired by this because I 
wanted to confront it and make it part of myself. 
But I have also been inspired by the opposite, by what 
appears on introspection as the dregs and sediment of 
one's nature. Writing has in this case been to me like a 
bath from which I have risen feeling cleaner, healthier, 
and freer. 15 
But although Ibsen professes to have modelled Brand and 
Peer Gynt on diverse sides of his own nature, he is still 
the common denominator of the two characters, and Ibsen 
saw himself, Maurice Valency believes, "not sometimes as 
the one and sometimes as the other, but both at the same 
time; so that it was necessary for him, as artist, 
constantly to superpose [sic the one image on the other 
in order to get at something like the truth. ""16 
In a report to Hegel, his publisher, on the progress 
of Emperor and Galilean Ibsen promised: "The positive 
Weltanschauung which the critics have long demanded of me 
\. 
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will be found here. "17 When the play eventually appeared, 
Arne Garborg, a perceptive but ambivalent admirer of Ibsen, 
was dissatisfied. Ibsen only asks, he gives no answers, 
Garborg protested. "For all his richness of thought, Ibsen 
has really nothing to give. He is, himself, only a seeker. 
He dissipates himself in a night of doubt. "18 The antithe- 
tical view of Brand and Peer Gynt reflects the fact that 
Ibsen the "seeker" has been overshadowed by Ibsen the 
castigator and satirist. 
In Brand and Peer Gynt Ibsen the seeker is searching 
for one and the same thing: his true self. The two plays 
belong together, not as opposites, not as the right and 
wrong approach to self-realisation, but as continuous 
stages in a quest for authentic selfhood. Ibsen once wrote 
to Bjornson: "So to conduct one's life as to realise one's 
self, this seems to me the highest attainment possible for 
a human being. It is the duty of one and all of us, but 
most of us bungle it. "19 Bjornson belonged to the very few 
of whom Ibsen could truly say that they had not bungled 
the task of self-realisation. "If I were to decide what to 
inscribe on your memorial column, " Ibsen told Bjornson, 
"I would choose these words: 'His life was his greatest 
poem' ., 120 Both Brand and Peer Gynt discover when they come 
to the end of the road. that they have bungled the all- 
important task of achieving true selfhood. Brand comes 
before his deus caritatis with his love-account still "a 
white virgin page" . 
(V, 238) and is destroyed by the 
avalanche. Peer Gynt, who has merely been "to himself-- 
enough, " pleases neither Heaven nor Hell and goes into the 
Button-Moulder's ladle. 
The one thing Ibsen longed for and treasured above 
21 "Who is the anything else was "to possess a whole soul. 
man among us, " Ibsen asked in his address to the students, 
"who has not at times felt and recognised within himself a 
contradiction between word and deed, between will and duty, 
between life and teaching? And who among us has not, at 
least on certain occasions, been egotistically sufficient 
unto himself,. and half unconsciously, half in good faith, 
21 
sought to extenuate his conduct both to others and to 
himself? "22 Knowing himself to be one person in his 
work and another apart from it, that desired wholeness 
of soul became the unattainable goal in the pursuit of 
which Ibsen exerted all his creative energy. 
In the youthful poem "On the Heights" (1859), which 
is one of his finest non-dramatic works and foreshadows 
the plays to come, Ibsen explores the aesthetic approach 
to wholeness. A young man, the narrator of the poem, 
leaves his mother and his bride-to-be, with promises of 
a quick return, to seek solitude in the mountains, driven 
by a half-conscious, half-defined craving for freedom. 
Up on the heights he feels like a new-born being, and he 
begins to understand what was wrong with his life in the 
valley. It had been a life of halves, torn between desire 
and guilt. From now on he will seek the higher life of 
solitary self-contemplation in the highland wilderness 
where he is close to God and far from the groping crowd: 
Here I stand as if born anew, 
My blood is cool and calm. 
This life of halves that's never whole, 
This life of sin and guilt-torn soul, 
I now will rise beyond. 
All wild desires, darkened lusts 
My heart will drive away. 
I feel so pure, I stand so near 
Myself, and near my God. (XIV, 390) 
On the heights he meets the Strange Hunter, his mysterious 
second self, whose silent thoughts "Blaze like northern 
lights round his brow, " and whose cold eyes are as un- 
fathomable "As the black mountain tarn, / Born of, and 
caged by, towering glaciers" (392). The Strange 
Hunter 
teaches him the way to perfect freedom, which can be 
gained only through complete emotional detachment 
from 
people and events. He must learn to get the perspective 
right, to view the world "through his hollowed 
hand" (398). 
On Christmas Eve he looks down into the valley and sees 
his homestead ablaze, with his mother in it. But the 
Strange Hunter consoles him in his grief by pointing out 
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the "wonderful effect" of the red flames rising into the 
moonlit night. The final test comes on Midsummer Day when 
from his lonely heights the young man watches the glitter- 
ing bridal procession in the valley, carrying his bride 
to her wedding with another man. With tears of despair 
burning in his eyes he steels himself to view the scene 
with aesthetic detachment: "But look--her red gown! / How 
brightly it shines through the birch-trees" (4oo). As his 
bride rides out of sight the young man cries victorious: 
I am steeled. I follow the calling 
That bids me to-scale the heights! 
The last of my lowland path is trod; 
Up here on the fells are freedom and God, 
Down below do but grope the others. 
(XIV, 4oo) 
But his victory gives him no happiness. He tells the 
Strange Hunter that from now on he will need no guide, 
for in his heart are "All symptoms of petrifaction" (4oo) 
and he no longer feels the cold on the heights. The 
young man has attained the wholeness he longed for, but 
it is a wholeness of sorts, achieved not by synthesis 
but by separation. He has gained aesthetic liberation 
by negating his human feelings. "On the Heights" is an 
intensely personal statement of the conflict between 
life and art which continued to haunt Ibsen to the end 
of his creative life. 
"The urge for freedom which pervades this poem, " 
Ibsen told Peter Hansen many years later, "did not find 
full expression until I wrote Love's Comedy. "23 And to 
Edmund Gosse he wrote: "Love's Comedy should really be 
regarded as a forerunner of Brand, for in it I have 
described the conflict which prevails in our present 
social conditions between reality and the claims of the 
ideal in everything that concerns love and marriage. "24 
Ibsen's extreme idealism is always counterbalanced 
by his keen sense of the absurd. In Love's Comedy (1863) 
he takes a satirical-look at the poet's obsessive "urge 
for freedom" and his bungling attempt to unite the ideal 
with the real, an exercise foredoomed to failure, for 
23 
the two are irreconcilable. In his Introduction to The 
Centenary Edition, Francis Bull says that "Love's Comedy 
is--with the possible exception of Brand--the most 
Kierkegaardian of all Ibsen's works" (IV9 131). Falk, the 
young poet-hero of the play is a typical Kierkegaardian 
aesthete who abandons himself to the pleasures of the 
moment and scandalises respectable society by declaring 
that love and marriage are incompatible. Love is ideal; 
marriage is compromise. Love can only blossom in freedom; 
marriage is "slavery, chains, and loss of freedom" (165). 
Love is eternally mysterious. "When love seeks to compre- 
hend/ Its own nature, it is lost" (168). Marriage is 
habit, and a widow's mourning is regret for habit broken 
(2o8). Falk's philosophy of marriage-less love is not 
original. It had been formulated in strikingly similar 
terms by Kierkegaard's aesthete in Either-Or (1843): 
Just because one never enters into marriage, it does not 
follow that life need be deprived of the erotic element. 
The erotic ought also to have infinity, but poetic 
infinity, which can just as well be concentrated into an 
hour as into a month. When two people fall in love and 
feel that they were made for each other, then they should 
have the courage to break it off; for by going on they 
have everything to lose and nothing to gain. This seems a 
paradox, and to the emotions it is, but not to the reason. 25 
Falk believes that he has a divine calling to become a 
poet, yet makes his poetic genius dependent not only on 
borrowed ideas, but even on borrowed emotions: 
Give me, if only for a month to borrow, 
A sharp, a crushing, a gigantic sorrow, 
And I shall celebrate life's joy in song. 
Or better, give me--till summer's fall-- 
A bride, to be my light, my sun, my God, 
my all. 
(Iv, 15o) 
Ibsen confided in a letter to C. J. Anker 
(1858): "I have 
ardently longed for, indeed almost prayed for, a great 
sorrow that might properly fill my existence and give my 
life meaning. It was foolish, and I have fought my way 
out of that stage" (Ibsen uses the Kierkegaardian term 
stadium) "--yet some memory of it will always remain. "26 
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Behind his self-defensive mask of flippancy Falk genuine- 
ly longs, as Ibsen himself had done, for some intense 
emotional experience that might give content to his empty 
self, and inspiration to his unfledged genius. He urges 
Svanhild to dare the "leap" (Ibsen uses Kierkegaard's word 
Springet) across the deadly gulf of convention and join 
him in the glorious freedom of marriage-less love--if only 
for the summer. She is the idealistic soul-mate who could 
fill his empty soul with song and make him a great poet: 
I must, like my falcon namesake, swing 
Against the wind, if I'm to reach the heights. 
You are the breeze to carry me aloft, 
You alone can give my wings the strength to rise. 
Be mine, be mine, until the world shall claim you-- 
When leaves are falling our paths shall part. 
Pour out in mine the treasures of your heart, 
And I shall give you song for song again. 
Then may you wither underneath the lamp, -- 
Like autumn leaves, without regret or pain. (IV, 178- 
79) 
Svanhild is not flattered by Falk's proposal, for his 
artistic egotism is ill concealed. "You prize me as a 
child does a reed/ Only to be made a flute of for a day" 
(179). In an early draft titled "Svanhild, " Falk's 
arrogant selfishness is even more blatantly evident: 
Answer me, would you have the courage to live that life 
with me, rich but short, for just one summer? (Svanhild 
remains silent. ) Yes, think well, for there's no going 
back. You must make a free choice. You must personally, 
give me yourself, otherwise I cannot use you. (Svanhild 
still remains silent. ) It is a question of a sacrifice 
for me, a sacrifice completely from your side: to sing 
yourself empty like the starling and fill me with the 
content, and when I am finished with you ... All over ... 
no winter to follow ... then we part ... Svanhild ... 
answer me before God, have. you the courage? 
(IV, 265) 
Falk's eulogy on his poetic calling does not impress 
Svanhild, for it reveals his complete lack of under- 
standing of what it means to be a poet. Mercilessly she 
strips the illusory poet to the empty core by offering 
her own interpretation of Falk's "lame and false simile": 
You were no falcon, but a kite, 
A versifying kite, cut out of paper. 
Whose own self remains a trifling thing, 
Dependent wholly on the string. (IV, 18o) 
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Falk's flapping paper-kite epigrams "wildly beat the air, 
but never hit" (181) because they are not rooted in 
living experience. Before he can become a poet he must 
become a self, and to attain to selfhood he must turn his 
noble ideals into living deeds. Only when his poetry is 
born of the treasures of his own soul is he a true poet, 
and only when the content of his self is self-achieved is 
he really free. Paper-poems belong to the writer's desk. 
Only poems lived belong to life. Svanhild urges him: 
! 'Choose between them: be or write! " (181). Falk proves 
an easy convert. He embraces the new philosophy of poetic 
living with the same naive enthusiasm with which he had 
thrust his paper-idealism upon an insipid, respectable 
tea. -party. From now on he will wage his war against the 
spirit of compromise. in open field: "I, or else falsehood-- 
one of us'must yield: " (212). When Falk, having declared 
himself henceforth a poet of living deeds, again asks 
Svanhild to join him love and battle, she throws herself 
boldly into his arms, confident that she has discovered 
his true self at last. Together they will show the world 
That love has in it an eternal power, 
Which carries it unstained in all its glory 
Through the dull and grimy weekday round. (VI, 213) 
Theirs is going to be a true marriage of free spirits. 
Each will realise himself in his complete devotion to the 
other and to their common calling. But their bold reso- 
lution does not stand up to the test of Guldstad's chall- 
enge. He quickly brings them down to earth by asking 
them 
to consider whether "love is at liberty/ To defy 
habit, 
poverty, age, and grief" and reminding them that marriage 
is "a veritable ocean/ Of claims and obligations" which 
have little to do with love (235). Guldstad becomes a 
formidable opponent when he proposes to Svanhild, off er- 
ing her as an alternative to Falk's self-indulgent, 
non-committal, idealised, romantic love, the practical 
poetry of conjugal love, the unostentatious poetry of 
duty and devotion, which grows where the other fades: 
. ý: ,.. __. _ _, _ __,.., r ..... _ý. _ ...., 
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It is the quiet flow of tender care 
That honours its recipient no less 
Than does the fevered adulation of 
a wistful dream. 
It is a sense of happiness in duty, 
Of fond solicitude, a peaceful home. 
Of wills that bow each to the other, 
Of watchfulness, that she may never 
Hurt her foot against a stone, walk 
where she will. (IV9 238) 
Guldstad is a parallel to Judge Wilhelm, the ethical man 
in Either-Or, who says that only the person who commits 
himself to love as a duty, an act of will, "truly lives 
poetically. "27 The aesthete regards duty as an enemy of 
love because he tries to make himself believe that "true 
freedom consists in being outside one's self, intoxicated 
by dreams. 128 In Ibsen's play, as in Either-Or, romantic 
love represents the aesthetic mode of existence, marriage 
the ethical mode, and the two are regarded as being 
incompatible. Guldstad's challenge means that Falk and 
Svanhild are confronted with a real existential choice 
between two equally valid, but mutually exclusive modes 
of existence. In the event, Falk lacks the courage to 
make the irrevocable existential leap he had thrice dared 
Svanhild to make (16o, 178,213). It is she who decides 
for him by accepting Guldstad's offer, not because she 
is tempted by his wealth, but because she is level- 
headed enough to realise that Falk is incapable of perma- 
nent commitment. He can promise neither eternal love nor 
lifelong devotion, only that his passion will last 
"a long, long time. " Svanhild. rejects his "poverty- 
stricken" pledge. She demands all or nothing. If love is 
not everlasting, better then that it should "die, as it 
lived, young and glorious" (241). It is only in memory 
that their young love can have infinity and be for Falk 
an eternal inspiration that will set him properly free 
as a poet. Svanhild renounces his love for ever in order 
to become his true songbird, and Falk, relieved of the 
heavy burden of choice, goes off into the mountains, 
cherishing the illusion that through the sacrifice of 
love he is finally born as a poet, and that his brief, 
27 
ecstatic spring love will sustain his poetic genius ever 
after. It is Svanhild who suffers the real loss. Guldstad 
recognises that "Something has burst within her soul C... ] " 
(IV9 245), but he demands no greater sappiness than to be 
the healer of her wounded heart. For Falk, conjugal love, 
even in its most virtuous and self-sacrificial guise, is 
no alternative to the ideal love of his dreams. He is. 
never more sincere than when. he pours forth his despair 
at the half-life of respectable society, the half-life 
of compromise, where the ideal always comes second: 
All as if burnt out, dead--unrelieved misery--i 
So through the world. they go, two and two, 
Huddling together, like charred tree-trunks 
On a desolate moor after a forest fire. 
Nothing but ashes as far, as eye can see. 
Oh, is there no green life anywhere! (IV, 174) 
In his letter to Edmund Gosse (see p. 22 above) 
Ibsen defined the theme of Love's Comedy as the conflict 
between the real and the ideal in, all that concerns love 
and marriage. But the play is ultimately about selfhood. 
Falk's idealism is an expression of his yearning for 
something that can give content to his insubstantial 
self. Ibsen is concerned with the relative merits of love 
and marriage and the proper relationship between them 
only in so far as they. constitute. the existential alter- 
natives, the choice, whereby the self can define itself. 
Falk chooses to remain an aesthete, or rather, Svanhild 
chooses for him, since he has proved himself incapable of 
the devotion and self-sacrifice which the ethical life 
demands. Falk's extreme idealism points towards Brand, 
but his non-committal attitude points towards Peer Gynt. 
Ibsen became, however, less and less convinced that 
Falk s. aestheticism could be justified at all, and in 
1865, writing from Italy, he told Bjornson that the most 
important benefit of his exile so far consisted in his 
having rid himself of "that isolated aestheticism with a 
claim to independent existence which formerly held sway 
over me. " He now regards this kind of aestheticism as 
"just as great a curse to poetry as theology is to reli- 
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gion. "29 Ibsen was in the rapture of writing Brand when he 
made this statement and had progressed from the aesthetic 
to the ethical stage, the second of Kierkegaard's three 
stadia of self-realisation; the third, and highest, being 
the religious. In fact, the stage that Brand represents 
ought properly to be called the ethico-religious stage, 
for Brand's demand for absolute selfhood cannot be 
separated from his aspiration to godhead. Kierkegaard's 
ethical stage, Harald Beyer observes, was always for him 
a "both-and. "3o It is an unconvincing attempt to strike a 
balance between the desire for individual freedom on the 
one hand, and the demands of the "universal-human" on the 
other, that is, of living with and for other people, 
which for Kierkegaard is best expressed in marriage (to 
which he had proved incapable of comitting himself). 
Kierkegaard based his whole philosophy on the "paradox" 
that the Individual is superior to the universal, 
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and 
the "both-and" was just as incompatible with his indi- 
vidualistic and uncompromising nature as it was with 
Ibsen's. His life's "either-or, " says Beyer, was deter- 
mined by his two chief interests: pagan aestheticism on 
the one hand, and the religion of absolute demands on the 
other. 
32 Brand's "all or nothing" has little to do with 
Judge Wilhelm's bloodless argument in favour of marriage 
and the subordination of the self to the common good. It 
belongs in the higher sphere of Kierkegaard's religious 
stage, which focuses on the single individual striving 
to define himself before God. 
Brand (1866) is Ibsen's ethico-religious approach to 
"wholeness. " Falk had said: "My poem shall be lived, ""33 
but he left for the mountains'to live on the memory of 
love as he had formerly lived on the yearning for love. 
Brand descends from the mountains and says: "I have sung 
my Sunday song; / Thy winged steed must be unsaddled; / But 
I see a greater goal [... 3" (V, 228) and becomes a poet 
of living deeds. Falk is a poet who speaks of poetry as 
poems lived. Brand is a priest, a man of action, for whom 
29 
"living is an art" (195) and life is "my life's poem" (361). 
Brand's uncompromising demand of "all or nothing" 
was immediately recognised as a variant of Kierkegaard's 
equally uncompromising "either-or, " but Ibsen hotly 
denied that he had used Soren Kierkegaard as a model for 
Brand. He had in any case "read very little of S. K., and 
understood even less. "34 The fact that Brand is a priest 
and that the problem is presented in religious terms is, 
Ibsen insisted, quite without significance. He could have 
. applied the same syllogism with equal propriety to a 
sculptor or a politician. 
35 "The demand of all or nothing 
applies to all aspects of life--to love, to art, etc. "36 
Ibsen objected fiercely to his play being treated as a 
work of edification rather than as a work of art, and by 
insisting on the irrelevance of the religious setting he 
obviously hoped to correct the misconception prevalent 
among his contemporary interpreters that Brand was a 
Kierkegaardian crusade for a more Christian Christianity. 
"Brand is an aesthetic work, pure and simple, and nothing 
else whatever, " he told Laura Kieler, the young authoress 
of a religious novel called Brand's Daughters (1869), an 
imagined sequel to Brand. "What it may have destroyed or 
built up, " he declared, "is a matter of absolute 
indifference to me. "37 
Ibsen's protest against the undue emphasis people 
put on the religious aspect of Brand--a protest which 
G. hi. Gathorne-Hardy, for whom Brand remains "one of the 
greatest religious dramas of our time, " describes as a 
"deplorable recantation"38--was an attempt to direct 
their attention not merely to the "poetry" of the play, 
but to the essential meaning of the "syllogism, " to 
which, he claimed, Brand's priesthood was irrelevant. 
He told another religiously-minded enquirer bluntly: 
"You are completely mistaken. When I wrote Brand, my only 
object was to portray an energetic personality. "39 Ibsen 
was trying to point out that Brand's "all or nothing" is 
not a question of morals, but of being, not a call for 
good deeds, but an existential "to be or not to be. " 
3o 
Ibsen's "all or nothing, " like Kierkegaard's "either-or, " 
is a question of being Somebody or Nobody, and is only 
ethical in the sense that Ibsen, like Kierkegaard, regarded 
it as man's prime moral duty to become Somebody. For Brand, 
selfhood is not a matter of being a good Christian, but of 
being an Individual. Brand says he hardly knows whether he 
is a Christian. "But I do know, " he assures Einar, the 
pleasure-loving artist, "that I am a man/ And I see the 
cancer/ That eats the marrow out of this land" (V, 191). 
Brand's all-important message to the people is self- 
realisation, not the salvation of the soul. 
. Brand's priesthood is, however, not an entirely 
arbitrary choice. While he was struggling with the "epic 
Brand"--before that happy revelation in St Peter's where, 
he told Bjornson, "I suddenly saw in strong and clear out- 
line the form for what I had to say"4o--Ibsen apparently 
went through a crisis when he felt like "one who has been 
left the sole survivor in a great tract where all other 
life is extinct. "41 At such a time it was not unnatural 
that he should want to ally himself with a priest, the 
zealous champion of a powerful and omnipresent Deity. But 
Ibsen counted himself among God's step-children. Although 
he was an avid reader of the Bible, neither his life nor 
his work testifies to an intimate relationship with the 
Almighty. He warned his pious sister, Hedvig: "Blake no 
attempts at conversion. I will be honest; what is to come, 
will come. "42 But for Ibsen as for Brand absolute self- 
realisation means total likeness to the divine image, 
and for one whose quest for selfhood is a striving after 
godhead, a priestly vocation seemed the most natural and 
the most dramatically effective choice. The play would 
not have been equally powerful or meaningful if Brand had 
been given a more worldly profession. No other Ibsen hero 
attains to the grandeur of the heaven-storming Brand. 
Brand's picture of man is essentialist, based on the 
belief that man is created in God's image. Ibsen had origi- 
nally intended to use the words from Genesis (1: 27) as an 
epigraph to the play, and it is not without significance 
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that he later changed his mind. 
43 Brand sees man as a 
divine creature, inspired with "the Spirit that was never 
born" (195), and God's existence proves man's divinity. 
It is as such that Brand has need of his God, rather than 
as the redeemer of lost souls. For Brand finds himself in 
the midst of a race of spiritual cripples with scant like- 
ness to the divine image, and with no will to improve the 
likeness, because that means sacrifice, which they shun. 
Among these mere torsos of humanity Brand descends, 
ordained by God, or so he believes, to restore them to 
wholeness that God may recognise his divine creation. 
Brand envisions a glorious future when 
Out of these mutilated scraps of soul, 
These torso-stumps of spirit, 
These severed heads and hands, 
A whole shall rise, that God may know 
-His man once more, his masterpiece, His heir, Adam, young and strong! (V, 195) 
Brand's ideal of wholeness is the perfection of Adam 
before the Fall, when man was truly God-like, and man's 
will was. one with God's will. But the age cannot be 
redeemed until its decrepit God has been shrouded and 
laid in his grave, and that, Brand declares, is going to 
be his first momentous missionary task. A senile Deity 
inspires no one to become godlike, and man's ultimate 
goal can be nothing less. The God in whose likeness Brand 
sees his true self is a storm, "young like Hercules" (194), 
implacable like the Old Testament, Jahve, and conversant 
like Kierkegaard's individualist-God only with the single 
individual who seeks him of an undivided will. Brand's 
God is not a God of infinite mercy, . 
but of infinite 
demand, for whom a faith that does not will the ultimate 
sacrifice: martyrdom with no promise of a heavenly crown, 
is no faith. Man's supreme calling is to become his true 
self, and its fulfilment is all he knows of Paradise (274). 
Will, not grace, is the way to salvation, when salvation 
is a question of saving selves before souls, in order 
that humanity may be restored to human dignity on earth. 
When the crowd demand to know what their reward will 
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be for having left the security of their homes to follow 
their priest into the wilderness, Brand can only promise: 
A will that is whole, 
A soaring faith, a single soul, 
The willingness to sacrifice that gave 
Itself rejoicing to the grave, 
A crown of thorns on every brow, 
That is the wage you are earning now! (V, 342) 
No wonder the crowd cries in fury: "Betrayed! Betrayed! " 
Brand is a Messiah who performs no miracles, feeds no 
desert-stranded multitude, promises happiness neither 
in this life nor in the life hereafter. On the contrary: 
"He insolently bids us die/ To serve unborn posterity! " 
(343). Brand's religion of the will is not for the 
multitude. It is a religion only for the exceptional 
individual who is prepared to give all, even his life, 
to become himself. When Brand is asked to become a 
pastor in his native village he refuses at first, because 
he believes that God has summoned him to a greater task, 
and to give up one's calling is to give up one's self. 
You can give your life, but "One thing is not yours to 
give away, " Brand tells the man who pleads on behalf of 
the villagers, "your own inner Self" (215). 
Ibsen was, like Kierkegaard, unable to identify 
himself with the crowd. He defined himself against it. 
To save the multitude was not his concern. Like Kierke- 
gaard he focused his attention on the single individual 
who stands out from the crowd. Brand demonstrates a 
strong awareness of his separateness from the crowd as 
the one who exists, while the life of the multitude is 
a mere presence on earth: 
You sever life from faith and teaching; 
To be seems worthy no man's strife. 
You aim to uplift your spirits, 
But not to live a whole, full life. (V, 193-4) 
To be "partial in vice, partial in virtue, / Partial in 
evil, partial in good" (192) is to be nothing. Brand 
advises Einar accordingly: 
Grant that you are pleasure's thrall-- 
But be it utterly, all in all. (Y, 191-2) 
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Be what you are with all your heart, And not by pieces and in part. (V, 192) 
Be what you must be, but be it absolutely. Peer Gynt is 
similarly warned by the Button-Moulder that "the betwixt 
and between, the half and half" leads neither to Heaven 
nor Hell. "There's more to it than merely wallowing in 
mire. / It takes vigour and earnestness to commit a sin" 
(VI, 218). The demand of "all or nothing" applies no less 
to the aesthetic than to the ethical life. Ibsen argues 
like Kierkegaard that selfhood is not determined by the 
kind of life a person chooses to live, but by the intens- 
ity with which he commits himself to his chosen mode of 
existence. Kierkegaard insists that "in making a choice 
it is not so much a question of choosing the right as of 
the energy, the earnestness, the pathos with which one 
chooses. Thereby the personality announces its innner 
infinity, and thereby, in turn, the personality is con- 
solidated. "44 For Kierkegaard, self-realisation is above 
all a question of exercising one's freedom of choice with 
passion. It is the aesthete in Either-Or who utters the 
famous words: "Let others complain that the age is wicked. 
My complaint is that it is wretched, for it lacks passion. 
[... ] This is the reason my soul always turns back to the 
Old Testament and to Shakespeare. I feel that those who 
speak there, at least, are human beings: they hate, they 
love, they murder their enemies, and curse their 
descendants throughout all generations, they sin. , 
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How then does one become oneself absolutely? Ibsen 
answers with Kierkegaard: By willing the absolute. Brand 
says about the peasant who refuses to guide him across 
the mountain because he is more anxious to save his own 
life than his dying daughter's eternal soul: "Help is 
" idle for the man/ Who nothing wills but what he can" (V, 
183). Brand abandons his dream of becoming a great world 
reformer and decides that his calling lies in the valley 
when he realises that it is not by spectacular achieve- 
ments and the wakening of its neglected capabilities that 
mankind can be restored to wholeness, but by will alone: 
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It is will alone that matters! 
Will alone that acquits or condemns, 
Will undivided in all the piecemeal, 
Will that avails for all tasks, 
great or small. (y, 228-29) 
To Agnes's objection that every mortal soul would be 
doomed if God were to demand of man what he demanded of 
Christ, Brand replies: "That you cannot will be forgiven; / 
That you will not, never" (236). Deserted by his con- 
gregation, not one of whom reached the summit, Brand has 
dark visions of the future being taken over by a race of 
dwarfs whose souls never sigh and lips never laugh and 
who have long since forgotten that "the duty of willing/ 
Does not end where the strength fails" (353). To will 
the absolute does not simply mean to exert oneself to the 
limit of one's capacity. It means to will the impossible. 
Brand's gospel of the will as the only way to attain 
to wholeness and true selfhood is in complete accordance 
with Kierkegaard's accentuation of will and choice as the 
decisive factors in the projection of the self. Kierke- 
gaard insists: "A man who has no will at all, is no self; 
the more will he has, the more consciousness of self he 
has also. "r46 Kierkegaard's "either-or" denotes the exis- 
tential alternative of willing/choosing or not willing/ 
choosing to be one's self. To choose means in Kierke- 
gaard's terms to choose oneself as an individual; not to 
choose is to remain in a state of being "a possibility of 
everything, " which means that one has not in an existen- 
tial sense acquired a self. Kierkegaard (or rather 
Johannes Climacus, the pseudonymous author of Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript (1846), Kierkegaard's chief philo- 
sophical treatise, and the great inspirational source of 
modern. Existentialism) describes the young aesthete in 
Either-Or as "an existential possibility (en Mulighed of 
Existents), a young, richly gifted, partly hopeful human 
being, experimenting with himself and with life; one 
'with whom it was impossible to grow angry, because the 
evil that was in him, like the conceptions of evil in 
the Middle Ages, had something of the childlike in it'; ' 
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he was not really an actuality, but a 'possibility of 
everything' (en Liulighed of Alt). "47 Kierkegaard's 
portrait of the aesthete anticipates Peer Gynt. Ibsen's 
colourful aesthete is'precisely "an existential possi- 
bility" that never becomes "an actuality, " because he 
never "chooses himself ethically. "48 Kierkegaard argues 
that man acquires a self only when he chooses himself 
as a "task" (Opgave), 49 that is to say, when he accepts 
responsibility for the content and development of his 
self. It is the freedom and responsibility of each indi- 
vidual to choose the mode of existence, the values and 
principles in accordance with which a definite personal- 
ity will emerge from the "possibility of everything" 
which is immediate man. For Kierkegaard, the act of 
choosing is more important than the thing chosen. "The 
choice itself, " he claims, "is decisive for the content 
of the personality; through the choice the personality 
immerses itself in the thing chosen, and when it does 
not choose it withers away in consumption. "5o 
When a person chooses himself ethically he also 
acknowledges an absolute distinction between good and 
evil. However, "my either-or, " says Kierkegaard, "does 
not in the first instance denote the choice between good 
and evil, it denotes the choice whereby one chooses good 
and evil/ or excludes them. " "The aesthetical, " he in- 
sists, "is not the evil, but neutrality (Indifferentsen) 
[... ] It is, therefore, not so much a question of choos- 
ing between willing the good or the evil, as of choosing 
to will [... ] . "51 The one thing needful is to make a 
choice, to commit oneself to something, for the alterna- 
tive is to lose one's self in neutrality, in Indifferent- 
sen--as Peer Gynt belatedly discovered when declared ripe 
for the Button-Moulder's ladle. 
Brand believes that man is, or was in the beginning 
of time, created in God's image, but that man's likeness 
to the Deity was forfeited by Adam's fall. For Kierke- 
gaard, similarly, Adam's fall signifies the loss of man's 
authentic being, and he consequently defines sin as the. 
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failure to be. Sin is the yawning gulf of total unlike- 
ness that separates man from God and prevents him from 
realising his highest self. It is the supreme ethical 
task of every individual to become "an entire man" (et 
heelt Menneske), 52 Kierkegaard argues, and man can be- 
come whole only when he realises himself in his "eternal 
validity, "53 that is to say, when he becomes conscious 
of himself as eternal spirit and enters into communion 
with the Eternal, with God. Only God by his grace can 
bridge the gulf that separates man from his ideal self, 
but to man belongs the choice whether to accept God's 
forgiveness of his sins, that restores the possibility 
of likeness, or to take offense and remain eternally 
alienated from his true self. 
For Brand, as for Kierkegaard, the goal of self- 
realisation is to restore the lost likeness to the god- 
head. But while Kierkegaard sees the imago dei in the 
suffering Christ, Brand dreams of restoring crippled 
mankind to the vigorous perfection of Adam as God 
created him in the first fresh spring of time. Brand 
does not accept the inevitable fact of the Fall and 
hence does not, like Kierkegaard, acknowledge that the 
wholeness of Adam is an unattainable ideal, and that in- 
complete man can only be saved by God's grace. Kierke- 
gaard, however, does not exempt the individual from the 
duty to strive for the unattainable. He insists with 
Brand that man's authentic being cannot be restored by 
divine charity, but only by man's uncompromising will to 
do what God demands of him. Will and choice is the only 
way to true selfhood. "Choose. You stand at the parting 
of the ways: " Brand demands of Agnes when Einar comes to 
claim her back, and leaves her in no doubt that the 
choice is absolute: 
Remember, my demands are stern, 
I require All or Nothing. 
On the path a single fall 
Flings your life to wind and wave. 
No compromise in utmost need, 
No least concession to a sin. 
If more than life is asked of you, 
Willing you must meet your death. (V, 23o) 
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Later when Brand himself stands at the crossroads, having 
lost his child and shrinking from the greater sacrifice 
that will yet be demanded of him, it is Agnes's turn to 
remind him of his terrible duty to choose between her 
and God: 
Now you stand in the valley of choice; 
On " ou has the burden novi fallen 
Of TH-e- demand--Nothing or All. (V, Sol) 
Ibsen shared Kierkegaard's reluctance to speculate 
on man's possible existence in an afterlife, but both 
are convinced that man can have no hope of continuing 
after death unless he has become an Individual in the 
present life. Kierkegaard comments wryly on the inauthen- 
tic person's concern with his immortality: "In Christen- 
dom he is a Christian (quite in the same sense in which 
in paganism he would have been a pagan, and in England 
an Englishman), one of the cultured Christians. The 
question of immortality has been often in his mind, more 
than once he has asked the parson whether there really 
was such an immortality, whether one would really recog- 
nise oneself again--which indeed must for him have a 
very singular interest, since he has no self. "54 
Divinity, authentic being, is not something to be inheri- 
ted in Heaven, but to be striven for here and now. 
Julian in Emperor and Galilean shocks his pious Christian 
friends, Basil and Gregory, by his heretical suggestion 
that only slaves dream of divinity after death: ` 
What you slavishly hope for after death is precisely what 
the great mystery aims to win for all the initiated here 
in our earthly life. It is regeneration that Maximus and 
his deciples seek--our lost likeness to the deity. [... ] 
In each successive generation there has been one soul in 
which the pure Adam has been born again; he was strong 
in Moses the lawgiver; in the Macedonian Alexander he had 
power to subdue the world; he was almost perfect 
in Jesus 
of Nazareth. But you see, Basil, (grasping his arm) they 
all lacked what is promised to me--the pure woman: (VII, 92) 
Julian's dream of regeneration through the pure 
woman is a delusion. When he discovers that the "pure" 
woman--the bride whom he was to lead to the land of 
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Helios, there to found the new and perfect race of the 
third empire--is a voluptuous mystic and pregnant with 
another man's child, his quest for truth and beauty, 
which is really a quest for his true mission in life, 
loses all meaning. He rejects the new truth because it is 
no longer true, and the old pagan beauty because it is no 
longer beautiful, and dies, defeated by his own disillu- 
sionment, crying: "Thou hast conquered, Galilean! " (328). 
Brand is tempted in the wilderness by a vision of 
the pure woman, promising him a life of peace and sun- 
shine with wife and child if he willingly wipes from his 
memory the fatal words that have caused all his misery: 
"all or nothing. " But Brand reaffirms his calling, 
declaring that "free and awake" he would choose all over 
again the life of suffering and sacrifice that God 
demands of him. At these words the Apparition vanishes 
and Brand recognises it as the Spirit of Compromise. 
Peer's redemption by the pure woman is irreconcil- 
able with the over-all message of the play which is that 
self-realisation is the duty and responsibility of each 
individual, and his alone, and that selfhood can be 
achieved only through self-activity. Perhaps Peer's 
redemption through Solveig's faith, hope, and love can 
be explained existentially as a leap into the absurd on 
the analogy of Kierkegaard's leap into the arms of God, 
in other words, as a salvation that is beyond reason. 
Kierkegaard ultimately rejected both the aesthetic 
and the ethical mode of existence as inadequate stages 
on life's way, and advocated the Christian faith as the 
only way for man to overcome his existential despair, 
which, according to Kierkegaard, is fundamentally the 
despair of his alienation from God. Kierkegaard defines 
man's self as essentially "spirit, " and the self is there- 
fore not fulfilled until it has become conscious of it- 
self as spirit, that is to say, until the individual has 
"in the deepest sense received an impression of the fact 
that there is a God, and that he, he himself, his self, 
exists before this God. "55 It must be explained here that 
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Kierkegaard's notion of "spirit" is not an essentialist 
concept referring to a static, homogenous substance in 
the sense in which Larlowe's Dr Faustus thought of his 
soul as an immutable, indissoluble substance, but denotes 
man's constant striving, through the exercise of his 
freedom, to fulfil his highest possibilities. Since 
Kierkegaard defines man as a synthesis of the finite and 
the infinite, the temporal and the eternal, it follows 
that man's highest possibilities are grounded in a trans- 
cendant reality, that is to say, in God. And man's 
striving to fulfil his highest possibilities is conse- 
quently, for Kierkegaard, a striving to be like God, 
which is also the essence of Brand's quest. 
Kierkegaard regards the leap to the Christian faith 
as the most decisive leap a human being can make. It is 
the supreme act of will, for it means staking all on a 
"truth" which cannot be proved by reason. The doctrine of 
the Incarnation is for Kierkegaard the Absolute Paradox, 
because it is absolutely unintelligible to reason and can 
only be appropriated by faith. To stake the fate of one's 
eternal soul on the unfathomable paradox of God Incarnate 
is like throwing oneself "out upon the seventy thousand 
fathoms of water. "56 But the Christian doctrine of salva- 
tion by God's grace does not make Christianity, in 
Kierkegaard's view, a soft option and a consolation to 
will-less shirkers who seek only to evade the responsi- 
bility of freedom. Kierkegaard's Christianity is a reli- 
gion of absolute demands: "Christianity did not come into 
the world (as the parsons snivellingly and falsely intro- 
duce it) as an admirable example of the gentle art of 
consolation--but as the absolute. "57 Commitment to Chris- 
tianity means suffering, even martyrdom: "Although I have 
the most enthusiastic apprehension of God's love, I have 
also an apprehension that he is not a dear old grandpapa 
who sits in heaven and indulges people, but that in time 
and in temporal existence one must be prepared to suffer 
everything. [... JBut he who wills in a religious sense 
must have a receptive attitude towards the terrible, he 
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must open himself to it, and he has only to take care 
that it does not stop halfway, but that it leads him 
into the security of the infinite. "' 
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Peer's salvation by the pure woman is absurd in the 
Kierkegaardian sense that it cannot be justified by 
reason. But Peer's redemption involves neither will nor 
suffering on his part. It is precisely a gentle conso- 
lation to one who has never willed the absolute, and 
whose philosophy has been to run away from responsibility 
and sacrifice. It is Brand, not Peer Gynt, who practices 
Kierkegaard's religion of absolute demands. But Brand 
does not regard his commitment to his own kind of Chris- 
tianity as a commitment to the absurd. Brand is not 
troubled by the mystery of the Incarnation and salvation 
by God's grace. Whereas Kierkegaard teaches that the 
absolute qualitative difference that exists between man 
and God cannot be overcome by man's efforts alone, but 
ultimately only by God's grace, Brand relies entirely on 
the quantum satis59 of the human will. Even as the ava- 
lanche is about to engulf him Brand protests: "Counts 
will for nothing/ Towards man's redemption--? " (V., 363). 
If the deus caritatis is a saviour as well as a 
destroyer and Brand is saved despite his mistakes, is he 
saved because his failures were heroic, or is his salva- 
tion by the God of Love due to no merit of his own, in 
which case his life of suffering and sacrifice has been 
futile? Ibsen does not commit himself to an unambiguous 
answer. Kierkegaard, however, would have solved the pro- 
blem of Brand's salvation by saying that Brand "lived in 
truth" although he worshipped the "wrong" God. For truth 
in Kierkegaard's philosophy is not determined by the 
content of a person's belief but by the passion with 
which he commits himself to his belief. In other words, 
"truth is passionate inwardness. , 
6o Kierkegaard rejects 
the Hegelian concept of Absolute Truth, an ultimate 
objective truth that has universal validity. Christianity, 
which for many people is the highest truth, is not con- 
ducive to proof by reason and hence is not universally 
41 
true. It is only true for the individual believer. The 
truth of Christianity, says Kierkegaard, exists only in 
subjectivity, if it exists at all. "Objectively, Chris- 
tianity has absolutely no existence. If its truth happens 
to be in only a single subject, it exists in him alone. ""61 
Thus Kierkegaard can claim that "truth is subjectivity" 
and "subjectivity is truth., 
62 Kierkegaard does not 
argue that all truth is subjective. He does not question 
the objective validity of empirical truths. His concern 
is with existential truth, with the meaning of life it- 
self. And since he maintains that the ultimate meaning 
of life belongs to the realm of the infinite and cannot 
be known to man, and that man can have no objective know- 
ledge of God's existence, it follows that moral values 
and religious beliefs have no ultimate rational justifi- 
cation, and hence cannot be valid for all men, but only 
for the individual who chooses to commit himself to them. 
For Kierkegaard, the meaning of existence is not a matter 
of knowing, but of doing. If there is an Absolute Truth, 
it can only be known by the Absolute, by God. Man, as a 
finite being)cannot possess absolute truth. He can only 
possess truth as a "persistent striving" for truth. 
Kierkegaard adopts as the motto of the "subjective 
thinker, " that is, the-existing individual, the following 
saying by Lessing: "If God held all truth concealed in 
his right hand, and in the left hand the persistent 
striving for the truth, and while warning me against 
eternal error, should say: Choose! I should humbly bow 
before his left hand and say: 'Father, give thy gift; 
the pure truth is for thee alone'. "'63 
For Ibsen, as for Kierkegaard, it is the striving, 
not the goal, which is the "truth" of man's quest. He 
writes in a letter to Georg Brandes on the subject of 
freedom: "I shall never agree to making freedom synony- 
mous with political freedom. What you call freedom 
[Brandes had been talking about the Franco-Prussian War], 
I call freedoms, and what I call the battle for freedom 
is nothing but the unceasing, living pursuit of the idea 
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of freedom. He who possesses freedom other than as some- 
thing striven for, possesses it dead and soulless, for by 
its very definition freedom perpetually expands as it is 
being acquired, so that if, during the quest, a man stops 
and says: 'Novi I have it, ' he simply shows that he has 
lost it. "64 Ibsen did not believe in eternal truths. 
Brand insists that his calling is not to promote any 
dogma, or any church, for dogmas and churches, like all 
created things, have a measured time and must yield to 
new forms and new truths. Brand has come to champion "the 
right of the eternal" (det Eviges Rett) (V, 195), and 
"the eternal" is "the Spirit that was not created, " but 
eternally is, and which inspires every human being. Man's 
yearning spirit is his bridge to the eternal. When the 
Apparition in the wilderness warns Brand that no man can 
leap across the gulf that was once cleft-between fallen 
mankind and Paradise, Brand protests: "He. left the path 
of longing open! " (358). And to the Dean's cynical 
reminder that "No one reaches quite to Heaven, " Brand 
replies: "Yet to Heaven reached Jacob's ladder; / To 
Heaven soars the yearning of the soul" (324). Brand's 
conception of spirit as the yearning for the infinite 
comes very close to Kierkegaard's idea of spirit as-move- 
ment, a perpetual becoming. Ibsen, however, does not 
argue with Kierkegaard that man's existential decisions, 
in the absence of Absolute Truth, are ultimately leaps 
into the absurd. "Kierkegaard, " says Ca. mus, "does more 
than discover the absurd, he lives it. "65 But Kierkegaard 
lived the absurd with God. He never disputed God's exis- 
tence and the immortality of the soul, only that they are 
susceptible of rational proof. Camus, however, to the ex- 
tent. that he lived.. the absurd, lived it without God. He 
is certain only, he*tells us, of "these two uncertainties 
--my appetite for the absolute and for unity and the 
impossibility of reducing this world to a rational and 
reasonable principle--I also know that I cannot reconcile 
them., 66 Camus defines the absurd as "that divorce 
between the mind that desires'and the world that dis- 
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appoints, my nostalgia for unity, this fragmented life 
and the contradiction that binds them together. "67 
Nothing in Ibsen's writings confirms that he 
responded, as did Camüs, to Kierkegaard's peculiar defi- 
nition of the absurd, but Ibsen's awareness of the para- 
doxical contradictions of life, of the "divorce between 
the mind that desires and the world that disappoints, " 
is everywhere demonstrated in his work. Brand recalls a 
boyhood fancy that used to make him laugh out loud: the 
thought of an owl scared by darkness, and a fish afraid 
of water. What was the point, he muses, that tickled 
him so? 
It was the dimly-apprehended gulf 
Between things as they are, 
And things as they ought to be. 
Between having to endure, 
And finding the burden unendurable. (V, 184) 
Brand no longer contemplates the paradoxes of life with 
the amusement of the child. Man's existence is funda- 
mentally contradictory, and therefore, Brand seems to 
suggest, fundamentally tragic. Man is just such an owl 
and such a fish, frightened of his natural element: 
Born to toil in the deep, 
Born to live in darkness. 
Yet this it is that makes him tremble. 
He flounders in panic towards the shore, 
He shuns the starry-vaulted night, 
And cries for air and the blaze of day! 
(V, 184) 
"This, " suggests Raymond Williams, "is the fundamental 
statement in Brand, and perhaps in the whole work of 
Ibsen. " It sums up the whole tragedy of Brand, which lies 
in the fact that "pursuit of the ideal is both necessary 
and fruitless. The call [to wholeness] is absolute; so 
are the barriers. " In this conflict Brand is broken. 
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Williams may attach a wider significance to Brand's 
observation than is warranted by the context in which'it 
occurs. Brand is not, in fact, making a philosophical 
statement about the tragic fate of all mankind. He says: 
"Almost every man in this land, sick or sound, / Is such 
an owl, and such a fish" (184). Clearly Brand does not 
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include himself among this pigmy race for whom the "all 
-or nothing" is an unendurable burden: 
. Any sacrifice they are prepared'to make-- 
-So long as life is not at stake! (V, 183) 
When his mother dies unrepentant, because she did not 
have the will to sacrifice all, Brand becomes more de- 
termined than ever to fight his crusade for "the triumph 
of the spirit over the weakness of the flesh" (V, 255), 
and more convinced that no barrier is insuperable for 
the man whom God has chosen to redeem the treasure of 
selfhood that has been forfeited by a will-less people: 
God has given me the sword of His Word. 
He has kindled in me the fire of His Wrath. 
I stand strong in the armour of my will. 
Now I dare, now I can, crush mountains! (V, 255) 
Self-realisation means in practical terms to follow 
one's calling. Ibsen's heroes, from the very first line 
of drama he composed, are driven forward by a compelling 
sense that they are called to fulfil a purpose in life 
higher than the duties of everyday existence, a purpose 
which can only be achieved by exerting one's potentiali- 
ties to the full. "Talents are not a right, " Ibsen once 
wrote, "they are a duty. "69 Catiline opens on these 
ringing lines: 
I must! I must! Thus bids me a voice 
In the depth of my soul--and i must follow it. 
Strength I possess, and courage for a better, 
A higher life than this. 
Wake up, Catiline! Wake up, and be a man! (I, 43) 
But man's inner voice is not a plain-speaking guide and 
is open to fateful misinterpretations. Brand is convinced 
that he has got the message right, but ends up in the 
wilderness pondering his mistakes. If one's calling is 
from God, why should it be so difficult to read God's 
will correctly? Peer Gynt learns only when the Button- 
Moulder comes to collect him for the casting-ladle that 
he was "meant to be a shining button/ On the waistcoat of 
the world" (VI, 219), but he has forfeited. his true self 
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because he has defied his life's purpose (Han har budt 
sit Livs Bestemmelse Trods) (221). "To be one's self, " 
the Button-Tdoulder explains, 11C ... 3 is to observe the 
Master's intention in all things"-(229). But for Peer 
the problem of selfhood is not thereby solved: 
PEER: Suppose a man never discovered 
What the Master intended? 
BUTTON-LIOULDER: He must divine it. 
PEER: But a man's intuition so often proves wrong, And he is carried ad undas in mid-career! BUTTON-MOULDER: Quite so, Peer Gynt; where insight is lacking 
The fellow with the hoof casts his best hook. PEER: This is a damnably knotty affair. C.. .3 (V2,229) 
Peer reflects that if being one's self depends on one's 
being able to divine the Master's intention, he will be 
hard put to prove that he has been himself: "That part 
of my case I must look on as lost" (229). He will try 
instead to convince the Button-Moulder that he has been 
a really great sinner. But Peer will not find it easier 
to prove that he has lived in deliberate defiance of the 
Master's intention, if he has never discovered what that 
intention is. 
The young Julian in Emperor and Galilean (1873) has 
received cryptic messages indicating that he is "the 
chosen one" and "heir to the empire. " But which empire? 
Where is he to seek it? "If Christ wants anything with 
me, he must speak plainly. Let me touch the nailwound--" 
(VII, 8o). But Christ remains aloof. Julian longs for 
"a new revelation. Or a revelation of something new" (8o). 
He turns to the old pagan gods, only to be disillusioned 
by their complete indifference to human affairs and to 
his own efforts to revivify the beauty and wisdom of the 
old religion. "We have even seen, " Julian is forced to 
admit', "how certain gods have neglected to support well- 
meant endeavours designed to promote their own good and 
honour" (272). He makes no attempt to disguise his dis- 
illusionment with the gods and with the world in the 
following memorable dialogue with Maximus the mystic. 
Julian has come to seek peace and solitude among the 
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ruins of the Apollo temple after a series of unsuccessful 
attempts to convince his subjects of the glory of the 
ancient religion, his latest failure being his proposed 
reinstatement ceremony in honour of Cybele, the goddess 
of fecundity, whom he had (appropriately) rescued from 
the dung-heap, only to be rewarded with scorn and indig- 
nant defiance from the crowd. Julian and Maximus appear 
among the moonlit columns of the ruined temple: 
MAXIMUS: Whither, my brother? ' 
JULIAN: Where it is loneliest. 
MAXIIitJS : But here--in this desolation? Among these 
rubbish-heaps--? 
JULIAN: Is not the whole world a rubbish-heap? 
MAXIMUS: Yet you have shown that what has fallen can be 
restored. 
JULIAN: Mocker! In Athens I saw a cobbler who had set 
up a little workshop in the temple of Theseus. In 
Rome I hear a corner of the Basilica Julia has been 
converted into a bullock-stable. You might call that 
restoration too! 
MAXIMUS: Why not? Do not all things happen piecemeal? 
What is the whole but the sum of all the parts? 
JULIAN: Foolish wisdom! (He points to the overturned 
statue of Apollo. ) Look at, this nose less face. See 
is splintered elbow, these shattered loins. Is the 
divine beauty of bygone days no more than the sum of 
all these deformities? 
MAXIMUS: How do you know that the bygone beauty was 
beautiful--in itself--except in the eye of the 
beholder? 
JULIAN: Ah, Maximus, that is the point. What exists in 
itself? After today I know of nothing. (He kicks the 
head of Apollo. ) Have you ever been mightier in 
yourself? 
Strange, Maximus, that there is such strength in'a 
delusion. Look at the Galileans. And look at me 
formerly, when I thought it possible to restore the 
fallen world of beauty. (VII9 262-63) 
Brand approached the task of restoring "torso-stumps of 
soul and thought" to divine perfection with undaunted 
confidence. Julian dismisses his youthful dream of re- 
surrecting the bygone world of beauty as a delusion. It 
is not for him, or anyone, to piece the universal rubble- 
heap together into a divinely harmonious whole. But he 
is driven on to his destruction by his "nostalgia for 
unity, " which, as Camus said, is constantly contra- 
dicted by our fragmented existence. Julian lets himself 
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be persuaded against his better judgement that he is the 
new Messiah chosen to lead mankind into the third empire, 
where truth and beauty, Logos and Pan, shall coexist in 
perfect harmony (mediated Hegelian-wise into a higher 
synthesis). For a brief ecstatic moment as he watches his 
ships go up in flames Julian is convinced that the third 
empire has arrived, that he is the Messiah, and that he 
is not merely burning ships but destroying the existing 
world order: 
[... ] In that red swirling pyre the crucified Galilean 
is burning to ashes; and the earthly Emperor is burning 
with the Galilean. But from the ashes shall rise--like 
that marvellous bird--the God of the earth and the 
Emperor of the spirit in one, in one, in one! (VII, 304) 
But his ecstasy is out short by the terrible revelation 
that he has been tricked by the Persian enemy into 
cutting off his army's retreat. Julian approaches his 
final battle in a suicidal mood. The gods keep their 
secrets and will reveal nothing about the outcome of his 
campaign. What do we know about the powers that rule over 
men's destinies, Julian remarks gloomily to his court 
physician. "We know nothing, Oribases--apart from their 
capriciousness and fickleness, of which we have ample 
evidence" (314). Yet he clings to the gods to the bitter 
end, because he is "pining with homesickness[ ... ]for the 
light and the sun and all the stars" (32o). The Romans 
win the battle but Julian is mortally wounded by one of 
his own soldiers, a mad Christian. Attempting to rise, 
but falling back, he cries: "Thou hast conquered, 
Galilean! " (326). Julian dies betrayed by life and be- 
trayed by the gods. His last words: "0h, sun, sun, why 
didst thou betray me? " (334) echo Christ's despairing 
cry on the cross: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken 
me? " But Christ's despair was only momentary. He was able 
to add: "It is accomplished" (John 19: 3o). Julian can add 
nothing. He has not acted as a free agent: "The world- 
will has been lying in ambush for me, Maximus! " (332). 
It is a moot point whether Christ acted as a free agent, 
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but Christ's will was one with God's will. Julian's 
interpretation of his calling does not coincide with the 
role he has been assigned in the universal scheme of 
things. And the feeling of having been a mere instrument 
in the service of a capricious and inscrutable world-will 
inspires no sense of accomplishment. Yet when he is asked 
whether he has emything to repent of, any action he would 
like to recall, he answers: "Truly I know not what that 
should be. " If anyone should think that he has not ful- 
filled all expectations, he "ought in fairness to con- 
sider that there is a mysterious power outside us which 
essentially determines the outcome of human endeavour" 
(333). If man is not a free agent, what is there to 
repent? Julian is not the chosen one, but another "victim 
on the altar of necessity, " like Cain and Judas. Maximus, 
who loved Julian and let himself be deceived by the 
oracles, reflects despondently: "What is it worth to live? 
All is sport and mockery. To will is to have to will. " 
Yet he reiterates his prophecy: "The third empire shall 
come! The spirit of man shall reclaim its heritage[... ]" 
(335). But it has, become a cry of despair. The elusive 
third empire is a misty hope for an even mistier future, 
of no comfort to the souls who are sacrificed in the pro- 
cess of evolution. Because the protagonist is one of those 
sad victims of necessity, albeit the greatest, the posi- 
tive Weltanschauung Ibsen said would be found in this 
play carries no emotional conviction. Nor does his con- 
fession to Brandes that "Working on Julian has made me 
something of a Fatalist, " confirm his avowedly positive 
world-view. "There are times, " he writes, "when the whole 
history of the world appears to me like one great ship- 
wreck; the important thing is to save oneself. "70 
The universal synthesis and harmony to which the 
Hegelian System aspired held a strong appeal for Ibsen, 
who experienced as acutely as Julian the duality of flesh 
and spirit accentuated by the Christian faith (as Ibsen 
had met it in the legalistic morality of Protestantism, 
and Julian in the guise of Greek asceticism), and the 
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fear and guilt attached to the indulgence of the senses. 
Julian voices Ibsen's rebellion against the life-denying 
spirit and inhuman demands of Christian morality when he 
protests: 
All that is human has become unlawful since the day when the seer of Galilee became ruler of the world. Through 
him, life has become death. Love and hatred, both are 
sins. Has he, then, transformed man's flesh and blood? Has not earth-bound man remained what he ever was? Our inmost, healthy soul rebels against it all; --and yet we are to will in the very teeth of our own will! Thou 
shalt, shalt, shalt: (VII, 154) 
But Ibsen derives little comfort from the triumph of an 
impersonal world-will. for which individual wills must be 
sacrificed. Like Kierkegaard, he cannot conceive of life 
without freedom, and selfhood without freedom of will. 
And what would a dramatist do in the third empire where 
the tension of opposing forces and opposing wills--the 
dialectic out of which drama is born--has been neutra- 
lised (aufgehoben)? The third empire remains an uncon- 
vincing philosophical abstraction. The dramatic interest 
lies in Julian's opposition to the concrete, uncompro- 
mising Christian "Thou shalt! " which challenges the 
single individual and assumes the essential divinity and 
perfectibility of every human being, but leaves the 
individual free to accept or reject the divine command. 
Julian resents the Christian demand for total commitment 
because commitment involves renunciation, but he also 
recognises that the unconquerable power of the Galilean 
resides in the individual commitment of his followers, 
the freedom of each individual to choose his salvation. 
Julian can exact "life and blood" from his subjects, but 
"Life and blood are not enough, " he tells general Jovian, 
a Christian who has pledged his "life and blood" to 
Caesar: "He who is to rule, must rule over the wills, 
over the minds of men. It is in this that your Jesus of 
Nazareth bars my way and contests my power" (276). Julian 
can instil fear into his subjects but he cannot win their 
minds and hearts, for Julian's "mission" has degenerated 
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into a self-assertive chase for power. Julian is only 
concerned with his own greatness, whereas the Galilean 
challenges every human being to realise his own divine 
potential. 
Brand, 'like Julian, believed that he was called to 
become a world reformer and had visions of transforming 
mankind by means of glorious pageantry, processions, and 
shouts of exultation from the clamouring throngs. But his 
eye-opening encounter with his unrepentant mother makes 
him realise that mankind consists of individual souls, 
lost, crippled, stubbornly earthbound souls. And if man's 
spiritual heritage is to be reclaimed, the battle must 
begin within each individual heart. Man cannot be 
transformed unless he wholeheartedly grills it: 
Within, within! That is the call. 
There is the way. 
One's own heart--that is the world, 
Newly created and ready to receive God. 
There shall the vulture that gnaws at 
the will be slain. 
There the new Adam shall be born. (V, 218) 
Every human being has a calling to be himself, and only 
the individual can know--or must decide--what his true 
self is, and what his mission in life is going to be. 
Julian made the mistake of searching outside his own 
self for a calling. He demanded that Christ speak plainly, 
and when he got no answer he turned to signs and oracles, 
and was deceived. Julian never appropriated the Christian 
religion as a living faith, and experienced no love for 
the "merciless god-man, " only fear: 
JULIAN: [... ] Wherever I wanted to go he loomed up 
large and forbidding in my path with his uncom- 
promising and pitiless demands. 
MAXIMUS : And these demands--were they within you? 
JULIAN: Always without. Always "Thou shalt! " 
(VII, 154) 
Julian's apostasy from Christianity is, as Paulus Svendsen 
has noted, "an apostasy to nothing C... ] a falling away 
into emptiness, "? 
l for Julian is searching for meaning 
in a meaningless world,, instead of projecting meaning 
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into that world, as the Galileans did by living their 
faith instead of asking about its "truth. " Young Julian 
went to Athens to vindicate the Christian truth against 
the pagan lie, but soon realised that the learned Athens 
was not his battlefield. Gregory, his Christian friend, 
advises him: "No, -it was not here--not with word against 
word, not with book against book, not with learned 
fencing in the lecture-hall. No, Julian, you must go out 
into the living world, taking your life into your hands--" 
(VII, 75). Unless he is prepared to sacrifice all for 
his faith, Julian will never discover the "truth" of 
Christianity, for its truth is not to be sought in its 
doctrines, nor in the lives of other Christians, but in 
one's own living commitment to Christ. But Julian is not 
prepared to take the existential risk of staking all-- 
not just his life, but his immortal soul--on a mere 
possibility of truth. He is prepared for martyrdom: 
"? 1artyrdom--ah, the sweetness of it makes my head spin, 
the crown of thorns on my brow--! " (81). But he will not 
die for an unrevealed truth. He demands a revelation as 
clear as that of Saul at Damascus, "an overwhelming 
flood of light, a vision, a voice--; " (8o). But no 
decisive illumination is vouchsafed him and Julian dies, 
as he had lived, in a night of doubt. 
God vanishes from Ibsen's universe after Emperor and 
Galilean, and man is thrown back upon himself entirely. 
The emancipated Rosmer says: "There is no judge over us. 
Therefore we must see to it that we judge ourselves" (X, 
437)" In the absence of a transcendent lawgiver man must 
be the author of his own values. "The existentialist, " 
writes Sartre, "[... ] finds it extremely embarrassing 
that God does not exist, for there disappears with Him 
all possibility of finding values in an intelligible 
heaven. There can no longer be any good a priori, since 
there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to think 
it. " In a world where everything is permitted man is 
forlorn, "for he cannot find anything to depend upon 
either within or outside himself. " Nor, if God does not 
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exist, is man provided with any values or commands that 
could legitimise and justify his behaviour. Man is "con- 
demned to be free"--condemned because his freedom means 
that from the moment he is thrown into this world-he-is 
responsible for everything he does. '2 Kierkegaard said 
very much the same thing--without suffering the embar- 
rassment of God's non-existence. He claimed that even 
if God exists there is still no ultimate justification 
for the values man chooses to lead his life by, since 
God's existence is a matter of faith and cannot be 
established by rational proof. Man is free to choose 
his values and hence is responsible for everything he 
does. The leap to Christ is no more "safe" than the leap 
into any alternative way of life. The only truth man can 
arrive at in this life is the wholeheartedness and 
"inwardness" with which he pursues his chosen ideals. 
Individuality is not determined by a man's values, but 
by the intensity of his existential commitment. 
Kierkegaard, however, does not agree with Sartre that 
man has nothing to depend on "either within or outside 
himself. " Man is free to choose himself, but to choose 
oneself means to have an ideal to strive after, and 
Kierkegaard insists that the goal after which man has to 
strive--"the picture in likeness to which he has to form 
himself"--exists within himself, and man acquires his 
ideal self nowhere but in himself. "If one does not hold 
fast to the fact that the individual has the ideal self 
in himself, his Dichten und Trachten remain abstract. He 
who would copy another man and he who would copy the 
normal man become both of them, though in different ways, 
equally affecteerte (affected, inauthentic). "73 
When Ibsen insisted that Brand is not a religious 
play, that its "syllogism" applies to all areas of life, 
and that his only object had been to "portray an ener- 
getic personality, " he was not just being casuistic. For 
while the heaven-storming Brand who is confident of his 
divine calling and is ready to sacrifice all for the sake 
of his God-ordained vocation represents Ibsen in his 
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"best moments, " there is also the other Brand who 
reflects Ibsen's less confident and more intimate self, 
the Brand who doubts and despairs and at the end of a 
quest that has demanded superhuman sacrifices is des- 
troyed by an unknown God whose wrath cannot be pacified 
by the quantum satis of man's will. Brand's bewildered 
cry in the hour of death: "Counts will for nothing/ 
Towards man's redemption--?! " (V, '362) is the cry of a 
forlorn soul who sees Heaven empty and bereft of meaning. 
Ibsen crossed out the intended epigraph to Brand: 
Og han skabte Iennesket i sit Billede. aste Mosebog. 
(Gen. 1: 27) (V, 429). Brand had become a play, not about 
man being created in God's image, but about man creating 
God in the image of his ideal self. Brand's Herculean 
God is a deity of his own making, reflecting his own 
aspiration to godhead, just as the grandfather God of 
the people mirrors the stunted hopes of a spiritless 
race who will contribute nothing of real worth towards 
the redemption of their lost likeness to the divine 
image, but rely on the mercy of a gullible God the Father 
to redeem them in the life to come. Brand's crusade to 
restore a stunted humanity to whole individuals fails 
because he does not acknowledge, as does Kierkegaard, 
that a man's ideal self cannot be imposed from without. 
Brand always talks about God as against your God, and 
assumes without questioning that his God is the right 
God and the ideal towards which everybody should aspire. 
Brand grants Agnes the comfort of a loving, childlike 
God-relationship to which he dare not abandon himself: 
AGNES: Brand--oh, see Him always so, 
As the God you can reach-- 
More the Father, less the Lord! 
BRAND: I dare not, Agnes, dare not bar 
The way of His own work. 
I must see Him great and strong, 
As great as Heaven itself--for 
A pigmy age needs Him thus. 
Oh, but you may see Him near, 
See Him as a loving Father, 
Lay your weary head. on His breast. 
Then return, healed and refreshed 
With the radiance of His presence 
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Still reflected in your eyes, 
And bring the glory of that light 
Back to me, in my toil and strife. (V, 266) 
But Brand will not allow Agnes to put love before will. 
She has chosen his mission as her own, and his mission 
is not to dispense charity, but to call the individual 
to "wholeness, " to become his ideal self, to realise his 
divine potential. Brand believes, like Kierkegaard, that, 
the ideal self is attainable only through the uncompro- 
mising striving of man's will. That is why salvation by 
a merciful God does not make sense to Brand. To become 
godlike is self-activity. Brand, the believer, practises 
unconsciously what Rosmer, the renegade, recognises as 
an inescapable duty and man's only option in a godless 
universe. Rosmer is his own judge, Brand is his own god, 
which amounts to the same thing. Both are the authors of 
their own values and set the standards by which they 
measure their own achievements and, unhappily, those of 
their fellow men. 
For Brand, as for Kierkegaard, man's highest goal 
in life is to become "an entire man" (et heelt Menneske): 
Room within the whole wide world 
To be oneself completely, 
That is Man's lawful right, 
And I claim no other! (V, 218) 
Brand's uncompromising "all or nothing" is a standard 
worthy of a god. Yet it proves. inadequate. The Voices in 
the wilderness confirm Brand's secret fear that absolute 
selfhood--Adam reborn--is an unattainable goal even for 
those of strongest will: 
Never, man, will you be like Him, 
For you in mortal flesh were born. 
Do His bidding or forsake Him, 
Equally you are forlorn! (V, 354) 
Deserted by his congregation and feeling rejected by God, 
Brand is vulnerable to the temptation to despair, and the 
Apparition in Agnes's shape, the embodiment of his desire 
to renounce his pitiless Ideal for the saving compromise 
of forgiving love, stabs harder still at his tottering-, 
faith: 
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Remember, One with a: flaming sword 
Drove Man from Paradise! 
He cleft a gulf before the gat 
Over that you cannot leap! (v, 358) 
When Brand protests: "He left the path of longing open,: " 
the Apparition screams as it vanishes: "Die! The world 
has no use for you! " (358). But Brand identifies the. 
Apparition as the Spirit of Compromise and is able to 
hold his ground. Seeing himself as the betrayed saviour 
of mankind and forsaken by God, Brand is invited by the 
third tempter, speaking through the mad gipsy girl, to 
lot himself be worshipped as Christ. Gerd believes that 
the torn and bleeding Brand is the crucified Christ re- 
surrected and asks: "Shall I not fall down/ And worship 
at thy feet? " It is only when Brand has rejected this 
most insidious temptation to have himself acclaimed: 
"the Chosen One, the Greatest of all, " and acknowledges 
with true humility that he is but "the vilest creature 
that crawls on earth" (36o), that the ice inside him 
breaks, and he can weep, and kneel, and pray. Brand had 
not before dared to yield to his longing to throw him- 
self into the arms of a loving God. He believed he was 
called to hold before a dwarfish and will-less people 
the image of a great and awesome Deity, and to open 
their eyes to the terrible reality of God's love: 
What the world calls love, 
I do not want and will not know. 
But I know the love of God, 
And that is not weak and mild. 
It is hard even to the terror of 
death, 
It smites when it caresses. 
What did God answer in the olive 
grove 
When His own Son in sweat of agony 
and terror 
Pleaded: "Take this cup from me! " 
Did He take the cup of pain from 
His lips? 
Nov child, He made Him drain it 
to the dregs. (V, 235) 
Brand has suppressed every clement feeling that 
might distract him from his mission. He has been seeking 
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to achieve "wholeness" precisely like the aesthete in 
"On the Heights" by negation. He has repressed his human 
emotions in order to become "whole" as a crusader for his 
cause. The imagery associated with Brand underlines the 
coldness and bleakness of his prohibitive idealism. Like 
the young man in the poem Brand prefers the heights. And 
that is where we first meet him, struggling westward 
through snow and fog in the half-light of dawn. His black 
clothing adds to the gloom. Agnes and Einar make a strik- 
ing contrast. When they appear "the sun gradually breaks 
through the fog, " and "a bright summer morning lies over 
the mountains" (V, 185). To Agnes Brand appears as a cloud 
eclipsing her sun, a. cold wind chilling her. to the bone, 
a black crag barring her way to the south. As a chilling 
gust sweeping down from the glacier Brand descends into 
his native village, where the people accuse him of being 
the cause of the rising storm: "Drive this flinty soul 
from our village with knives and stones! " (2o6). The 
vicarage is situated in the coldest, darkest, most con- 
fined nook of the valley where the sun even at midsummer 
only skirts the mountain tops. Here Brand enjoys three 
years of domestic happiness. When this bleak, sun-starved 
place has claimed his wife and baby son and he can no 
longer find harmony in anything he undertakes in the 
parish--his anguished soul produces only discordant 
shrieks when he plays the organ in his new church--Brand 
returns to the heights. Deserted by his congregation he 
makes his way to the Ice Church alone, to be buried under 
the snow. His life has come full circle. Or, almost. 
It is on his "homecoming" to the mountains that 
Brand experiences his "conversion. " When he has passed 
the obligatory test of the three temptations in the 
wilderness and acknowledged his need of redemption by 
God's grace, he can weep as he has never wept before. The 
ice-fetters of the Law are broken and he can abandon him- 
self to his humanness at last. Brand's conversion is not 
an*entirely unprepared for event. Although he had managed 
to suppress his human feelings when they clashed with his 
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calling, he never resolved the-conflict between love and 
will in his life. He had solved it intellectually by 
demanding that love must be subordinated to will: 
When Will has triumphed, 
-Then comes the time for Love. 
Then it descends like a white dove, 
Bearing the olive-leaf of life. (V, 239) 
But this solution did not work. emotionally. When he was 
faced with the choice between his duty to God and the 
life of his infant son, love proved so much stronger 
than will that. Brand pleaded in agony: "Take the cup of 
choice from me! " (262). Will did triumph over love, but 
only to amplify the emotional discord. The terrible 
decision to sacrifice his son is made in an agony of 
emotional confusion. When Brand has reached the tragic 
impasse of being unable to reconcile his duty as a father 
with his duty to God, the love for his son with the will 
to sacrifice all, it is not to his mighty Herculean God 
that he pours forth the anguish of his soul, but to the 
merciful Christ: "Jesus, Jesus, give me light! " (262). 
Like a night-scared owl Brand refuses to accept that he 
was born to live in darkness, and cries for the light of 
day. It is the torture of not being able to reconcile 
his intellectual self with his emotional self, coupled 
with increasing doubts about the power of man's will to 
regain him his lost integrity, that force upon Brand the 
recognition that his only hope of salvation rests with 
a merciful redeemer. This is the turning-point: 
Until today I strove to be 
A tablet on which God could write. 
But from today my life shall flow 
Like a poem, rich and warm. (V, 361) 
But the avalanche cuts off his life's poem before he has 
time to add another line. Love, as he predicted, does 
indeed descend "like a white dove. " Shrinking before the 
onrushing avalanche Brand cries to the heights: 
Answer me, God, in the abyss of death. 
Counts Will for nothing 
Towards man's redemption--?! (V, 362) 
58 
Although Ibsen seems to answer "no"to Brand's final, 
despairing question by introducing the deus caritatis, 
he has, in fact, made Will count for a lot. Brand has 
been fighting to restore a fallen, fragmented mankind to 
"whole" personalities. He has been exhorting every human 
being to become the new Adam. For unless a person becomes 
"an entire man"--which he can only achieve by exerting 
his potentiality to the full--he will, in Brand's (and 
in Ibsens) view, have no soul worth saving for a possi- 
ble afterlife. Brand is himself the best example of the 
redeeming power of man's will. With his single-minded 
pursuit of selfhood, his relentless self-discipline, and 
his readiness to sacrifice all for the supreme cause, 
Brand towers high above his cowardly compromising and 
pitifully unaspiring fellow men. He stands out, as Peer 
Gynt should have done, like "a shining button/ On the 
waistcoat of the world. " If Brand is still imperfect, he 
is, in John Northam's words, "a magnificent imperfection. "74 
When Ibsen wrote Brand he was more than half con- 
vinced that Kierkegaard's individualism was the answer 
to man's directionless existence in a world devoid of 
eternal certainties. If there is no Supreme Judge to 
whom man can appeal for guidance, then man, that is to 
say the individual, must be his own lawgiver, his own god. 
But if Ibsen could do without God, he could not rid him- 
self of the problem of sin, guilt, and retribution. And 
this is a problem of the soul rather than of the self, 
religious rather than existential. That Ibsen was trying 
to make a distinction between soul and self (perhaps 
again influenced by Kierkegaard), 'becomes more obvious 
in Peer Gynt, where the Button-Moulder clearly separates 
the two. Peer has no self, but he still has spirit--the 
Button-Moulder does not use the word "soul"--and that 
gives him value as metal. It is purely for his metal 
value that the Button-Moulder takes interest in him. But 
it is the self and not the spirit which is Peer's ticket 
to Heaven or Hell. The spirit appears to be but the raw 
material out of which the self may develop by 
the self- 
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activity of the individual. Ibsen insisted that the reli- 
gious framework of Brand is immaterial, but he has not 
been able to separate self-realisation in the Kierke- 
gaardian existentialist sense from the salvation of the 
soul in the traditional Christian sense. The self is in- 
extricably bound to the soul, and the cord which unites 
then is Original Sin. Brand claimed space within the 
whole, wide world to be himself completely, but was 
immediately reminded of the limitations of his freedom: 
To be oneself completely? But the 
burden 
Of one's guilt inherited from kin? (V, 218) 
How can he be wholly himself if he is accountable for the 
sins of his ancestors? His unrepentant mother is a con- 
tinual reminder of his inherited burden of guilt. If man 
is born to live in darkness, she is one who does not shun 
her natural element, for she has acquired the courage of 
the frozen heart. Her darkness, however, is not the exis- 
tential darkness Brand was attempting to convey by his 
images of the owl and the fish frightened by the darkness 
they were created to live in. Brand's mother walks in the 
shadow of Hell. She, has sacrificed her most precious 
human gift, love, for money, and that, in Ibsen's view, 
is a crime on a par with selling one's soul to the Devil. 
And since she died clutching her worldly riches,, we can 
only assume that the Devil came to claim his due. 
Can one ever liberate oneself from the burden of, 
parental guilt? Brand answered "no" when he recalled the 
two small children who had witnessed the horror of their 
father's homicide. Although they hardly understood what 
was happening, their souls had received a scar which time 
would never heal. From that appalling memory a chain of 
sin and crime would stretch link upon link throughout 
generations. -Why should such things be? 
Oh, dizzy depth of impenetrable riddle, 
No man can fathom your mystery. 
Yet on the brink of the abyss the crowd 
Dance on, heedless, mindless, 
When their souls should scream aghast! 
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Not one in a thousand sees 
What a mountain of guilt towers up 
From that little word: live. (V, 212) 
Brand acknowledges that his own soul has been permanent- 
ly scarred by a childhood experience almost as horri- 
fying as that of the two children. He had watched his 
mother swoop upon his father's death-bed "like a falcon 
on its prey" and tear the bedding apart with greedy 
claws in search of money. Yet Brand is confident that he 
has the power of will, not only to overcome the effects 
of that memory, but to repay his mother's spiritual debt 
"down to the last atom. " "Fear not, " he comforts her: 
Your son takes all your debt on him. 
God's image, which you have defiled, 
Shall rise again in me, purified by 
Willi (V, 225) 
She has wasted the divine spirit God lent her. That is 
her debt. Brand cannot, however, expiate her sin. Her sin 
lies in the wasting, and that she must answer for herself. 
She must repent, or perish. Brand's distinction between 
sin and spiritual debt is a curious piece of theology 
which reflects the confusion in the play between soul 
and self. Brand acknowledges that he cannot redeem his 
mother's soul, but he claims that he can make good the 
"sum of human worth" she has squandered in slavish toil. 
He admits that Original Sin is a mystery too deep to 
fathom, but he does not give in to the fact of the Fall. 
In his capacity as world healer Brand can aim at nothing 
less than the restoration of mankind to prelapsarian 
purity and integrity, and he fights his crusade in the 
belief that man can recapture Paradise by the sheer force 
of his will. But not*one of Brand's parishioners had the 
strength of will to follow their priest to the heights. 
And Brand, who rejects the idea of a dens caritatis who 
might make allowance for the frailty of the human will, 
is brought to utter despair by his defeat: 
Is that image lost and forgotten 
Wherein man's soul was made? 
Has the Spirit from whence we sprang 
been defeated--? No 354) 
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His question is answered by the Voices in the wilderness, 
who tell him that he can never be like God, for he has 
"drained the cup of death, " and by the Apparition in 
Agnes's shape, who reminds him of the gulf once cleft 
between Man and Paradise, which no man can leap across. 
The Fall is a fact not to be reversed by will alone, and 
it affects man's self as well as his soul. Brand's soul 
has been permanently stained by his mother's sin against 
love. Brand has, as Agnes discovered, a tremendous capa- 
city for love, but he has inherited his mother's indomi- 
table will-power together with her readiness to suppress 
every human feeling which does not fit into the scheme 
of things. His inability to reconcile love and will is 
his undoing. Like his mother he wastes his most precious 
human asset, love. And the sin lies in the wasting. For 
this he is punished by the God of Love. Yet Brand could 
not'help wasting it. His soul had been poisoned by his 
mother's crime. Not only has Brand committed a sin 
against the God of Love for which his soul stands in need 
of redemption, but he has also failed to become a "whole" 
personality. You cannot sacrifice love and still claim 
to be "complete. " It appears, then, that even if one is 
given room within the whole, wide world to be oneself 
completely; one can never achieve absolute integrity, 
because one is not free to choose. One cannot liberate 
oneself from one's inheritance of sin. Brand was not 
free to choose both love and will. His failure to 
reconcile them was an inherited flaw from his mother. 
Authentic selfhood, which for Brand means absolute 
integrity, has ever since Adam's fall been an unattain- 
able ideal. The cynical Dean warned Brand: "No one 
reaches quite to Heaven. " Brand protested: "Yet to 
Heaven reached Jacob's ladder; / To Heaven soars the 
yearning of the soul" (324). Man's yearning for Heaven, 
the impossibility of reaching it, and the contradiction 
that binds them together, that is the tragic paradox of 
life, as Ibsen sees it in this play. 
Peer Gynt 
(1867) 
AASE: Oh, you devil's story-teller! 
Cross of Christ, how you can lie! 
This rigmarole you foist upon me 
I remember now I heard 
As a lass of twenty. 
Gudbrand Glesne it befell, 
Not you, you--i 
PEER: Me like him. 
Such things happen more than once. (VI, 62-63) 
Not only has Gudbrand Glesne's fabulous buck-ride also 
happened to Peer. It happens again before Mother Aase's 
very eyes, with such breakneck, such sun-exploding 
vividness that she becomes quite giddy-and has to reach 
for a tree-trunk to support herself. Peer is telling the 
truth, the poet's and the actor's truth. His is a world 
where imaginary happenings are as real and as fateful as 
actual ones. Peer has gained quite a reputation in the 
village for claiming other people's adventures as his 
own, and the Haggstad crowd are not as easily taken in 
as is Mother Aase by Peer's revamped versions of the old 
legends. His boastful tale about his having conjured the 
devil into a nutshell and made an enemy of Aslak the 
Smith who roasted his fingers when the devil escaped, is 
applauded as "a wonderful yarn"--"one of his best. " But 
Peer is not flattered by the acclaim. He asks defiantly: 
"Do you think I'm making it up? " (82). When the aged 
Peer Gynt returns to his native village to realise his 
youthful dream of restoring the name of Gynt to its 
former honour and glory, he finds that it is the 
unflattering memory of Peer the incorrigible, spinner of 
yarns that has stuck in people's minds. All that the 
bailiff is able to tell the unrecognised greybeard 
about the late Peer Gynt is that he was "an abominable 
romancer" (en vederstyggelig Digter) (2o8). 
To be called a digter (poet) in Peer's community 
is equivalent to being called a liar, and Peer furiously 
resents having that dishonourable label stuck on him. 
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His stories are not lies. For him the life of the 
imagination is more "true" than the humdrum, earth-bent 
materialism of the villagers. Life must be more than a 
struggle for food and a scramble for property. So strong 
is Peer's yearning for a higher life than this that he 
leaves his mother's farm in the busiest haymaking season, 
ostensibly to hunt reindeer on the snow. He returns 
months later, without gun or game, but with a fantastic 
story about an incredible ride on a reindeer buck. Aase 
scolds him for his idleness and his torn breeches. She 
does not understand that Peer's fanciful story is an 
attempt to express an existential experience. He hardly 
understands it himself, for his insight into the mystery 
of existence is as yet wholly intuitive and imaginative 
and can only be conveyed in pictures. Peer reveals in 
the course of his tale that he has not found that uniden- 
tified something he was seeking on the heights, for his 
exhilarating flight along the Gjendin Edge ends with a 
splash in the lake below and Peer offering the buck to 
his mother if she can catch him. 
Peer's rejection of the buck, comments Sverre Arestad, 
"constitutes the first bit of evidence that he had 
realized before the drama opened that he was spiritually 
and intellectually bankrupt. It indicates, moreover, that 
he had begun to develop a sense of self-criticism and 
represents the first decision that he made. "75 Arestad 
seems to credit the young Peer Gynt with a degree of 
self-awareness that. renders four and a half acts of self- 
exploration up to the crucial confrontation with the 
Button-Moulder superfluous. However, even Aase in the 
heat of her anger registers that there is more to Peer's 
tale than meets the eye. She accuses him of telling lies, 
not merely because she recognises the old legend, but 
because she does not half understand Peer's strange and 
wild talk about "eagles' backs and all the other horrors" 
he has embellished the old story with. She does not see 
what the audience sees, that Peer is offering not just a 
new version of an old tale but an image of life. Whatever 
64 
truth Peer has gleaned about the nature of human exist-. 
ence during his hunting-spree in the mountains is 
contained in the story of the buck--ride. 
Aase gasps at the scene of "speechless dread" Peer 
conjures up before her eyes. The setting for his 
stupendous buck-ride is the Gjendin Edge: 
Nigh on four miles long it stretches, 
Narrow and sharp as the blade of a scythe. 
Down beyond glacier, scar, and hillside, 
Down over slides and sheer grey scree, 
You can see on either side 
Straight into the brooding lakes 
That slumber dark and heavy, 
More than three thousand feet below. 
The length of the Edge he and I 
Clove our passage through the air. 
Never rode I such a steed! 
Before us as we tore along 
Suns seemed to explode in our eyes. 
Brown-backed eagles that were sailing 
In the wide and dizzy void 
Halfway between us and the lakes, 
Fell behind like motes of dust. (VI, 6o-61) 
Then suddenly, startled by a soared ptarmigan that flew 
into the air in front of him, 
The buck shied half around, 
Leapt sky-high, and plunged 
Both of us into the depths! 
Behind us the black mountain wall, 
Below us the bottomless void! (VI9 61) 
Peer's captivating "lie" reveals a fearful truth to which 
he is slowly awakening--the discovery that life is a pre- 
carious balancing act on a knife's edger leaving no room 
for the "round about, " for on either side lies the bottom- 
less abyss. The only road forward is the narrow path 
"straight through, " and there is no possibility of turn- 
ing back when the unexpected obstacle shoots up in front 
of you. If you cannot cope with the unforeseen, but "shy 
half around, " the plunge into the abyss is unavoidable. 
Peer may appear to lose interest in the buck when 
the tale is told, and his offering it to his mother 
suggests a conscious, if not decisive, rejection of 
the 
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false world of illusion in which he has been brought up. 
However, an incident in the Cairo madhouse reveals that 
the reindeer buck has continued to haunt Peer throughout 
his life as a symbol of his own self--or as it turns out 
in his dialogue with the mad Hussein, his own lack of 
self. Hussein claims to be a pen that has been mistaken 
for a sand-box, and has consequently never been his true 
self since he has never been used for the purpose for 
which he was designed. His case is not unique. Peer 
understands his predicament. He knows what it feels like 
to have no sense of identity: 
Just imagine: to be a reindeer, to leap 
from on high-- 
To fall and fall, and never feel the ground 
under your hoofs! (VI, 185) 
In middle age Peer has obviously still not found what the 
young, wistful buck-rider went into the mountains to seek. 
He has continued to fall and fall, and the madhouse scene 
has opened his eyes to the terrifying prospect that he 
may never touch bottom, because there is none. 
Young Peer "divines" that he was designed for some- 
thing great in life. "The whole parish shall honour you, " 
he promises his fretting mother, "Only wait till I have 
done/ Something--something really great! " (67). He will 
be King, Emperor, he tells her, which makes mother Aase 
wonder whether he has lost the last remnant of his wits. 
Yet it is she who has fostered Peer's imperial ambition, 
having brought him up a prince in her fairy tale world. 
Peer's quest for power and glory takes him through 
a series of rides, which, like the first, invariably end 
with a cold splash into reality. On his way to Hmggstad 
Peer wanders off into the clouds and becomes Emperor Peer 
Gynt riding in splendour over the ocean to England's 
shore, where he is greeted by-all England's maidens, 
nobles, and the Emperor himself, who doffs his crown and 
says--: "Why, if it isn't that drunken swine Peer Gynt; " 
(74). Aslak the Smith's grimy grin brings Peer back to 
the sordid truth of factual reality. He looks at himself. 
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A sorry sight. His breeches are torn, tattered and filthy, 
and he has nothing new to wear. Who is going to believe 
that the drunken swine is a prospective Emperor? When 
Peer arrives among the merry crowd at Hmggstad he is 
greeted by a united front of sneering incredulity. Here 
comes that braggart, that liar Peer Gynt. "Mocking 
glances, whispers, smiles. / They grate like a saw-blade 
under the file! " (78). Peer is an outsider and obsessive- 
ly aware of it. He is stung and unnerved by the cutting 
sniggers of the crowd, as Ibsen himself had been. 
"At home I was afraid when I stood in that clammy crowd 
and sensed their malicious smiles behind my back, " Ibsen 
wrote to his mother-in-law from Italy in 1865. He had to 
get away from "all that swinishness up there, " he told 
her, in order to preserve his integrity both as a human 
being and as an artist. 
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Peer's absurdly inflated ambitions and extravagant 
claims of omnipotence on the one hand, and his morbid 
sensitivity to ridicule and desperately pointless and 
self-destructive efforts to assert himself on the other, 
testify to, as James Hurt notes, "a very fragile sense 
of self. "77 When challenged Peer will swear to the truth 
of the most incredible tale and threaten to beat the day- 
light out of anyone who'dares call him a liar. In soli- 
tary moments of remorse and self-contempt he will equally 
emphatically renounce his adventures, real or imaginary, 
as lies. Notably when the consequences are too unpleasant 
to contemplate: 
Flight over the Gjendin Edge. 
Invention and damned lies! 
Climbing the steepest hillside 
With the bride--and drunk all day. 
Hunted by hawks and kites, 
Threatened by trolls and the like, 
Sporting with crazy wenches-- 
Lies and damned invention! (VI, 94) 
Finding himself "knee-deep in mire and filth" Peer is 
momentarily overcome by an intense longing to soar beyond 
his earthly, not to say, beastly self as he watches two 
eagles sail over the mountains: 
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I will join you! I will wash myself 
clean 
In the bath of the keenest winds! 
I will soar! I will plunge myself 
fair 
In that gleaming christening-font: 
I will fly high over the serer pasture, 
I will ride till my soul is pure. 
I will forth over the salty ocean, 
And high over England's prince! (VI, 94-95) 
But Peer's noble dream of spiritual purification quickly 
deflates to a fantasy of worldly power and glory, and 
the eagles vanish, "Whisked away by the devil! " (95). 
Peer never reaches "that gleaming christening-font, " but 
alights instead outside his grandfather's gleaming, 
newly built farmhouse, where the rich Jon Gynt is feast- 
ing the local dignitaries in the great hall. They call 
for the host's young son, for the provost wants to drink 
his health: 
Go in then, Peer Gynt, to the verdict. 
It rings out in song and acclaim: 
Peer Gynt, thou art born of greatness, 
And to greatness thou shalt attain! 
(Lea-os forward but hits his nose against 
T 'rock and falls senseless. ) (VI, 96) 
Peer is ready for the pig-ride into the Dovre Hall. 
The Woman in Green throws her arms around his neck: "0h, 
Peer, I can see we were made for each other. " For Peer 
appears to be endowed with the double vision of the 
trolls--the ability to delude oneself that "Black looks 
white, and ugly looks fair. / Big looks little, and foul 
looks clean" (97). The Dovre King himself is pleasantly 
surprised to find the human prince so amenable to the 
Ronde folk's way of life. Peer readily accepts, for the 
honour of being called king, that he must never heed 
what lies outside the kingdom of Ronde, "Day you must 
shun, and all its deeds, and every sunlit spot" 
(99). 
But above all, he must learn to recognise a troll from 
a human being: 
Out there, under the shining vault, 
Among men, they say: "Man, be thyself! " 
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Here, in the world of the trolls, we say: 
"Troll, to thyself be--enough: " (VI, loo) 
Asked whether he can "fathom the depth" of this dis- 
tinction Peer admits: "It seems rather misty" (loo). But 
although the difference between troll and man escapes 
him, Peer considers himself distinctly and preciously 
different from the beasts. When the Troll King orders 
that his own Sunday tail be tied on Peer's indecently 
exposed backside, Peer protests indignantly: "Turn a man 
into a beast? " (lol). But when presented with the either- 
or of accepting the troll tail or losing the kingship, 
Peer is in no doubt about his preference. A tail is 
after all only an external adornment, and one must make 
some concession to local fashion. And Peer finds the 
Dovre King, for all his conditions, a surprisingly 
reasonable master. The king has no objection to Peer re- 
taining his treasured Christian faith. He merely demands 
conformity in externals. A troll is recognised by the 
cut of his coat. Peer is welcome to keep whatever private 
beliefs he may cherish under his troll coat, provided 
they do not interfere with the Ronde way of life. A self 
that does not show in outward appearance is of no conse- 
quence in the troll world. 
But Peer's human nature is not as easily suppressed 
as his willingness to conform had led the Dovre King to 
believe. Invited to express his frank opinion of the 
entertainment given in his honour, Peer says he sees 
"Something unspeakably ugly" (lo2), for to his human eyes 
the music-maid is a cow twanging a gutstring with her 
hoof, and the dancing-maid is a capering sow. Peer's 
insolent remark throws the hall into an uproar of pro- 
tests, and the king proposes that Peer, for his own good, 
submit to an eye operation which will cure him of his 
tyrannical human nature once and for all. His right eye 
will be cut out, but his left will be given just a small 
scratch so that he sees obliquely. When Peer retreats in 
horror from the propounded surgery the king asks him to 
consider how much anxiety and tribulation he will rid 
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himself of for the rest of his life if he goes through 
with it., "Remember, the eyes are the well-spring/ Of the 
bitter, searing flood of tears"--the 'years of remorse. 
Of all the possible roads that might lead Peer to his 
Empire there is none he is so anxious to avoid as the 
thorny path of repentance and atonement. He must admit 
there is wisdom in the king's councel. Indeed the Good 
Book lends support to his argument, for it says: "If 
thine eye offend thee, pluck it out! " (lo4) (Matt. 5: 29). 
But when Peer learns that he can never get his human 
eyesight back, he refuses point-blank. Not that he 
rejects the trollish way of life. He would fain be a 
troll for a bride and a well-run kingdom to boot. He 
has accepted the tail and would readily swear that a cow 
is a maiden, for one can always swallow an oath, 
But to know that one can never free 
oneself, 
That one cannot die a respectable human 
death, 
That one must live as a mountain troll 
for the rest of one's days. 
This thing that one can never turn back, 
As the Good Book says, and which you so 
insist on-- 
That's something I'll never agree to. (VI, 165) 
Peer wants to live as a troll but he dare not die as one. 
However, it is too late, once he has stepped inside, to 
discover that the Dovre gate does not open outwards. 
Peer learns to his horror and consternation that desires 
are equal to deeds in the troll world and that he has 
fathered a troll brat merely by ogling the king's 
daughter. He shall not escape the consequences. Peer 
wipes the sweat from his brow: "I wish to God I could 
wake! " (lo6). When an experience, actual or imagined, 
becomes unbearably disagreeable, Peer will insist it 
must be a dream and a "lie. " He accepts as "truth" only 
that which is pleasant and desirable. In Peer's world 
the distinction between fact and fiction, truth and lies, 
is an aesthetic, not a moral and rational one. Realising 
that he is trapped in the Dovre Hall the terror-stricken 
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Peer cries to his mother for help and is rescued from 
the fangs of the vicious troll-imps by the ringing of 
church bells. But he has not therefore put the troll 
world behind him. After the grotesque comedy of the 
troll scene follows the cold horror of the Boyg, "as 
powerful an image of engulfment as appears in Ibsen's 
work, " comments James Hurt. 
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The scene with the Boyg is set in "pitch darkness" 
and Peer "is heard slashing and flailing about with a 
great branch" (lo8). He finds his passage barred-by a 
huge, slimy, slippery presence without shape or form, 
neither dead nor alive, that is all around him. When he 
demands. to know what the monster is, a voice answers: 
"Myself. " Peer is none the wiser. Nor does the name of 
the monster, the Great Boyg, solve the riddle. When Peer 
shouts: "Make way! " the voice replies: "Go round about, 
Peer! The mountain is wide enough. " But Peer discovered 
on his buck-ride along the Gjendin Edge that the moun- 
tain can be dangerously narrow, and if you do not steer 
a straight course you risk plunging into the abyss on 
either side. He insists: "Nov straight through; " (lo8) 
and he hacks and slashes away, but to no avail, for he 
is fighting against "The Boyg that is hurt, and is yet 
unwounded. / The Boyg that is slain, and is yet alive" 
(lo9). When Peer realises that he cannot hew his way 
through this ominous shapelessness, he cries once again 
to the women for help. This time to Solveig: "The clasp- 
book! Hurl it straight into his eyes! " Church bells and 
hymn singing are heard in the distance, and the Boyg 
shrinks to nothing with a gasp: "He was too strong. 
There were women behind him" (llo). 
It is by spiritual, not by physical-force that the 
Boyg must be overcome, and Peer recognises that Solveig 
has the strength he lacks to conquer this formless thing 
which claims to be "Myself, "*and which challenges Peer: 
"Can you say the same? " (lo8). Whatever the Boyg is 
meant to symbolise, he obviously represents something 
that Peer must conquer in order to become his true self. 
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The Boyg is a troll, and may be seen as another aspect 
of man's trollish self, the Spirit of Compromise, which 
Brand claimed is Satan, for the spirit of compromise is 
the great obstacle barring man's way to his divine self. 
From an existentialist point of view the Boyg may be 
seen to represent the existence which precedes essence, 
what Kierkegaard calls "the possibility of everything" 
which is "immediate man" before he has acquired an indi- 
vidual self. 
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of possibilities which is his immediate being can Peer 
become his real self. More concretely the way through is 
to find, or choose, a mission or vocation he can identi- 
fy himself with, and then pursue it with the dedicated 
single-mindedness of Brand. For if he does not steer a 
straight course through the shapelessness of existence, 
but keeps going round about and avoids making existen- 
tial choices, the Boyg will win, for he wins without 
battle. In other words, it will be Peer's non-fighting 
non-self that wins. 
Peer did not conquer the Boyg. He was saved by the 
ringing of church bells. But bell-ringing saved him 
neither from adopting the troll creed nor from following 
the Boyg's convenient advice to go round about. Peer con- 
tinues against his better judgement to solve his problems 
in the world of dreams. Outlawed for the bride-abduction 
he must build his home in the mountains, and at the 
beginning of Act III he is busy felling timber for that 
purpose. Hewing timber is hard enough, 
But hewing and dreaming together 
is the devil. 
I must. stop it--this floating away 
Into the mists of fantasy in broad 
daylight-- 
You're outlawed, my lad! Banned to 
the woods. (VI, 112) 
He needs a good lock on the door to shut out trolls and 
spiteful hobgoblins. But is he not deceiving himself? 
Hobgoblins are as nimble as thoughts. Peer shall soon 
have the chance to test the strength of his lock. 
72 
Solveig comes over the heath on skis and greets him: 
God bless your work. Don't send me away. 
I had your message, and you must take me. (VI, 117) 
She has severed all family ties to join an outlaw, and 
she is not even sure that he really wants her. "I only 
knew what I had to do, " she tells Peer. But it is not 
for Peer's sake alone that Solveig seeks the mountainp: 
The valley was stifling. I felt shut in. 
It was partly that, that drove me away. 
But here where the pine trees whisper-- 
What stillness and song! This is my home. (VI, 118) 
Solveig knows that she is born to live on the heights, 
and it is only by going "home" to the mountains that she 
can truly become herself. She does what she must do. She 
goes "straight through" and burns her bridges behind her: 
"The road I have come does not lead back" (118). Peer is 
so cheered by her unexpected arrival, and so confident 
that her presence will protect him from spiteful goblin- 
thoughts, that he throws away hammer, nails and planks: 
If you dare dwell with the hunter, 
His hut will be holy ground. (VI, 118) 
Solveig's coming is almost too good to be true. Such 
things happen only in fairy tales. When Solveig enters 
his hut Peer is so overwhelmed by his good fortune that 
he imagines himself to be Askeladden who has won the 
princess (Askeladden is the Aladdin of Norwegian folk- 
lore, the lucky lad who despite his idleness and his 
elder brothers' ridicule always wins the princess in the 
end, and half the kingdom to boot): 
My king's daughter! She is found and won. ' 
Nov a king's palace shall rise from the 
ground! (VI, 119) 
But Peer has neither found nor won Solveig. She has come 
to him as a Heaven-sent gift, for which he should thank 
God by doing his best to deserve her. But Peer is so 
immersed in his Askeladd dream--the dream of gaining all 
for nothing--that the thought of having to make even the 
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slightest sacrifice is alien to him. Outside the holy 
ground of Solveig's presence Peer is unprotected against 
hobgoblin-thoughts. When he goes out to hew timber for 
his new palace, an old-looking woman in a tattered green 
dress steps out of the woods and claims her right to 
share Peer with "the girl in there. " An ugly child is 
holding on to her skirt. Peer cannot deny, she snivels, 
that he is the father of the imp, which is obvious for 
all to see, for the brat is crippled in the shank as 
Peer is crippled in the mind. And Peer shall not escape 
his family duties. She vows she will return every day of 
the year to demand her share of the kissing and cuddling. 
Peer clenches his fists. And all this for nothing but 
dreams and desires! His world has suddenly turned ugly, 
and his joy has grown old. He cannot go back to Solveig, 
"my purest, fairest gold, " so ugly and soiled by 
memories of his debaucheries with trolls and wild women. 
"To speak, yet be silent? Confess, yet conceal--? " (122): 
Go round about, lad! There is no way 
Straight through this from you to her. (VI, 122) 
Peer hesitates. There ought to be a way. Does not the 
Good Book say something about repentance? But he has 
forgotten what, and he has no book, and there is no one 
in the wild forest to guide him. Nor has'Peer any 
genuine desire to repent: 
Repentance? Why, it might take years 
Before I won through. A meagre life 
that would be. (VT, 122) 
Why repentance should take years and lead to a meagre 
life is not altogether clear, but Peer's reluctance to 
choose the way of penitence is explained in a scene 
Ibsen cut from the final version. It is an extension of 
the scene in which Aase with the help of Solveig and her 
parents is searching for her outlawed son. When they 
find him, Peer asks Solveig's father to give him his 
daughter, pleading that she is the only one who can save 
him from his bad ways. The father's first reaction is: 
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"I'd sooner nail her coffin" (264). But he finally con- 
sents, on one condition: that Peer returns to the valley 
and accepts the punishment that the law imposes for 
bride-stealing, which is seven years in jail, and that 
he "Bear all seven as a penance from above. " Peer is 
appalled: "In jail! " but the man insists: "Straight 
through. Will you? " (265). When Peer refuses outright, 
the man warns him that the Devil is playing for his soul, 
and has already won the best part of it. Only one thing 
can save Peer. He must choose the way of repentance: 
Never were you bidden to choose as now. 
Perdition or salvation, jubilation or dread! 
Let life's earnestness lash you to shreds, 
Melt you, transform you from raven to dove, 
Burn you till you rise cleansed from the flame! 
Choose, choose, choose, in the Lord's name! (VI, 265) 
But Peer is not ripe for repentance: 
When am I to live? 
I must try my wings in the world first. 
I cannot now go and shut myself in, 
Perhaps suffer hard labour, hunger and thirst-- 
Man, you must offer better conditions. (VI, 265) 
Ibsen changed his mind and granted Peer a nobler motive 
for leaving Solveig than first intended, having him 
argue that it would be sacrilege to return to Solveig 
with the troll-rabble at his heels, but Peer cherishes 
no noble sentiments that are detrimental to his self- 
interest: 
I've got to get round this as best I can, 
So that it becomes neither gain nor loss. (VI, 122) 
Peer plays it safe, or so he thinks, and opts for 
neutrality. He runs away from his obligation to Solveig, 
for he will not once more step inside a gate that might 
not open outwards. Instead of taking the decisive leap 
straight through as Solveig had done, Peer flees home 
to 
his mother, hoping that she might help him find the easy 
way out as she has done so often in the past. But Aase 
is not in a fairy-tale mood when Peer arrives. She is 
t 
r 75 
dying, and her restless mind is on Peer's future and on 
her own funeral. Peer, who had come to his mother "think- 
ing here, at least, I'd be free, " (124) does not, however, 
want to be reminded of "everything that's wrong and 
crooked, / And all that's bitter and sore" (125). When 
Aase asks for the prayer-book to prepare herself for the 
last journey, Peer persuades her instead to come with 
him for a ride to Soria Moria, the castle east of the 
sun and west of the moon, where the King and the Prince 
are giving a feast. Aase is reluctant: "But Peer, dear, 
am I invited? " (127). She and Peer have been to Soria 
Moria many a time, but this time the journey is-different, 
for now it is Peer who sits in the driver's seat, and 
Aase is frightened by the hollow ringing of the sleigh- 
bells and, the strange, wild soughing of the pine trees. 
She is overwhelmed by the grand celebration Peer is 
driving her to, but asks anxiously: "Peer, dear, are you 
on the right road? " (128) to which Peer replies reassur- 
ingly: "This is the broad highroad. " Aase has cause to 
be uneasy, for the broad road is, according to the Good 
Book, precisely the road which does not. lead to Heaven, 
although most people choose it. Exhausted by the tearing 
speed Aase lies back and closes her eyes. When Peer 
drives up to the castle gate, mother Aase is no longer 
present in fairy land to hear the glad tidings that she 
will be God the Father's special guest at the banquet, 
and to thank Peer for the ride. Alas, she discovers when 
she wakes up in the hereafter that she has little to 
thank him for. Years later when the old Peer Gynt is 
running aimlessly about in the wasteland of a fire- 
ravaged moor, harassed by reproaching voices, he can hear 
Aase calling him from afar, accusing him of being a reck- 
less driver who has let himself be deluded by the Devil 
into driving her the wrong way. But Peer knew no other 
god than God the Father of Soria Moria to drive his 
mother to, for she has told him of no other. Yet she 
holds him responsible for not finding the way he was 
never shown. 
C 
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Young Peer feels instinctively what the Button- 
Moulder confirmed only when it was too late, that "You 
were designed to be a shining button/ On the waistcoat 
of the world" (219). But Peer's Empire is still shrouded 
in the mists of fantasy and he leaves Mother Aase for 
the great world without-having found the signpost marked: 
"This is the way" (2o8). Or has he wilfully overlooked 
it? The existential either-or had been forcefully 
imprinted on his mind by the Troll King. Peer has the 
choice between being himself, which is to live the 
ethical life, and being to himself enough, which is to 
live the aesthetic life. If he fails to choose the former, 
which must be chosen in absolute-earnestness, he will 
inevitably drift into the latter. There is no both-and, 
for the two ways are incompatible. Kierkegaard considered 
marriage to be of central importance to the ethical life, 
for it contains within it all the fundamental demands of 
ethical existence: commitment to other people, acceptance 
of duty and obligation, submission of personal interest 
to the common good. He claims that marriage "was precise- 
ly designed for the highest end, for lasting possession. "8o 
Peer "divines" that the way to his-Empire goes through 
Solveig, but he declines to act on that insight, for he 
will accept no bonds, no responsibilities, no sacrifice. 
He wants to be free to fly where his fancy takes him, 
and be to himself enough. 
The aesthetic attitude to existence, which in the 
case of the young Peer Gynt had been imaginative and 
unreflective, has become the middle-aged Sir Peter's 
proclaimed philosophy of life: 
Drink, gentlemen! If man is made 
For pleasure, let him take his fill. 
It is written: Lost is lost, and 
Gone is gone--. What can I offer you? (VI, 131) 
Herr von Eberkopf compliments Peer on his being a quite 
exceptional combination of Ur--Natur and enlightened cosmo- 
politanism, and pretends interest in the true origin of 
C' 
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this phenomenon. Peer readily supplies the answer: 
The reason is that I've never married. 
Yes, gentlemen, it's as simple 
As that. What should a man be? 
Himself, is my short answer. 
He must live for himself 
And himself alone. A thing impossible 
If he plays the pack-horse 
To other people's weal and woe. (VI, 132) 
The poetry has gone. Peer has been elevated to the rank 
of Thinker. v. Eberkopf feigns admiration for his unified 
view of life: 
Whereas the average opinionist 
Sees every detail separately, 
And never grasps things'as a whole, 
You see comprehensively. 
You measure all things by one norm. 
You focus every random fact 
Till they diverge like rays 
From the light of a central life-philosophy. 
And you have never been to university? (VI9 134) 
Unconscious of the irony of v. Eberkopf's praise, Peer 
explains how, as "an entirely self-educated man, " he has 
arrived at his comprehensive view of things. He claims 
to have learnt nothing methodically. He has studied 
history "in patches"--there was never time for more; and 
religion "in snatches"--to have some spiritual security 
to fall back on when times are hard. Learning is not to 
"glut oneself with reading, / But to select what will be 
useful" (134). v. Eberkopf flatteringly overrates Peer's 
originality as Thinker. His "central life-philosophy" 
has, although Peer is unaware of the fact, been adopted 
wholesale from the trolls, and the principle on which 
he has founded his worldly prosperity is, as he himself 
proudly acknowledges, a legacy from his family. This is 
Peer's simple key to success: Never commit yourself to 
the irrevocable, but keep yourself free to choose, and 
make sure there is always a bridge securing your 
retreat (138). 
But what does Peer mean to do with all his wealth, 
the pragmatical Mr Cotton is curious to know. To sail 
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merely for the pleasure of the journey does not seem 
much of an aim in life. He must surely have a more 
serious goal. "To become Emperor, " is Peer's prompt 
reply. "Of all the world. By the power of gold! " (14o). 
He assures his flabbergasted companions that this idea 
has ever since childhood been the soul of all his 
journeying, and is no mere flight of fancy, for it has 
been written or said, he cannot remember where: 
That if you gained the whole world 
But lost your Self, your gain were 
But a wreath around a broken skull. (VI, loo) 
v. Eberkopf is mystified: "But what is the Gyntish Self, 
exactly? " Peer explains: 
The world within my vaulted skull 
That makes me me and no one else, 
Any more than Ud can be the Devil. (VI, 14o) 
He rises to rhetorical heights: 
The Gyntish Self--it is the host 
Of wishes, desires, and appetites, 
The Gyntish Self--it is the sea 
Of fancies, cravings, and demands, 
All that, in short, which swells 
within breast, 
And whereby It as I, exist. (VI, 141) 
The Gyntish Self is an amorphous mass of instincts and 
impulses, lacking the structuring principle needful to 
shape it into a truly individual self. Peer's definition 
of the Gyntish Self accords with Kierkegaard's descrip- 
tion of the aesthetic self in the following passage from 
Either-Or: 
When an individual regards his self (si sely) aestheti- 
cally, he becomes conscious of this self Seiv) as 
a manifold concretion very variously charac erase . 
But in spite of the inward diversity, all of it taken 
together is, nevertheless, his nature (horns Vasen). Each 
component has just as much right to assert itsc , just 
as much right to demand satisfaction. His soul is like a 
plot of ground in which all sorts of herbs are planted, 
all with the same claim to thrive. His self consists of 
this multifariousness, and lie has no self which is 
higher than this. 81 
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A man does not become an individual "by necessity, " 
like growing up, but "by freedom, " that is, by a conscious 
existential effort. Kierkegaard does not say that one 
who lives aesthetically does not develop, but that his 
development is "like that of a plant" by necessity, and 
not by freedom, for the choices he makes are only rela- 
tive. They are "more or less, " not "either-or" choices, 
and it is only when a person chooses himself absolutely 
that a metamorphosis takes place whereby he becomes a 
conscious, "existent" individual. 
82 While the essence of 
ethical existence is commitment to the "universal-human" 
values embodied in marriage and the fulfilment of moral 
obligations, the life of the aesthete is devoted entire- 
ly to the pursuit of selfish pleasure, albeit often in 
very refined forms. Limited to the enjoyment of the 
"immediate, " the aesthete lives only, in the moment. And 
since he refuses to relate his existence to an absolute, 
permanent principle capable of linking up one moment 
with the next, his life has no unity, no coherence, but 
hurries along "in a perpetual vanishing, precisely like 
music, " which exists only in the moment, and is over as 
soon as it has ceased to sound. 
83 His pleasure-dominated 
life does not, however, mean that the aesthete is forever 
content merely to gratify his "natural" self. Man's 
aspiration towards the ideal, and his constant urge to 
transcend his immediate being, are most clearly revealed 
in the poetic personality. "A poet, " says Kierkegaard, 
"is an unhappy being whose heart is torn by secret 
. sufferings, but whose lips are so strangely 
formed that 
when the sighs and the cries escape them, they sound like 
beautiful music. "84 He is destined to be misunderstood 
by the crowd, for they listen to his sweet songs and do 
not hear the cries. But as long as this yearning for the 
ideal is only contemplated as a mere aesthetic, or imagi- 
native possibility of the self, and not turned into 
active decision and actually "lived, " he will remain on 
the surface of existence, incapable of any serious iden- 
tification with the deepest needs of his being. Because 
8o 
his urge towards the ideal, or the "eternal, " is being 
constantly frustrated, the life of the aesthete will 
inevitably lead to despair. 
Peer's Emperor-dream reflects his longing to trans- 
cend the "multifariousness" of wishes, desires, and 
appetites which constitutes the "immediate" Gyntish Self. 
But Peer cut himself adrift from the anchor of his being 
in leaving Solveig, and his "round about" quest has only 
led him further and further away from the realisation of 
a higher, a truly individual self. Of the youthful idea- 
lism betokened by Peer's rejection of "H ggstad farm and 
more" in favour of "a prayer-book wrapped in a handker- 
chief" (88) not a trace can be detected in the middle- 
aged Sir Peter, for whom gold appears to have become the 
be-all and end-all of life. Peer admits that his traffic 
in "Negro slaves to Carolina and heathen images to China 
[... ] hovered on the brink of the permissible" (135), 
but he prides himself on having neutralised his vices by 
an equal amount of virtues, both profit-making, of course. 
Yet he is still far from having amassed enough gold to 
become Emperor of the whole world, and nothing less will 
do, for: 
C... ] I must be Myself en bloc, 
Gynt of the entire globe, 
From top to toe Sir Peter Gynt; (VI, 141) 
Sir Peter's worldly ambitions are as absurdly unrealistic 
as ever the young buck-rider's fantasies were, and his- 
sense of identity is, if anything, more. vaporous. Peer 
knows his self merely as a "host" of wishes, a "sea" of 
fancies. Blind to the fact that he had gone forth into 
the world as defective goods, Peer has been searching 
vainly for his true self by all kinds of devious routes, 
assuming one role after another but remaining permanently 
identified with none. Having no specific vocation--the 
Emperor-dream is too diffuse to qualify as such--and no 
permanent core of values to relate his existence to, his 
life has no genuine continuity. His role-playing is a 
"perpetual vanishing" of discontinuous "selves. " 
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It takes the loss of his costly yacht to bring home 
to Peer that "To be oneself on the basis of gold/ Is to 
build one's house upon sand" (155). Seeing the yacht, 
with all his gold on board, the very foundation of his 
World Emperorship, steaming away towards the horizon, 
Peer tears his hair and tells himself: "It's a dream! I 
insist that it must be a dream! " (146). But this time 
the unpleasant is not a "lie. " It is in times like these 
that Peer turns to religion: 
Stop the pirates! Make something go wrong! 
Hear me, God! Forget other people's troubles. 
The world can look after itself for a while-- 
No, he's not listening! Stone deaf as usual! 
That's a fine thing! A God who's run out of 
advice! (VI9 146) 
Peer has just about given up hope of divine intervention 
when an explosion is heard, and the ship vanishes in a 
cloud of fire and smoke. Peer breathes a pious sigh of 
relief: 
What a wonderful feeling of safety and comfort 
It gives one to know oneself specially shielded! 
(VI9 147) 
Only, he would have preferred that his prayers were 
answered with less extravagance. Contemplating the cost 
of the Lord's "fatherly thought" for his personal welfare, 
Peer concludes with regret: "But economical--no, that he 
is not! " (148). With the limitless waste of the Sahara 
desert before his eyes, Peer cannot but marvel at the 
unprofitableness of the divine enterprise: 
What is one to believe was God's intention 
In creating all this voidness and deadness? 
This waste, bereft of all sources of life, 
This burnt-out tract that profits no one-- 
This slice of the world, for ever fallow, 
This corpse that never, since the world began, 
Has given its Maker a gesture of thanks. 
Why was it made? Nature is prodigal. (VI, 152) 
Peer, who so readily turned the lizard and the toad into 
symbols of self, because they were true to their animal 
nature and remained to themselves enough, ironically 
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fails to see the symbolic connection between the waste- 
land he has so tellingly depicted, and the "voidness" of 
, 
the Gyntish Self, which so far has given its Maker little 
thanks. Nor has Peer ever bothered to ask who the Maker 
is, and what he is like. But Peer is, all the same, a 
staunch essentialist, for whom the Maker's seal is 
evident on the brow of the smallest creature. "What inno- 
cence in the life of beasts, " he muses as he watches the 
lizard's carefree skuttling to and fro: 
Each obeys its Creator, unquestioning, 
Preserving its own indelible character, 
Playing or fighting, always itself, 
Itself, as it was on His first order: Be! 
(VI, 151) 
Whereas Brand had made the realisation of his divine self 
his supreme mission, it never even occurs to Peer to ask 
whether the Gyntish Self fulfils the Creator's intention. 
Nor, if he had asked, would he have been any the wiser, 
for how can one know whether an undefined self answers to 
the intention of its unidentified Maker? However, if pre- 
serving one's indelible character means to remain immured 
in one's block of sandstone, like the toad, and watch the 
world as from behind a window, and be to oneself enough, 
then Peer has done precisely that. He is, however, not 
quite so convinced about the innocence of beasts when he 
is forced to spend a most disagreeable night among a 
swarm of apes who amuse themselves by throwing filth on 
the "Lord of Creation. " Peer wishes he had a tail to make 
him resemble the brutes. But the apes' familiarity with 
Peer suggests that his affinity with the beasts is closer 
than his apparent taillessness indicates. Peer has for- 
gotten that he once accepted-the Dovre King's Sunday-best. 
Stranded in the wilderness and his gold gone, Peer 
casts about for a new part to play. And he was not just 
imagining things when he claimed to be under the Almighty's 
special protection, for Peer need only offer half his 
kingdom for a horse, and a horse neighs by his side, 
laden with costly robes, jewels, and a sword. Peer has 
read somewhere that "the will can move mountains" (154), 
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and here is the proof. He puts on the robes and surveys 
the transformation: "Sir Peter--and a Turk from top to 
toe! " (154). He climbs into the saddle and gallops off 
into the desert. 
A change of garb, and Peer is transformed from 
capitalist to prophet: 
A prophet--now that is a clearer position. 
At least you know on what footing you stand. 
If you are a success, it's your own self 
that gets the applause, 
And not your pounds, shillings, and pence. 
(VI9 156) 
"A prophet--yes, that's the life for me, " Peer concludes 
with relish as he watches the dancing girls from his bed 
of cushions: 
And I slipped into it so utterly unawares, 
Simply by galloping into the desert 
And chancing to meet these children of nature. 
Their prophet had come. That was perfectly 
clear. (VI, 156) 
This is Peer's life in a nutshell. He is what he is by 
chance, and not by choice, as Brand is. However, these 
innocent children of the desert are not as gullible as 
the Prophet himself. Anitra's brain-pan may be too narrow 
for a decent-sized soul, but she is extravagantly endowed 
with das ewig weibliche which ziehet Peer an, and she 
knows how to applaud the Prophet to get hold of his 
. riches. 
It seems that the Prophet finds her all the more 
attractive for her soullessness. Indeed, it is for that 
very quality he has graciously selected Anitra to 
become 
his rejuvenator. Only in full manhood can he be the man 
he is, Peer tells her, and to recover his manhood he 
needs to reign supreme in a maiden's virgin thoughts: 
All of you, every inch and fibre, 
Will-less, without yea or nay, 
Shall be filled with none but me. (VI, 163) 
And the emptier her head, the more completely can she be 
filled with none but Peer, for: "With a soul, one is 
bound/ In contemplation of one's self" (164). Peer seems 
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to equate "soul" with "consciousness of self, " which is 
as good as saying that to have no soul is to have no 
self. It does not, however, occur to Peer that he will 
not become more of a self by conquering another person's 
non-self. His fatuous claim that only in the full vigour 
of manhood can he be his real self, shows how far Peer 
has strayed from that youthful conception of self of 
which "a prayer-book wrapped in a handkerchief" was the 
emblem. At the point when the Prophet has been outwitted 
and robbed by the empty-headed Anitra, in whose heart he 
proposed to found the Caliphate of his essential self, 
and has dismissed womankind as "a fickle lot, " the faith- 
fully waiting Solveig is shown in a brief tableau sitting 
at her spinning wheel outside the hut in the forest and 
singing her song of blessing on the long awaited Peer, 
to remind the audience of one who remembers and who lets 
Peer fill her, every inch and fibre, of her own free 
will. Solveig has found her real self in her love for 
Peer because she has committed herself completely to it. 
Hers is the dedicated selflessness to which the Button- 
Moulder refers when he explains to Peer that "To be one's 
self is: to slay one's self" (229). But that explanation 
is wasted on Peer who has always believed that living 
for other people is incompatible with being true to one's 
self. However, if Peer thinks he can become his real self' 
by reigning supreme in someone else's thoughts, then it 
is to Solveig he must look for the true Caliphate of his 
being. But the idea of returning to his deserted saviour 
does not even enter his mind at this stage. 
85 On the con- 
trary. Having stripped off his Turkish robes Peer at once 
applies himself to finding a new opening for his versa- 
tile talent. He soon recovers from the humiliation of 
having been made a fool of by a soulless woman. After 
all, Peer comforts himself, it was the Prophet and not 
his personal self that was made an ass of, and the 
. 
Prophet's heathen ways were luckily "only a matter of 
costume, / And not, as the saying goes, bred on the bone" 
(167). 
85 
Reflecting that his business career is "a closed 
chapter, " and his love-play "a cast-off garment, " Peer 
wonders which way to choose next. "It's the choice that 
distinguishes the wise man from the fool" (169), he 
observes knowingly. Having decided that the present is 
both faithless and gutless, "not worth an old boot, " 
Peer will henceforth devote himself to studying the glory 
of bygone days. He will re-live the past "as in a dream. " 
From a safe vantage-point he will watch heroes do battle 
for honour and right, see thinkers perish and martyrs 
bleed, see empires rise and fall, in short, "skim the 
cream of history": 
How uplifting to set oneself a goal, 
And drive straight for it, like flint and steel! (With restrained emotion. ) 
To sever completely on every side, 
The bonds that bind one to home and friends. 
To scatter one's entire store of riches, 
To bid the sweet joys of love good-night, 
All to solve the mystery of Truth. (Wipes a tear from his eye. ) 
That is the test of the true enquirer: (VI, 169-7o) 
Peer prides himself on having made a fundamental decision, 
while he is merely making a virtue of his own foolishness. 
It'is Brand who by Peer's test is the true enquirer. Yet 
he failed to solve the mystery of Truth. Brand sacrificed 
love, happiness, worldly riches, everything to lead his 
people to the Truth, but when the weary, hungry, and 
bewildered flock who had followed their priest into the 
wilderness demand their reward, Brand tells them: "He who 
marches in the foremost line/ Must fall for the cause he 
serves" (V, 342)--for Brand's cause, that is, for Brand 
assumes that his truth is the Truth. Hence his utter 
bewilderment to find it discredited by the God of Love. 
Brand lived a life of superhuman self-sacrifice, only to 
be rewarded with a death of complete futility--a death 
which not only made a mockery of his promise to begin a 
new life of love, but rendered his life of extreme dedi- 
cation meaningless: "Counts Will for nothing [... ] ?! 11 
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Brand lived the Truth. Peer is content to be "an 
onlooker only. " In proper Hegelian fashion he proposes 
to unravel the mystery of Truth by studying the world- 
historical process. Peer concedes that his scholarly 
grounding in the subject is "patchy, " and "History's 
inner mechanics are subtle. " But what of it? "The most 
unlikely starting-point/ Often leads to the most origi- 
nal conclusion" (169). Peer prefers the backward-looking 
view because it is "safe. " It does not demand personal 
commitment and having to make risky decisions in the 
face of an unknown future. It was one of Kierkegaard's 
main quarrels with Hegel that in his preoccupation with 
the backward-looking world-historical point of view, 
Hegel ignored the ethical dilemmas facing the living 
human being, for whom history is not yet completed. 
Kierkegaard notes in his Journals, 1843: "It is perfectly 
true, as philosophers say, that life must be understood 
backwards. But they forget the other proposition, that 
it must be lived forwards., 
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To exist, according to 
Kierkegaard, is not to be a knowing subject, but to be 
a moral agent. While Hegel adopted the motto of the 
Greeks: Know thyself, Kierkegaard said: Choose thyself. 
Nor, Kierkegaard reflects, can man ever really understand 
himself backwards, since he is always in the process of 
becoming. "In spite of all that Hegel says about pro- 
cess, " Kierkegaard remarks in the Postscri-gt, "he does 
not understand history from the point of view of be- 
coming, but with the help of the illusion attaching to 
pastness understands it from the point of view of a final- 
ity that excludes all becoming. It is therefore impossi- 
ble for a Hegelian to understand himself by means of his 
philosophy, for his philosophy helps him to understand 
only that which is past and finished, and a living person 
is surely not dead. 1187 The speculative philosopher, who 
desires to remain in the pure being of abstract thought 
which for him is the highest goal of human life, ought 
to ask himself whether he does in fact exist. "And if he 
does, is he then not in the process of becoming? And if 
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he is in the process of becoming, does he not face the 
future? And does he ever face the future by way of 
action? And if he never does, will he not forgive an 
ethical individuality for saying in passion and with 
dramatic truth, that he is an ass? "8° 
Peer has made of himself precisely such a specula- 
tive "ass" who prefers to ignore the fact that life must 
be lived forwards, and refuses to face the future by way 
of action. The "Truth" ! Peer proposes to seek in History 
is an "abstract" truth that has no relevance to his life 
as an existing human being. "I shall hold the absolute 
key to the past, / And never more tread the thorny paths 
of the living" (1lo). Peer, like the Hegelian philo- 
sopher as Kierkegaard one-sidedly presents him, counts 
it of greater importance to know the Absolute Truth 
about the past than to be himself in the present. 
Professing himself happy beyond all measure thus to 
have solved the riddle of his destiny, Peer decides to 
start his historical sightseeing in Egypt. "Now, for a 
change I'll become an Egyptian, / But an Egyptian on the 
basis of the Gyntish I (det gyntske jeg)" (171). Peer 
insists that whatever external guise he appears in, the 
essential Gyntish I remains intact underneath. 
The two monuments of ancient Egypt that have parti- 
cular interest for Peer are the statue of Memnon and the 
Great Sphinx. Arne Liden in his article "Peer Gynt i 
Egypten" ("Peer Gynt in Egypt") in Edda, XL, 194o, in 
which he discusses Hegelian influences in Peer Gynt, 
points to Hegel's interpretation of the symbolism of the 
Sphinx and the statue of Memnon in his Philosophy of 
History (1837). Hegel writes: 
The Sphinx may be regarded as a symbol of the Egyptian 
Spirit. The human head looking out from the brute body 
represents the Spirit as it begins to rise above, and 
tear itself loose from, the merely Natural, and already 
to look more freely around it; without, however, entirely 
freeing itself from the fetters of Nature [... ] 
The colossal statue of Memnon resounds at the first 
glance of the young morning sun, though it is not yet 
the completely free consciousness of the Spirit which 
resounds. 89 
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Liden comments: "It is hardly a coincidence that Ibsen 
has chosen precisely the two motifs which, according to 
Hegel, best symbolise the struggle of the spirit to free 
itself from the animal instincts. " The riddle of the 
Memnon Statue, says Liden, is that the statue "is in 
itself a riddle. It has no more than Peer reached a full 
personal development. Therein lies the reproachful appeal 
of the song, an appeal which is lost on the person to 
whom it is addressed, for Peer did not understand the 
text of the song. 1190 
Peer does not interpret the Memnon Statue and the 
Sphinx in quite as lofty terms as Hegel does. In fact, 
to Peer they represent nothing but pure beasthood. The 
Memnon Statue reminds him of "the Old Men of Dovre, so 
called" (173). The voice of the statue warns him that if 
he does not solve the riddle of the song, he must die. 
Peer predictably reacts to the warning by dismissing the 
song as a delusion. When Peer describes the song of the 
statue as "the Music of the Past" (Fortidsmusik, a gibe 
at Wagner's Zukunftsmusik), the Past refers not only to 
Antiquity, but to Peer's own past. The association with 
the Dovre King brings back disturbing "music" from Peer's 
murky history, reminding him of another unsolved riddle: 
the distinction between troll and man, which Peer had 
never "fathomed. " The Great Sphinx is to Peer a "monster" 
and a "curious mongrel, " which calls to mind another 
long forgotten beast: "Why, it's the Boyg, whose skull I 
cracked, / I mean, I dreamt it, for I lay in a fever" (173). 
Peer would like to think that he, had only dreamt it, but 
his nightmarish struggle with the Boyg was real enough 
while it lasted. Peer seems to have forgotten that he 
was all but defeated by the monster, when he was saved 
from its trollish hold by the ringing of church bells. 
In his Aesthetics (1835) Hegel observes that the 
Sphinx in the Greek myth appears as a monster asking a 
riddle: "What is it that in the morning goes on four 
legs, at mid-day on two, and in the evening on three? 
Oedipus found the simple answer: man, and he tumbled the 
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Sphinx from the rock. " Hegel expounds: "The explanation 
of the symbol lies in the absolute meaning, in the 
Spirit, just as the famous Greek inscription calls to 
man: Know thyself. "91 Peer addresses the Sphinx: 
So that's it, Boyg. You look like a lion 
When seen in the daylight, and from behind! 
Do you still speak in riddles? We'll try. 
Let's see if you answer the same as before! (Calling to the Sphinx. ) 
Hi, Boyg! Who are you? (VI, 173) 
Peer has not forgotten what the Boyg answered before: 
"Myself. Can you say the same? " (lo8). Peer has not yet 
solved the riddle of what it means to be "Myself. " The 
Sphinx proves no more helpful than the Boyg. He merely 
echoes: "Ach, Sphinx, wer bist du? " (174). Strange? The 
Sphinx answers in German! Peer makes a hasty note of his 
original discovery: "Echo in German. Dialect, Berlin. " 
Begriffenfeldt emerges from behind the Sphinx. Peer adds 
another note: "Later arrived at a different conclusion. " 
When B egriffenf eldt approaches Peer, anxious to know who 
the Sphinx is, Peer promptly replies: "He is himself" 
(174). Whereas Hegel interpreted the riddle of the 
Sphinx as: Know thyself, Peer, like Kierkegaard, puts 
the accent on: Be thyself. In search of authentic self- 
hood--the Lebensfrage to which the Hegelian System could 
provide no solution--the mad Begriffenfeldt ("field of 
concepts") is so dazzled by Peer's profound insight, his 
answer having in a flash solved "the riddle of life" 
(Livsgaaden) (174), that he instantly proclaims Peer 
"The Emperor of Interpreters--on the basis of Self! " (175). 
On learning Peer's name, Begriffenfeldt pronounces with 
hushed admiration: 
Peer Gynt! Allegorical! What I expected. 
Peer Gynt? That is to say: The Unknown! 
The arrival, whose coming was foretold me. (VI, 175) 
Arne Lidgin suggests that the word "allegorical" is 
another direct reference to Hegel, who in his Aesthetics 
describes allegory as a further step in the development 
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of the Spirit expressing itself in art. Allegory is still 
a kind of symbolism, and hence is not yet "pure art, " but 
it is an advance from the mysterious symbolism of the 
Sphinx. In allegory the Idea is clearly expressed, but 
its expression is limited to general, abstract situations 
or qualities, e. g., religion, love, etc. The first con- 
cern of allegory consists in personifying these universal 
ideas, but allegorical figures are not individuals. Their 
subjectivity is but an empty form. Lidgin quotes Hegel: 
"An allegorical being, however much it may be given a 
human shape, does not attain the concrete individuality 
of a Greek god or of a saint or of some other actual 
person, because, in order that there may be congruity 
between subjectivity and the abstract meaning which it 
has, the allegorical being must make subjectivity so 
hollow that all specific individuality vanishes from it. "92 
Ziden comments: "Is not this the theme on which Ibsen 
has made a 'capricious' variation in order to present 
the self-confident Peer in a comic light--Peer, who has 
solved the riddle of the Sphinx and is prepared to prove 
his identity with a passport, when he is still only an 
'empty form, ' lacking concrete individuality? "93 
Begriffenfeldt drags the "allegorical" Peer along 
to the Cairo madhouse where the inmates await the "dawn 
of liberation" (178), seeing that "Absolute Reason/ 
Dropped dead last night at eleven o'clock" (176). Peer 
would fain decline the honour of being elected Emperor 
in a place where being oneself seems to be a question of 
being beside oneself. He protests his unworthiness, but 
the Doktor assures him that his false modesty is quite 
unjustified, for 
Here everybody is himself with a vengeance; 
Himself, and nothing else whatsoever, 
Speeding ahead, full sail, as himself. 
Each one shut up in the cask of self, 
Steeped in the fermentation of self, 
Hermetically sealed with the bung of self 
Between staves seasoned in the well of self. 
No one sheds a tear for another man's woes; 
No one listens to another man's ideas. 
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We are ourselves in thought, word and deed, 
Ourselves to the uttermost edge of the 
springboard. 
And so, if we're to elect an Emperor here, 
It's obvious that you are just the man. 
(VI, 178-79) 
Peer is to become Emperor of the new, emancipated age, 
the antithetical age of Unreason. Begriffenfeldt believes 
that a few examples of what it means to be oneself with a 
vengeance will suffice to convince Peer that he is the 
right man for the Emperorship. First there is Huhu, the 
language reformer, who is fighting his lonely battle for 
the right of the orang-outang to shriek in his authentic 
forest lingo, and who gratefully accepts Peer's sugges- 
tion that he, like other great men, emigrate to serve un- 
interpreted expatriates. Then there is the-f ellah who is 
struggling to prove that he is King Apis (another symbol 
of man's beasthood, and of his bondage to his past), and 
who promptly acts on Peer's advice to go hang himself 
and thereafter remain completely dead like the great 
king. And finally there is Minister Hussein, who is 
striving to be recognised for what he really is: a pen 
longing for the taste of the sharpening knife, and who, 
when Peer hands him the knife, ecstatically cuts his 
throat. Peer watches the absurd self-absorption of the 
madmen with increasing nausea and terror until he can 
stand no more of it and cries to Heaven for help, to the 
God whose name he has forgotten and can appeal to only 
as "Thou-Guardian of all madmen! " (185), and sinks down 
insensible. Whereupon Begriffenfeldt leaps astride his 
prostrate body and, pressing a wreath of straw on his 
head, hails him "Emperor of Self" (186). Unconscious had 
been his adoption of the troll creed, and unconscious 
"enthroned in the mire--/ Beside himself! " (186) does 
Peer reap the crowning reward. 
The burlesque tone of Act IV creates an overall 
impression of a life frittering away on the surface of 
existence, and makes us feel, Ronald Gaskell suggests, 
"not the viciousness but the nullity of a life of self- 
possession. "94 But the culminating cry in terror to 
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Heaven as Peer sees himself becoming inexorably engulfed 
in the grotesque self-annihilation of the asylum scene, 
is a cry of genuine existential anguish, and his dizzi- 
ness (Ibsen uses the word svimler which means "becoming 
dizzy, " not "fainting" as the Oxford translation has it. 
Cf. det vide svimle Slug ( 61), "the wide, dizzy abyss" 
into which Peer plunged astride the reindeer buck) is 
the dizziness of one looking into the abyss of 
existential nothingness: 
What shall I--! What am I? 0 Great One-- 
keep hold! 
I am whatever you want--a Turk, a sinner, 
A hill-troll. But help me! Something has 
burst--! (VI, 185) 
Yet nothing appears to have changed with Peer when 
we meet him years later on board the homeward bound ship 
gazing towards his native shores, except that his hair 
has gone grey and his expression has hardened. Peer has 
not outlived his youthful dream of riding in triumph 
into his native village to take back what was once his. 
He will rebuild the farmhouse into a shining palace, but 
let nobody inside, and not a farthing will be dropped to 
the beggars at the gate. Peer has remained faithful to 
the trolls' maxim of being to oneself enough. He is 
suddenly jolted out of his pleasant reverie by the unex- 
pected appearance of the Strange Passenger, whose death- 
ly white physiognomy and blasphemous talk about corpses 
in the face of the oncoming storm quite unsettles Peer. 
The Strange Passenger even has the audacity to approach 
him about the bequest, should the ship sink, of his 
"esteemed carcass" in the interest of Science, more 
particularly for the uncovering of the "seat of 
dreams" 
(194). Peer tells him to clear off. "Sinister fellows 
these scientists! / With their freethinking ways--" 
(195). 
His mind is not exactly set at rest when he learns that 
nobody else has seen the mysterious passenger, who 
hoped 
he would find Peer in a more tractable mood the next 
time they met. He reappears when Peer is riding on the 
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keel of the capsized dinghy, having disburdened himself 
of the cook, and given him the best testimonial: "You 
were yourself to the last gasp--" (197). This time the 
Strange Passenger does not come in the interest of 
Science but as an unpleasant moraliser apparently intent 
on putting the fear of God into Peer. He denies that he 
is the Devil, and speaks like a preacher of repentance, 
asking Peer disturbing questions like: "Friend, have you 
even twice a year/ Truly felt the earnestness of dread 
(Angstens Alvor)? " and "Have you even once in your life/ 
Known the victory that is given in dread (Sejren, som i 
Angst er givet)? " (199). Peer is conscious that the 
Strange Passenger is not talking about the fear of danger 
or even of death, but the deeper meaning of his words is 
hidden to. Peer. 
Kierkegaard deals with many aspects of Angst, but 
basically Angst is the dread a person feels when he 
awakes to the infinite possibility of choosing himself, 
and to the awful responsibility that his freedom entails. 
A well-known passage in The Concept of Dread (1844) runs: 
"Dread (Anpest) may be likened to dizziness (Svimmelhed). 
He whose eye comes to glance down into the yawning abyss 
grows dizzy. But the reason for this is just as much the 
eye as the abyss. For suppose he had not looked down. 
Thus dread is the dizziness of freedom (Frihedens Svim- 
len) which occurs when freedom gazes down into its own 
possibility (Mulighed). "95 Kierkegaard is not, like 
modern existentialists, so much concerned with man's 
infinite range of everyday possibilities, as with man's 
infinite possibility, that is to say, his freedom to 
choose between good and evil on the one hand, and indiff e- 
rence, neutrality, on the other. This is for Kierkegaard 
the decisive either-or whereby individuality is deter- 
mined--or forfeited. Angst is also dread of nothingness, 
the dread a man feels when he contemplates the nothing- 
ness he will fall into if he "betrays" the possibility 
(besviger Liuligheden) by which his individuality is to 
be formed. 96 Kierkegaard holds that man has not truly 
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chosen himself as an individual until he has made the 
leap of faith. Angst defined as "consciousness of sin" 
(and this is what The Concept of Dread is really about) 
is the dread that precedes, and leads, or may lead to 
faith. Angst in this sense is not simply feeling guilty 
about particular sins, but of being conscious of oneself 
as a spiritual being alienated from God by one's own 
sinfulness, and of the fact that every individual is 
held eternally accountable for the restoration of his 
true relationship with God. And this relationship can be 
restored only by man's repentance of his sins, and his 
acceptance of God's forgiveness. Thus An1st is seen as 
the prerequisite of true self-realisation, which is man's 
affirmation of himself as "spirit, " as movement towards 
the divine. 
All these various aspects, or kinds, of Angst are 
applicable to Peer Gynt, but it seems to be Angst as 
"consciousness of sin" that the Strange Passenger has 
particularly in mind. At least he appears to Peer to be 
more concerned with saving Peer's soul than with saving 
what is infinitely more precious to Peer: his life. Peer 
will hear nothing of repentance and salvation, which he 
associates with death, and Peer is not yet ready to die. 
However, it is not at all clear that the Strange Passen- 
ger has a Christian salvation in mind and has come to 
prepare Peer for death. He says he has come "to light a 
lantern/On life's dark journey through fear (Livsens 
Nattvej gjennem Frygten)" (199). Ibsen substituted 
Livsens Nattvej for the original Frelsens Fodsti, "the 
path of salvation" (315), which shows that he is being 
deliberately equivocal about the nature of the Strange 
Passenger's mission. Peer, even when left high and dry 
in the Sahara desert, is conscious of his many possi- 
bilities and of the need to choose: "Which path shall I 
choose? / Many lay open before me" (168). But Peer has 
been going round about the one thing needful: the deci- 
sive either-or whereby selfhood is won--or lost, and it 
is clearly this fundamental choice that the Strange 
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Passenger has come to remind him of. But Peer has no use 
for his belated enlightenment, and tells him so: 
If you've come to open a door, 
It's a pity you didn't come before. 
What's the sense in choosing one's time 
When the sea is about to swallow one up? (VI, 199) 
Peer, unlike Brand, cannot be persuaded of the value of 
a victory that is only won in death. Reassuring him that 
"One doesn't die in the middle of the fifth act" (2oo), 
the Strange Passenger glides away, thoroughly undeceived 
about Peer's readiness to accept a part in a morality 
play. 
While glad to see the back of that "tedious moral- 
ist, " Peer would not at all mind being judged by the 
worthy parish priest he heard panegyrising at the grave- 
side of a "kindred spirit" of whom it was said: 
He was a poor patriot. To Church and State 
A barren tree. But on that mountain slope 
. 
In the narrow circle where he saw his calling, 
There he was great, because he was himself. 
The tone he was born with, there rang true. 
(VI, 2o3) 
His peace of mind restored by the benevolent sermon, 
Peer exclaims: "Now that's what I call Christianity! / 
Nothing unpleasant to jar the mind" (2o3). And feeling 
inclined to expound upon its edifying theme: "to be one's 
unshakeable self, " he concludes: 
One must be oneself: look after oneself 
And one's own, in all things, great or small. 
If luck goes against you, at least you have 
the honour 
Of knowing you've always lived by your 
principles. (VI, 2o4) 
The scene which greets Peer on his homecoming to his 
native village is the most eloquent comment on the merit 
of a life lived in accordance with Peer's selfish prin- 
ciples: "A hillside with the dried-up bed of a stream, 
beside which stands a ruined mill. The ground is torn up'. 
Desolation all around" (2o5). With Peer sitting on a 
rubbish heap in the middle of this ruin, the scene 
96 
becomes a telling image of a life wasted in trollish 
to-thyself-be-enough-ness and of talents squandered in 
self-evasive non-commitment. 
An auction is in progress at Hwggstad. Peer is not 
recognised, but his memory is still alive among the 
villagers, to whom the "abominable romancer" has become 
a figure of legend. Just as the young buck-rider had 
resented being called a digter, a spinner of yarns, so 
the greybeard is dispirited to find himself remembered 
for the things that he would most like to forget. Con- 
fronted with these sad vestiges of his youth, Peer is 
suddenly feeling old. He asks for brandy and tells the 
villagers that he, too, has junk to put up for auction. 
A palace in the Ronde, "solidly built. " Grane, his horse, 
"That charger can fly/ As fast--as fast as Peer Gynt 
could tell lies. " An Empire is thrown to the crowd, "You 
can scramble for it! " (2o7), and a crown to go with it 
"of the finest straw" (2o8). Peer is not the "merry old 
chap" the villagers take him for. They do not see that 
the levity with which he throws the chaff of his futile 
dreams among the crowd conceals anguish as poignant as 
the death-squeal under the Devil's cloak. However, if 
the empire Peer had gained in the big world turned out 
to be a crown of straw, he has not yet given up the quest 
for that precious something which can make the metal he 
was made of ring true. But having no clear idea of what 
it is that he is seeking Peer, ironically, throws away 
the jewel with the junk, lumping "a dream of a clasp- 
book" together with the palace in the Ronde and the other 
useless cast-offs, which makes the likelihood of his 
finding his true Empire seem more remote than ever. 
On Whitsun Eve Peer is crawling about in the forest 
not very far from his old hut, which he has not yet 
spotted, looking for wild onions to eat. Seeing himself 
reduced to a herbivorous brute, Peer takes comfort in 
the thought that "At least I rank first among the wild 
animals" (21o). When he dies he will crawl under a 
fallen tree and carve his epitaph on the tree-trunk: 
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"Here lies Peer Gynt. A decent chap. / Emperor of all the 
other beasts" (21o). Emperor? Peer chuckles: 
You old fake! You're no Emperor. You're just an onion. Now, my dear Peer, I'm going to peel you! Begging for mercy won't help in the least. 
(VI, 210-11) 
He strips the onion layer by layer, making ironic 
comments on the various selves they remind him of, 
hoping finally to arrive at the core of this multi- 
farious collection. He becomes impatient: 
What an'incredible number of layers! 
Isn't the kernel soon coming to light? (Pulls the whole onion to pieces. ) 
No, I'm damned if it is. To the innermost 
centre 
There's nothing but layers--only smaller 
and smaller. 
Nature is witty! (Throws the pieces away. ) 
(VI, 211) 
From a passage drafted for the onion speech but crossed 
out in the manuscript, it would seem that Ibsen origi- 
nally meant Peer to see the onion as a symbol of Man 
rather than of his personal self. The passage runs: 
It's obvious that Man is an onion. 
It isn't coats, -it's the body itself 
He peels off to the kernel bud. 
But that's the fine thing, that at the 
innermost centre 
Is the onion's (innermost altered to) 
most succulent self to be ±o d. (VI, 322)97 
To Peer, the confirmed essentialist, it is quite incon- 
ceivable that the human onion should have no core. He 
expects "at the innermost centre" to find "the onion's 
most succulent self. " So much the greater his surprise 
when the kernel fails to appear. The full horror of his 
discovery is only brought home to him when he fails to 
qualify for acceptance to Hell, never mind Heaven. 
When Ibsen later decided to reserve the kernel-less 
onion for the Gyntish Self and make it less explicitly a 
symbol of Man--although it is apposite to the entire cast 
of coreless characters in the play, among whom Peer 
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stands out by virtue of the number of layers around the 
emptiness--it was clearly with the one exception in mind 
to which the Onion symbol could not be applied: Solveig. 
But then Solveig is a very exceptional being. She exists 
in a category of her own, representing divine rather 
than human nature. Solveig never errs. Brand, too, is an 
exceptional individual, but for all his striving towards 
godhead he remains human. He errs and doubts and despairs, 
and however sincere his choice, he still chooses the 
wrong path. He may be a martyr, but he is no saint. 
Solveig--and if ever there was a perfect Kierkegaardian 
Individual, she is one--makes the right choice at once, 
and never looks back. Her love for Peer is angelic. We 
never see her crying her heart out when her fickle friend 
deserts her. She seems to be above human suffering. 
In Peer Gynt God no longer exists as a metaphysical 
reality, although he is still present as a figure of folk- 
lore, as the benevolent God the Father of Soria Moria. 
Faced with the problem of filling the vacancy, which he 
was not yet prepared to leave unoccupied, Ibsen resorted 
to the traditional romantic solution of introducing a 
Madonna-like woman as a God-substitute. Solveig becomes 
Peer's deus caritatis who--unlike the God of Love whom 
Brand only knew as a destroyer--is content to love and 
forgive and claim nothing in return. Her undemanding 
love comes close to the popular idea of divine love 
which Brand so despised and ridiculed: 
When the path is narrow, steep and 
slippery, 
It can be cut short--by love. 
When a man walks on the broad road 
of sin, 
There is still hope--in love. 
When he sees his goal, but will not 
strive, 
He can yet conquer--through love. 
When he goes astray, while knowing 
what is right, 
He may still find refuge--in love! (V, 238) 
In Brand God is still a possibility, and as such permits 
the assumption that Brand has a God-given calling. In 
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Peer Gynt God has become a myth, and with his disappear- 
ance from the realm of possibility vanishes the notion of 
man being made in God's image and having a God-ordained 
purpose to fulfil in life. But Ibsen, who is still very 
much concerned with man in a metaphysical context, having 
not yet reached the stage when he is seemingly content to 
establish a meaningful existence for his characters on a 
purely secular level, needs to posit an absolute calling 
for Peer, and does so by insisting on Peer's obligation, 
however vaguely defined, to the divine Solveig. 
Both God and the Devil receive comic treatment in 
the play, but not Solveig. She is portrayed with*a 
seriousness not accorded to any other character, which 
is a mark of her divinity. But being both human and 
divine, representing both eros (human love in her capa- 
city as woman, although it seems impossible for Peer to 
think of her as an object of sexual nossession)'and 
agape (divine love in her capacity as saviour) Solveig 
becomes a very unconvincing character, functioning credi- 
bly in neither capacity. And in neither capacity does 
she solve the problem of the Onion. If Ibsen in Solveig 
has provided for the salvation of Peer's soul--which in 
any case is not a Christian salvation since Solveig 
declares that Peer has sinned in nothing--he has not in 
her found the answer to the crucial question: What, if 
man is not created in God's image, is the nature of the 
human self? Peer thought he knew, but the amazing dis- 
covery that the onion has no core jolts him out of his 
misapprehension: 
A queer business, this whole affair! 
Life, as they say, has a fox behind 
its ear. 
But grab at him, and he takes to his 
heels, 
And you've caught something else-- 
or nothing at all. (VI, 211-12)98 
Life, Peer concludes in retrospect, is a grasping for 
something that forever-eludes one, a stretching out for 
the golden crown and snatching a wreath of straw. He 
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suddenly sees his old hut and hears someone singing 
inside. He rises to his feet, quiet and deathly pale: 
One who remembered, and one who forgot. 
One who squandered, and one who saved. 
0 earnestness! Never can the game be 
replayed! 
0 dread! Here was my Empire! (VI9 212) 
Peer experiences for the first time "the earnestness of 
dread" which the Strange Passenger spoke of, but it does 
not lead to victory, for Peer is not yet ready to repent. 
He follows the Boyg's advice and flees. 
Night falls on the heath and Peer runs into a fire- 
ravaged wasteland of blackened tree-trunks stretching as 
far as the eye can see. A pall of white mist shrouds the 
desolation. The symbolism is as clear to Peer as to the 
audience: "Ashes, mist, and wind-blown dust--/ Here's 
enough to build with! " (212). A memorial to eternalise 
his non-self takes shape in Peer's imagination. It will 
be a pyramid founded on "Fancies, dreams, and still-born 
knowledge, " over which the edifice will mount up and up 
in steps of lies, and at the apex will flaunt the motto: 
"Flee from truth, shun repentance" (213). Peer would 
fain flee from the dire truth of the wasteland but finds 
his path blocked by threadballs, telling him that they 
are the thoughts he should have thought, and by withered 
leaves complaining that they are the watchwords he never 
proclaimed. Sighs in the air lament that they are the 
songs he stifled in the depth of his heart. Dewdrops 
fall from the branches. They are the tears he never shed. 
Broken straws remind him of the deeds he left undone. On 
Judgement Day they will flock to voice their accusation. 
From far away echoes the voice of the last complainant. 
It is mother Aase accusing her reckless coachman of 
having driven her to perdition. Peer has had enough. 
Refusing to "carry the Devil's sins" he flees--and runs 
straight into the Button-Moulder, who says he has come 
on Master's orders to fetch Peer's soul without delay. 
Peer believes that he is facing the Devil himself, 
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but soon learns that he has made a mistake, for the 
Button-Moulder, it transpires, only collects souls who 
are not airy enough for Heaven or substantial enough for 
Hell, seeing that these places only accept Individuals 
who are themselves in a positive or a negative way. 
People who, like Peer, have bungled the imperative task of 
self-realisation and have no identity, are only fit to go 
back into the melting-pot "to be merged in the mass. " 
"Now you, " reveals the Button-Moulder when it is too late 
for Peer to make use of the information, "were designed 
to be a shining button/ On the waistcoat of the world. 
But the loop gave way" (219). Peer's soul has consequently 
only scrap metal value since there is no self to go with 
it. It appears that the Button-Moulder, like Peer, sub- 
scribes to the essentialist belief that man is born with 
God's seal--Master's intention--stamped on his brow, 
which means that he is born with an innate essence of self, 
and that God designed him for a specific task in life. 
But it is, according to the Button-Moulder, still possible 
to waste one's God-given self, to wear the stamp off the 
coin, as it were. His essentialist conception of selfhood, 
therefore, does not prevent him from pronouncing a Kierke- 
gaardian judgement on Peer's "self-less" existence. Peer 
protests: "You're surely not meaning to melt me down/ With 
Tom, Dick, and Harry into something different? " (219). The 
very thought is an affront to Peer's innermost soul. He is 
prepared to compromise as far as his station in the after- 
life is concerned, but he will not give up one jot of his 
precious self: 
--to be swallowed up 
Like a speck of dust in a stranger's body, 
This ladle affair, this cessation of Gynthood, 
Why, it rouses my innermost soul to revolt: (VI, 22o) 
The Button-Moulder feigns surprise that Peer should get 
so worked up over such a trifle: "Up till now, you have 
never been yourself. / What difference does it make that 
you vanish completely? " (22o). Peer is dumbfounded: 
lot 
Have I never been--? I could almost laugh! 
Peer Gynt has been something else, I suppose! 
No, Button-Moulder, you're judging blindly. 
If you could look into my inmost being, 
You'd find Peer and only Peer, 
Nothing else, and nothing more. (VI, 22o-21) 
But Peer's assurance does not convince the Button-Moulder, 
who has it in writing that Peer is to go into the casting- 
ladle as defective goods since he has defied the purpose 
for which he was designed. However, Peer mananges to 
persuade the Button-Moulder to give him a little respite 
to prove his case: "We only live once, / And would fain 
hang on to the self we were born with" (222). 
Peer's homecoming now turns into a mad race against 
time to find witnesses willing to testify that he has 
always been himself: "The world's a bungle! What a state 
of affairs/ When a man has to prove his obvious right! " 
(222). But Peer appears to have luck on his side, for the 
first person he meets is the Old Man of Dovxe, now de- 
posed and reduced to beggary. Peer promises the Old Man 
a few coppers for a drink if he will testify in court to 
Peer's having stood out against the trolls' attempt to 
distort his vision, and to his having renounced love, 
power and glory, simply and solely to remain himself. 
But the Old Man of Dovre is an honourable man who refuses 
to swear to a lie. Peer, he alleges, left the Ronde with 
the trolls' maxim firmly engraved on his heart, and has 
been living up to it ever since. It is by that potent 
word "enough" that Peer has swung himself up as a man of 
substance. "A hill-troll? I? " (226). Peer is speechless. 
His sacrifices, his restless roaming around the world 
have been to no purpose. He might as well have stayed in 
the Ronde in peace and comfort and saved, God knows, how 
many pairs of shoes. The Old Man's allegation is absurd. 
He must be insane, or else senile. Peer suggests he 
should be in a Home. Alas, that comfort, says the Old Man, 
is denied him by his grandson's offspring who say that he 
only exists in books. And since he cannot count on 
Prince 
Peer who claims that he is himself a beggar to the extent 
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that even "My princely self is in pawn" (227), the Old 
Man's last hope is to go on the stage, where they have 
been advertising for national types. Sharing with the 
Old Man the misfortune of having become a myth in his 
own lifetime, Peer considers he might do the same, if 
only he could get out of this ladle affair: 
I shall write them a farce, both crazy 
and profound, 
And call it: "Sic transit gloria mundi. " 
(VI, 227) 
Peer has already reached the crossroads, but without the 
testimonial with which he had hoped to redeem his 
"princely self. " When he learns from the Button-Moulder 
that the Master's intention is something one must 
"divine, " Peer gives up trying to prove that he has been 
himself in accordance with that intention. However, his 
ship on the rocks he still clings to the wreckage. "Any- 
thing rather than go on the scrap-heap! " (228). He begs 
the Button-Moulder to give him a second chance. He will 
try to prove that he has been himself in defiance of the 
Master's intention: a really great sinner. He meets a 
parson carrying a fowler's net, who on closer inspection 
turns out to be a soul-catcher walking on a natural hoof, 
the very witness Peer needs. But the Lean One, despite 
the low turnover of truly individual souls, is not one 
to compromise. Peer with nothing more substantial to his 
credit than trafficking in slaves and idols, is a mere 
trifler compared to those who have trafficked in wills 
and minds and still failed to get in because they bungled 
it. The Lean One regrets to have to refuse Peer's request: 
What's all this talk of "more or less, " 
With due respect? Who do you think 
Is going to waste expensive fuel in times 
Like these, on such half-hearted rubbish? (VI, 234) 
A man can be himself in two different ways, the Lean One 
explains. He can be, as it were, either a positive or a 
negative copy of the photograph. Now, if a soul in the 
course of its life has photographed itself in the nega- 
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tive way, the plate is not therefore destroyed, but is 
sent on to the Lean One for further treatment by the 
appropriate purgatorial means until a metamorphosis is 
effected and the positive image emerges which the plate 
was meant to give. But when, 'as in Peer's case, the 
features are half. rubbed out, neither sulphur nor potash 
will do the trick. The Lean One has obviously read his 
Kierkegaard: "[... ] it is not so much a question of 
choosing the right as of the energy, the earnestness, 
the pathos with which one chooses. "99 Having had his 
featureless plate of "half-way" virtues and "half-way" 
sins rejected by Heaven and Hell respectively, Peer must 
resign himself to the fact that he is "expelled from the 
self-owning nobility" (237), 
loo if indeed he was ever in 
it. He sees a shooting star flash to extinction in the 
night. Peer nods after it: 
Greetings from Peer Gynt, brother shooting star! 
Sparkle, slip, and be lost in the void-- 
(VI, 237) 
Suddenly seized by terror he cries into the engulfing 
mists: 
Is there no one, no one in all the Universe, 
No one in the Abyss, no one in Heaven--i (VI9 237) 
Stripped of his Empire-dream and his "princely self" 
Peer is lost in the depths of utter God-abandoned hope- 
lessness, alone in the universe, belonging nowhere, a 
spark of consciousness flashing across the void into 
annihilation. After a while panic subsides into resigned 
despair: 
So unspeakably poor can a soul return 
To nothingness in the misty grey. 
Beautiful earth, do not be angry 
That I trampled your grass to no avail. 
Beautiful sun, you have squandered 
Your glorious light on an empty hut. 
There was no one within to warm and gladden. 
The owner, they say, was never at home. 
(VI9 237) 
Approaching the next' crossroads and the sweeping 
away of his soul into nothingness, Peer is suddenly over- 
los 
come by an intense longing to climb to the highest peak 
to watch the sun rice once again over the promised land 
that he will not be allowed to enter. And when he has 
gazed himself tired, he will heap snow over his mortal 
remains, above which they may write: "Here lies No One" 
(237). Churchgoers pass by on the forest path, singing 
a Whitsun hymn. Peer crouches in terror: 
Never look that way! There is desert 
and waste--. 
I fear I was dead long before I died. (VI9 238) 
Peer, who is still fleeing from truth and shunning 
repentance, tries once again to slink away, but finds 
himself already on the crossroads, face to face with the 
Button-Moulder, who announces that his time is up and 
demands to see his list of sins. It is still a blank. 
But Peer, who is near his old hut and hears singing in- 
side,. cries: "That's where I shall find my list of sins" 
(238). As he approaches the hut he hesitates: 
No! It's like a wild, unending lament 
To go back, to go in, to go home. (VI9 239) 
He remembers the Boyg's advice: "Go round about! " "No! 
This time/ Straight through, however narrow the path! " 
He throws himself down on the threshold: "If you have 
judgement for a sinner, then speak out now! " (239). 
Solveig, now blind, recognises him instantly and rejoices 
in the homecoming of the prodigal son. Desperately 
anxious to have his list of sins confirmed, knowing that 
the Button-Moulder is waiting behind the hut, Peer is 
told that he has sinned in nothing, that he has made 
Solveig's life a beautiful song, and blessed be their 
Whitsuntide reunion. Peer's last hope is dashed. He is 
utterly lost--unless Solveig can answer a riddle: 
Where was I, as my self, my whole, my 
true self? 
Where was I, with God's seal on my brow? (VI, 24o) 
For Solveig the riddle is easy: "In my faith, in my hope, 
and in my love" (24o). Peer is nonplussed. Her answer is 
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yet another riddle. He responds as the audience will re- 
spond: "You are mother yourself to the boy that's there! " 
Solveig agrees, and the Father is "He who forgives when 
the mother prays" (24o). Peer's face lights up: 
My mother! My wife! Purest of women! 
Oh, hide me, hide me in your heart. (VI9 241) 
Peer has found his true Empire at last, in the pure love 
of a mother-wife, a love which is given freely, which 
knows no bounds, which blesses and forgives and demands 
nothing in return, no confessions of sins, no repentance, 
no penance, no sacrifice. Or has he? 
With the Button-Moulder still waiting for Peer's 
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list of sins, which is to prove whether he has been an 
Individual worthy of Hell if not of Heaven, what does 
the concluding Pieta really signify? Peer's salvation in 
Solveig's lap has been no less of an embarrassment to 
critics than the last line announcement of a deus cari- 
tatis in Brand, which Roman Woerner dismissed as ein 
Verlegenheitsschluss. 101 What is there to save if Peer 
has no self, his soul being, in the words of the Lean 
One, a featureless plate beyond redemption by any method, 
positive or negative? Assuming that Peer is "saved, " how 
is his "salvation" to be understood, considering that 
Peer Gynt is primarily about self-realisation, not about 
the salvation of the soul, and that the emphasis is on 
the absolute responsibility of the individual for the 
actualisation of his authentic self? 
Ibsen's attempt to distinguish between the Christian 
soul and the existential self has in Peer Gynt become, if 
anything, more confused than in Brand. `ehe only person in 
the play who expresses a Christian concern, although with 
little Christian charity, for the salvation of Peer's 
soul, is Solveig's father, the "psalmsinger. " Solveig 
herself expresses anxiety neither for Peer's self nor for 
his soul, so confident is she about the integrity of 
Peer's self being preserved in her faith, hope, and love, 
and about the redemption of his soul by the Father who 
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forgives when the mother prays. 
The Dovre scene focuses entirely on the existential 
"either-or, " the choice between being a man and being a 
troll, between realising oneself as an Individual in un- 
selfish, ethical commitment, or remaining an aesthetic 
non-self, pursuing one's own selfish ends. The Boyg 
symbolises man's indestructible troll-self, his primeval 
nature, the Ur-Natur v. Eberkopf spoke cf, or Kierke- 
gaard's "immediate man" (or, for the psychoanalytically 
inclined, the Freudian Id), something which must be 
conquered every day by a conscious effort of the will 
if man is to become his true self--whatever that is. 
The "moral" of Act IV is pertinently summed up in 
Peer's misquotation from the Bible about gaining the 
whole world but losing one's self, by which--conveniently 
substituting "self" for "soul"- 
102. Peer justifies his 
pursuit of limitless self-aggrandisement, predicting with 
unconscious irony: 
That if you gained the whole world 
But lost your Self, your gain were 
But a wreath around a broken skull. (VI, 14o) 
Peer's fantastical quest for "global" selfhood ends in 
his being crowned Emperor of Self in the Cairo madhouse, 
where the self-annihilation to which the troll creed 
ultimately leads is demonstrated before the terrified 
Peer's very eyes. 
The Strange Passenger, on his first appearance, 
reveals himself as the most cynical "aesthete, " expecting 
his dissection of Peer's "esteemed carcass" to uncover 
neither soul nor self, but seeking the well-spring of 
the Gyntish Self in the "seat of dreams. " On his reappear- 
ance, however, he comes as a "tedious moralist, " asking 
unpleasant ethical questions which Peer interprets as 
a belated and irrelevant attempt to save his soul. 
? Hore surprisingly, however, the worthy pastor 
speaking at the graveside, the one most likely to concern 
himself with the matter, does not have a word to say 
about the salvation of the soul by God's mercy, but ends 
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his sermon on a line reminiscent of Brand, expressing 
the confident hope that, because he was himself, "This 
man scarce stands crippled now before his God; " (2o3). 
As a contrast we are reminded of Kierkegaard's "unworthy" 
parson ministering immortality to the State Church 
Christian who "goes to church every Sunday, hears and 
understands the parson, yea, they understand one another; 
he dies; the parson introduces him into eternity for 
the price of $lo--but a self he was not, and a self he 
did not become. ++lo3 
However, since self-less souls like loop-less 
buttons and coins worn smooth still have their metal 
value, they are parsimoniously collected for remelting 
in the Button-Moulder's ladle. (The economical Master 
cannot be'identical with the spendthrift God the Father. ) 
While the Button-Moulder on the one hand claims that 
each individual is born with God's seal on his brow, which 
might be taken to mean that he is born with a permanent 
essence of self, it appears on the other hand that the 
soul is not an immutable, indestructible essence, since 
it can, as in Peer's case, vanish completely. It would 
seem, in fact, that the soul is only the raw material, 
the metal out of which. the self is moulded, which suggests 
that the Button-Moulder accepts the existentialist notion 
that the self is not inborn, but has to be acquired, and 
is only acquired when a person chooses himself absolutely. 
Peer remains a featureless plate because it has always 
been his policy never to burn his bridges, and since 
" neither sulphur nor potash can transform neutrality into 
individuality, the Lean One--who means Individuals when 
he talks about souls--has to refuse Peer's request for a 
purgatorial metamorphosis. If the majority of people end 
up in the casting-ladle, it follows that man is not born 
with an immortal soul, but with the possibility of 
achieving immortality by becoming an Individual, in a 
positive or a negative way. If he remains neutral, uncom- 
mitted, his soul has value as only so much scrap. Conse- 
quently, Peer's soul can be saved only when it has been 
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established that he has always been himself in Solveig's 
faith, hope, and love. But how cän Peer be himself in 
someone else's faith, hope, and love when the play so 
emphatically insists that self-realisation is self- 
activity? Peer's salvation depends, from an existential 
point of view, not on Solveig's love and forgiveness 
(nor does he come to her as a repentant sinner) but on 
his conquering the Boyg, and that, we must assume, is 
the real achievement of his leap--to which he is driven 
in desperation rather than by conviction--"straight 
through" at last. But over Peer's dubious salvation 
hovers the unsolved riddle of the Onion, that multi- 
farious collection of "selves" which on dissection failed 
to produce the essential core, the permanent God-given 
self, which behind the actor's transient disguises is 
the real, the unique, the immortal Peer. Peer's dream of 
an Empire, like Brand's quest for godhead, is not a 
yearning for Heaven, but for divinity on earth, for 
transcendence of the "immediate man"--although Peer does 
not know how to ask the appropriate question: "Where was 
I, as my self, my whole, my true self? " (24o) until, all 
too late, it is brought home to him that his non- 
comittal existence has been a living death. 
Peer continues Brand's quest for authentic selfhood, 
but in a world where the traditional certainties have 
become much less certain. Brand has a God whom he can 
take seriously and who, viewed existentially, serves him 
well as an ideal on which he can model his own self, 
although in a Christian context he turns out to be an 
inadequate ideal. Peer's God is the God of the fairy 
tales he was nursed on, whom he can only treat with the 
seriousness he accords to other figures of folklore. If 
Peer thinks the Devil a fool who can be conjured into a 
worm-eaten nut, and is later hoodwinked into searching 
for Peer's soul at the missionary-infested Cape of Good 
Hope, he has an equally "human" conception of God the 
Father, who treats every newcomer to Soria Idoria to cakes 
and ale, and is a spendthrift whom Peer would hesitate to 
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consult in business matters, and upon whose deaf ears he 
drums only in times of utter distress. Peer's God the 
Father can no more serve as an. ideal to strive after than 
can the people's "family God" whom Brand declared he had 
come to bury. Nor does Peer enjoy the advantage Brand has 
of knowing precisely what his calling is. True, Brand is 
torn between his duties as a priest and those of a husband 
and father, but he never doubts that his prime duty is to 
his priesthood. Peer has no such occupational preference. 
He has no sense of being God-ordained for a specific task 
in life. He dreams of outshining the villagers even as 
the Emperor outshines the tattered and ridiculed buck- 
rider, but he has no clearly defined goal towards which 
his exaggerated aspirations may be directed. 
Peer rejoiced in having found his Princess when 
Solveig came to join him in the forest, but his soiled 
past prevented him from accepting her pure love. Nor was 
there anything in the fairy tales about winning a Prin- 
cess on one's bended knees as a repentant sinner. He 
dreamt of coming to his Princess as the glorious Prince 
Peer riding through the air. The fact that Peer makes 
his fear of committing sacrilege the excuse for leaving 
Solveig is not so much a proof of his inherent goodness 
and morality as a rationalisation of his unconscious 
terror of being "sucked up" by Solveig's stronger self, 
just as he later rebels against the thought of being merged 
like a speck of dust in someone else's body. Peer prefers 
the empty-headed Anitra over whose non-self he can reign 
supreme, and whom he is free to leave when he is tired 
of the game. Indeed, he attributes his worldly success to 
the fact that he never married. Having no sense of identi- 
ty, Peer regards love, in the sense of being inextricably 
tied to another person, as a threatening invasion of self, 
feeling he cannot be himself unless he is himself alone. 
It is only when Peer peels the onion and finds no 
kernel at the heart of it that he becomes seriously aware 
of the fact that there may not be a "real" Peer inside 
the actor of many parts, and that Peer, like the onion, 
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is the multifarious collection of his layers, a quite 
accidental assortment of "selves" around an empty core. 
For Peer has stumbled upon his unlikely roles, not 
chosen them, and might just as easily have been a quite 
different collection. If there is no one in the Abyss 
and no one in Heaven, no Absolute Being in whose image 
Peer was created a unique individual--and a mysterious 
Master whose intentions are undivinable is to all practi- 
cal purposes non-existent as far as Peer is concerned-- 
then his quest for Empire has been a chase after an 
empty mirage, a crown of straw, and his soul will return 
"To nothingness in the misty grey" (237). Unless, of 
course, one accepts that the image of Peer lodged in 
Solveig's heart is the true Peer as God "designed" him. 
Or perhaps Solveig, when she tells Peer that he has been 
himself in her faith, hope, and love, is in fact saying 
that a person's selfhood can only be recognised by 
others, that selfhood does not exist "in and for itself" 
(v. Eberkopf refers to Peer's egotistical self-suffici- 
ency as "this for-and-in-oneself-existence" (132), a 
variation on Hegel's an und für sich Sein), but only in 
relation to other people, and that Peer has been himself, 
complete and true, in. Solveig's love, not by virtue of 
what he has done to deserve it, but by virtue of what he 
has meant to her. And Peer has been the pivot of her 
existence. Waiting for his return has filled her life 
with meaning and made it "a beautiful song. " Solveig, in 
turn, is the "purest of women" because Peer sees her thus. 
This interpretation, however, is contradicted by the fact 
that Solveig has so obviously "earned" her selfhood by 
her lifelong devotion to Peer, while Peer is the one who 
"forgot. " Nor will Ibsen allow us to rest too comfort- 
ably in the assumption that Peer is "saved"--whatever 
that means--for from behind the hut echoes the Button- 
Moulder's warning: 
We shall meet at the last crossroads, Peer; 
And then we'll see if--i I say no more. 
(VI, 241) 
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" Peer Gynt is an exploration not only of the nature 
of the Self, but of the nature of Reality, for the two 
are inseparable. If, as the Strange Passenger intimates, 
Peer's self springs from the "seat ol' dreams, " and 
returns, as Solveig's song implies, to the cradle of 
dreams, may not his entire existence be a dream? 
Certainly for Peer the distinction between reality and 
dream/fantasy--and he knows from the fact that Aase and 
the villagers insist on calling his stories "lies" that 
there must be such a distinction--becomes increasingly 
difficult to uphold. Brand, for all his super-human 
idealism, still lives in the world of facts, although 
his leading his congregation into the mountains with no 
thought for their material needs, and his meeting with 
the tempters in the wilderness, are signs of his losing 
his grip of factual reality. Peer Gynt lives in a world 
where dreams are as real as waking experience, and 
actual adventures as fantastic as fiction. In Peer's 
world one may be punished in waking life for sins commit- 
ted in dreams, and merely lusting after a girl "in heart 
and eye" (los) may have unpleasantly factual consequen- 
ces. If one feasts with trolls in dreams, one continues 
to be a troll in "real" life, and Peer's "real" life 
coronation as "Troll" Emperor in the Cairo madhouse is a 
nightmare to equal the grotesque horror of the Dovre 
scene. Dream characters are just as real and influential 
as ordinary people. Peer's wooing of the Green Woman 
turns out to be a more dangerous game than his philander- 
ing with Ingrid and Anitra. And the Dovre King and the 
Boyg are at least as influential in shaping Peer's life 
as are Mother Aase and Solveig. Nor is it Solveig, but 
the Strange Passenger, the Voices on the heath, the 
Button-I1loulder, and the Lean One who strip Peer of his 
comfortable self-delusions and show him the yawning gulf 
of unused possibilities into which he will vanish with- 
out a trace if he fails to prove that he has been himself. 
The dream scenes in Act II are clearly bracketed as 
dreams by the fact that Peer, before he enters the Dovre 
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Hall, is knocked unconscious by running his nose against 
a rock, and after the struggle with the Boyg--which, 
moreover, takes place in pitch darkness--yawns awake with 
a very realistic craving for a pickled herring. In the 
last act there are no such explicitly marked transitions 
between dream scenes and real life scenes. Peer never 
questions the real existence of the Strange Passenger, 
although none of the crew had seen him. He sympatises 
with the deposed Dovre King's plight of having become a 
figure of legend relegated to the stage, but never doubts 
his reality. Nor does he dispute the verdict of the Lean 
One, for all he unmasks him as a gullible fool. And it 
is his very real fear of the Button-Moulder rather than 
his love for Solveig that makes Peer take the desperate 
plunge "straight through" at last. Nor does Solveig's 
song wake Peer from his dream state, but very appropri- 
ately lulls him to his last sleep in the lap of dreams. 
All his life Peer has done nothing but fictionalise 
himself. It was not good enough for him to be just poor 
Mother Aase's son, heir to a run-down, debt-ridden farm. 
What Gudbrand Glesne could do, Peer could do even better, 
and he would not stop with the flight along the Gjendin 
Edge, but rode "forth over the salty ocean, / And high 
over England's prince! " (95) with the aim of becoming 
Emperor of all the world by the power of gold. When he 
returns to his native village an old man, still in 
search of his "princely self, " the living Peer is not 
recognised. He was hanged a long time ago in a foreign 
land as far as the villagers are concerned. But the 
fictionalised Peer--the buck-rider, the devil-conjurer, 
the bride-abductor (legend does not distinguish between 
fact and fiction), the abominable romancer--continues to 
enjoy a very vivid existence in the village memory. So 
who is the more "real" Peer, the living Peer or the Peer 
of legend? And the answer to Peer's riddle: "Where was I, 
as my self, my whole, my true self? " (24o) is simply 
that Peer's true self is a fiction mothered by Solveig's 
faith, hope, and love. 
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Rolf Fjelde bases his theory of the "dissolving self" 
in'Peer Gynt on the assumption that Peer starts out with 
a "substantial soul" in the traditional sense. The church 
bells and hymns that rescue Peer from the trolls and the 
Boyg imply, he argues, that the young Peer "is still 
residually a soul to be saved, like Faust a half century 
earlier, recalled from poison by the Easter chorales. ""lo4 
But the ringing of church bells to reclaim people who 
have been "troll-taken" is traditional folklore and does 
not necessarily prove that Peer is a soul to be saved in 
the Christian sense. Indeed the Boyg attributes his defeat 
not to the bell-ringing but to Peer's strength because 
he had women, the power of love, behind him. The Button- 
Moulder makes it quite clear that Peer's soul, far from 
being "substantial, " will vanish without a trace in the 
molten mass of the casting-ladle because he has failed to 
give it the stamp of an Individual Self. Fjelde contends 
that Peer's "unresolved identity" remains in a "suspended 
state of dissolution" until the culminating disclosure of 
the Onion Self, which he compares with Kierkegaard's 
concept of self as summed up by George Price: "it can be 
argued with some justice that ... Kierkegaard has dis- 
solved [the self] into a bundle of relationships, and 
reached the conclusion'that it was all pure possibility. 
But his reply to this would be equally just: 'I do not 
dissolve man; he is already dissolved. What else is man 
but a possibility that seldom becomes an actuality? ',, 
lo5 
Is not this, precisely, the "new picture of man" in 
Peer Gynt? Ibsen does not dissolve Peer's self. Peer has 
no self to be dissolved. He is "pure possibility. " The 
dissolution of the essential self--and we must distinguish 
between the individual self and this or that concept of 
self--happens earlier, in Brand. Brand bases his uncompro- 
mising quest for selfhood on the presumption that man is 
made in God's image and therefore knows in his heart, he 
does not have to guess, what his true self is and what 
God demands of every human being--only to discover when 
he is punished for his hubris by an Unknown God, that he 
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never could know. Brand's concept of man is essentialist, 
but his approach to the task of self-realisation is 
existentialist. He does not wait for a definitive Voice 
from Heaven to enlighten him. He defines his ideal Self 
and chooses his vocation, and achieves selfhood in the 
only way that man, according to existentialist belief, 
can achieve selfhood, by choosing himself absolutely. 
Although unable to define his Empire--having no 
model God in whose likeness he would strive to realise 
himself, like Brand--the imaginative, resourceful, 
exuberantly alive Peer Gynt of the three first acts 
comes across, not as a soul in need of salvation, but as 
a tremendous "possibility. " However, when we meet him 
again years later as the glib aesthete of Act IV9 
preaching and practising the doctrine of pleasure for 
pleasure's sake, we meet him as a possibility that has 
failed to become an actuality. Act V leaves us with the 
question: What is the point of becoming an actuality if 
life has no ultimate Bestemmelse (purpose) of which man 
can gain certainty? Brand sacrificed all human happiness 
in order to realise his true self, and came to a grievous 
end. Peer refuses to commit himself to an ideal the 
correctness of which can only be divined and has to be 
accepted on faith, which means that he never commits 
himself irrevocably to anything, and is, against all 
odds, "saved" by another person's sacrificial love. 
Having dissolved the essential self, the concept of 
man's permanent identity which, as Fjelde points out, 
was always at the core of dramatic characterisation, how 
does the "new picture of man" affect Ibsen's attitude to 
character delineation? Among Clemens Petersen's many 
objections to Peer Gynt (that it lacked a "clear sequence 
in the plot development" and "perfect integrity in the 
execution, " that the whole of Act IV was an irrelevant 
whim, that the play was full of empty riddles, that the 
identification of the Boyg with the Sphinx was an "intel- 
lectual swindle, " that the Ideal was lacking and that 
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the play, therefore, was not poetry but a piece of 
polemical journalism) are also some strong reservations 
about Ibsen's characters: that they are not fully 
rounded "persons" and lack "life, " that Ibsen uses the 
characters to explain the situations rather than the 
situations to explain the characters, and that he has 
"a strong tendency to dissolve the characters into mere 
concepts, " such as the Strange Passenger personifying 
the concept of Angst. 
1o6 Ibsen was furious. "Tell me 
now, " he thundered in a letter to Bjornson, "is Peer 
Gynt himself not a personality, complete and individual? 
I know that he is. And the mother, is she not? "107 
Clemens Petersen's remark about Ibsen's "tendency 
to dissolve the characters into mere concepts" is not 
as unjustified as Ibsen's irate response might suggest. 
Apart from Peer himself, and perhaps Mother Aase, the 
play is peopled by single-feature types and allegorical 
figures. What infuriated Ibsen was not so much that 
Petersen's observations about his characters were wrong, 
as the fact that he faulted Ibsen for his use of alle- 
gorical characters, which he considered "unpoetical. " 
Petersen, who insisted that allegory is not poetry and 
that only characters who are "living human beings" are 
poetical, failed to recognise the true function and 
justification of the allegorical characters in Peer G, ynt. 
But Ibsen declared: "My book is poetry; and if it is not, 
then it shall be. The conception of poetry in our country, 
in Norway, shall shape itself according to my book. There 
is nothing fixed and eternal in the world of concepts. ß, 
1o8 
The constituents that make up Peer's dissolved self 
can be divided into three categories. First there is the 
Gyntish Self of "wishes, desires and appetites. " This is 
Peer's troll self, his "immediate" nature. Next there are 
the social roles that make up Peer's onion personality. 
This is Peer the actor of many parts. And finally there 
are the spiritual aspects that constitute Peer's "soul": 
his yearning for the ideal, his awakening consciousness 
of self, his fear, Angst, and guilt. The distinction 
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between these various aspects of Peer's multifarious 
self is reflected in Ibsen's dramatic technique. When 
Peer peels the onion and comments on its various layers, 
it is not the Gyntish Self of "wishes, desires, and 
appetites" he describes, but the actor of many parts. He 
peels off the "gold-digger self" with the juice all gone; 
then a coarse skin, the fur-trapper from Hudson Bay; 
then a bit that looks like a crowm, which he throws away 
"without further comment"; next the student of history, 
"short but vigorous"; then the Prophet, "fresh and juicy" 
and stinking of lies; then a soft and curly layer, the 
gentleman who lived in ease and pleasure. Another layer 
looks sick, and is streaked with black, which could mean 
"both priest and nigger" (VI, 211). All these are what 
we may call Peer's "occupational" selves, Peer as he 
presents himself to the world. The darker forces of the 
Gyntish Self, Peer's subconscious drives, are externa- 
lised by the mythical figures that only Peer sees: the 
trolls, the Woman in Green, the Boyg. The sorter girls 
and Anitra, although supposedly "real" persons, are 
simply extensions of the Woman in Green and symbolise 
the Gyntish appetite for "das ewig weibliche. " The madmen 
are similarly "real life" extensions of the Dovre trolls, 
and illustrate Peer's perverted selfhood. The "soul" 
aspects of Peer's self are represented by the disturbing 
and unpleasant mythical figures who pass judgement on 
Peer's non-self: the Strange Passenger, the Button- 
Moulder, and the Lean One. These characters symbolise 
Peer's awakening consciousness of self, his recognition 
of the distinction between selfishness and selfhood, and 
his realisation of the seriousness of being without a 
self. The Boyg is an enigmatic figure who embodies 
both 
the lower and the higher nature of Peer's self. As a 
troll the Boyg embodies Peer's animal nature, but as a 
challenger of Peer's selfhood he also represents 
Peer's 
awakening consciousness of self. The Boyg, whose 
likeness 
Peer later recognises in the Sphinx, is another symbol of 
the struggle of the spirit, perhaps 
in an earlier phase, 
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to free itself from, and rise above, the beast. In Peer's 
fight with the Boyg the beast conquers the spirit. Only 
when Peer, all too late, decides to go "straight through" 
to Solveig at last, is the beast vanquished. Solveig, 
as well as being a real person, is an externalisation of 
Peer's yearning for the ideal, or the divine, which, 
according to Kierkegaard, properly constitutes man's 
spirit. Solveig is also the symbol of true selfhood. 
Whereas Peer is a personality without a self, Solveig is 
a realised self almost divested of personality, which 
accounts for the bloodlessness of her dramatic presence. 
A producer's (and actor's) ability to transform 
Ibsen's discontinuous hero into a unified, integrated 
personality has been the prime criterion of a successful 
stage production of Peer Gynt. Consistency has been 
achieved either by cutting most of Act IV (or indeed the 
two last acts! )l09 and presenting a wholly romantic Peer, 
or (since Hans Jacob Nilsen's radical de-romanticisation 
of Peer Gynt at the Norwegian Theatre in 1947-48) by 
keeping Act IV and offering a very anti-romantic Peer. In 
his article "The Dramatic Unity of the Peer Gynt Figure" 
Egil A. Wyller argues that "The chief aim of any inter- 
pretation, both for the actor, the audience, and the 
reader, must be to find that unity of action and mood, 
and that inner identity of character which one must 
assume are there. " Wyller considers that interpretation 
of greatest value which "in the most convincing way 
demonstrates the greatest degree of artistic unity in 
the work. "llo With a "motley" play like Peer Gynt, this 
is no easy task. Each individual scene or episode con- 
stitutes in itself an artistic unity, so much so that 
the play can easily dissolve into a series of tableaux. 
It is the Peer Gynt figure alone that holds the action 
together, and the prime task for the producer (and the 
actor) is therefore to bring to light the inner, spiri- 
tual unity of the main character. This, Wyller concedes, 
is also his greatest problem, for the action makes at 
two places such gigantic "jumps" that the audience has 
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great difficulty in keeping a grip on Peer's identity. 
The first is the transition from the romantic-lyrical 
first three acts to the satirical-intellectual fourth 
act, and the second is Peer's sudden confrontation with 
Solveig in the metaphysical-symbolical last scene. Dis- 
covering the inner, spiritual unity of Peer's character 
is, in Wyller's view, a matter of being able to define 
the "greatness" which Peer himself was unable to define, 
of finding the permanent core of his personality--a core 
which must be of precious metal since it attracts the 
noble Solveig. Wyller finds the essential, the true, the 
great Peer Gynt in the poet Peer Gynt. "Peer is 'great' 
because of, not despite, his youth's damned lies. "lll It 
is in Peer the poet--torn between his yearning for the 
heights and his enslavement to the earthbound, between 
his desire for individual freedom and his inescapable 
involvement with other people, between life on the tragic 
and life on the trivial plane--that the dramatic unity 
of this apparently "capricious" play is to be found. 
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Ibsen has made it plain enough in the play that 
Peer is a poet, but not that he is "great" because he is 
a poet. Peer is a poet of sorts, a dreamer and romancer, 
who in the eyes of the people is en vederstyggelig 
Digter (VI, 2o8). Peer knows he is a diter, but he 
resents being labelled as such, for in his community 
being a dieter is a disreputable occupation. In his more 
sober moments he also knows that it is a devilishly idle 
occupation, and he tells himself off for dreaming 
glittering castles instead of getting on with the serious 
business of building a roof over his outlawed head. We 
learn from the Button-Moulder that Peer has a God-given 
purpose, a Bestemmelse, in life, but we do not learn 
what that purpose is, only that Peer is supposed to be 
able to "divine" it. Daniel Haakonsen argues that Peer's 
"visionary imagination" makes him better equipped than 
most to divine the Master's intention, and that his 
poetic talent is his "greatest spiritual gift" because 
it is the bridge that connects him with his higher self. 
12o 
Haakonsen, like Wyller, insists on the greatness of 
l'eer's poetic talent despite his negative use of it. 
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But is Peer a poet in the sense that he has a great and 
noble vision? Peer yearns for the heights, but what he 
dreams of is worldly power and glory, and revenge on the 
villagers for his own failures: "I'll ride like a storm 
over you all. / The whole parish shall fall at my feet! " 
(VI, 82). The young Peer is given some great poetic 
passages to speak--such as the story of the buck-ride, 
"What a strange cloud! [... 3" (73-74), "Castle rises on 
castle! C... 311 (93-96), and his last ride to Soria Moria 
with Mother Aase--passages which bear out the Button- 
Moulder's statement that Peer was meant to be "a shining 
button/ On the waistcoat of the world" (219). However, 
"greatness" in Ibsen's play is not determined by talent 
but by achievement. It is what Peer does with his talent 
that matters. His greatness as a poet remains a largely 
unrealised possibility. Instead he gives full rein to 
his talent for romancing, and'this becomes his undoing. 
Peer's self is "volatilised" in idle dreaming. 
Ylyller is searching for that inner essence of Peer's 
character which remains recognisably the same throughout 
the discontinuous action, and believes that he finds it 
in the poet Peer Gynt. But being a poet is precisely 
Peer's identity problem. Not only is a poet's self split 
between the artist and the man, in Peer's case between 
the dreamer of an Empire and the son and lover who has 
obligations to the "women behind him, " but as a poet 
Peer is any number of invented "selves. " So where is the 
permanent core of the poet? And where, for that matter, 
is the permanent core of the man, for Peer as a man of 
affairs is any number of occupational "selves"? Yet while 
Peer's self is dissolved, his personality, the onion's 
unmistakable Gynthood, remains. It is this that makes us 
feel akin to Peer Gynt, be the blood ever so thin. 
It was left to Strindberg to invent a dramatic form 
which truly reflected the modern vision of man's 
dissolved self, peeled "to the suffering 'nothing'. ýý114 
Chapter 2 
Strindberg and the Suffering Self 
"Each Strindbergian character, " observes R. J. Kauf- 
mann, "can cry out of his inescapable mishaps, 'I know my 
misery and it is mine alone. I suffer therefore I am'"1 
Strindberg's life and work--for the two are insepar- 
able --are a pilgrimage in quest of self, the Unknown on 
the road to Damascus searching for his divine identity. 
And to the last words of his last play Strindberg clings 
to his suffering as the only tangible proof that he is 
the chosen one, Jacob with whom God has wrestled. With 
the Hunter in The Great Highway (19o9) he cries: 
0 Eternal One! I'll not let go your hand, 
Your hard hand, until you bless me! 
Bless me, and your whole mankind, 
Who suffer, suffer from your gift of life! 
Me first, who suffered most, 
Whose deepest suffering was this-- 
I could not be the one I wished to be! (LI, loo) 
Strindberg, like Peer Gynt, was forever reaching out for 
the laurel crown of self, but snatching a wreath of straw. 
His relentless unmasking of the illusion of self in the 
traumatic banquet scene in To Damascus II (1898) is remi- 
niscent of Peer's experience in the Dovre Hall and in the 
Cairo madhouse. 
A banquet, "regal" in its splendour, is being given 
in honour of the Unknown, who has at last succeeded in 
making gold, an achievement which to him is equivalent to 
having solved the riddle of the Sphinx. A laurel crown is 
placed on his head and a glittering order hung round his 
neck, expressing the "committee's" recognition of "the 
greatest man of this great century" (XXIX, 185). It is an 
honour which, declares the Unknown, who prides himself on 
not being easily fooled, "has given me back the most pre- 
cious thing any man can possess: belief in himself" (187). 
During the crowning ceremony, however, the scene begins 
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to change. One by one the frock-coated dignitaries steal 
away, the tables are stripped to the bare trestles, the 
golden goblets are replaced by cheap earthenware mugs, 
and the "guests" gathering round the top table are the 
shabby customers of a squalid bar. The speaker who hailed 
the Unknown "Icing in the realm of the Intellect" (188) 
turns out to be none other than Caesar, the lunatic, who 
with equal flourish denounces him as an "arch-swindler" 
and a "charlatan" when. he refuses to reveal the secret 
formula of gold-making. Painfully undeceived about the 
honour that has been bestowed upon him, finding himself 
feted, not by the learned elite, but by beggars, whores, 
and lunatics of the Drunkards' Society, and unable to pay 
the bill, the Unknown wakes up in a prison cell, thinking 
he has been in hell. Unless he has dreamt it all, which 
amounts to the same thing. For the Unknown discovers like 
Peer Gynt that dreams have a fearful reality, more real 
than waking life.. The fete is no hoax, the Beggar tells 
him. When he accepted the invitation, wishing to be cele- 
brated as a great scientist, it became serious! And there 
is no dodging the consequences. It will be a "royal 
reckoning" (195). In the prison cell, which is only a 
waking up to continue the nightmare, the Unknown is 
stripped of the last vestiges of selfhood. Not only is 
the fateful banquet reported in the morning paper and the 
alchemist exposed as a fraud, but it is announced on the 
front page that his wife has already remarried, which' 
means that his children will be brought up in the image 
of a stepfather. Even the Beggar is too proud to be seen 
in his company. He advises the Unknown to humble himself 
before the Almighty and repent: 
THE BEGGAR: Yield, or be broken. 
THE UNI OV'IN: I cannot yield. 
THE BEGGAR: Break, then. 
THE UNKNOWN falls to the ground. (XXIX, 2ol) 
Strindberg's search for his quintessential self leads him 
repeatedly to the empty core of the onion. But forever 
refusing to accept that the suffering of existence signi- 
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fies "nothing, " he continues the hunt along a different 
path, leaving no "ism" uninvestigated or untried. 
3 
Having resigned himself to the notion of a God- 
abandoned universe in which the human soul is but a momen- 
tary flash of consciousness extinguished in the void, 
peer Gynt is content to see written on the heap of snow 
-covering his mortal remains: "Here lies No One" (VI, 237). 
Strindberg's Hunter in a parallel scene at the end of 
The Great Highway imagines a very different epitaph for 
his snow-covered grave on the heights: 
Here rests Ishmael, son of Hagar, 
Who was once called Israel, 
Because he fought a fight with God, 
And ceased not to struggle until laid low, 
Conquered by his Almighty goodness. (LI, loo) 
This in a nutshell, is the goal of Strindberg's quest: 
to prove to himself and to the world that Ishmael, 
4 the 
bondwoman's cast-out son, turned rebel, is, in fact, 
identical with Jacob, "the son of peace, " who was blessed 
with the name of Israel because he strove with God and 
prevailed. 
5 An injured hip is his proof. 
If the mortification of the ego-self as the only way 
to true selfhood was incomprehensible to Peer Gynt, it is 
"madness" to Strindberg. "Why do you always exhort me to 
extirpate my self (utrota mitt jag)? " he protests in a 
letter to his theosophist friend and benefactor Torsten 
Hedlund, 
6 
and continues in Inferno (1897): 
All that I know, little as it ma be, springs from one 
central point, my self (mitt ; jag . Not the cult, 
but the 
cultivation of this self (detta jag) seems to me 
to be 
the supreme and ultimate goal of existence. [... Jto 
kill 
the self (jazets dödande) is to commit suicide. 
(XXVIII 
He rejects, as a corollary, the theosophist doctrine of 
Karma. A "collective deity"--Karma being "the sum total of 
human destinies which counterbalance one another, so as to 
result in a kind of Nemesis" 
(XXVIII, 82)--does not 
appeal to the self-assertive Strindberg. Only a personal 
God can satisfy his religious needs. Renouncing Karma as 
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"the socialist god" Strindberg, like Brand, claims as his 
'"the individualist (anarchist--) god" of the Old Testament, 
whom, unlike Brand's uncompromising Jehovah, Strindberg 
-pictures as "exceedingly great and reasonable. "7 Assuming, 
however, a fearful-likeness to his authoritarian father, 
Strindberg's God is an oppressor to rebel against rather 
than an ideal to strive towards. "God had gobbled up his 
ego, " complains Johan in The Son of a Servant (XVIII, 215). 
When he longs to cry out his sorrows on a loving bosom 
Strindberg, like Brand, turns to Woman, the virgin-mother 
and "chaste wife of an inconceivably great God who calls 
himself my father and whom I dare not approach" (XXVIII, 
324). Yet the mild, suffering Christ leaves him cold. 
Strindberg is too proud and too jealous of his fragile 
self to accept Christ's vicarious atonement for his sins, 
and like Brand ridicules the cowardly and hypocritical 
assumption of Christians that sins confessed are sins 
forgiven, and only in Christ can one sin and be happy. 
Miss Julie represents Strindberg's idea of the true aris- 
tocrat when she refuses to lay the burden of her mistakes 
on Jesus as Christine did. "It is I, " she proudly 
declares, "who must bear the blame, carry the conse- 
quences. " Typically of Strindberg she does not, however, 
say: I am to blame. It is my fault. Miss Julie does not 
account herself responsible for her "fall": 
Who is to blame for what happened! Whose fault is it? 
My father's--my mother's--or mine! Mine? Why, I have 
nothing that's mine! I haven't a thought I didn't get 
from my father, not a passion I didn't get from my mother, 
and this last silly notion--about all people being equal-- 
I got that from him, my fiance--whom I call a coward and 
a fool because of it! How can it be my fault then? (XXIII, 
184) 
Having thus exculpated herself Miss Julie assumes the 
role of scapegoat, the innocent victim of circumstance. 
While Ibsen's work is a Judgement Day over himself, the 
greater part of Strindberg's, Sten Linder maintains, has 
become a Judgement Day over others. 
8 
Strindberg's favourite pose is that of Job, "the 
righteous and blameless man, put to the test by the 
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Eternal One to show the wicked how well an upright man 
can endure suffering unjustly inflicted" (XXVIII, 138). 
Exposing his own "pious vanity" with the frankness of the 
detached artist observer, he continues: "I boast of my 
sufferings as if they were favours, and I never tire of 
exclaiming: Look how I have suffered! [ ... I In short, I am 
one chosen; Swedenborg9has said so, and feeling assured 
of the protection of the Eternal One, I challenge the 
demons" (138). Imagining himself persecuted by demons at 
611 times and everywhere during the Inferno crisis, 
Strindberg embraces with eagerness and relief Swedenborg's 
explanation that demons are not malevolent forces, but 
disciplinary spirits sent by Providence to perfect his 
personality for a higher existence. He writes optimisti- 
cally in Legends (1897): "These inexplicable sufferings 
do have a purpose: the improvement of my self and its 
development into something greater--the ideal Nietzsche 
dreamed of, although differently conceived" (239). He 
does not, however, find it altogether easy to defend his 
role as innocent sufferer against his own persistent and 
deep-seated sense of guilt. For he is not only Job, he 
is also Faust, the proud rebel prepared to sacrifice love 
and happiness, even his soul, in the pursuit of knowledge 
and power. 
It was with a feeling of jubilation he parted from 
his wife (Frida Uhl) at the Gare du Nord, Strindberg con- 
fesses in the opening lines of Inferno, to return to his 
lonely study where at last, freed from the fetters of 
love, he was able to devote himself, body and soul, to 
solving "the great problem" of gold-making, and win "the 
only immortality accorded to mortals" (8). But when his 
alchemical experiments fail, leaving him penniless, 
suffering from sulphur burns, and feeling desperately 
lonely, Strindberg is assailed by doubts and pangs of 
remorse. Had he not committed the sin-of hubris--"the one 
vice that the gods do not forgive"--in imagining that he 
could solve the riddle of the Sphinx? (8o). Had he not 
sacrificed his happiness, and that of his wife and child 
126 
too, for a chimera? No doubt about it. He is in Hell to 
be punished for his arrogance, conceit, hubris. What is 
to be done? He must humble himself and repent. But humble 
himself before whom? Before people? Never! That would 
merely make them proud. Before God, then? But it is an 
insult to the Highest to drag him down to the level of 
a planter who rules over slaves. Nor will Strindberg 
readily admit that he has anything to repent of. If the 
Powerslo have chosen him to be their scourge, to punish, 
to overthrow idols, to raise the standard of revolt, and 
have afterwards withdrawn their protection, forcing him to 
recant and make himself look ridiculous, how can they ask 
him to apologise and make amends? Strindberg accuses the 
Powers of having directed him on an erratic quest for 
truth, which after thirty years of toil and suffering has 
led. him precisely nowhere: 
In my youth I was a sincere believer, and you made me a 
free-thinker. Of the free-thinker you made an atheist; 
and of the atheist a religious man. Inspired by humani- 
tarian ideas I extolled socialism. Five years later you 
showed me the absurdity of socialism. You have made all 
my enthusiasms seem futile! And supposing that I again 
become religious, I am certain that in another ten years 
you will prove religion false. 
Flust we not conclude that the gods are jesting with 
us poor mortals.... (XXVIII, 191) 
Strindberg emerges from Inferno professing a "confession- 
less Christianity, "11 but without having conquered his 
disillusionment with the gods and his pessimistic view of 
the world as a torture chamber for their sport, yet for 
that reason all the more unwilling to abandon the "cult 
of the self. " 
What then is "this self" that Strindberg proclaims 
it his "most sacred duty to nurse, cultivate, and 
observe. " 
12 Strindberg's Romantic cult of the unique and 
autonomous self can be traced back to the two most pro- 
foundly influential revelations of his early reading, 
Ibsen's Brand and Kierkegaard's Either-Or, both of which 
impressed upon the mind of the insecure and vacillating 
young Strindberg that to have no will is to have no self. 
127 
Young Johan in The Son of a Servant (1886) relishes the 
identification with Ibsen's fanatic idealist "who dared 
believe himself in the right against the whole world L... 3 
when, in fact, he was in the wrong, " and who insisted 
that "all ties of concern, of love, must be broken for 
the sake of the 'cause. ' C... 3 Brand gave him faith in a 
conscience purer than the one his upbringing had given 
him, and a right that stood above the law. And he needed 
this iron rod in his weak back" (XVIII, 355). It is, 
however, in Peer Gynt, the will-less, "characterless" 
dreamer, that Strindberg sees his own likeness, recog- 
nises his own plight: the artist's split self, or worse, 
lack of self. Perhaps the most poignant illustration of 
Strindbergs Peer Gynt problem is to be found in the 
touching story in Sagor (Tales, 19o3) called "Jubal utan 
jag" ("Jubal without-Self"). ' 
Gustav Klang, so the fable goes, was born with a 
strong will, and called himself "I" from the first, not 
"he" as other small children do. But his soldier father, 
who knew no better because he was trained to want only 
what his officer wanted, crushed the boy's will by telling 
him, "You have no 'I' 111 and "Your will grows in the forest. " 
Consequently, when his father asked him one day what he 
wanted to be, the boy, who did not dare tell him that he 
had a liking for music, replied like an obedient child, 
"I don't want anything. " Whereupon his father decided he 
should become a tapster. One fine day however, a travel- 
ler, a former opera singer, heard Klang singing in the 
wine-cellar, and told him he ought to go on the stage. 
And he did not stop trying to persuade Klang of his great 
talent until he had given him back his self-confidence 
and his will--"this iron rod in a man's back that holds 
him upright so that he doesn't fall down on all fours" 
(as did the will-less Peer Gynt, crawling like an animal 
on all fours looking for wild onions). "Don't lose your- 
self, my son, " gras his mother's last word when Klang left 
for the great world to become a famous opera singer., Now 
friend Klang flourished and could say not only "I will" 
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but "I command. " His self grew-out of all conscience and 
he could endure no other selves in his presence. He 
repudiated his parents and his past, and having become a 
celebrity, changed his name, for such was the custom, to 
the resounding Mister Jubal (as Peer became Sir Peter), 
which made him feel truly English, even to the point that 
check-suits grew on him of their own accord, like bark on 
a tree. In the Opera he played kings and prophets, rebels 
and demons, and (like Peer Gynt) believed himself to be 
the person he acted. But Jubal met his Nemesis in the 
guise of a woman (as Peer did in Anitra), when he married 
an ambitious soceress with a will stronger than his own. 
He squandered his talent in teaching her to sing, and 
soon her fame overshadowed his, and he was forgotten. He 
resigned from the Opera and wandered about the world, 
seeming to other people as if he were looking or waiting 
for someone. And he never said "I, " and "I think, " but 
"It seems. " He had lost his self, but did not realise it 
till he looked in the shaving-mirror one day and saw the 
wall behind him but not his own face. Seized with an 
intense longing to recover his self he decided to look up 
his wife, to whom he had given the best part of it, his 
will. But she had remarried and left for some distant 
land. Tired of looking, and longing, like all tired men, 
for the source of his life, his mother, he went into the 
mountains where she, now widowed, was living alone (like 
Solveig) in a tumble-down hut. When he heard her calling' 
out his real name, Gustav Klang, all the roles he had 
played, kings and demons, maestri and models, flew away, 
and he became himself again, just his mother's son. He 
buried his head in her lap and sobbed: "Now let me die! 
Let me die! " 
In Strindberg's fable, the "self"--which is essen- 
tially "will"--is something a"person is born with. It 
can be lost and recovered, but neither the losing nor 
the recovery is attributed to the hero. His ignorant 
father destroys it, an understanding stranger restores 
it, a wilful wife appropriates it, until he finds himself 
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again in his mother's lap. Whereas the "self" in Brand 
and Peer Gynt is something that has to be achieved, 
something a person becomes through committed existential 
choice, Jubal's jag is a matter of havin a self, given 
one by Nature. But the daa is not therefore indestruct- 
ible. It can be lost through lack of encouragement. To 
have a ja means quite simply to have an independent 
will and a mind of one's own. Peer Gynt "loses" his self 
because he fails to become a self., Jubal loses his self 
because his self-will is crushed by other people. How- 
ever, no consistent definition of "self" can be extracted 
from Strindberg's fable, for it appears that an inflated 
ego also leads to the loss of self. When Klang becomes a 
famous opera singer and repudiates his humble past and 
his uncultured parents, and changes his name to Mister 
Jubal, he loses his sense of identity, and like Peer 
Gynt, alias Sir Peter, assumes the identity of whichever 
fictional character he happens to be impersonating. 
Strindberg's fable is concerned with the loss of self 
rather than with defining selfhood, and suggests not 
just one, but several reasons for Jubal's loss of self, 
all of which, needless to say, reflect Strindberg's 
private preoccupations: the suppression of a child's 
independence of will that leads to a will-less character; 
alienation from one's parents and one's past; paranoia, 
an exaggerated sense of self which carries its own 
punishment of boundless loneliness and emptiness; the 
self-lessness peculiar to the artist, the sense of having 
no self apart from the characters he creates or imperso- 
nates; and the loss of self in the , 
battle of the sexes. 
If Jubal loses his-self through Woman the temptress, 
it is also to Woman he must return for his salvation, 
but to woman as Mother. Strindberg never resolved the 
dilemma of seeing woman as both mistress and mother, 
devil and angel, temptress and saviour. His ambivalent 
attitude to woman reflects the conflict within his own 
self of wanting to be both son and lover, passive child 
and aggressive male, of longing for the innocent and pure 
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love that exists between mother and child, and needing 
to vindicate his manhood in a sexual relationship. 
Jubal's "salvation" is an obvious parallel to that of 
Peer Gynt in Solveig's lap. Both protagonists return to 
their origin in search of their pristine, unadulterated 
selves. But Jubal's salvation is as unconvincing as 
Peer's, for his mother, it turns out, cannot restore his 
lost will, and the will is the backbone of the self. 
"You gave your will to a woman, " she says. Jubal protests 
he is not to blame: "I had to, I otherwise I would never 
have won her. " However, now that he has returned to his 
mother, will no longer matters, for children, she explains, 
should have no will, only grown men should have one. 
It is only by returning to childhood innocence, when 
the problem of will and sex has not yet arisen, that 
Jubal can become "whole" again. Adulthood means conscious- 
ness of sex and hence of evil. Strindberg embraced the 
biblical (and in A Dream Play the Buddhist) concept that 
sin came into the world with sex. It was in his relation- 
ship with woman that Strindberg experienced most acutely 
the split within the self between the yearning for 
spiritual purity and the cravings of the flesh that 
dragged him down. But Strindberg's preoccupation with the 
evil of sex has more to do with his fear of losing his 
self in a sexual relationship, which in his experience 
invariably evolves into a battle of wills, with the con- 
testing egos attempting to devour and destroy each other, 
and with woman more often than not proving the stronger 
sex. Jubal is defeated in the sexual battle of wills, 
and his salvation in the maternal lap--which like Peer's 
is a regression to the passive, will-less, irresponsible 
innocence of the womb--is an evasion, not a solution, of 
the problem of the split self. 
But is not the traditional idea of the self as one 
single and unified entity a myth anyway, Strindberg asks 
himself in The Son of a Servant. Wondering why other 
people's opinions about his character differ so widely, 
and observing how other people, like himself, adopt roles 
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to suit the occasion, Johan comes to the conclusion that 
the idea of the fixed and cohesive self is false: "The 
'S' ( jaget) is not one single self (sj , lvt); it is a 
multiplicity of reflexes, a compendium of drives, desires, 
alternately repressed and released! " (XVIII, 218). 
Johan's psychological definition of the self as a multi- 
plicity of reflexes, drives and desires, is reminiscent 
of 'Peer's less "scientific" description of the Gyntish 
Self as a "host of wishes, desires, -and appetites" (VI, 
141). But while Ibsen presents the Gyntish Self in a 
wholly negative light, as the troll in man that he must 
conquer in order to become his true self, Strindberg, as 
one critic has remarked, seems bent on convincing us 
that Johan's "characterlessness" is actually a virtue, a 
distinct mark of superiority. 
14 His inability to commit 
himself to any view or belief, or to make a choice, even 
between two brands of tobacco, never mind of a vocation 
and finding his place in society, his over-sensitivity 
to pressure, and constant probing into the motives of 
his own actions--and those of others, are construed as 
signs of a healthy scepticism, a refusal to become an 
automaton, an unthinking cog in the social machinery. 
The word "character, " which originally signified "the 
dominant ground-note in the soul-complex, " has, Strind- 
berg maintains in the Preface to Miss Julie (1888), 
become "the middle-class term for the automaton, " a 
person who has adapted himself to a fixed role in life 
and has ceased to grow, whereas, he congratulates 
himself, the person who continues to develop, the skilful 
navigator of life's river who trims his sails to the 
wind, is stigmatised as "characterless" because he is so 
hard to catch, classify, and keep track of (XXIII, lo3). 
Strindberg's rejection of the "bourgeois notion 
of the immutability of the soul" leads in turn to his 
decrying the stereotype "stage characters" of the tradi- 
tional, bourgeois-dominated theatre as representing a 
gross over-simplification of the richly complex human 
personality. "This one-sided manner of looking at human 
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beings"--this man is a fool, that one is brutal, this 
one is jealous, that one is stingy--"still survives in 
the great Iaoliere. Harpagon is a miser and nothing else, 
although he might well have been both a miser and a 
first-class financier, a fine father, and a public- 
spirited citizen" (XXIII, lo3). 
15 Shakespeare, on the 
other hand, Strindberg reflects in Open Letters to the 
Intimate Theatre (19o8-o9), knew that people are not 
composed of homogeneous elements, "but must be contra- 
dictory in order to hold together, just like the forces 
that attract unlikes to each other, " and he depicts them 
accordingly. "In that fashion Hamlet himself is simply 
made up of apparent contradictions, good and evil, hating 
and loving, cynical and enthusiastic, mean and indulgent, 
strong and weak--in a word: a human being, different 
every moment just as every human being is" (L, 8o-81). 
16 
True to his "naturalist" conception of the complex- 
ity of the human psyche Strindberg's characters--whom 
he prefers to call "souls"--are, he informs us in the 
Preface to bliss Julie, "conglomerates of past and present 
cultures, scraps from books and newspapers, fragments of 
humanity, torn shreds of Sunday clothing that has become 
rags, exactly as the human soul is patched together" (1o4). 
Albeit she is Strindberg's most carefully individualised 
character, Miss Julie does not, like her close successor 
Hedda Gabler, '7or like Nora Helmer, have the individu- 
ality of a fully rounded "person, " that might, as it 
were, step out of the play and assume an independent 
existence. Miss Julie is a multiple type, a complex 
"stage character, " credible only within the fictional 
frame of the play. Martin Lamm observes in his essay on 
Miss Julie that Strindberg "never had been and was never 
to become a spontaneous creator of character in the grand 
manner. This was because he had no intuitive sense of 
'the basic trait' or 'ruling passion' in human character 
and lacked the ability to perform the imaginative psycho- 
logical synthesis that is required for that kind of 
character-making. Substantial, integrated people are 
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conspicuously absent from his world. "18 But Lamm's 
criticism--if it is meant as such--cannot fairly be 
levelled against Miss Julie since Strindberg in this 
play expressly set out to demonstrate the "character- 
lessness, " the complexity and discontinuity of the human 
personality. Nor is Strindberg so much concerned with 
portraying character as with studying the "psychological 
process" (VIII, lo4). Miss Julie is treated as a "case" 
rather than as a "person. " If Strindberg failed to syn- 
thesise his mosaic characters into "whole" personalities, 
it was not so much because he lacked the intuitive sense 
of the "basic trait" as the fact that he did not believe 
in the "immutability of the soul" and its corollary, the 
substantial, integrated self, and reacted against the 
summary judgement of human nature reflected in the simple 
stage characters of older drama, whose "individuality" 
consisted precisely of one "basic trait. " Strindberg 
sees modern man as "split and vacillating, " the product 
of an age of transition more "breathlessly hysterical" 
than the age which preceded it (l04). Miss Julie is such 
a modern character, a patched-together soul without a 
central core. If Strindberg does not match Ibsen as a 
creator of character in the "grand manner, " he did what 
he set out to do, depict a "characterless character, " 
and for this he was eminently equipped. "What he did 
possess, and that to an exceptionally high degree, " says 
Lamm, "was the analyst's skill in distinguishing among 
different aspects of an individual personality and the 
ability to observe revealing little details of behavior, 
to describe human beings as changing and developing, and 
to render their mutual relationships. He was particularly 
successful with those disharmonious, fractured natures 
whom he identified with his own. "19 
But Strindberg's gift for psycho-analysis does not 
alone make him a great dramatist. Whereas the "mystery" 
that accounts for the intensity, the spellbinding humanity, 
or rather, inhumanity, and the enduring fascination of 
Hedda Gabler's character inheres in the obscure depths 
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of her psyche, Miss Julie's character, dissected for the 
purpose of uncovering the "psychological process, " is 
deprived of its human mystery in that the motivation for 
Julie's every action is scrupulously accounted for in 
terms of heredity, environment, upbringing, the age, her 
physical condition, the festive mood of Midsummer Night, 
the intoxicating effect of the dance etc. But what the 
characters--Jean as well as Julie,. not to mention Chris- 
tine--lack in mystery and depth is compensated for in 
other ways. Peer Gynt's character similarly contains no 
psychological mystery, no inscrutable depths of soul. 
Yet one can hardly think of anyone more intensely alive, 
more irrepressibly versatile, more irresistibly and 
unforgettably human--"Blood's never so thin/ We don't 
feel a little akin to Peer Gynt (VI, 2o6). What 
Peer lacks in depth of soul he makes up for in richness 
of experience, real and fantastical. His multifarious 
(rather than complex) personality is made up of the tales 
he tells, the dreams he dreams, the roles he plays, and 
the motley cast of characters, humans and mythical beings, 
that he meets. By these "external, " expressionistic means 
Peer's discontinuous onion self, all layers and no core, 
springs alive to our imagination. Strindberg's dramatic 
genius reveals itself similarly in his ability to create 
an atmosphere in which man dissolved into the various 
aspects of his "characterlessness" comes dramatically 
alive, an atmosphere of great emotional intensity coupled 
with the unreality of dream and fantasy, which mesmerises 
the audience, as it apparently did the author himself, 
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into the illusion that these fragments of humanity are 
real living beings. Even in Miss Julie, his naturalistic 
test-piece, Strindberg relies consciously on an atmos- 
phere of unreality to make his heroine plausible. There 
is the magic of Midsummer Eve, a night on which the 
extraordinary is expected, and we are repeatedly reminded 
that Miss Julie's behaviour is extraordinary. "Tonight, " 
announces Jean in the opening line, "Miss Julie has gone 
mad again--completely mad! " (117). There is Christine's 
/ 
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pantomime, and the peasants' ritual midsummer dance in 
the kitchen, accompanying Jean's and Julie's "fall" back- 
stairs. There is the hysterical, ritualistic bird-killing 
scene, and Julie's frenzied reiteration before the stodgy 
and unresponsive Christine of Jean's fanciful plan for 
their elopement, and finally her somnambulist exit to the 
ultimate disgrace--or victory, 
21 
all expressionistic 
elements conjuring up an atmosphere of dream, developing 
into nightmare, in which a pair of boots can come alive 
with the ominous presence of a Count. 
Having come to see "characterlessness" as the mark 
of the truly authentic individual--the person who con- 
tinues to develop, who refuses to become an automaton in 
a fixed role with fixed beliefs and who, in his constant 
pursuit of everchanging truth is willing to reconsider 
his position at every crossroads, even at the risk of 
being called an opportunist and a false prophet--Johan 
proceeds to interpret his flattering discovery in his 
favour as a dramatist. To the dramatist, he concludes, 
characterlessness is not merely a virtue but a prerequi- 
site, for he must be able to don the mask of any one of 
his characters and to see life from more than one point 
of view. Strindberg frequently speaks of himself, echo- 
ing Kierkegaard, as an experimenter with points of view. 
22 
But is the writer because he incarnates himself in 
different personalities therefore without a self? Johan 
had believed that a poet's life was "a shadow life, " 
that he had no self but existed only in other selves. 
However, in the light of his discovery that character- 
lessness*is true authenticity Strindberg reflects: 
Is it so certain that the poet lacks a self (ett 'a 
), 
because he does not have only one? Perhaps he is richer 
who possesses more than the others. And why is it better 
to have only one, - when the single self 
(det enda jaget) 
in any case is no more one's own than several selves, 
since a self is a resume composed of parents, educators, 
company, books? Perhaps because society like a piece of 
machinery demands that its units, the selves, must 
become integral parts as wheels, nuts, machine parts, 
and work in a limited, automatic maimer. But is not then 
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the poet more than the machine part, since he himself 
is a whole machine? (XVIII, 436)23 
But this affirmative statement of the poet's non-identity 
is no answer to the horrible vacuum which descends upon 
the poet when the day's creative spurt is over, when the 
Dreamer wakes up from his dream and finds that he has no 
identity of his own to hold on to. It is in-those vacuous 
gaps between dreams that Strindberg experiences the Gynt- 
ian dilemma most acutely, fearing that the characterless- 
ness without which he would not be a poet will ultimately 
lead hin as an individual to the Button-Moulder's ladle. 24 
To the question posed at the end of his autobiography 
whether Johan had found his self (sitt jag) during this 
"sad walk in the shadowy world of memories" (XIX, 278), 
the answer is "no. " He found only ". a, motley confusion, 
lacking substance, changing form according to the obser- 
vor's point of view, having perhaps no more reality than 
the rainbow, which can be seen but does not exist" (277). 
Yet, although Strindberg in his naturalist manifesto had 
dissolved the immutable soul into a multiplicity of 
"solves, " he continued the Gyntian quest for the quint- 
essential Self oven to the end of the Great Highway, and 
despite his suspicion that life is a mockery he never 
stopped asking: \'lhat is the meaning of my suffering? 
Strindberg confesses in Legends that what makes life 
endurable is the thought that our earthly existence is 
only an illusion, a bad dream inflicted upon us as a 
punishment, and that death is an awakening to true 
reality, when vie shall discover that our evil deeds have 
not been committed, that they were only a dream. "That 
is redemption, salvation: " (XXXVIII, 316). His disbelief 
in the reality of existence is echoed by the Unknown who 
claims that "there are moments when I doubt whether life 
has any more reality than my poems" (XXIX, 9). Apropos of 
The Temmest, quoting Prospero's famous speech (Act IV, 
Sc. l) beginning: "Our revels now are ended"--indicating, 
according to Strindberg, that "ho is about to wake from 
the instructive dream that is called life"--and ending: 
f- 
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'We are such stuff/ As dreams are made on, and our 
little life/ Is rounded with a sleep, " Strindberg writes: 
"If one looks back at what one has lived through, it is 
so terrible one hardly believes it is real,. and the best 
that had a sort of reality slowly dissolves as if it 
were smoke. Is it strange if one begins to doubt the 
reality of reality? In The Tempest, Shakespeare has in 
several places emphasised that life is a dream and has 
tried to dramatise this Buddhist idea" (L, 2o1-o2). 25 
It is through "Buddhism"--an idiosyncratic compound 
of Brahmanism, Buddhism, Schopenhauerian pessimism, and 
Christianity without Christ--that Strindberg comes 
closest to an acceptance of suffering, if not to dis- 
covering its ultimate meaning. While he blames his exces- 
sive preoccupation with self on his Christian upbringing, 
maintaining that "The egotistic self-criticism of Chris- 
tianity had accustomed him to busy himself with his self 
(sitt jag), to fondle it, to fuss over it, as over a 
beloved person" (XVIII, 271), he finds in Buddhism a 
cure for the ills of self. Buddhism teaches that exist- 
ence is suffering, that all suffering originates in 
desire, which cannot be satisfied because of the imperma- 
nence of being. All striving after happiness must there- 
fore inevitably end in disillusionment. Only through the 
destruction of the desiring ego can one reach Nirvana. In 
Alone (Ensam, 19o3) Strindberg sums up the message of 
Buddhism thus: "Desire nothing, demand nothing of human 
beings or of life, and you will always feel. that you 
have received more than you could have demanded" (X XvIII, 
16o). But this is an ideal to which only the flowers 
have attained, those "superior beings that have realised 
Buddha's dream of coveting nothing, of enduring all 
things, of descending into the self, even to the point 
of unconsciousness. "26 Strindberg declines to affirm 
whether he really believes in the Buddhist ideal of self- 
denial, but admits it is a healthy and edifying thought. 
It is not by contemplation and "inwardness" that 
Strindberg can attain to the positive selflessness which 
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liberates from suffering, but by living the lives of 
, other people: his dramatis personae. Only in his 
creative work is he truly alive and happy: 
I live, and I live many times over the lives of the 
people I depict. I am cheerful with the cheerful, angry 
with the angry, good with the good. I crawl out of my 
own person, and speak from the mouths of children, of 
women, of old men. I am king and beggar. I am the most 
exalted, the tyrant, and the most despised, the suppres- 
sed rebel against tyrants. I hold all views, and profess 
all religions. I live in all ages and have myself ceased to exist. This is a condition of indescribable happiness. 
(XXXVIII, 155-56)27 
As a writer Strindberg considers himself the spokesman 
of mankind before the Eternal Powers, and as such names 
as a writer's first qualification his ability to feel 
deeply--to suffer. In a series of letters on "How to 
become a writer"28 Strindberg, betraying his identifi- 
cation with Ibsen's youthful aestheticism, declares that 
"he who has a sorrow ought to become a writer, he can 
always count on sympathy at least, " and goes on to 
explain how through his own sorrow he becomes aware of 
other people's: 
First it is I who am struck! Oh, it is terrible! But I 
need only look to the right or to the left and immediately 
see another one damned. Then I suffer with him. My pain 
becomes twofold! Then I see several more, my blood rises. 
I assume then in my agitation that the whole world is in 
pain. My suffering becomes a thousandfold--I gather 
everybody's suffering into me--I become a kind of Christ 
--I become mankind's representative. 29 
It is, however, only with A Dream Play, which he calls 
"my most beloved play, child of my greatest pain, "30 and 
only after the Unknown in To Damascus III (19ol) has 
made a solemn vow before entering the monastery to 
forget the history of his personal suffering for all 
time and never recount it again, that Strindberg truly 
becomes mankind's representative and changes his refrain 
from: "Look how I have suffered, " to "Mankind is to be 
pitied. " 
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In A Dream Play (lgol) Strindberg has transposed the 
action from the personal to the universal-mystical plane 
by choosing for his chief protagonist a divine being, 
Indra's Daughter. And to make it abundantly clear that he 
is concerned neither with his own personal tragedy nor with 
that of any individual, but with the existential meaning 
of suffering, he has chosen a decidedly non-naturalistic 
mode of presentation which, he proudly declares in a 
letter to his German translator, is "a new form, which 
is my invention. "31 He is writing 'a dream play in which, 
he explains in the Preface, he has "attempted to imitate 
the disconnected yet transparently logical form of a 
dream. Anything can happen, everything is possible and 
likely. Time and space do not exist" (XXXVI, 215). 
Time and space are the fetters of self. Only by 
breaking them--in the fiery blast of suffering--can the 
spirit, in the words of the Unknown, anticipating A Dream 
Pte, "mount to the ether, elude the Powers, and reach 
the Throne, in order to lay the lamentations of mankind 
at the feet of the Eternal One" (XXIX, 175). In the scene 
"By the sea" in To Damascus I (1898) the Unknown experi- 
ences one such timeless, spaceless moment when he feels 
his self swelling, stretching outwards, becoming infinite: 
I am everywhere, in the sea which is my blood, in the 
mountains which are my bones, in the trees, in the 
flowers. And my head reaches up to heaven. I look out 
over the universe. I am the universe, and I feel the 
whole power of the Creator within me, for I am He. 
I should like to take the whole mass into my hand and 
knead it into something more perfect, more lasting, 
more beautiful. I want to see all creation and every 
creature happy: born without pain, live without sorrow, 
and die in quiet joy: Eve, will you die with me now, 
in this moment, for the next will bring back sorrow? (XXIX, 54) 
As long as man remains imprisoned in time and space, 
attached to the illusion of self, he must inevitably 
suffer, since individuality, according to Buddhist 
theory, resides in selfish desire and the struggle of 
conflicting desires. When the Poet asks Indra's Daughter 
to explain the riddle of existence, she tells the myth 
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of how the world came into being by a divine Fall before 
the morning of time, when Brahma let himself be seduced 
by Maya, the world mother, in order to increase and 
multiply. The phenomenal world is thus only a phantom, 
a semblance, a dream picture. To free themselves from 
the earthly element Brahma's decendants seek renunciation 
and suffering. This is suffering as liberator. But the 
longing of the penitent for suffering is in conflict 
with the yearning of the voluptuary for pleasure and 
love. Thus man is torn between the spirit, which seeks 
one-ness with the Divine through self-denial, and the 
flesh, which struggles for self-assertion in the grati- 
fication of selfish desire. 
Such is the human predicament which Strindberg in 
A Dream Play aims to illuminate from as many points of 
view as possible. And to this purpose he lets his 
characters "split, double, multiply, evaporate, condense, 
disperse, come together" (XVI, 215). Since his aim is 
not to portray individuals but to convey the common experi- 
ence of suffering, the characters, he tells his German 
translator, are merely "sketched, " and "the sketches 
flow together: the same person splits into several 
persons only to form into one again. "32 Thus Indra's 
Daughter is both the Child of Heaven, the Glazier's 
daughter, the Lawyer's wife, the Officer's mistress, the 
Poet's muse, all converging into Indra's Daughter again 
at the end. The Officer, apart from being an officer, 
plays the parts of son, lover, Doctor of Philosophy, 
frustrated school-boy, and as the most typical dreamer 
in the play is clearly the Poet's double. 
33 Strindberg's 
promise never to recount his personal tragedy again, 
does not, however, mean that the author of A Dream Play 
has refined himself out of existence, or more to the 
point, out of ,a self. He is the Dreamer, whose conscious- 
ness, we are informed in the Preface, "rules over them 
all, " including Indra's Daughter. For the Dreamer there 
are "no secrets, no inconsequence, no scruples, no laws. " 
He is the artist in supreme control of the multiverse of 
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his creation. He is, in the words of Maurice Valency, the 
Brahma of his dream-world, whose "single consciousness 
becomes multiple as he bodies forth through his fancy 
the dream characters who live their independent lives 
while his mind is absorbed in them, and yet have no being 
aside from his. ""34 
More or less "abstract"35 and archetypäl Strindberg's 
dream-characters function both as various manifestations 
of one "multiple" self, that of the Dreamer, and as 
different aspects of Everyman. In A Dream Play there are 
thus no "characterless" characters as defined in the 
Preface to Miss Julie. The numerous cast are all types 
identified either by occupation--the Glazier, the Officer, 
the Billposter, the Lawyer, the Poet--or by a single 
characteristic--the Old Fop, the Old Coquette, Blind Man-- 
or simply as He and She. Those identified by name, mostly: 
females, are equally unindividualised. Victoria remains 
entirely abstract. Never seen, except when flitting past 
the fire at the end, she symbolises that indefinable 
something for which man is always waiting. As the Unknown 
says in the opening lines of To Damascus I: "For forty 
years I have been waiting for something. I believe they 
call it happiness, or perhaps it is just the end of un- 
happiness" (XXIX, 7-8). Nor in the case of the Daughter 
is Strindberg concerned with the "evolution of a soul. " 
She is sent to earth to find out whether the complaints 
of mankind are justified and report back to Indra. Her 
journey through the world of human misery provides the 
little continuity there is in the play. But her experi- 
ence does not fundamentally change her character. She 
learns about human suffering, without learning to endure 
it. As an observer and reporter she remains essentially 
the same. Indeed she has no real character to change. 
She incarnates herself in a variety of roles, but she is 
not a complex character in a psychological sense. Her 
roles are all one-sided. Even in her most "human" guise, 
as the Lawyer's wife, she is the female side of the sex 
battle rather than an individual person. Nor does Indra's 
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Daughter convince us that she suffers mankind's agony a 
hundredfold because, as she claims, her preceptions are 
finer. On the contrary, she demonstrates--revealing 
Strindberg's pessimism about the Powers that rule our 
destiny--that she, the Child of Heaven, cannot bear the 
suffering which human beings have to endure. She can opt 
out of her misery when she has had enough of it. If the 
shawl of sorrows becomes too heavy, the Doorkeeper is 
always ready to relieve her of her burden. She does not 
cope for very long with the bickering and tedium of 
married life before she leaves her Lawyer husband and 
runs off with the Officer. And when her feet become so 
heavy with clay-that she loses touch with her divine self, 
she throws her shoes into the fire and returns to her 
ethereal origin. However, although one cannot really talk 
about a development of character as regards the Daughter, 
her youthful optimism about the improvability of the 
human condition wears noticeably thinner with experience. 
Her marriage to the Lawyer proves to what extent "Love 
conquers all" (XXXVI, 229), and she is forced to admit 
that mankind's perpetual complaints about the injustice 
of their afflictions are hard to refute "because ... 
there are so many unknowns ... "(271). Nor are the 
Daughter's offers of liberation received with much 
enthusiasm. People will cling to the suffering they know 
rather than take the plunge into the frightening unknown. 
The truest and most intense expressions of the human 
experience are spoken through the Daughter rather than 
by her. In the long passages of poetry she recites, she 
is an interpreter of wisdom fed to her by the winds in 
Pingal's Cave or by the Poet in his petition, and in her 
farewell speech the Daughter is clearly expressing the 
feelings of the Poet, if not the Poet in the play, then 
certainly the poet of the play, for whom the agony of 
having his heart torn apart by a longing. to leave and 
longing for what he had loved and left was a very real 
experience, while it is not borne out by the Daughter's 
own journey in the flesh. 
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Indra is not known to have a daughter. She is 
Strindberg's own invention, and it is not accidental 
that he has chosen to incarnate his "divine advocate" 
in female form. One hesitates to call Indra's Daughter a 
""redeemer" or "deliverer" since her mission is merely to 
observe and report. "It was my dream, " the Unknown con- 
fesses to the Lady in To Damascus III, "to find recon- 
ciliation--through a woman! " (XXIX, 279). And likewise 
to the Tempter: "lily dearest hope, my most secret longing, 
and my last prayer! Reconciliation with mankind, through 
woman" (3o9). But his dream was shattered again and again: 
I sought in woman an angel, who could lend me wings, and 
I fell into the arms of an earth-spirit C... ] I sought 
an Ariel and found a Caliban. When I wanted to rise she 
dragged me down, and always reminded me of the fail. (XXIX, 277) 
When Strindberg became an atheist it was to woman he 
looked for a God-substitute. This is how Strindberg in 
A Madman's Defence (1888) remembers one of his first 
meetings with Baroness Wrangel (Siri von Essen): 
At that minute. I was seized, troubled down to my marrow, 
as if before a vision. The sense of veneration which I 
bear in me emerged completely, with the desire for a 
cult. The emptiness left by dispelled religiosity 
increased: the need to adore reappeared in a new form. 
God was relegated. Woman took his place, but woman, 
virgin and mother at once; for when I. saw her little 
girl by her side I couldn't believe that that childbirth 
had been possible [... ] From that moment the woman pre- 
sented herself to me as the incarnation of a Soul, pure, 
inaccessible, invested with that glorious body with which 
the Holy Scriptures endow the souls of the dead. (XXVI, 
52-53)36 
Strindberg looked to woman, virgin and mother, for the 
salvation, not of his soul, but of his split self, for 
only by his returning to the innocence of childhood 
could his self be restored to "wholeness. " It is in her 
role as seductress for the propagation of the race that 
woman becomes Strindberg's enemy. For him sex is a battle 
of wills, that is, of selves, and he points to the root 
cause of his marital failures when he admits in the 
words-of the Unknown: "Perhaps I have been jealous of my 
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individuality (min person)--afraid of anyone having 
influence over me" (XXIX, 276-77). Like Peer Gynt, the 
Unknown is afraid of being devoured by a stronger self 
than his own. He fears that the Lady might do to him 
what he has done to her: "Now you have sucked me dry, 
eaten me hollow, killed my self (mitt jag), my perso- 
nality (min personlighet)" (322). Theirs will always be 
a love-hate relationship, each fighting for the preser- 
vation of his individual self: "We resemble two drops of 
water that fear to get close together lest they should 
cease to be two and become one" (323). However, when 
woman is dissociated from sex, she possesses for Strind- 
berg the beauty which alone can convince him of the 
harmony of the universe. The Officer says to Agnes: 37 
There are lines in your figure the like of which I find 
only in the solar system, in the beautiful melody of 
strings, in the vibrations of light. You are a child of 
heaven ... 
(XXXVI, 223) 
Yet when she offers to free him from his imprisonment in 
the castle and his loathsome stable-boy chores in order 
that he may enjoy the freedom and beauty she represents, 
he hesitates: "I do long, but it's so hard to break the 
habit. " The Officer is clearly acting in "bad faith" in 
an existential as well-as a religious sense, for the 
Daughter rebukes him saying: "But it's your duty to seek 
freedom in the light! " (224). 
Why should life be a duty, why should anything be 
a duty? Strindberg asks when he comes to the end of 
Kierkegaard's Either-Or and finds that even the ethical 
individual is doomed to despair. Better then to be an 
aesthete. ' But it is impossible to be an aesthete when 
one has been a Christian for five sixths of one's life, 
and it is not enough to be an ethical individual without 
Christ. There is only one way out of his dilemma. But 
Strindberg vehemently rejects Kierkegaard's idea of the 
"leap" into the absurd. "The 'choice' or 'leap' must be 
made, but to what? " asks Johan in The Son of a Servant. 
"Out into space to the paradox or Christ, that he could 
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not do, because it meant annihilation or madness. But 
Kierkegaard preached madness" (XVIII, 387). Johan 
. suspected 
Kierkegaard of preaching the paradox in order 
to silence his own intellect which merely led him into 
contradictions and inaction. "Was it, " he wonders, "the 
despair of the overly conscious mind of being always 
conscious? Was it the need of the penetrating intellect 
for the intoxication of insensibility? " (387). But Johan 
who like Kierkegaard's aesthete indulged in suffering-- 
"writing, with all its pain, was a tremendous pleasure" 
(389), he confesses--was unable to silence his guilty 
conscience until, after years of struggling to reconcile 
sensuality and reason, pleasure and duty, he realised-- 
having had his suspicion confirmed by the philosophers 
of evolution--that Kierkegaard's "either-or" was a false 
proposition, that the aesthetic and the ethical life 
went quite well together, that work and duty were not 
the opposites of pleasure, and that pleasure, usefully 
spent, was a duty (390). 
Like Strindberg, the Officer fears the leap into 
freedom because it might mean annihilation. Although he 
will not admit it, but puts forward as his reason for 
rejecting freedom that he may have to pay for it by 
suffering threefold, it is clearly the fear of the 
unknown that holds him back, not the prospect of more 
suffering. The Officer is not only prepared to put up 
with his suffering, he clings to it, for it is the only 
thing he can claim as his own, and which for him identifies the 
self. And his suffering is all the more worth while when 
he can lay it at the feet of the Adored One: "Agnes, I'd 
rather put up with it--if only I get to see you! " (223). 
Again compare the Unknown, who confides to the Lady: 
"In the old days nothing was of value to me if I couldn't 
lay it at a woman's feet! Not as a tribute to an over- 
bearing mistress, but as a sacrifice to beauty and good- 
ness" (XXIX, 279). Strindberg's madonna worship is an 
expression of his longing for innocence. It is also a 
reaching out for something beyond the self. But woman 
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can function as the Adored One only so long as she is 
ivorshipped at a distance. If the idol comes within the 
reach of his baser senses and becomes the Desired One, 
she must invariably fall. Hence Victoria ("the ideal 
woman") is never seen, only heard. She is, as the 
Daughter suggests, merely an illusion, a fiction of the 
Officer's mind. "What she is to us and others, he doesn't 
care. She is only what she is to him" (XXXVI, 235). All 
his happiness resides in the Absent One, and he will 
continue to wait for the illusory Victoria until his 
bunch of flowers has withered to the bare twigs. 
Strindberg had originally intended the waiting motif 
to be the theme of a full-length play, which in one draft 
is called "Väntan" ("Waiting" ). In this unfinished play the 
lover is an opera composer, and his fiancee, Carita, an 
opera singer, who has risen to stardom in his opera, and 
whom, after their common success, he is waiting to marry 
and take on a journey to the South. But summer passes, 
his bouquet of roses wither, and he is eventually told 
that she has gone abroad alone. Yet he continues to 
return to the opera corridor to wait for'his Carita until 
as an old man he one day collapses and dies, still bless- 
ing his beloved who deceived him. 
38 In A Dream Play the 
Adored One has become even more illusive and abstract. 
She does not need to leave the theatre to be non-existent. 
Strindberg's choice of the Opera corridor as the 
setting of the waiting scene is significant. Being itself 
a house of illusions the Opera becomes a symbol of the 
world, representing both the Buddhist view of the world 
as the illusion of maya, and the closely related idea 
expressed in Inferno of the world as a stage on which 
human life is mounted as a puppet-show for the sport of 
the gods, making us all, like the Officer, fools on the 
stage of life. But the suffering of the fool, Strindberg 
insists, is still painfully real. He shows us, not the 
glittering spectacle of the pleasure dome, but the corri- 
dor of shattered hopes, of failure and rejection, where 
the Doorkeeper with her shawl of sorrows has taken the 
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place of the Primadonna. When the shawl is put on the 
Daughter's shoulders she remarks: "It is heavy, and it 
burns like nettles. " But she accepts the burden with 
confidence: "What you can bear, I surely can. " To which 
the Doorkeeper replies prophetically: "We shall see: " 
(XXXVI, 237). 
However, the Daughter will know nothing of human 
suffering until she has experienced the most intimate of 
human relationships, in the Lawyer's words: "The most 
delightful which is, also the most bitter: love! Mate and 
home! The highest and the lowest! " (252). She has already 
had a preview of marital "bliss" in the Officer's parental 
home, which prompted the first utterance of her choral 
line: "Mankind is to be pitied! " To which, however, she 
adds optimistically: "But love conquers all. Come and 
see! " (229). Her marriage to the Lawyer will be the 
crucial test of this divine dictum. However, the senti- 
ment on which the Daughter proposes to found her marriage 
is already a premonition of its failure, for she is 
attracted to the Lawyer not because he is lovable but 
because he is worthy of pity; which implies the superi- 
ority of the "overbearing mistress" over the object of 
her pity. She pities the Lawyer in his role as scapegoat, 
a role in which Strindberg frequently pictured himself. 
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So intensely has the Lawyer involved himself in the evil, 
the envy, the suffering of his clients that it has 
affected his physiognomy. His face is chalk-white, lined 
" and ugly, and his hands are black and bleeding from the 
crimes and vices that have been forced upon him. None of 
which is heavier to carry than the separation of husband 
and wife, for that is "treason against the source of 
life, the spring of what is good, against love" (245). 
Yet for all his suffering and pleading on humanity's 
behalf the Lawyer is not found worthy of the laurel crown. 
The earthlings, as Indra had warned, are an ungrateful 
lot. They strike their friends, their prophets and libe- 
rators in the face, because they ]mow no better. Instead 
of the worthless honour of the world, the Daughter 
r 
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offers him a wreath which she says will become him 
better, and places a crown of thorns on his head. Strind- 
berg was able to accept Christ's vicarious suffering 
only when he himself played the role of Christ. It is 
with this poverty-stricken, unsightly, despised outcast 
that the Daughter of Heaven hopes to experience the ulti- 
mate of human happiness. In the very next scene, however, 
that dream of marital bliss has already reached its 
lowest ebb. Home has become a mutual torture chamber of 
no exit. Closed up in a single room where every crack at 
the Lawyer's orders is being pasted over against the 
freezing cold outside, the Daughter experiences to the 
full the suffocation of the soul imprisoned in flesh. 
Having married an earthly creature the Divine Daughter 
has herself become guilty of Heaven's Fall, and must 
suffer the consequences. She has tied herself to an 
imperfect love, a love dependent on compromise and mutual 
self-sacrifice, which is as impossible as it is impossible 
for a creature of flesh and blood to deny his self. Even 
to have to sacrifice one's taste for cabbage is experi- 
enced as a painful incursion of self by Strindberg's nar- 
cissistic marriage partners. "The most delightful is the 
greatest hell" (236) moans the Lawyer as he picks up 
from the floor another of his untidy wife's hairpins, ' 
which he promptly turns into a symbol of marriage, 
describing it as a contrivance in which the two are one, 
yet never meet, because they are parallel, and so are 
neither one nor two. Love is the subtlest of infernal 
tortures because it depends on partnership, and on a 
partnership in which the one's pleasure is the other's 
pain. Suffocating in her marital prison and unable 
to 
endure life with her Lawyer husband any longer the 
Daughter accepts with eager anticipation--unlike the 
Officer when their roles were reversed--the invitation 
of her liberator to elope with him to freedom, beauty, 
youth, and happiness at Fairhaven. However, since no 
traveller is admitted to Fairhaven until he has spent 
the required period of quarantine at Foulstrand, this is 
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where the Daughter begins her guided tour around the 
motley gallery of human destinies, where she will learn, 
in the Officer's words: "What a strange world of contra- 
dictions this is! " (269). 
1n'charge at Foulstrand is the Quarantine Master, 
another of Strindberg's easily recognisable self- 
portraits. Always misunderstood--if he talks about his 
exploits people say he is bragging, if he keeps quiet 
they call him a hypocrite--he hides behind a mask, making 
himself a little blacker than he is to escape their envy, 
and has taken to masquerades and play-acting in order to 
escape from himself. Here is also the Poet, the clear- 
sighted sceptic who suspects that the whole creation is 
mere junk, since clay, whether in the hand of the god 
Ptah or an ordinary mortal, is still only mud. Yet he is 
homesick for that same mud, descending every now and 
again from his poetic heights to wallow in it, because 
dirt hardens his hyper-sensitive skin against the stings 
of criticism. But when he sees the young lovers--the 
image of "perfect happiness, total bliss, the ecstasy of 
young love! " (272)--being mercilessly hauled towards 
Foulstrand to be disinfected of their passion, the Poet 
in a forgetful moment of compassion cries: "Don't touch 
them! Don't touch love! That's the greatest crime! Alas, 
alas! All that is beautiful must be debased, dragged 
down into the mud! " (237). However, he quickly gathers 
about him his protective cloak, of pessimism, and as a 
word of comfort to the sorrow-stricken couple facing 
forty days and nights in quarantine quotes, with a 
sardonic twist, the Daughter's divine maxim: "Love 
conquers all, even sulphur fumes and carbolic acid*"' 
(274). 40 To the lovers' disconsolate lament: "Alas, what 
have we done? " the short answer is: "You don't have to 
have done anything to be hit by the small discomforts of 
life! " (273). Having told Lina's sad story of how she, 
the obedient daughter who has sacrificed her youth and 
beauty in childbearing and domestic drugery, is sent to 
church to be scolded for not being perfect, while her 
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prodigal sister's homecoming is celebrated with a sump- 
tuous feast on the fatted calf, the Poet challenges Miss 
Agnes: "Is that justice? " (271). The Daughter of Heaven 
has to admit defeat. She has no answer to the injustice 
of human suffering. 
On the other side, at Fairhaven, where the Officer 
had promised her summer, sunshine, beauty, and happiness, 
the Daughter finds the landscape covered in snow, and no 
happiness amid the merrymaking. Saddest of all is Ugly 
Edith, the rejected, the outcast, an Ishmael in female 
form, who behind her unattractive appearance hides a 
beautiful soul which pours forth music that holds every- 
body in rapt attention. She illustrates Strindberg's 
thesis that the artist needs sorrow in order to create; 
not merely because it provides an incentive, or a theme, 
but because it makes him a seer. Illustrating this idea 
is the Blind Man's tale about the child who taught him 
wisdom, explaining to him why a human being weeps when 
he is sad. It is, said the child, "because his glasses 
have to be washed occasionally so that he can see more 
clearly! " (285). It is at Fairhaven, too, that the 
Officer, despite his having received his doctor's degree, 
which is just a matter of donning the appropriate 
costume, is sent back to school to start the painfully 
laborious process of learning all over again, allegedly 
iii order to mature. Frustrated and bewildered by this 
humiliating setback and wondering how long he will have 
to stay, the Officer is merely snubbed with another ques- 
tion: "Do you think time and space exist? "(281). In other 
words, he is doomed to the status quo, with no prospect 
of ever solving the impossible problem of two times two, 
or figuring out the crazy logic of a crazy world. This, 
on the surface the most light-heartedly comical scene in 
the play, has an undertone of deep despair, reflecting 
Strindberg's fear that death may not be the end, but only 
another beginning, a starting all over again the meaning- 
less pattern of life. 
Having been round Foulstrand and Fairhaven and taken 
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" in the whole pitiful kaleidoscope of human life, the 
Daughter is warned by her Lawyer husband that she has 
not yet tried the worst, the repetition, going back-and 
doing the same thing again and again. Despite the 
Lawyer's threat to sue her, she flatly refuses to return 
to the soul-destroying tedium of domestic duties, to the 
squalor and the cabbage. The degradation of the flesh, 
the misery mankind suffers for all sorts of absurd 
reasons--the poor because they have no food, the rich 
because they have no appetite--becomes too much for the 
Child of Heaven. She longs to return to her celestial 
origin. But first she wants to see the mysterious trefoil 
door opened that she may learn the secret believed to be 
hidden behind it. A prisoner in the flesh Indra's 
Daughter appears to be as mystified by the trefoil door 
and its secret as any mortal. Thoroughly disillusioned 
with marriage, an experience which has left her complete- 
ly confused about her identity, the Daughter tells her 
Lawyer husband that she wants to go alone into the wilder- 
ness in order,. she says, "to find myself again" (29o). 
But she does not go alone. She chooses as her 
companion the Poet, with whom, it appears, she feels a 
closer affinity than with any other character in the play. 
As mankind's spokesman before the gods the Poet performs 
the same function as the Daughter, and she may be seen 
as the divine extension of the Poet's self. Invited into 
Fingal's Cave, the Ear of Indra, to listen to the lamen- 
tation of the winds which the Daughter translates for him, 
the Poet learns nothing he did not already know, that 
The earth is not clean, 
Life is not good, 
Men are not evil, 
Nor are they good. 
They live as they can, 
One day at a time. 
The sons of dust wander in dust, 
Born of dust 
To dust they return. 
They were given. f eet to plod, 
Not wings. 
They become dusty, 
Is the blame theirs, 
Or yours? (XXXVI, 298. -99) 
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The waves add their testimony to the winds' complaint, 
in the wreckage washed ashore from sunken ships. Justice, 
Friendship, The Golden Peace, Hope--mankind's grandest 
illusions are all there on the rubbish-heap. The name- 
board of the ship Justice, which left Fairhaven with the 
Blind Man's son and Ugly Edith's hopeless love on board, 
brings back to the Poet and the Daughter memories of all 
the previous scenes in the play, and occasions the 
following dialogue on the relation between dreaming, 
poetry, and reality: 
DAUGHTER: I have dreamed it all. 
POET: I put it into poetry once. 
DAUGHTER: Then you know what poetry is. 
POET: Then I know what dreaming is. What is poetry? 
DAUGHTER: Not reality, but more than reality. 
Not dreaming, but waking dreams. (XXXVI, 3ol) 
While Poor Gynt, according to the Button-Moulder, has 
squandered his true self by dreaming instead of doing 
and is consequently only fit for the casting-ladle, 
Strindberg's Poet argues, in fact, that there is nothing 
more "real" than the reality of the imagination, and 
that it is therefore in his dreams, his poetry, that man 
is his true self: 
POET: And the children of man think that we poets 
only play, invent and make up! 
DAUGHTER: It is better so, my friend. Otherwise 
the world would be laid waste for lack of 
encouragement. Everyone would lie on his back 
looking at the sky. No one would put his hand 
to the plow and spade, plane and hoe. (XXXVI, 3o1-o2) 
The Poet is not a little astonished at the Daughter's 
prosaic, utilitarian attitude to the Dreamer, the 
indefatigable quester for the something beyond this 
prison of clay: "This you say, Daughter of Indra, you 
who are of the gods? " (3o2). Indeed, the Daughter's 
speech amounts to an admission that mankind's continued 
" existence on earth depends on man being kept in ignorance 
of his divine origin. Hence mankind crucifies its prophets 
and liberators without knowing why. A petition to the 
Powers who hold mankind in bondage for whatever 
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inscrutable reason would seem to be a futile exercise. 
Nor is the Poet's petition a prayer, but a series of 
questions, mankind's eternal questions which have never 
been answered to mankind's satisfaction, addressed to 
the gods, not with humility, but in a tone of Promethean 
defiance: 
Why are we born like the beasts, 
We who are divine and human? 
Our spirit craves a garment 
Other than this of blood and dirt! 
Is the image of God to cut its teeth-- 
to which the Daughter replies: 
Hush: you curious-- 
The creation blames not its Creator! 
No one has yet solved the riddle of 
life. (XX. XV2,304) 
Not even the Daughter of Heaven can answer the ultimate 
question. No wonder then that the Poet hesitates to 
grasp his chance of liberation. When the Daughter, 
seeing his terror as the rising waves threaten to drown 
them in the cave, asks: "Don't you want to be set free? " 
the Poet cries: "Of course I do. But not now. And not in 
water: " (3o6). He speaks for all mankind. The people 
crave an answer to the riddle of existence, but when it 
is given they will not accept it, for it is an answer 
that destroys man's ultimate life-lie: the illusion that 
his suffering has a metaphysical significance that one 
day will become apparent, if not in this life, then 
surely in the life beyond. 
After long court proceedings permission has at last 
been obtained for the door to be opened and the secret 
disclosed. Present at this important occasion are all 
right-thinking people, which means everybody, since that 
is what every person labels himself. Man's preposterous 
self-importance is comically represented by the quadri- 
metrically opposed Deans of the four university facul- 
ties, each claiming that he alone stands for the Truth, 
without, of course, being able to agree upon a defini- 
tion of truth. Strindberg, like Ibsen, maintained that 
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truth is relative and everchanging, and that what is 
recognised as truth today may not necessarily be so 
tomorrow or next year. "Views? " says the Chancellor, who 
obviously speaks for the author, "No. I watch out for 
views. I once had a few, but they were immediately dis- 
proved--by one's opponent, of course! " (314). The Dean 
of Theology, who does not think but believes, believes 
that the door should not be opened "because it conceals 
dangerous truths" (312). Religion depends, in his view, 
on people being kept in ignorance of dangerous truths. 
To which the Dean of. Philosophy, equally cock-sure, 
replies: "The truth is never dangerous. " But why then 
are the prophets killed? When the door is finally opened 
and to everybody's bewildered disbelief found to conceal 
nothing, the four Deans in turn demonstrate their inabili- 
ty to interpret the revelation of the ultimate mystery: 
DEAN OF THEOLOGY: Nothing: That is the solution 
of the riddle of the universe. In the beginning 
God created heaven and earth out of nothing. 
DEAN OF PHILOSOPHY: Out of nothing comes nothing. 
DEAN OF MEDICINE: Nonsense! There's nothing there. 
DEAN OF LAW: I question that. A fraud has been 
committed here. I appeal to all right-thinking 
people! (XXXVI, 317) 
To the accusation by all right-thinking people that she 
has betrayed them the Daughter replies patronisingly 
that they do not understand "that nothing" behind the 
door, and would not believe her explanation if she . 
gave them one. Only the Poet is considered qualified to 
grasp the ultimate truth, and she promises to tell him 
the secret of the universe if he will come with her into 
the wilderness. 
However, the Daughter has still a lesson to learn 
about "life's small disharmonies" (237) before she is 
allowed to escape from the burden of her earthly exist- 
ence. She has yet to experience the agony of choice. 
Reminded by the Lawyer of her duties to her child who is 
crying for her, the Daughter is made to feel the anguish 
of having to choose between her child and her "higher 
duties. " But the torment of her split soul remains a 
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mere statement. Her cry: "Oh, how it tears me: " (321) 
does not carry the emotional conviction of Brand's: 
"Jesus, Jesus, give me light! " (V, 262). Again the 
Poet's and the Daughter's identities are linked by their 
similar fates. He too has lost his inner peace because, 
he confesses: "I have spread sorrow and destruction 
through fulfilling my calling, note 'calling, ' which is 
the highest duty" (321). All that the Daughter is able, 
or willing, to reveal about the riddle of existence 
only confirms what the Poet has always known, that the 
world is an illusion, and the Poet's truth is the only 
truth, for it is all a dream play. When he challenges 
her to confirm the existence of an ultimate reality 
beyond the dream, a reality of peace and rest from 
suffering--after all she did speak of the world as a 
false copy--the Daughter merely tells him: "Hush! You 
may not ask any more, and I may not answer" (325). 
Replying to the question as to what caused her most 
suffering here on earth the Daughter describes the Poet's 
own experience exactly: "Existing--being alive. Feeling 
my sight weakened by an eye, my hearing dulled by an ear, 
" and my thought, my light, airy thought bound in the 
windings of a brain" (326). 
At last the moment has come for the Child of Heaven 
to be freed from her imprisonment in matter. Shaking the 
clay from her feet and putting her shoes into the puri- 
fying flames she prepares to enter the castle. But the 
fire which for Indra's Daughter promises release from 
her burden of suffering, becomes for the mortals left 
behind a funeral pyre of meaningless sorrows, withered 
hopes, shattered illusions, rejected beliefs. Cast into 
the fire are the Doorkeeper's shawl, the Officer's 
roses, the Glazier's diamond that opened the door, 
Victoria's beauty, Edith's ugliness, and finally the 
Theologian's calendar of martyrs--for "how, "-he protests, 
"can I defend a god who doesn't defend his own? It's all 
nonsense! " (328). The Daughter's promise to carry their 
complaints before the Throne--she studiously avoids 
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-mentioning God or Heaven--is shown to have no consola- 
tory effect on mankind. 'Her picturesque departure is 
sot against "a wall of human faces, enquiring, grieving, 
desuairinc: " (33o). 
The Divine Daughter's presence on earth has changed 
nothing and solved nothing. Having' explained the origin 
of human suffering as the sinful union of Brahma with 
Maya, which produced this illusory world, 
41 
she declines 
to reveal whether there is an end to the misery, whether 
there is hope of peace and rest on the other side of 
death. Behind the door was nothing and mankind felt 
cheated. It made no difference to the bewildered crowd 
whether "that nothing" signified just plain nothing or 
the sublime nothingness of Nirvana, which they were too 
obtuse to understand. Indra's Daughter is not, as some 
critics will have it, a Christ-like redeemer. 
42 Although 
she expresses a Christ-like compassion for suffering 
humanity she shows neither his capacity nor his willing- 
ness to endure the severe test of life, and does not, 
like the crucified Christ, prove the existence of a 
loving God. On the contrary, the Daughter's incapacity 
to cope even with life's "small disharmonies, " and her 
unwillingness, or inability, to answer mankind's questions 
about the meaning of existence, serve merely to under- 
mine mankind's belief in God, or gods, or at least in 
his benevolence. Indra himself does not display much 
liking for the earthlings, calling them "a dissatisfied, 
ungrateful lot, " and vowing he cannot breathe down there. 
A Dream Play, writes Raymond Jarvi, "is an outstand- 
ing formulation of modern pessimism which simultaneously 
imparts the expression of limitless compassion for 
suffering human beings. "43 Jarvi exaggerates about 
Strindberg's "limitless compassion" for suffering mankind, 
which so far as it is expressed by Indra's Daughter, 
repeating her parrot-like refrain: "Mankind is to be 
pitied, " remains a purely theatrical emotion. But there 
is no mistaking the pessimism, metaphysical and otherwise, 
of A Dream Play; conveyed not so much by the nothingness 
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disclosed, which is anticipated from the outset, as by 
the Daughter's failure to explain its meaning. It would 
be less of an exaggeration to say that A Dream Play 
expresses limitless suffering, since human beings are 
given no promise that death will be end of their misery. 
The hopelessness of man's lot is most movingly illu- 
strated by the Officer's faithful attendance upon his 
elusive Victoria, the cancelled dinners, the withered 
roses, the optimistic reiteration of the same pathetic 
ritual year in, year out. Furthermore, the pain of life 
is unjustly inflicted upon mankind through Heaven's Fall, 
yet is found to have no metaphysical significance. The 
opening of the door has revealed the nothingness of 
human suffering, and consequently the nothingness of the 
Dreamer's suffering self. 
A Dream Play is essentially a quest. for self, and 
as such has many similarities with Peer Gyn. t. In both 
plays the quester is a dreamer, albeit Strindberg's 
Dreamer is visible only in the multiplicity of his 
fictional selves, his dream figures. It is thus the 
invisible Dreamer who is the characterless character of 
A Dream Play. Ibsen's Dreamer is always present in his 
own dreams as one easily identifiable person, but all 
the mythical figures that only Peer sees may be regarded 
as fictions of his own mind, as Ausstrahlungen des Ichs, 
as it were, including the Button-Moulder, who tells Peer 
nothing he does not in his heart of hearts know already. 
In both plays, moreover, the question of self is twofold. 
It concerns the nature of man's self in general, and the 
nature of the poet's self in particular, Both plays 
demonstrate man's failure to verify God's existence, or 
rather, God's failure to prove his existence to man. If 
God does not exist and the traditional notion that man 
is made in God's image and has an immutable soul must 
therefore be discarded, what then is a man's self? 
Ibsen's tentative answer is existential: Man is what he 
wills, or fails to will, himself to be. Strindberg's is 
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"Buddhist": Man is what he suffers, whether it be suffer- 
ing inflicted upon him because he is born into a world 
which originated in sin, or suffering he inflicts upon 
himself for the sake of others. And presumably the 
. 
greater his capacity to suffer, the more self he has. 
All the various characters/aspects of the Dreamer's con- 
sciousness have one thing in common, their suffering. And 
what would each of them be without his individual sorrow? 
What would the Officer be without his withered roses, the 
Doorkeeper without her shawl, the Lawyer without his 
lined face and bleeding hands, Ugly Edith without her 
ugliness, or the Poet without his petition lamenting the 
fate of mankind? As for the nature of the poet's self, 
Strindberg asks with Ibsen: Is the poet infinitely richer' 
than other people because he has an infinite number Of 
selves, or emptier because he exists only in the parts 
he creates, having no self which is uniquely and indeli- 
bly his own? Is he a mere reflection like the rainbow, 
which can be seen but does not exist? Strindberg, like 
Ibsen, finds that the answer to the riddle of the Sphinx 
is Nothing. Just as Peer Gynt, peeling layer after layer 
off his player self, finally reaches the empty core, so 
Strindberg's Dreamer in pursuit of the secret of exist- 
ence opens the door on the nothingness of life and of 
his suffering self. 
Yet although the quest of either dreamer for his 
true self has been crowned with a wreath of straw, both 
plays end on an ambiguously triumphant note. Peer Gynt 
is told, contrary to all expectation, that he has been 
his true self all along, in a faithful woman's love. 
Egil A. Wyller maintains that Solveig realised that Peer 
was no ordinary liar, but a poet, and in Peer's fantas- 
tical "lies" she saw his true greatness. Wyller insists, 
despite the revelation of the onion scene, that Peer has 
an "essential" self, and that the "poet" is the "perma- 
nent core" of Peer's personality. 
44 But what, Ibsen and 
Strindberg ask, is the permanent core of the poet? Is 
not the onion precisely a symbol of the poet's self? And 
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" if Peer is "essentially" a poet, has he not been himself 
precisely by lacking a self, by being "characterless"? 
A Dream Plav ends with the, flower-bud on the roof of the 
burning castle bursting into a gigantic chrysanthemum. 
To explain exactly what this triumphant gesture means, 
however, is a different matter, for the burning castle 
with its crowning blossom is a composite symbol carrying 
a wealth of meanings, suggesting to some the denial of 
the flesh and the exaltation of the spirit as the true 
essence of man, and to others the affirmation of the 
sensual and the unconscious as the only reality, all else 
being an illusion. 
45 Obviously the Growing Castle itself, 
since it is a growing thing and moreover grows out of 
manure, symbolises in the widest sense earthly life. But 
since the earthly life of each individual human being is 
embodied in his illusion of self, the castle becomes more 
specifically a symbol of self. 
46 The funtion of the 
castle as a prison, from which, the Daughter says, it is 
man's duty to seek to be released, accords with the 
Buddhist idea of the self as the prison of the soul. For 
the individual soul to become reunited with the All-One 
the self must be annihilated, that is to say, all earthly 
passions must be done away with. Thus the burning castle 
may be seen as the destruction of the illusion of self 
through positive suffering, and the bursting flower-bud 
as the triumphant release of the soul to be united with 
the All-One. However, the Buddhist ideal of self-denial 
had only a limited appeal to the self-assertive Strind- 
berg. A Dream Play--"my most beloved play, child of my 
greatest pain"--is a vindication, not a negation, of self. 
Seen in relation to the poet, the flower bursting forth 
from the flames of suffering is his work of art, a 
creation which is uniquely his, and therefore signifies 
not the annihilation of self but the transmutation of 
self into some higher essence of self. In Alone, the last 
of his autobiographies, Strindberg tells us how his 
wandering through Balzac's great human comedy had taught 
him resignation and helped him reconcile himself to his 
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suffering when at the same time "I also discovered how 
sorrow and pain somehow burned up the refuse of the soul, 
refined instincts and feelings and even conferred higher 
skills upon the soul released from the tormented body" 
( 'V ! II, 147-46). But Strindberg was not out out for 
the ascetic's'-part. In a letter to Hedlund he gives vent 
to his exasperation with the irrepressible demands of 
his baser self: "Shall I never learn how to kill my 
flesh? It is still too young and fiery. But then it 
shall be burned up! And will be indeed! But what of the 
spirit? Perhaps up in smoke too: 147 
In the final conflagration of A Dream Play Strind- 
berg allows man's grandest illusion to go up in smoke, 
the illusion that he has a divine soul. The wall of 
despairing human faces against which the Daughter's 
departure to her vague destination is set, suggests that 
the crowd are not watching the reunion of a soul with 
her divine origin, but a soul going up in smoke as all 
their other illusions have done. But the golden bloom 
remains. Perhaps that too is an illusion, the only one 
that the Dreamer has left: his dream, or rather, his 
dream play. In his dream play the Dreamer is himself the 
supreme ruler, with the whole power of the Creator within 
him to knead chaos into a meaningful, coherent universe. 
If all else is meaningless the poet will not let go of 
his last illusion that art has meaning and that the 
suffering out of which art is born therefore is not 
pointless. Having divested man of his self, his soul, 
his metaphysical significance, and demonstrated the 
nothingness of his suffering, Strindberg declares that 
the Poet's vision remains, and that is all that matters, 
to the Dreamer, at least. Strindberg's pessimism stops 
short of the ultimate negation. 
Even in The Ghost Sonata (19o7) where he strips his 
characters to the hollow core--divesting them not only of 
name, pedigree, rank, riches, culture, crimes, secrets, 
guilt, everything that makes up the illusion of self, but 
of their very humanity, reducing them to jabbering parrots, 
161 
mummies, ghosts, while remarking sardonically on the 
wise and gentle Buddha who is sitting there watching the 
flower grow heavenward out of his lap and waiting for 
this madhouse earth to transform itself into a paradise-- 
Strindberg keeps in reserve a Sunday child, a seer, in 
i7hom he invests his hope, however remote, of an ideal 
world rising from the ashes of this "world of everlasting 
change, disappointments, and pain" (XLV, 211). 
Like Ibsen, Strindberg never abandoned his quest 
for the Absolute, and for the immutable essence of self 
which corresponds to the image of the Absolute. His 
longing to discover the fixed point in the flux of being 
is pithily expressed in the following dialogue. in 
The Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven (1891-92), ostensibly 
a, fairy play for children on the pattern of Lucky Per's 
Journey (1882), but with a message clearly intended for 
grow, m-ups. While they are registering at an inn in the 
course of their dream journey in search of the Kingdom 
of Heaven, the following colloquy ensues between the 
Smith, who is really looking for his dead children, and 
his magician-guide, Doctor All-knowing, whose identity-- 
he gives his name as "Anonymous"--puzzles the Smith: 
THE SMITH [who writes for him]: An unusual name! 
Your occupation? 
THE DOCTOR: lily occupation? I have several! Put 
down doctor! 
THE SMITH: Where from? 
THE DOCTOR: The womb! 
THE S14ITH: Where to? 
THE DOCTOR: The grave! 
THE SMITH: Always mysterious : "Who 'are you, strange 
man, who now have my fate in your hands. What do 
you wish of me? 
THE DOCTOR: You will know that later, when you are 
ready. ' 
THE SMITH: When shall I be ready? 
THE DOCTOR: When you, as I, have learnt to know 
yourself (dig s: iäly) 
THE SI6ITH: Al-ways one's self (Alltid siäly) I What 
is this self (det släly) that you forever preach? 
THE DOCTOR: It is the fixed point which Archimedes 
searched for, the point from which he thought he 
could move the earth. It is your "I" (ditt jag) 
which is not another, the central point on your 
horizon. 
162 
. THE SMITH: Who am I then? THE DOCTOR: For the present, a lad of forty, with 
ore and slag mixed, and like a child as quickly 
moved by sorrow as by joy! And no doubt life's 
simple pleasures still lure you: a well set 
table, a brimful glass, a dance with maidens on 
the green ... (XXV, 138-4o) 
There is no mistaking the inspirational source of this 
dialogue. Not only is the Smith's character, as described 
by the Doctor, akin to the Gyntish Self, but the impli- 
cation of the dialogue is that the Smith will only truly 
know himself when he has arrived at a self-recognition 
similar to that of Peer Gynt: that he is Anonymous, an, 
evanescent spark of consciousness between womb and tomb. 
Only then is he ready for the truth: that the Kingdom of 
Heaven exists only as his nostalgia for Heaven. When 
like Brand he tries to climb Jacob's ladder--while being 
reminded of every abortive endeavour made by mankind, 
including the tower of Babel--to reach Heaven, Doctor 
All-knowing remarks: 
Go on then, climb up and try the ladder, 
But if it should not lead to Heaven, 
At least it stands firmly on the earth! (XXV, 213) 
Jacob's ladder does not lead to Heaven but to a vision 
of his humble smithy with his children in it. He no 
longer needs the Doctor's help, for now he knows that he 
too can "troll. " He can call his children to life by the 
power of his imagination, and only in his imagination 
can he possess them forever innocent and lovable. 
Similarly in To Damascus and A Dream Play the 
odyssey of Strindberg's unknown Dreamer leads him back, 
as it did Peer Gynt, to his point of departure, having 
at no stage, or station of the cross, brought him any 
closer to the Archimedean point of existence and his 
essential self, for the ambiguously happy ending is in 
each case negated by the disillusionment of the Dreamer. 
The futility of the quest is in all three plays reflected 
in a plot structure which is at once progressive and 
circular. Peer Gynt's journey progresses in time from 
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youth to old age, but. in terms of his quest for selfhood 
it is circular in that it takes him back to the valley 
of his youth where, defeated by adulthood, he seeks a 
spurious salvation in the lap of childhood innocence. In 
To Damascus I the circularity of the quest is made even 
more manifest by the fact that the journey of the Unknpyvn, 
while it progresses in chronological time through the 
seventeen scenes of the play, is both literally and meta- 
phorically a pilgrimage through eight stations of the 
cross, with the ninth, the Asylum scene, marking the 
turning-point; and back through the same stations, the 
unavoidable repetition--yet with a difference, for the 
scenes revisited are coloured by his descent into-the 
abyss, morally and existentially, in the Asylum scene-- 
back to the street corner where he first met the Lady, 
and where the money which might have saved him the pain- 
ful journey, had he trusted the good will of the Invisi- 
ble and claimed the letter, has been vvaiting for him all 
the time. The Unknown refused, like Peer Gynt, to make 
the leap "straight through" because he did not want to 
be made a fool of by life. But life's fool is precisely 
what his going "round about" has made him. And again, 
like Peer, he blames his "bad faith" on the trolls, 
alleging that he is a changeling substituted by the 
elves for the human child that was born. Nor is his 
reconciliation with the Invisible more than a temporary 
truce, for he consents to go through the chapel, but not 
to stay, a hint that his search for the real child will 
continue; which indeed it does in continuous circles of 
futility for two more plays until Strindberg finally 
shuts him up in a monastery and makes him promise never 
to recount the story of his suffering self again. In 
A Dream Play, which in the case of Indra's Daughter is 
another "pilgrimage play, " Strindberg repeats, but in a 
less strictly symmetrical manner, the circular "journey 
of a soul" pattern of To Damascus I, with the Daughter 
descending through seven stations of human suffering, to 
reach the bottom of the slough of existence in the eighth, 
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the marriage scene, after which begins her ascent, 
reversing the pattern, back-through the-cave and the 
corridor to the burning castle. In so far as Indra's 
Daughter represents the Dreamer's soul, her ascension is 
a sign of hope, promising release from the burden of 
pain in a spiritual realm beyond. But what has her 
mission accomplished for the sorrowing crowd left behind, 
who are also mart of the Dreamer's manifold self? It has 
done nothing to alleviate their distress, nor has it 
brought them closer to discovering the meaning of'exist- 
ence. However, in so far as the Daughter is also identi- 
cal with the Poet, her descent to earth is a poetic 
necessity, for the poet, in order to be creative, cannot 
live on the heights all the time, as the Daughter 
explains. in her farewell speech: 
You poet, who best understands how 
to live; 
On wings hovering above the earth, 
You dive at times into the mire 
To touch it, but not to stick fast! (XXXVI, 329) 
While Ibsen claimed that he went into the sewer to 
cleanse,, it, Strindberg dived into the mud--and marriage 
was the deepest he could get--in order to suffer; after 
which he withdrew to the heights to feast on his 
suffering in writing, by suffering it many times over 
in the lives of the characters he created. 
Strindberg remained an aesthete (in the Kierke- 
gaardian sense) all his life, and felt perpetually guilty 
about it, but persistently refused to leap to the Kierke- 
gaardian paradox, fearing that he might be fooled. All 
his life he waited for the Eternal One to prove his 
existence, and believed at times that he had wrestled 
with the Almighty or heard his voice in a thunder storm, 
but he waited in vain for the ultimate proof. He was 
both the hunter and the hunted in a chase ending with 
the sad recognition of the Hunter in The Great Highway, 
subtitled "A Wander Play with Seven Stations"--and the 
great highway very appropriately ends on the snow-white 
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heights--that he could not be the one he wished to be, 
but, characteristically of Strindberg, phrased in such 
a way as to exempt him from blame. 
The pattern of the quest in A Dream Play and 
The Great Highway recalls that of Brand, which is also 
a descent into the sun-starved vale of human misery, 
ending with a return to the heights. But the nature of 
Brand's quest is different, for with Brand Ibsen had 
progressed from the stage of aesthetic detachment in 
"On the Heights" and Love's Comedy to the stage of 
ethical responsibility. Strindberg's Hunter is searching 
for the divine self he believes was once his, but which 
he has lost through the sin of being born and conse- 
quently through no fault of his own, and is waiting for 
the Eternal One to reveal his existence and restore his 
real self to him, meanwhile clinging to his suffering as 
a sign that he is considered worthy of the blessing. 
Brand, on the other hand, accepts responsibility for the 
Fall, and sets about creating a new Adam out of the 
broken-fragments of fallen humanity, confident that he 
can succeed where the Creator failed. Instead of waiting 
for signs in the sky Brand chooses his God and his 
callings and even if his choice ultimately leads to his 
destruction, his mission has not been futile, for he has 
realised himself in the only way possible in an absurd 
world. He decides himself where the Archimedean point of 
the universe is and orders his existence accordingly. 
From whichever point of view Strindberg approached 
the problem of identity he repeatedly returned to the 
same answer, the only positive answer that this illusory 
world yields: that the Dreamer's--the Poet's--world is 
the "real" reality, and the true self is the Poet's : elf, 
which exists only in the work he creates. 
Chapter 3 
Beckett and the Suffering Nothing 
When Samuel Beckett was awarded the Nobel Prize for 
Literature in 1969, The Times, in its editorial tribute 
to the prize-winner, reflected that the recognition was 
both "surprising" and "inevitable. " Surprising because 
"Mr. Beckett is an original. " His work 
resembles nothing in earlier vrriting. The only works like those of Beckett have been written quite recently by dis- 
ciples who cannot withstand his influence and who find it 
necessary to explore for themselves the world he has dis- 
covered. 
And inevitable because 
he has found the words and the forms, both in narrative 
and in drama, for a world which we recognize to be real 
and true to experience; a few of his predecessors knew 
that it existed but found in action, like Hamlet, or in 
death, like Shakespeare's Timon, an escape from its nearer 
shores. Beckett has made his way into its hinterland. 1 
If The Times editor had known Strindberg's dream plays he 
would have needed to qualify his statement about Beckett's 
work resembling nothing in earlier writing, and if he had 
been familiar with Eliot's Doctrine of Tradition he might 
have stopped to consider whether he was in fact paying 
tribute to genuine originality or merely extolling novelty. 
Moreover, if the world that Beckett has discovered has 
anything to do with the modern concept of the unconscious, 
then Strindberg began to explore the unmapped regions of 
its hinterland at least as early as, and quite indepen- 
dently of, Proud. Or if the editor is referring to the 
existential notion of man thrown into an absurd universe, 
then there are critics who are prepared to argue that the 
world of King Lear is as absurd as that of Beckett's 
derelict wayfarers. 
Artistic originality, Eliot insists in "Tradition 
and the Individual Talent, " is not synonymous with novel- 
ty, and he condemns the popular tendency "to insist, when 
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we praise a poet, upon those aspects of his work in which 
he least resembles anyone else. " We pretend that it is in 
his difference from his predecessors that a poet's indi- 
vidual essence is to be found, whereas if we approach him 
without this-prejudice we shall often find, Eliot main- 
tains, that the best and the most individual parts of his 
work are those in which his predecessors assert their 
immortality most vigorously. 
2 No poet, or artist, has his 
complete meaning alone. His significance can only be 
properly appreciated in relation to the poets and artists 
of the past, and it is a test of the true innovator that 
he changes the past as well as the present. What happens 
when a "really new" work of art is created, Eliot explains, 
is something that happens simultaneously to all the works 
that preceded it. The new work disturbs the ideal order 
which the existing monuments have formed among themselves, 
and for order to persist after the new arrival "the whole 
existing order must be, if ever so slightly, altered, " 
and this readjustment of each work toward the whole is 
"conformity between the old and the new. "3 True original- 
ity, Eliot repeats in another context, is merely develop- 
ment of the art of one's predecessors, and genuine when 
a logical development. 
4 
If we accept Eliot's theory that a poet's influence 
on the modern response to the artistic monuments of the 
past is a test of his artistic authenticity, we need only 
look to Martin Esslin's authoritative book on the Theatre 
of the Absurd for confirmation of Beckett's truly origi- 
nal talent. In Esslin's view Beckett's arrival has indeed 
altered the whole existing order. So much so that "one 
begins to feel, " Kenneth Tynan protested in a review of 
Esslin's book, "that the whole history of dramatic 
literature [including Shakespeare, Goethe, and Ibsen] has 
been nothing but a prelude to the glorious emergence of 
Beckett and Ionesco. "5 Jan Kott's absurdist reassessment 
of the Bard in Shakesreare Our Contemporary (1964) is an 
eminent testimony to Beckett's creative influence on-the 
past, notably the chapter entitled "King Lear, or Endgame, " 
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in which, Patrick Murray observes, "Shakespeare's supreme 
tragic masterpiece and Beckett's second-best play are 
accorded approximately the same degree of critical appre- 
ciation. " It has become almost a fashion, Murray maintains, 
to name Beckett in association with Shakespeare, not 
merely to suggest that Beckett may owe something to his 
great ancestor, but that the achievements of these two 
dramatists are broadly comparable. 
b To the reviewer of 
The Times, however, who saw the Royal Court production 
1964-5 of Waiting for Godot, supervised by the author him- 
self, Beckett's importance as a dramatic innovator needed 
no such apology. When first seen in London (in 1955), he 
writes, "the play was obviously recognizable as a work of 
the highest originality and talent: nine years later, it 
stands revealed as the work that gave the theatre a new 
language and created a world of its own which has passed 
into folklore: these are the highest achievements within 
the range of literary composition. "7 
But if comparisons between the plays of Shakespeare 
and Beckett have become a critical commonplace, little 
has yet been done to throw light on Beckett's relation 
to his more immediate predecessors, those unavoidable 
touchstones of modern drama, Ibsen and Strindberg. 
Martin Esslin dwells on the subject of Strindberg's dream 
plays for a page and a half because he regards them as 
"direct sources of the Theatre of the Absurd. "$ But he 
does not relate them to Beckett's plays. The only exten- 
sive comparison between the plays of Strindberg and 
Beckett that has appeared so far is the chapter devoted 
to Beckett's En attendant Godot and Fin de Partie in 
Anthony Swerling's book Strindberg's Impact in France 192o- 
196o (pp. 111-35). Swerling makes many valid and enlight- 
ening comparisons between the two-dramatists, which will 
be acknowledged in due course, but his persistent diminish- 
ment of Beckett in order to emphasise the magnitude of 
Strindberg's influence regrettably reduces the critical 
value of his investigation. Swerling argues that "there 
is 
hardly an element, theme, fact or condition of Godot and 
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Fin de Partie which is not to be found or paralleled in 
Strindberg's theatre. "9 What, one wonders, is then left 
of original Beckett? 
While Anthony Swerling has concentrated his efforts 
on demonstrating Strindberg's "decisive" influence on 
Beckett Is plays, I shall in the present study be concerned 
with Beckett's evolution from his Scandinavian forbears. 
My aim will be to show that Beckett's plays--and I shall 
focus mainly on Waiting for Godot (1952) and Endgame 
(1958)--are a "logical" development from the non-natura- 
listic drama of Ibsen and Strindberg, and most obviously 
from Strindberg's post-Inferno plays To Damascus (1898- 
19ol), A Dream Play (19ol), and The Ghost Sonata (19o7), 
which in turn are "logical" descendants of Peer Gynt. 
However, I shall not, like Swerling, attempt to cover a 
multitude of aspects, but shall focus my attention on what 
I consider to be the main theme, not only of Beckett's 
plays, but of his entire oeuvre: the quest for Self. 
Like Peer Gynt and Strindberg's Unknown, Beckett's 
wayfarers have one all-absorbing preoccupation in life: 
the perpetual search for their true identity. The quester 
on the road from Peer Gynt via Damascus to Godot is modern 
man, cut adrift from his divine moorings, in desperate pur- 
suit of his dwindling self. While Brand still clings to 
the traditional belief in man's divine essence and the 
substantial unity of the soul, and consequently equates 
"wholeness" with godhead, Peer Gynt, for whom God the 
Father is little more than a fairy-tale figure, is content 
to aspire to the heights of worldly power, to become 
Emperor "enbloc--Gynt of the entire globe" (VI, 141), 
which is still only one rung of the ladder below the 
Almighty. For the Unknown, who stands on the threshold of 
the twentieth century, the laurel crown of science becomes 
the symbol of selfhood. But Beckett's vagrants, who have 
come almost to the end of the road, cherish no expectation 
beyond the privilege of meeting one Mr Godot of whom they 
know little more than that he has servants, that his 
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servants sleep in the hay, that-he beats the shepherd but 
not the goatherd for reasons unknown, and that (Christ 
have mercy on us! ) he probably has a white beard. Had 
Godot arrived in person, he could have been relied upon 
to Fear a bowler hat. 
Ibsen, Strindberg, and Beckett all tell the story of 
modern man groping about in a God-forsaken universe in 
search of the Archimedean point of his existence. All peel 
the onion to reveal the nothingness at the core of man's 
self where his divine soul was once thought to be. Which 
in turn leads them to ask: if we can no longer believe 
that man is made in God's image, what then is his essential 
Self? When man's substantial soul has dissolved, what is 
the permanent "I" that holds his personality together? And 
all come up with the same answer: that there is no essen- 
tial, permanent "I, " that the individual personality is, 
in the case of Ibsen and Strindberg, a multiplicity of 
roles played by one actor, and in the case of Beckett, a 
succession of everchanging habits. 
When man's image of God shrinks and dwindles, man's 
self shrinks accordingly. Brand is superhuman because his 
God is young and strong and demands the absolute. His 
parishioners are a dwarfish humanity because their God is 
old and decrepit and harmlessly undemanding. Brand aspires 
quite to Heaven, to equality with the Almighty. Estranged 
from the Deity, Peer Gynt and the Unknown strive after 
worldly power and glory. Peer dreams of becoming world 
emperor by the power of gold, the Unknown of becoming 
"king in the realm of the Intellect" by solving the 
alchemical riddle of gold-making. But Beckett's tramps 
have come so far down in the world, and Heaven has become 
so distant, that they seem unable to imagine a glory beyond 
the bowler hat, and to have the old one replaced by a new 
is a luxury past their expectation. Vladimir is delighted 
to come into the possession of Lucky's once fine hat which 
Pozzo has trampled into the dust to put an end to his 
menial's distressingly nonsensical "thinking. " Lucky's hat 
is the emblem of his humanity. Indeed, it is his humanity, 
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what little is left of it, for-when his hat is removed, 
" his thinking stops and he is reduced to a mute beast. In 
Waiting for Godot the shabby bowler hat of the clown has 
become the symbol of modern man's "smothered divinity. " 
In the Preface to his study of The Absurd (1969) 
Arnold P. Hinchliffe writes: 
I have taken it as axiomatic that for Absurdity to exist, 
God must be dead and that following this awareness there 
must be no attempt to substitute a transcendent Alter Ego. 
[... ] The death of God and Transcendence safely elimi- 
nates most of the distinguished predecessors--such as 
Kafka and Dostoevsky--and limits the area of historical 
description to the last forty years. 10 
Waiting, for Godot must by this definition be excluded 
from the category of the Absurd, for in Godot God is not 
yet dead. But he has become so distant as to be but a 
"thingless name" (the French Dieu clearly separates God 
from Godot), a name to which the tramps can attach no 
image whatever, and their insistence that they have an 
appointment with the mysterious and awesome Godot, who 
might be able to save them, is precisely an attempt, how- 
ever pitiful, to substitute a transcendent Alter Ego. 
Godot is an image of worldly prosperity: a landowner with 
servants, family, friends, agents, correspondents, books, 
bank account. But viewed from the tramps' zero-point of 
utter destitution even a petty landowner is an ideal 
sufficiently remote to take on a dimension of transcen- 
dence, and with a white beard added to his remoteness 
Godot assumes an aspect of godlike awe. Far from aspiring 
to divinity in this world or the next, Beckett's tramps 
dare not even approach their diminutive Alter Ego as 
upright human beings, but picture themselves crawling on 
their hands and knees before His Worship to present their 
"vague supplication. " Uncertain about their arrangement 
with Godot, Estragon wonders:. "Where do we come in? " 
VLADIISIR: Come in? On our hands and Inees. 
ESTRAGON: As bad as that? 
VLADIMIR: Your Worship wishes to assert his 
prerogatives? 
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ESTRAGON: We've lost our rights? 
VLADIMIR: (distinctly). We've got-rid of them. (19) 
Tihat promise of salvation, of transcendence from their 
wretched, unprivileged, wormlike. selves is there in being 
"tied" to a landed, petty bourgeois Alter Ego like Godot? 
In the French version Vladimir stakes his hopes no higher 
than that "Tonight perhaps we shall sleep in his place, 
in the warmth, dry, our bellies full, on the straw. It is 
worth waiting for that, is it not? " To which Estragon, 
unimpressed, replies: "Not the whole night. "11 Estragon's 
dejected response to Vladimir's encouragement indicates 
that Beckett's destitutes, although incapable of rising 
to Brand's towering conception of selfhood, or Peer's 
soaring flights of fancy, are yearning for something else 
and something higher than the mere satisfaction of their 
physical needs. 
Vladimir and Estragon are waiting to be "saved. " But 
as for the nature of the salvation they are waiting for, 
they can no more define it than can the Unknown, who in 
the opening scene of To Damascus I finds himself in a 
situation very similar to that of the tramps in Godot. 
He too is waiting--not on a country road, but on a street 
corner, where there is also a tree--for someone or some- 
thing indefinable. A lady enters, greets him, is about to 
pass him, but stops: 
THE UNI'TOViN : Ah, there you are. I thought you would 
come. 
THE LADY: You called me, then? Yes, I felt it. But 
why are you standing here on the street corner? 
THE UNKNOWN: I don't know. I must stand somewhere 
while I wait. 
THE LADY: What are you waiting for? 
THE UNICIOt7N: If I only knew. For forty years I have 
been waiting for something. I believe they call, 
it happiness, or perhaps it is just the end of 
unhappiness. [... ] But I beg you: do not leave me. 
I am a stranger here, without a single friend, 
and my few acquaintances seem more like enemies. 
THE LADY: Enemies everywhere, alone everywhere! 
? /hy did you leave your wife and children? 
THE UNI i'IOVIN: I wish I knew. I wish I knew why I 
exist, why I stand here, where I should go, and 
what I should do. Do you think that the living 
can be damned already? (XXIX, 7-8) 
r 
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Beckett may, or may not, have known To Damascus when he 
wrote Waiting for Godot, but I can think of no scene in 
Strindberg's plays that more closely and profoundly sums 
up the existential predicament that Strindberg's charac- 
ters share with Beckett's destitutes. Like the Unknown, 
Didi and Gogo are waiting for the end of unhappiness. 
like the Unknown they are strangers in a hostile world. 
Estragon is beaten up every night by an alien lot 
-referred to as "they. " Like the Unknown they are afraid 
in their loneliness and cling to each other as he., Tclings 
to the Lady. And their alienation is more than just 
social. It is existential and metaphysical, in Beckett's 
play so much so that the social aspect has become irrele- 
vant. They are all exiles in an alien universe, not 
because God does not exist, for they dare not trust his 
non-existence, but because he cannot be defined, or 
because they have become estranged from the traditional 
concept of God and find themselves in a frightening 
vacuum, uncertain which way 'to go, and what to do, and 
groping after a substitute ideal or idol to relate their 
eternal longings to. But like the Unknown, Didi and Gogo 
fear that the living may be damned already. Vladimir 
suggests: "Suppose we repented": 
ESTRAGON: Repented what? 
VLADII, MIR: Oh ... 
(He reflects. ) We wouldn't have 
to go into the details. 
ESTRAGON: Our being born? (11) 
There is only one way to undo the sin of being born, but 
the tramps are not free to choose death. They have "got 
rid of" that privilege too, by failing to take the oppor- 
tunity when they were still presentable enough to be 
admitted to the Eiffel Tower. The Unknown, too, deluded 
himself about his freedom to choose death. He tells the 
Lady that when he can bear life no longer he shall go 
"Into annihilation. To know that I hold death in my hand 
gives me an amazing feeling of power" (XXTX, 9). But after 
having been through the traumatic experience in the asylum 
where he found himself sitting at table with the ghosts 
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of his past, he confesses to the Mother: "Last and worst: 
I dare not die, for I am no longer sure that death will 
be the end of my misery" (lol). This is also one reason 
why Didi and Gogo cringe from the ultimate step of 
suicide. It is what "All the dead voices" tell them: 
ESTRAGON: They talk about their lives. 
VLADIbIIR: To have lived is not enough for them. 
ESTRAGON: They have to talk about it. 
VLADIMIR: To be dead is not enough for them. 
ESTRAGON: It is not sufficient. (63) 
One life may not be sufficient atonement for the sin of 
being born. But how can one then be redeemed? muses 
Malone, who, without knowing exactly what his sin was 
felt full well that living was not a sufficient atone- 
ment for it or that this atonement was in itself a sin, 
calling for more atonement, and so on, as if there 
could be anything but life, for the living. (24o) 
Life's repetitiveness, and the fear that death is 
merely another beginning of the same meaningless round, 
is a constant theme in Beckett's work, and one that links 
him closely with Strindberg. "The sun shone, having no 
alternative, on the nothing new, " begins Murphy (1938). 
"The essential doesn't change, " echoes Vladimir (21). "And 
if I could begin it all over again, " says Arsene in Watt 
(1953) on having completed his service at Mr Knott's 
house, "a hundred times, knowing each time a little more 
than the time before, the result would always be the 
same, and the hundredth life as the first, and the 
hundred lives as one" (46). The Unnamable, having reached 
the other side of death, discovers that death is not the 
end of consciousness, not silence and peace, but the 
beginning of another relentless round of his futile quest 
for identity. And the prospect of having "to start again 
from nowhere, from no one and from nothing and win to me 
again" (3o4) frightens him. Like the Officer in A Dream 
Play he has nightmares about being sent back to school 
to relearn the old lessons in order to mature, so as to 
become eligible for the final end, and being scolded for 
not knowing the answers to the most elementary questions: 
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Praise, yes, they gave me to understand I was making 
progress. Well done, sonny, that will be all for today, 
run along now back to your dark and see you tomorrow. 
And there I am, with my white beard, sitting among the 
children, babbling, cringing from the rod. [... ] Pupil 
Mahood, for the twenty-five thousandth time, what is a 
mammal? And I'll fall down dead, worn out by the rudi- 
ments. [ ... ] Pupil Ijahood, repeat after me, Fran is a higher mammal. I couldn't. [... ] Frankly, between our- 
selves, what the hell could it matter to pupil Mahood 
that man was this rather than that? (339-4oj 
The Unnamable hardly qualifies as a mammal, much 
less as a higher mammal, being quite literally a torso 
of humanity, "stuck like a sheaf of flowers in a deep 
jar" (329), gazing before him with weeping, unblinking 
eyes "like a great horn-owl in an aviary" (295). 
Vladimir and Estragon, although destitute, are still 
recognisable as human beings, Estragon even as a some- 
time poet, unmistakably so, by his rags. But existen- 
tially Beckett's tramps are precisely such "stumps of 
soul, " such "fragments of humanity, " as Brand set out to 
save, committing himself to the impossible task of piecing 
together broken bits of soul into whole beings in whom 
God could recognise his own image, not because he (Brand) 
loved them, but because he despised a humanity who came 
crawling before God as. invalids. Measured against Brand's 
monumental concept of man, Didi and Gogo are dwarfs made 
in the image of a dwarfish God. Yet they cling to every 
vestige of their diminutive selves, as pathetically 
reluctant to accept their nothingness as is Peer Gynt, 
who pleads with the Button-Moulder to let him borrow 
himself for a bit that he may collect testimonials to 
prove that he has always been himself: "You are born only 
once, / And you like to hang on to the self you began 
with" (VI9 222). 
Richard N. Coe argues, mainly with reference to 
Beckett's novels, that Beckett sees the human condition 
as an impossible paradox: "that of an indefinable Neant 
within, conscious of a possible relationship with an 
equally indefinable Neant without, yet invalidating that 
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relationship by the very fact of its consciousness. 1112 
Rephrasing this Sartrean statement'3 in terms of a Dantean 
symbolism Coe explains why "without exception, Purgatory 
is the residence of every different manifestation of 
Beckett's moi": 
Dian has a vision of Paradise--the ultimate realisation of the Self in a Neant beyond space and time, void united 
with void; yet to desire such a Paradise is to be aware 
of a Self desiring, and a Self desiring is not a void, 
and therefore cannot enter. l4 
In short, Man is a Nothing who fails to reach Nothingness 
because he is condemned to self-awareness. In order to 
explain why a self desiring is not a void, and conse- 
quently cannot become united with the void without, Coe 
turns to yet another philosophy, that of Buddhism. In 
Buddhist teaching Nirvana's is by definition that which 
cannot be desired, and. the self that desires is to the 
Buddhist merely a pseudo-self, the illusion of Maya, the 
not-self imprisoned in time and space. The desiring pseudo- 
self "destroys the Unity of existence by using language, 
by defining, dividing, measuring and separating the 
elements of the material world around it. Only when the 
mind has ceased to desire and to define can it be at one 
with the Totality, only then can it begin to feel its own 
essential reality., 
16 From Murphy onwards, says Coe, 
Beckett is everlastingly in search of new solutions to the 
riddle of Self, which has now become the "Proustian riddle" 
(another significantinfluence on Beckett) : "How am 'I, ' an 
a-temporal being imprisoned in time and space, to escape 
from my imprisonment, when I know that outside space and 
time lies Nothing, and that 'I, ' in the ultimate depths of 
my reality, am Nothing also? "17 But if Beckett's novels 
are a fertile hunting-ground for Buddhist-inspired inter- 
preters, Coe has to admit that "As a Buddhist, Beckett is, 
to say the least of it, unsatisfactory. 1118 Nor, I submit, 
are Beckett's characters any more genuine Buddhists than 
are Strindberg's Unknown and the Dreamer of A Dream Play, 
who both toy with the idea of Nothingness as an escape from 
the suffering inflicted upon them as prisoners in the clay. 
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Murphy, who, as Beckett has intimated, is the origin 
of the tramps in Godot, 19 is a "seedy solipsist" because 
he has cast his vote in favour of "the little world, " the 
microcosm of his own mind, which "pictured itself as a 
large hollow sphere, hermetically closed to the universe 
without" (76), and because he derives such pleasure from 
his retreats into the "sanctuary" of the mind that plea- 
sure is not the word. What Murphy is seeking in the void 
within, we learn, is "what he had not ceased to seek from 
the moment of his being strangled into a state of respi- 
ration--the best of himself" (52). And the best of him- 
self is the self that exists beyond space and time, or as 
Murphy more accurately puts it, beyond "the contingencies 
of the contingent world" (117). If Murphy can be said to 
be a "searcher after infinity, " it must be underlined, as 
Coe quite rightly does, that "infinity is his infinity, 
it is the infinite dimension of his own Self, his 
'precious ipsissimosity, ' to use Belacaua's phrase, and 
other people are no more than obstacles to his eventual 
self-realisation. "20 But if Murphy is searching for his 
"precious ipsissimosity, " for his infinity, it cannot be 
for Nirvana, which belongs to no separate self, and can- 
not be prefixed by the possessive pronoun. What to the 
Buddhist is the completion of self: one-ness with the 
All-One, is to the Western mind the extinction of self. 
Nirvana is the annihilation of all we know as the perso- 
nal, separative self. Professor Radhakrishnan explains: 
Through the destruction of all that is individual in us, 
we enter into communion with the whole universe, and 
become an integral part of the great purpose. Perfection 
is then the sense of oneness with all that is, has ever 
been and can ever be. The horizon of being is extended 
to the. limits of reality. 21 
Nirvana is thus the very opposite of Murphy's closed- 
circuit microcosm. Says Radhakrishnan: "Foregoing self, 
the Universe grows I. "22 Murphy has no intention of for- 
going self. His "seedy solipsist" void is a bizarre cari- 
cature of Nirvana, not the Plenum-Void of infinite expan- 
sion, but a "closed system" becoming closer and closer. 
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And "The more his own system closed around him, the less 
he could tolerate its being subordinated to any other, " 
so much so that he claims he is the prior system, the 
stars depending on him and not he on them (126). Murphy 
aspires to become like his lunatic friend Mr Endon (Greek 
for "within") a perfectly padded cell unto himself, which 
is his idea of absolute selfhood. Watching Mr Endon's 
adeptness at avoiding contact with his opponent on the 
chessboard and realising that he can never hope to match 
the complete self-immersion of the schizoid mind, Murphy 
drops his head on the board in despair, and unexpectedly 
begins to see "nothing, " 
that colourlessness which is such a rare postnatal treat, 
being the absence (to abuse a nice distinction) not of 
ercinere but of perci-ai. His other senses also found 
themselves at peace, an unexpected pleasure. Not the numb 
peace of their own suspension, but the positive peace 
that comes when the somethings give way, or perhaps 
simply add up, to the Nothing, than which in the guffaw 
of the Abderite naught is more real. (168) 
Murphy's acute self-awareness, his keen consciousness of 
a self desiring, his pleasure in feeling all his senses 
suck in the bliss of nothingness, indicate that his 
Paradise is not the self-lessness of Nirvana. 
Murphy's desire to shut himself up in the "closed 
system" of his mind, and his nostalgia for the womb, 
"the embryonal repose"--both being states of absolute 
will-lessness, irresponsibility, and non-involvement-- 
are manifestations of his failure to cope with his irre- 
deemably split self. Murphy hates the body and loves the 
mind, and has no wish to reconcile the cravings of the 
former and the pleasures of the latter, but finds that he 
lacks the means (fundamentally the will) to "clinch" the 
choice between "renouncing all that lay outside the 
intellectual love in which alone he could love himself, 
because there alone he was lovable, " and submitting to 
his "deplorable susceptibility to Celia, ginger, and so 
on" (124). Like the Poet in Ibsen's youthful poem "On the 
Heights" and the Hunter in Strindberg's last play 
The Great Highway, Murphy opts for the aesthetic solution 
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to the problem of the split self, in seeking to become 
"whole, " not by attempting to reconcile body and mind, 
Eros and Amor intellectualis, the earthbound and the 
heaven-bound, but by negating the former in favour of the 
latter, shutting himself up in his mind and striving to 
make it as "body-tight" as possible. Murphy's body/mind 
dilemma is an ironic reflection of the artist's split 
self. Like the Poet and the Hunter he longs to shake the 
dust off his feet and leave the oppressive valley of 
physical bonds and desires and ascend to the heights of 
pure intellect, for there alone he can be free. But free 
to do what? Ibsen's and Strindberg's heroes seek the 
heights in order to fulfil their artistic vocation and 
thus realise themselves. Murphy seeks the heights in 
order to be free to do nothing, to be free from the yoke 
of freedom. Beckett underlines with savage irony the 
futility of Murphy's quest by having him ascend, not to 
the lofty mountains of Ibsen and Strindberg, but very 
appropriately--and quite in line with the "evolution" of 
the diminishing Self--to a garret under the roof of the 
M. M. M. asylum. 
It is among madmen that Murphy, like Peer Gynt, 
comes closest to attaining the imperial crown of Self. 
In the Magdalen Mental Mercyseat, as in the Cairo mad- 
house, it can truly be said with Doktor Begriffenfeldt 
that "Here everybody is himself with a vengeance; / Him- 
self and nothing else whatsoever" (VI, 178). Murphy's 
impressions of the complete self-immersion of the "higher 
schizoids, " each shut up in his private, tightly sealed 
padded cell, enviably indifferent to the "contingencies 
of the"contingent world, " correspond exactly to Doktor 
Begriffenfeldt's observations about his subjects: 
Each one shut up in the cask of self, 
Steeped in the fermentation of self, 
Hermetically sealed with the bung of self 
Between staves seasoned in the well of self. 
No one sheds a tear for another man's woes; 
No one listens to another man's ideas. (VI, 179) 
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But Murphy, who is ignorant of the difference between 
"being oneself" and "being to oneself enough, " does not 
recognise, as does the terror-stricken Peer, that the 
lunatics, far from being themselves, are quite beside 
themselves, and that the recognition "little short of 
scandalous" he has won among the patients of the M. M. M. 
is a crown of straw. He persists to the very end in the 
delusion that the absolute self-seclusion of the "higher 
schizoids" is the apotheosis of selfhood. But Murphy's 
"to-thyself-be-enough-ness" leads, as inevitably as 
Peer's, to the annihilation of self. His last, self- 
indulgent wish, set down in his will, that the ashes of 
"these my body, mind and soul" be brought to "the neces- 
sary house" of the Abbey Theatre "where their happiest 
hours have been spent, " and "that the chain be there 
pulled upon them, if possible during the performance of 
a piece, the whole to be executed without ceremony or 
show of grief" (183), is not to be fulfilled. Murphy's 
ashes are strewn, accidentally and ingloriously, over 
the floor of a low-class saloon, and swept away with the 
detritus of the common herd--an exit which, far from 
being the final self-affirmation Murphy had intended it 
to be, is even less sublime than ending up in the 
Button-Moulder's ladle, which is at least a recognition 
of one's metal value. 
Kierkegaard and Sartre teach that to be is to choose, 
and that man faced with the Absurd is himself responsible 
for the content of his self and the meaningfulness of his 
life. Beckett, to whom the freedom to choose among an 
infinite number of equally futile alternatives does not 
add up to a meaningful existence, adopts instead Bishop 
Berkeley's principle esse est percipi: to be is to be 
perceived. Berkeley postulated his New Principle with 
the avowed intention of giving reasoned and conclusive 
proof of God's existence, arguing that all things exist 
ultimately because they are perceived by God. In his own 
words: "The existence of the corporeal universe consists 
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in its being the object of the divine awareness, and its 
occurrence to and impact on our awareness are the imme- 
diate consequence of the divine volition. "23 But esse 
est rerci ii 3i only half of Berkeley's principle, and 
accounts merely for passive existence, for the existence 
of things perceived. To cover the active existence of 
the perceiving subject Berkeley extended his formula to 
esse est nercici auf nerciaere: 
24 to be is to be perceived 
or to perceive. Murphy, we remember, describes his bliss- 
ful experience of nothingness as "the absence (to abuse 
a nice distinction) not of percirere but of percipi" (168). 
His nothingness, in other words, does not mean non- 
existence, for he is still the perceiving subject. But 
he is no longer an object of perception, dependent on an 
outside perceiver. The absence of percipi means, in fact, 
that Murphy in the world of his "body-tight" mind is God, 
the sole perceiver of his microcosm, or to borrow an apt 
epithet of Peer Gynt, he is himself "en bloc--Murphy of 
the entire globe. " However, it is a measure of the diminu- 
tion of man's self since Peer Gynt that Murphy's globe 
is of a size with the hollow sphere of his brainpan. 
Murphy is clearly a heretic in Berkeleian terms in not 
recognising God as the ultimate perceiver, but proclaim- 
ing himself "the accidentless One-and-Only" (168). 
Berkeley is concerned with the self as a perceiving 
agent, not for the purpose of proving individual exist- 
ence, but of disproving the existence of mindless, un- 
perceivable matter. He has little to say about the self 
as a distinct entity from other selves. For him the 
important distinction is that between minds (who per- 
ceive) and sensible things (the "ideas" of the mind, 
the things perceived). 
25 Beckett, however, who like Ibsen 
and Strindberg is concerned with individual existence 
rather than with the nature of being, applies Berkeley's 
ontological principle esse est nercipi to an existential 
purpose, that is, to establish the identity of the Self. 
The cardinal question, even for the Unnamable, 
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whose ontological uncertainty about the very humanness 
of his existence in "the wedge-headed trunk in which I 
am now marooned" (333) might have been cause for-greater 
anxiety than the problem of individual selfhood, is: Who 
am I? not What am I? Where among all the different 
voices that speak through his consciousness is the voice 
that is his, and his alone. "Ah if I could only find a 
voice of my own, in all this babble, it would be the end 
of their troubles, and of mine" (351). Only when he has 
located his own true self among the crowd of his invented 
creatures, his "vice-existers, " will he have lasting 
peace, and peace to the Unnamable means the absence both 
of percipi and of percipere, "that peace where he neither 
is, nor is not, and where the language dies that permits 
of such expressions" (337). It is clear, however, that the 
Unnamable seeks the peace of non-being in much the same 
spirit as the Unknown sought the peace of the monastery, 
not from a genuine desire for self-annihilation, but out 
of sheer exhaustion, not as a solution, but as an escape: 
I think I'll soon go silent for good, in spite of its 
being prohibited. [... ] I think I'll soon be dead, I hope 
I find it a change. I should have liked to go silent first 
C... 7 to enter living into silence, so as to be able to 
enjoy it C... 3 so as to feel myself silent, one with all 
this quiet air shattered unceasingly by my voice alone 
C... ] I wanted myself, in my own land for a brief space, 
I didn't want to die a stranger in the midst of strangers, 
a stranger in my own midst, surrounded by invaders C... J (4oo) 
The Unnamable has a "strange notion" of having a task 
to perform before he can be acquitted and achieve the 
right to silence: 
Yes, I have a pensum to discharge, before I can be free 
[... 7 I was given a pensum, at birth perhaps, as a 
punishment for having been born perhaps [... ] and I've 
forgotten what it is. But was I ever told? (312) 
Like Peer Gynt, the Unnamable is inclined to lay the 
blame for the failure of his quest, his failure to 
carry out the master's intention, on the master's 
inexplicitness: 
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A little more explicitness on his part, since the initiative belongs to him, might be a help C... ] Let 
him inform me once and for all what exactly it is he 
wants from me, for me. What he wants is my good, I 
know that, at least I say it, in the hope of bringing 
him round to a more reasonable frame of mind, assuming 
he exists and, existing, hears me. But what good, there 
must be more than one. The supreme perhaps. In a word 
let him enlighten me, that's all I ask, so that I may 
at least have the satisfaction of knowing in what sense 
I leave to be desired. (315) 
While Peer Gynt is threatened with the Button-rdoulder's 
ladle because he has no identity, the Unnamable learns 
that an identity is precisely what he needs to be 
eligible for non-being. At least that is what "they" 
tell him, the voices who try to "sell" him an identity: 
But my dear man, come, be reasonable, look, this is you, 
look at this photograph, and here's your file, no con- 
victions, I assure you, come now, make an effort, at 
your age, to have no identity, it's a scandal, I assure 
you, look at this photograph, what, you see nothing 
true for you C... J"- 
? 38o) 
We are reminded of Peer Gynt's negative photograph on 
which his gutless sins have made so little impression 
that neither sulphur nor potash can transform it into a 
recognisable Self. But that is precisely what "they" can 
offer the Unnamable: to fill in the blank picture with the 
necessary "sins" and afflictions to give it "human shape. " 
. 
Among the Beckettian themes which Hinchliffe traces 
back to Proust is "the belief that suffering is the one 
force powerful enough to establish the identity of 
Self. "26 But this is a theme which Beckett also shares 
with Strindberg. It is a main, not to say the main, 
theme of his post-Inferno plays, and is most poignantly 
summed up in the final lines of The Great Highway. 
The Hunter is craving the blessing of the Eternal One 
with whom he has wrestled as mankind's representative, 
and "Mankind is to be pitied": 
But first bless me who suffered most, 
Whose deepest suffering was this-- 
I could not be the one I wished to be. (LI, loo) 
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His prayer is at once an anguished plea for the recog- 
nition of his suffering, which is the one permanent 
reality whereby he can identify his self, and a deeply 
disillusioned acknowledgement of the purposelessness of 
human suffering. He has wrestled with God, but he has 
not won what he set out to gain, his true self. 
The Unnamable is not at all convinced that identity 
is a matter of sin and suffering. Driven by a gnawing 
sense of guilt to seek explanations for his failure to 
assume an identity, he concludes that "this state of 
affairs" is nobody's fault: 
what have I done to them, what have I done to God, what 
have they done to God, what has God done to us, nothing, 
and we've done nothing to him, you can't do anything to 
him, he can't do anything to us, we're innocent, he's 
innocent, it's nobody's fault [... 3 (389) 
Or he goes to the opposite extreme and declares: 
all here is sin, you don't know why, you don't know 
whose, you don't know against whom r_... ß (4o7-8) 
If his existence is entirely a matter of words, a possi- 
bility which a compulsive talker like himself must face: 
I'm in words, made of words, others' words C... 3 I'm all 
these words, all these strangers [... 3 coming together 
to say, fleeing one another to say, that I am they, all 
of them L... 3 (390) 
then his identity problem is clearly a linguistic problem: 
it's the fault of the pronouns, there is no name for me, 
no pronoun for me, all the trouble comes from that C... ) (4o8) 
The problem of the Unnamable, constantly searching 
for his own voice among the pseudo-selves he invents-- 
and cannot stop inventing--and discovering that there is 
no pronoun that clinches his quintessential Self, is the 
problem of Peer Gynt and the onion, and of the Dreamer 
of A Dream Play and the secret of the clover-leaf door. 
(Strindberg's Dreamer is more invisible than Beckett's 
hero is unnamable, since he speaks only through his 
dream characters, whereas the Unnamable is present in 
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his own voice as the "I" of an interior monologue, 
reflecting on his own consciousness. ) All represent the 
existential dilemma of the artist, hovering between 
being and non being, because he exists in all the 
characters he creates, yet cannot completely identify 
with any of them. Peer Gynt is all in favour of "being, " 
and is prepared to suffer purgatorial torment "For a 
hundred years, if need be" (VI, 22o) in order to preserve 
the Gyntish Self. Strindberg's Dreamer is attracted to 
the idea of Nothingness as an escape from suffering, but 
cannot make up his mind whether the Nothingness revealed 
by Indra's Daughter signifies a sublime reality, the 
promise of a higher Self, or just plain nothing, the non- 
existence of self. In Beckett's case non-being seems to 
be the only permanent solution to the artist's dilemma. 
For the Unnamable, the self has lost its value as a 
desirable thing in itself. If life is suffering, and if 
having a self does not relieve the suffering, but on the 
contrary augments it--he learns from "them" that to 
assume an identity is a painful process--then a self is 
an affliction to be endured only as a means to an end, - 
which for the Unnamable is non-being. It would seem 
absurd to seek a self as a means to attain non-being, 
but you cannot "not be" unless you "be" first, as the 
unnamable knows from bitter experience: 
But say I succeed in dying, to adopt the most comfort- 
able hypothesis, without having been able to believe I 
ever lived, I know to my cost it is not that they wish 
for me. For it has happened to me many times already, 
without their having granted me so much as a brief sick- 
leave among the worms, before resurrecting me. L... ] And 
I for my part have no longer the least desire to leave 
this world, in which they keep trying to foist me, with- 
out some kind of assurance that I was really there C... 3 
(344-45) 
However, on that premise his quest is doomed to fail, 
for the Unnamable is a dreamer who, like Peer and the 
invisible Dreamer of A Dream Play, is unable to 
distinguish between dream and reality, and can therefore 
never be sure that he "was really there. " 
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The very first question asked in Waiting for Godot 
is one of identity. Returning from his nightly ditch to 
be greeted by Vladimir's: "So there you are again, " 
Estragon retorts: "Am I? " (9) Only Vladimir's recognition 
can bring Estragon back to himself. Later when Estragon. 
falls asleep Vladimir will wake him up whining: "I felt 
lonely" (15). Without a perceiver he is lost. Esse est 
percipi, to be is to be perceived by the Other, man or 
God or both--and not just to be seen, which is merely a 
confirmation of one's objective existence, but to be 
recognised as having a separate and permanent identity. 
Didi and Gogo have only each other to rely on as mutual 
witnesses to their identity, hence their inability to 
part and to commit suicide. 
Comparing the "symbiotic" couples of To Damascus 
and Godot Anthony Swerling observes: 
The couples of both plays are symbiotic in spite of 
themselves, their attempts to leave each other and life 
being thwarted by their dread of solitude. Thus The 
Stranger and The Lady: "I would like to go away/ Haven't 
you tried to leave six times but not succeeded? " (p. 154); 
hence: 
Estragon: On ferait mieux de se separer. 
Vladimir: Tu dis toujours ca. Et chaque fois tu 
reviens. 27 
Over-anxious to prove that Beckett's symbiotic couples 
originate from the familiar Strindberg set-up, Swerling 
overlooks the differences. Strindberg's couple is a male- 
female relationship and is symbiotic only in a sexual, 
not in an existential sense. Beckett, however, having 
excluded woman, is only concerned with the existential 
interdependence of his partners. 
28 A symbiosis means a 
mutually beneficial partnership, and since their need of 
an identity is mutual, Didi and Gogo are a truly symbi- 
otic pair. Not so the Unknown and the Lady. Existentially 
their relationship is a one-sided and parasitic one. It 
is the Unknown who needs the Lady, but not vice versa. 
He wants to possess not only her love, but her very self, 
to bolster his precarious sense of selfhood. He wants to 
"exist, " that is, to suffer, for both of them, and the 
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lady herself must be self-less. That is why he calls 
her Eve. To' him she is Woman, not an individual. We are 
xeminded of Peer Gynt who flattered himself that he had 
increased the value of the Gyntish Self by adding 
Anitra's non-self to his own. He, likewise, calls Anitra 
"You natural daughter of Eve" (VI, 158). When the Lady 
begins to assert an independent will by reading his for- 
bidden book and refusing to be called Eve, she becomes 
in the eyes of the Unknown a vampire, a threat to his 
self, and he leaves her. Their partnership can only work 
as one between master and slave, more analogous to the 
Pozzo-Lucky relationship than to that of the tramps. 
Not that the companionship of Didi and Gogo is an 
untroubled one. Both are conscious of the tension between 
the need to be alone and the fear of loneliness. Estragon 
craves Vladimir's attention but rejects his embrace, and 
Vladimir wakes up Estragon but refuses to listen to his 
nightmares. While both know that they depend on each 
other for recognition, each is concerned first and fore- 
most to fend for his own self. The egotistical "to thyself 
be enough" attitude manifests itself most clearly when 
their attention is turned to an outside perceiver. Didi 
and Gogo are staggering about on one leg "doing the tree": 
ESTRAGON: Do you think God sees me? 
VLADIMIR: You must close your eyes. 
Estragon closes his eyes, staggers worse. 
ESTRAGON: (stoning, brandishin his fists, at the 
ton of his voice). God have pity on me: 
VLADIIIR: (vexed). And me? -- 
ESTRAGON: 0n me: On me! Pity! On me! (76-77) 
Estragon's self-seeking cry to Heaven is reminiscent of 
the Hunter's: "But first bless me who suffered most--. " 
When the Boy first arrives and asks what message he is 
to take back to Godot, Vladimir replies anxiously: "Tell 
him ... 
(lie hesitates) ... tell him you saw us. 
(Pause. ) 
You did see us, didn't you? " (52). But when Godot's 
messenger fails to recognise them from one day to the 
next (the French text states explicitly that he is the 
same, "le garcon de la veille, " although the boy says 
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he isn't) Vladimir, anticipating the worst, can no 
longer afford to be generous, and changes the pronoun 
to the selfish me: 
Tell him ... 
(he hesitates) ... tell him you saw me and that ... 
(ho hesita es ... that you saw me. (C... ] With 
sudden violence. ) You're sure you saw me, you won't come 
and tell me tomorrow that you never saw me! (92) 
Looking to Godot for the ultimate proof of their 
identity, Didi and Gogo are, existentially, nobody until 
Godot arrives. But Godot's coming depends on their being 
able to recognise him when he comes. The Pozzo-Lucky 
interlude serves to demonstrate that they will not. 
Estragon is never really convinced that the new arrival 
on the scene is PPPOZZZO: and not Godot, and frankly 
admits: "Personally I wouldn't even know him if I saw 
him" (23). Although the tramps are strangers to him, 
Pozzo condescends to acknowledge their humanity: 
(halting). You are human beings none the less. (He puts 
on hi's glasses. ) As far as one can see. (He takes off 
Eis glasses. Of the same species as myself. (He bursts 
into an enormous laugh. ) Of the same species as Pozzo. 
Made in Goas image. 
(23) 
But it means nothing to the tramps to be told that they 
are made in God's image. It is a distinction that cannot 
redeem them from the sin of being born, nor has it saved 
them from their present wretchedness. Didi and Gogo share 
the fate of having been granted a useless "divinity" with 
the sorrowing crowd of ADreamPlay. Their only hope 'rests 
with Godot. Only the coming of Godot can save them from 
being nothing. They refuse to admit the possibility that 
they are nothing precisely because they are tied to Godot. 
In his essay on Proust (1931) Beckett, discussing the 
human personality as subjected to the Time cancer, says: 
We are not merely more weary because of yesterday, we 
are other, no longer what we were before the calamity 
of yesterday. [... 3 The aspirations of yesterday were 
valid for yesterday's ego, not for to-day's. 
(13) 
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life, therefore, is a constant disappointment because we 
can never catch up with ourselves. When the aspirations 
of yesterday are fulfilled, we are already somebody else 
with new unfulfilled aspirations. Old Krapp listening to 
his younger selves on tape hears his thirty-nine-year- 
old self comment on the youthful aspirations of the 
twenty-nine-year old: 
Hard to believe I was ever that young whelp. The voice! 
Jesus! And the aspirations! (Brief laugh in which KRAPP 
-oins. ) And the resolutions! Brief laugh in which KRAPP 
oins. ) To drink less, in particular. (Brief laugh of 
APP alone. ) C... 3 Plans for a less ... (hesitates) ... engrossing sexual life. L... 7 Sneers at what he calls 
his youth and thanks to God that it's over. (Pause. ) 
False ring there. (Pause. ) Shadows of the opus ... magnum. Closing with a--(brief laugh)--yelp to Providence. 
(Prolonged laugh in which 1 APP joins. ) What remains of 
all that misery? A girl in a shabby green coat, on a 
railway-station platform? No? (13) 
Continues Beckett in Proust, in the voice of Proust's 
narrator, who 'chinks like himself: 
how absurd is our dream of a Paradise with retention of 
personality, since our life is a succession of Paradises 
successively denied, that the only true Paradise is the 
Paradise that has been lost, and that death will cure 
many of the desire for immortality. (26) 
Beckett demonstrates in The Unnamable the Proustian idea 
of death being a cure of the desire for immortality, but 
Beckett is more pessimistic than Proust, placing his 
nameless hero in hell with no memory of a lost Paradise 
to comfort him. 
Krapp's Last Tane (1958) is, or may easily be inter- 
preted as, a parody of the Proustian search for self. The 
play might well, Patrick Murray suggests, be sub-titled 
A La Recherche du Temps Perdu. The solitary figure of 
Krapp, alone on the stage with his tape-recorder, is 
vainly seeking to confirm his true identity by reliving 
various periods of his past life, but encounters only 
different versions of himself. 
29 Proust (like Ibsen and 
Strindberg) sees the individual, not as one immutable 
entity, but as a temporal series of discontinuous selves, 
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a succession of habits. His is the quest for that essence 
of self-which is glimpsed in rare moments of "involuntary 
memory, " when sensations joyfully experienced in the past 
are recaptured in the present. The painful immediacy of 
involuntary memory is for Proust the true reality, and 
the essential source of artistic inspiration. Beckett, 
commenting on Proust's creatures as victims of Time, 
observes that the permanent reality, if any, of the human 
personality "can only be apprehended as a retrospective 
hypothesis" (15). Strindberg said precisely that about 
the artist's personality in The Son of a Servant. Johan 
did not find the permanent, immutable "I" he had been 
seeking on his "sad walk in the shadowy world of memories, " 
for the artist's self can only be apprehended as the sum 
of the thousand printed pages (XIX, 277). 
Going back over the recorded history of his succes- 
sive "selves"--from hopeful, ambitious youth, to the 
smug, middle-aged self-deceiver waiting for the creative 
miracle to happen, to impotent, disillusioned old age, 
summing up his life's achievement as "seventeen copies 
sold" (18)--Krapp, like Peer when peeling the onion, not 
only fails to find his immutable "I, " but apprehends the 
abysmal nothingness of his existence: 
At twenty-nine: Flagging pursuit of happiness. Unattain- 
a le axa ion. Sneers at what he calls his youth and 
thanks to God that it's over. (13) 
At thirty-nine: Perhaps my best years are gone. When 
t here was a chance of happiness. But I wouldn't want 
them back. Not with the fire in me now. No, I wouldn't 
want them back. 
(2o) 
At sixty-nine: Just been listening to that stupid 
astar took myself for thirty years ago, hard to 
believe I was ever as bad as that. Thank God that's 
all done with anyway. (Pause. ) 
(17) 
At the heart of Krapp's nothingness lies, as with Peer, 
the failure of love, meaning the incapacity for devotional 
love. Like Peer, young Krapp indulges in an "engrossing 
sexual life, " but his one romantic love affair, his only 
chance of happiness, which he keeps coming back to again 
and again, ends in an agonising admission of failure: 
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I said again I thought it was hopeless and no good going 
on and she agreed, without opening her eyes. (Pause. ) I 
asked her to look at me and after a few moments--(Dause) 
--after a few moments she did, but the eyes just slits, 
because of the glare. I bent over her to get them in the 
shadow and they opened. (Pause. Low. ) Let me in. (Pause. ) 
(16-17) 
He longs for communication, for recognition, and 
affection, but is afraid of being invaded by the other 
person. Like Peer and the Unknown, Krapp sees love as a 
threat to his own insubstantial self. Or perhaps the 
lovers' mutual admission of the hopelessness of their 
'. attachment is rather a testimony to the absolute "impene- 
trability (isolation)" of human beings. Complete posses- 
sion of another person is impossible, argues Beckett in 
Proust, because the "essence of oneself" is incommuni- 
cable (65). He quotes Proust: "Man is the creature that 
cannot come forth from himself, who knows others only in 
himself, and who, if he asserts the contrary, lies. " 
Adds Beckett: "Vie are alone. We cannot know and we cannot 
be known" (66). But if the "essence of oneself" is 
incommunicable, the tape-recorder can be of no use to 
Krapp in his quest for his essential, or total, self. 
His former selves preserved on tape exist only in words, 
and whatever may have been the essence of his self at 
thirty-nine cannot be communicated to his present self. 
Indeed, so much is old Krapp a stranger to the vocabu- 
lary in which his former selves exist that he needs to 
consult a dictionary. Not only have his painstaking 
recordings been an entirely futile exercise because 
words, written or spoken, cannot connect yesterday's ego 
with today's, but his successive negations of his former 
selves, and repeated assurance that he would not want 
the past back, lead one to suspect that there was nothing 
worthwhile, nothing of eternal value, to record in the 
first place, and that the lost Paradise he keeps 
returning to, never was Paradise. 
For Vladimir and Estragon who have their past 
recorded neither in the written nor the spoken word, but 
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have to rely entirely on memory for that "retrospective 
hypothesis" which is their permanent reality, if any, 
the "prospects" are far from "inspiring" (14), for their 
memory is so defective as practically to deny them a 
past. Estragon is not exaggerating when he protests that 
he is no "historian" (65), for his memory is not even 
long enough to tie his "I"s together from one day to the 
next. Vladimir's is slightly better. He can recall the 
nineties, when they were still "presentable" enough to 
be admitted to the Eiffel Tower (lo). But the "million 
years" that separate their respectable past from their 
unprivileged present are lost in the dark. Neither of 
the tramps can rely on his memory when it comes to 
identifying Godot, and since they have admitted that 
they hardly know him and would not recognise him if they 
saw him, they have no way of verifying whether Pozzo is 
actually Godot. They simply have to take his word for it 
that his name is Pozzo and that he has never heard of 
"this ... Godet ... Godot ... 
Godin ... " 
(29). But how 
can Pozzo know that he is not Godot? Lucky may know him 
as Pozzo, but he might well be Godot to someone else. 
Indeed, he may well have made an appointment with the 
tramps--after all, they are waiting on his land--and 
then forgotten all about it, for he too reveals a deplor- 
ably defective memory. And it is deteriorating fast. 
On 
his second arrival when Vladimir reminds him: "d"ie met 
yesterday. (Silence. ) Do you not remember? " Pozzo replies: 
I don't remember having met anyone yesterday. But 
tomorrow I won't remember having met anyone today. (88) 
So don't count on me to enlighten you. 
If human identity is as fluid as Beckett suggests in 
Proust, then there is no mystery about Pozzo taking Didi 
and Gogo for strangers, and the tramps not recognising 
him. Admittedly Pozzo does not have a white beard, 
3o 
so 
in that respect he does not answer to their picture of 
Godot. But there are other significant similarities. 
Like Godot he is a landowner with servants, or slaves, 
and one of his slaves, Lucky, is tied to 
him by a long 
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cord, as Vladimir and Estragon are "tied" to Godot. 
. Anthony Swerling is convinced that 
Besides the predicament of Estragon and Vladimir, A Dreamrlav has influenced the figure of Lucky who (with his cord around his neck) undergoes the torment of The Porteress with her cord around her wrist. Neither is 
allowed to sleep without being tugged out of their 
slumber by their cords. The Porteress and Lucky (accord- ing to Pozzo) are glad enough to get their jobs . 31 
Swerling is content to point out the superficial simi- 
larities between the two characters and does not look 
into the deeper meaning of their respective cords and 
the suffering they symbolise. The Doorkeeper's bell- 
cord--which she tells the Daughter she ties to her arm 
at night because she must be on duty when the watchmen 
change, but is not actually seen to wear--is a much less 
prominent feature in Strindberg's play than is the long 
rope in Godot, which is permanently tied around Lucky's 
neck and violently pulled by the tyrannical Pozzo. The 
Doorkeeper calls the people who pull her bell-cord "my 
young friends. " And as she herself says, it is the shawl 
and not the bell-cord which is the true symbol of her 
suffering. Both Lucky and the Doorkeeper are scapegoat 
figures, but whereas the Doorkeeper's suffering is her 
very crown of self because she carries mankind's agony 
on her shoulders--a burden which even Indra's Daughter 
cannot sustain for long--Lucky's cord indicates that he 
has "sold" his self to Pozzo in exchange for existential 
security, and is reduced to a beast because he prefers 
the misery of slavery to the anguish of freedom. 
Vladimir and Estragon consider themselves lucky, 
for a similar reason, in being tied to Godot. It gives 
them a sense of purpose. Their appointment with Godot is 
the Archimedean point of their existence. Vladimir says: 
What are we doing here, that is the question. And we 
are blessed in this, that we happen to Imow the answer. 
Yes, in this immense confusion one thing alone is clear. 
We are waiting for Godot to come-- (8o) 
In the immense confusion of existential possibility they 
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" are spared the responsibility of choice, for until Godot 
comes they can do nothing but wait. Not for them the 
leap "straight through. " Nor do they take the trouble to 
go "round about. " Peer's was at least an active escape. 
Defeated by the Boyg he put all the more zest into going 
round about, and gained, if not authentic selfhood, at 
least a very colourful personality. Didi and Gogo prefer 
to sit in the muck of passivity, like the Officer of 
A Dream Play in the stables of the manured castle, and 
just wait for salvation to be brought to them on a plate. 
In the Officer's case Godot does actually arrive in the 
shape of Indra's Daughter. But when liberation is offered 
him he is reluctant to accept the invitation, afraid to 
venture into the unknown. For with the Officer as with 
the tramps, "habit is a great deadener" (Godot, 91). 
Man's tendency to flee his freedom is "bad faith" 
in Sartre's view, but to Beckett, freedom in an absurd 
world makes no more sense than being "tied. " To be a 
master is not preferable to being a slave. Nor, accord- 
ing to Pozzo, is it a matter of choice whether you are 
one or the other. He says about Lucky: 
Remark that I might just as well have been in his shoes 
and he in mine. If chance had not willed it otherwise. 
To each one his due. (31) 
Pozzo's and Lucky's reappearance in Act II shows that 
the Time cancer does not distinguish between master and 
slave, but reduces every human effort to the absurdity 
of death. However, for as long as they are condemned to 
life, Pozzo and Lucky belong together. "The truth is, " 
Pozzo admits, leading Lucky to the fair, "you can't drive 
such creatures away. The best thing would be to kill 
them" (32). But Pozzo owes his selfhood to Lucky and is 
permanently dependent upon his servant to uphold it: 
But for him all my thoughts, all my feelings, would have 
been of common things. E... 3 Beauty, grace, truth of the 
first water, I knew they were all beyond me. So I took a 
knook. (33) 
The attachment between Pozzo and Lucky, visually 
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" -symbolised by the rope that joins them, bears close 
-resemblance to the master-slave relationship as analysed 
by Hegel in the celebrated section of The Phenomenology 
(18o7) called "blaster and Slave. " Hegel argues that 
consciousness of one's own selfhood demands as a condi- 
tion the recognition of this selfhood by another self. 
However, while one self requires the presence of another 
self for the development of his own self-image, each self 
will also try to cancel out or annihilate the other in 
order to assert his own autonomy, for the independence of 
the one will appear as a limitation of the freedom of the 
other. Thus the point of the battle for self-identity is 
to conquer the other, that is to say, obtain-his recog- 
nition of one's own autonomy without extinguishing him. 
The victor in this battle becomes a consciousness "for- 
itself, " independent, a master, while the conquered 
becomes a consciousness "for-another, " a slave who, Hegel 
suggests, has perhaps arranged this relationship to save 
his life. But while the master maintains the power, he 
is self-sufficient only through the labour of the slave, 
and this makes for an unstable relationship, since the 
master now finds that he depends for his self-existence 
on a being who is no longer an independent consciousness 
with a will of his own, and is consequently incapable of 
giving him the recognition of an independent other party. 
Thus the master, in turn, is debased to a sub-human state 
32 
It is because Lucky's recognition of his master's 
self-image is no longer considered adequate--since he can 
no longer perform the "thinking" which lifts Pozzo above 
the beasts (the "rational" Pozzo is unable to appreciate 
the absurd poetry in which Lucky's existential anguish 
is clothed)--that Pozzo is trying to get rid of him and 
is looking for recognition elsewhere. He tells the tramps: 
Gentlemen, I am happy to have met you. (Before their 
incredulous expression. ) Yes, yes, sincerely happy. 
E... 3 Yes, the road seems long when one journeys all 
alone for ... 
(lie consults his watch) ... yes ... 
(he 
calculates) ... yes, six hours, *that's right, six hours on end, and never a soul in sight. (24) 
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lucky obviously no longer counts as a soul. Pozzo 
acknowledges the tramps as fellow human beings. In that 
sense they are his "likes. " But he does not accept them 
as his equals: 
Yes, gentlemen, I cannot go for long without the society 
of my likes (he puts on his glasses and looks at the two 
likes) even when i he likeness is an imperfect one. (24) 
If the Pozzo-Lucky relationship is a parallel to 
the tie that exists between the tramps and Godot, then 
Godot is the master whose existence depends on the 
recognition of his slaves, and who, consequently, can 
only be as great as they are capable of conceiving him. 
Just as in Brand the people's decrepit family God 
reflects the spiritual capacity of a dwarfish race, so 
Godot must shrink with the shrinking self-image of his 
dependents. Vladimir and Estragon acknowledge their 
enslavement to Godot, their existence "for-another, " 
when they confess that they have lost, or rather "got 
rid of, " their rights. The irony of their situation is 
that they are seeking recognition of their self-identity 
from the very person to whom they have "sold" their 
selves in exchange for comforts they are unable to 
define, not knowing that the rights they have got rid of 
are their existential freedom, which is the conditio 
sine aua non of selfhood. The Unknown in To Damascus I 
expresses a similar wish to tie himself to someone in 
order to escape the fearful loneliness of freedom, and 
his words may well have influenced Lucky's fate: 
33 
THE UNKNOWN: Are you religious? 
THE LADY: I am nothing. 
THE UNICN0, 'T; : So much the better, then you can 
become something. How I wish I were your blind, 
old father, whom you were leading to the fair 
to sing [... I wish I were someone's dog whom 
I could follow, so that I would never be alone-- 
a little food sometimes, a kick now and then, 
a pat perhaps, a lash of the whip more often-- (XXIX, 16) 
Didi and Gogo have given up their rights for a chimera. 
Godot, it turns out, has merely told them "That he 
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couldn't promise anything" (18), and when they search 
their pockets they find that they have no written 
confirmation of their appointment with Godot. Even if he 
were eventually to arrive, there is no reason to believe 
that his coming would "save" the tramps, any more than 
the journey of Indra's Daughter on earth promised hope 
for the scrrowing crowd of A Dream Play. In fact, the 
Pozzo-Lucky interlude serves to remind us that Godot's 
appearance on the scene would at best be a brief diver- 
tissement to kill time. To Estragon's despondent ques- 
tion: "And if he comes? " Vladimir replies without hope 
or conviction: "We'll be saved? " (94). Their immobility 
when the curtain falls indicates the hopelessness of 
their waiting. like the Unknown they have been made fools 
of by life. A very appropriate epilogue (or epigraph) to 
Waiting for Godot is given by Malone, who says: 
he Who has waited long enough will wait for ever. 
And there comes the hour when nothing more can happen 
and nobody more can come and all is ended but the 
waiting that knows itself in vain. (242) 
However, while Godot's recognition of their self- 
hood lies in the uncertain future, their suffering is 
with them always. And for Didi and Gogo who have been 
stripped of all social symbols of self-identification: 
family, friends, profession, social status, material 
possessions, home, address, surname--and are not being 
helped by variable first names and identical-looking 
bowler hats--their aches and pains are the only self- 
validating certainties they have left. Consequently both 
are anxious that their individual ailments should be 
recognised. Struggling to release his swelling foot from 
the boot Estragon whines for Vladimir's assistance: 
VLADIMIR: It hurts? 
ESTRAGON: Hurts! He wants to know if it hurts! 
VLADIMIR: (angrily). No one ever suffers but you. 
I don't count. I'd like to hear what 
you's say if you had what I have. 
ESTRAGON: It hurts? 
VLADIMIR: Hurts? He wants to know if it hurts! 
(10) 
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" Beginning with Belacqua who, in the story "A Wet 
Night, " deliberately squeezes an anthrax growing on his 
neck because the pangs "were a guarantee of identity, "t34 
Beckett's characters, like Strindberg's, seize on suffer- 
ing--sometimes self-inflicted, but. mostly because it is 
the one permanent element in the flux of being--in order 
both to prove their identity and to 'intensify their 
sense of existing. The Unnamable, trying to separate his 
own self from "all these Murphys, MMolloys and Malones" 
who force themselves on his consciousness, insists: 
They never suffered my pains, their pains are nothing, 
compared to mine, a mere tittle of mine, the tittle I 
thought I could put from me, in order to witness it. 
Let them be gone now C... ] give me back the pains I 
lent them and vanish C... 7 these creatures have never 
been, only I and this black void have ever been. (3o5-6) 
Strindberg's characters tend to interpret their suffer- 
ing as a sign that they are uniquely favoured by the 
gods. But Malone, with reference to Macmann lying supine 
in a muddy pulp and wishing "that the rain would never 
cease nor consequently his sufferings or pain, for the 
cause of his pain was almost certainly the rain, " dis- 
misses any such assumption as a fallacy, "as if there 
existed a relation between that which suffers and that 
which causes to suffer" (243). 
Vladimir and Estragon do not think of their suffer- 
ing as a favour bestowed upon them by higher powers, but 
Estragon, whose swelling feet force him to go barefoot, 
feels entitled to compare himself to Christ--to Christ 
the scapegoat, that is, for he rejects, or is simply 
ignorant of, Christ the redeemer. When Vladimir mentions 
"our Saviour, " Estragon asks: "Our what? " (12). It is 
Estragon, too, who calls Lucky's dance "The Scapegoat's 
Agony, " an indication that he identifies himself with 
Lucky as an innocent beast of burden. But neither 
Estragon nor Lucky is an innocent victim bearing the 
blame for other people's misdeeds. They are scapegoats 
only in the sense of having to atone for the sin of 
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being born, a sin which it was not in their power to 
prevent. But they are also atoning for the sin of having 
willingly tied themselves to a master in order to escape 
the responsibility of . freedom. 
Pozzo claims to be of divine origin and consequently 
to be above suffering: "(Drawing himself up, striking his 
chest. ) Do I look like a man that can be made to suffer? 
Frankly? " (34). Yet he predicts, when offering the tramps 
some entertainment, that Lucky's performance will be no 
fun for himself: "For I shall suffer, no doubt about that" 
(39). And he is seen to suffer agony during Lucky's wild, 
rambling speech. The stage direction reads: "Pozzo 
dejected and disgusted. [... 3 Pozzo's sufferings increase. 
[... 3 Pozzo more and more agitated and groaning" (42). 
In Pozzo's case suffering is clearly not an affirmation 
of self, but a sign of the disintegration of self. His 
blindness in Act II is symbolic of his complete loss of 
" self-identity. He is no longer PPPOZZZO! but simply man, 
an instant flash in the void. His recognition of the 
human fate he cannot escape is expressed with genuine 
pathos: "They give birth astride of a grave, the light 
gleams an instant, then it's night once more" (89). We 
are reminded of Peer Gynt's vision of the shooting star: 
"Sparkle, slip, and be lost in the void--" (VI, 237). 
Vladimir echoes Pozzo: "Astride of a grave and a diffi- 
cult birth. Down in the hole, lingeringly, the grave- 
digger puts on the forceps. We have time to grow old. 
The air is full of our cries" (9o-91). Ibsen's and 
Beckett's descriptions of man's brief womb-to-tomb exist- 
ence are remarkably similar, but perhaps deceptively so, 
for Peer's response to his vision is different from that 
of Beckett's characters, and their different attitudes 
may be seen as another testimony of the devalued Self. 
Whereas Peer regrets the Void that swallows the star, 
and would dearly like to hang on to the Gyntish Self as 
long as possible, lamenting that "Life's a high price to 
pay for one's birth" (VI, 237), Beckett's characters, 
for whom life is suffering, regret the birth of the star 
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and the fact that man has time to grow old. For them 
the shorter the flash is, the better. The Unnamable 
actually welcomes the Void. Yet they all hesitate to 
make the final exit. 
But if man is born to suffer--and Beckett is more 
pessimistic than Strindberg in describing life as "a 
veritable calvary, with no limit to its stations and no 
hope of crucifixion" (Molloy, 78)--then perhaps Didi and 
Gogo have not yet suffered enough? In that same lucid 
moment of despair Vladimir says: 
Was I sleeping, while the others suffered? Am I sleeping 
nova'? Tomorrow, when I wake, or think I do, what shall I 
say of today? C... 3 At me too someone is looking, of me 
too someone is saying, he is sleeping, he knows nothing, 
let him sleep on. (Pause. ) I can't go on! (Pause. ) What 
have I said? (9o_91) 
Has their waiting for Godot merely been a sleeping away 
their time, merely been an escape from suffering? 
Perhaps they should have actively pursued suffering in 
order to exist more intensely and make sure that they 
were "really there. " 
Beckett, in Proust, divides life between two modes 
of existence: "the boredom of living"--which is Habit-- 
and "the suffering of being"--which is suspension of 
Habit and "the free play of every faculty" (19-2o). 
Habit protects the individual from the threat of reality, 
from the unknown, its action being to hide the essence-- 
the Idea--of things in a haze of preconception (23). It 
is "the guarantee of a dull inviolability, the lightning- 
conductor of his existence" (19). Routine. living takes 
up the best part of our lives, "life is a succession of 
habits" (19). The suffering of being occurs only in the 
interstices between habits, when routine gives way to 
the unknown. The brief periods between the death of old 
and the creation of new habits are "the perilous zones 
in the life of the individual, dangerous, precarious, 
painful, mysterious and fertile" (19). These are the 
truly creative periods of an artist's life, when the 
cruelties and enchantments of reality are laid bare (22). 
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Suffering "opens a window on the real and is the main 
condition of the artistic experience" (28). It is in 
these moments of freedom from habit that "involuntary 
memory (as opposed to "voluntary memory")35 operates. 
And here, 
in that "gouffre interdit ä nos sondes, " is stored the 
essence of ourselves, the best of our many selves C... ] 
the best because accumulated slyly and painfully and 
patiently under the nose of our vulgarity, the fine 
essence of a smothered divinity C... 7 the pearl that 
may give the lie to our carapace of paste and pewter. 
(31). 
Longing for the end of that endlessly protracted 
endgame which is life, Clov tells himself: 
Clov, you must learn to suffer better than that if you 
want them to weary of punishing you--one day. E ... 3 Clov, you must be there better than that if you want 
them to let you go--one day. But I feel too old, and 
too far, to form new habits. Good, it'll never end, 
I'll never go. (Pause. ) (51) 
Clov seems to be thinking along the lines of the 
Unnamable that perhaps the reason why "they" continue to 
punish him is that they are trying to make him live in 
some fuller manner before they will let him go. He must 
suffer more intensely, or make better use of his suffer- 
ing, in order to become eligible for the final end. Or 
perhaps he has not yet suffered enough to atone for the 
sin of being born. In A Dream Play Indra's Daughter 
explains that earthly existence is a sin because it came 
into being through Heaven's Fall, but that "to free 
themselves from the earthly, Brahma's descendants seek 
self-denial and suffering. There you have suffering as 
the liberator" (xCCVI, 324). The irony of Clov's 
situation, however, is that there can be little scope 
for further self-denial when the world is in ashes and 
he is denied pretty well everything already. But the end 
of his punishment will come one day, whether he has done 
anything to deserve it or not. He will be free to make 
his exit, because the end is inevitable, and he will have 
endured the punishment of life to no discernible purpose: 
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I open the door of the cell and go. I am so bowed I only 
see my feet, if I open my eyes, and between my legs a 
little trail of black dust. I say to myself that the 
earth is extinguished, though I never saw it lit. (Pause. ) 
It's easy going. (Pause. ) When I fall I'll weep for 
happiness. (51) 
But Clov, like Didi and Gogo, and the Officer of A Dream 
Play, is a creature of habit, who, when he is actually 
free to leave the prison of his earthly existence, 
hesitates to take the plunge into the unknown. Similarly 
Hamm, who has come to end of his futile story which he 
has been retelling all his life without being able to 
enlarge it with any new characters because there are 
none to find, admits: 
Enough, it's time it ended, in the refuge too. (Pause. ) 
And yet I hesitate, I hesitate to ... to end. Yes, there 
it is it's time it ended and yet I hesitate to--(he 
yawns5--to end. (Yawns. ) (12) 
Hamm hesitates to discontinue his story because, however 
tedious and repetitious, it is something. It is all he 
has got. After it there is nothing, for Hamm does not 
share the tramps' hope of a possible "salvation. " He is 
not enduring the punishment of life in the expectation 
of some indefinable reward, although, being a slave of 
habit, he keeps up the ritual of praying to God, while 
cursing his non-existence: "The bastard! He doesn't 
exist: "(38)" Nor does Hamm delude himself that his 
misery is a guarantee of identity. His Pozzo-like 
attempt in his introductory speech to establish his 
superiority over other creatures, using suffering as the 
yardstick, leads to a negative conclusion: 
Can there be misery--(he vav1ns)--loftier than mine? 
No doubt. Formerly. But now? Pause. ) (12) 
Tragedy is no longer possible, for there can be no 
tragedy without heroes, only misery, and the world Hamm 
lives in is no longer capable of producing heroes. It is 
even doubtful whether man ranks above the beasts,, or 
indeed above things, for Hamm lumps his parents together 
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with his dog under the label "such creatures"--"my dog" 
referring to a toy dog, which is three-legged and sex- 
less to boot, and as such a worthy symbol of his master: 
My father? (Pause. ) My mother? (Pause. ) My ... dog? (Pause. ) Oh I am willing to believe they suffer as much 
as such creatures can suffer. But does that mean their 
sufferings equal mine? No doubt. (Pause. ) No, all is 
a--(he yawns)--bsolute, (nroudly) the bigger a man is 
the fuller he is. (Pause. Gloomily. ) And the emptier. 
(12) 
Hamm's observation is reminiscent of the discovery 
made by Peer Gynt and by Johan in The Son of a Servant, 
not forgetting the invisible Dreamer of A Dream Play, 
about the artist, that although he is richer than other 
people in that he possesses a multitude of "selves, " he 
is also emptier, because he only exists in the characters 
he creates and the roles he plays, and has no quint- 
essential self apart from his creations. Hamm is himself 
an artist. He is the author of a "chronicle, " and as his 
name suggests, a ham actor. His first utterance is: 
"I, ie--(he yawns)--to play. " And when Clov near the end of 
the play implores him: "Let's stop playing: " Hamm retorts: 
"Never! " and a little later says: "I'm warming up for my 
last soliloquy" (49). From his first line to his last 
Hamm is playing at life, or rather, playing at dying, 
for he has reached the denouement. The Unknown in 
To Damascus T expresses his sense of the unreality of 
life and death in similar terms. He tells the Lady that 
when he can bear life no longer he shall go into annihi- 
lation*, and that it gives him an amazing feeling of 
power to know that he holds death in his hands: 
THE LADY: Lily God, you are playing with death! 
THE UN} JOV N: As I am playing with life--remember 
I was a poet. Despite my melancholy temperament 
I've never been able to take anything seriously, 
not even my greatest sorrows, and there are 
moments when I doubt that life itself has more 
reality than my poems. (A De Profundis is heard 
from the funeral rrocession. XXI::, 9) 
But a play, by Hamrn's definition, requires more than one 
actor. When Clov protests: "What is there to keep me here? " 
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Hamm replies confidently: "The dialogue" (39). All the 
characters are conscious of being actors in a play. Clov 
echoes Nell: "Why this farce, day after day? " (18,26), 
and Nagg complains that he is telling his favourite 
story worse and worse. Yet the show must go on to the 
end, however meaningless. Both Hamm and Clov laugh at 
the idea that they might mean something, and Nell laughs 
at unhappiness because "it's the most comical thing in 
the world" (2o). A similar attitude is expressed by the 
Beggar in To Damascus I, one of the Unknown's personas: 
THE UNKNOWN: So you cling to appearances. 
THE BEGGAR: What else should I cling to? What 
is within us is nothing but pure--nonsense. 
THE UNKNOWN: And that is the sum of your whole 
philosophy of life? 
THE BEGGAR: My complete metaphysic: The view 
may be rather our of date, but... 
THE UI KNOUN: Can you be serious for a moment? C... 3 
THE BEGGAR: E ... 3 Do you think I'm always so merry? No, only when I meet you. You're so damnably 
funny. 
THE UNK OWN: How can you laugh with a wrecked 
life behind you? 
THE BEGGAR: Now he's getting personal! If you 
can't laugh at adversity, not even that of 
others, you are begging of life itself. E... 3 
I once heard a bird sing of Polycrates and his 
ring, how he'd become possessed of all. the 
glory of this world, but didn't know what to 
do with it. So he sent tidings east and west 
of the great Nothing he'd helped to create from 
the empty universe. I wouldn't say you were the 
man if I didn't believe it so firmly that I 
could take my oath on it. MXIX, 114-15) 
Hamm may guffaw at the idea that his life should have a 
meaning, but he is unable to conceal his nostalgia for 
the rational past, when people demanded a reason for - 
everything: 
And without going as far as that, we ourselves ... 
(with 
emotion)... we ourselves ... at certain moments ... 
(Veie- 
mently. ) To think perhaps it won't all have been for 
nothing. (27) 
But for Hamm the routine of praying to a non-existent 
God is merely part of the show, and the praying session 
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ends with Hamm echoing Prospero: "Our revels now are 
ended" (39). Shakespeare's play is clearly evoked for 
ironic contrast. And what a poor show are Hamm's revels 
compared to those conjured up by Shakespeare's magician. 
Hamm is not an original artist who can create something 
out of nothing. His imagination has dried up for lack of 
external stimuli. He is incapable of enriching his story 
with new characters, for "Where, " asks the blind chron- 
icler, unaware of the irony, "would I look for them? " (37). 
Prospero's splendid vision of "cloud-capp'd towers, " 
"gorgeous palaces, " and "solemn temples, " has shrunk to 
a grey, bare, cell-like interior, which with its two 
small windows high up on the walls may well be the inside 
of a skull. 
36 And "right in the centre" of his skull- 
sized world thrones in an armchair on castors a blind 
and crippled Prospero, commanding, with the help of a 
whistle and a gaff, an earthbound Ariel who needs a 
ladder--which Hamm finds disturbing: "Why? Have you 
shrunk? " (24)--and a telescope to be able to reassure 
his master that the earth is "corpsed. " And love, which 
in Hamm's world is inseparable from the unforgivable sin 
of procreation, is "bottled" in two dustbins. 
Endpame, too, is a dream play, but the confined 
setting and ghostly atmosphere of Beckett's play reflect, 
if anything, the influence of Strindberg's nightmarish 
Ghost Sonata rather than that of Shakespeare's sumptuous 
Tempest. Beckett's play is set, if we interpret the 
setting as the interior of a human skull, in the very 
"seat of dreams, " and the characters thus represent, as 
in A Dream Play, different aspects of a single conscious- 
ness, or fragments of a disintegrated self. The cell- and 
skull-like interior calls to mind the padded cells in 
murDhv, in which the "higher schizoids" were confined, 
physically and mentally. We might well be within a mind 
like that of Idr Endon, watching him make the final moves 
in the endgame of chess, his one frivolity. 
37 Indeed, 
Mr Endon could be the madman Hamm refers to 
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who thought the end of the world had come. He was a 
painter--and engraver. I had a great fondness for him. I used to go and see him, in the asylum. I'd take him by the hand and drag him to the window. Look! There! All that rising corn! And there! Look; The sails of the herring fleet! All that loveliness! (Pause. ) He'd 
snatch away his hand and go back into his corner. Appalled. All he had seen was ashes. (Pause. ) He alone had been spared. (Pause. ) Forgotten. (Pause. ) It 
appears the case is... was not so ... so unusual. (32) 
Hamm's fondness for his schizophrene friend shows that 
he identifies himself with his "case, " as Murphy identi- 
fied himself with Mr Endon. Hamm, too, is an artist 
whose world is in ashes, and blind Hamm, enclosed in a 
cell within a cell, is as far withdrawn from the world 
as he could possibly be, short of death. 
In his book The Divided Self R. D. Laing explains 
that the schizoid person experiences himself as funda- 
mentally split into a mind and a body. What he variously 
calls his "inner, " "true, " "real" self is experienced as 
a mental entity divorced from the body, which in turn is 
felt to be the core of a system of false selves, the 
personas he presents to the world, and which the mental 
self, in order to preserve its identity, treats as though 
they were other people whom it depersonalises. Because of 
his "ontological insecurity" and his precariously estab- 
lished self the schizophrenic is subject to the dread of 
his own dissolution into non-being. He fears relation- 
ships of any kind with other people, for their living 
reality is felt as an impingement on his own insubstan- 
tial self, "threatening to overwhelm and obliterate his 
self completely as a gas will obliterate a vacuum, or as 
water will gush in and entirely fill an empty dam. "38 We 
are reminded of Murphy's sad end which was quite liter- 
ally a gas "implosion" obliterating a vacuum. Always on 
guard against losing his autonomy the schizophrenic can 
relate himself only to depersonalised persons, phantoms of 
his own imagination, and to things and animals, because 
none of these have a subjectivity of their own, and hence 
can have no reciprocal intentions that pose a threat to 
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-the self's identity. While needing constant confirmation 
from others of his existence as a person, the schizo- 
phrenic feels persistently at risk of becoming no more 
than a thing in the world of the other, and he tries to 
forestall the danger either by turning the other person 
into a thing, thus nullifying his human individuality, 
or by affecting indifference, thus denying him his signi- 
ficance. Only within his mental microcosm does the 
schizoid person feel safe, free, autonomous, for in his 
fantasy world he is all things and persons to himself, 
omnipotent, in complete control. But the tragic paradox 
of his condition is that his effort to preserve his self 
by shutting himself up in the citadel of his mind is 
self-destroying. For when the microcosm cuts itself off 
from all creative contact with the world it becomes 
itself a vacuum, and the dread of being engulfed by out- 
side reality is thus potentiated rather than mitigated 
by the attempt to exclude it. Moreover, when the indi- 
vidual delegates all transactions with the world to his 
personas, which means that the self does not experience 
anything spontaneously and immediately but always at one 
remove, the world itself becomes unreal, and the activi- 
ties of the body, because they are not felt to express 
the self, seem futile and meaningless. And the person 
who does not act in reality but only in fantasy becomes 
himself unreal. In fantasy he can be anybody, free and 
omnipotent, but in reality he is nobody, unable to exer- 
cise effective freedom of choice in the world, and power- 
less to effect real changes in it. Even when the mental 
self, feeling empty, arid, impotent, and worthless in 
its isolation, desperately yearns to be refreshed and 
fertilised, it dares not expose itself to the richness 
of the outside world, for the schizoid person is unable 
to believe that he can fill his own emptiness without 
reducing what is there to nothing. And to protect his 
vacuous self from being engulfed by the abundance of 
Nature he reduces the world to dust and ashes. Thus the 
schizophrenic (like Murphy) is paradoxically struggling 
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to preserve his non-self from non-being and to sustain 
a transcendent, disembodied self--for only thus is it 
safe-even though its transcendence is a void. His 
"case" is indeed absurd, but not "so unusual. " 
The Hamra-Clov couple might be seen as a dramatic 
version of the schizoid self-body dichotomy into which 
-Murphy's being is cleft, with blind Hamm representing 
the self-enclosed mental self, asserting its superiority 
over the body-self, the "creatures" Clov, Nagg and Nell, 
but mainly Clov (whose name, among other meanings, is 
the past tense of "cleave": clove) whom Hamm has brought 
up to be an obedient tool in his hands, with no will and 
autonomy of his own: 
HAIM: Go and get the gaff. 
Clov goes to door, halts. 
CLOV: Do this, do that, and I do it. I never 
refuse. Why? 
HAIM: You're not able to. 
CLOV: Soon I won't do it any more. 
HAI1Ti: You won't be able to any more. (Exit Clov. ) 
Ah the creatures, the creatures, every ling 
has to be explained to them. 
Enter Clov with gaff. (31-32) 
But Hamm, although he appears to control his body-self 
like a puppet on a string, still feels threatened by 
Clov's presence, and repeatedly demands when Clov is 
standing immediately behind his chair: "Don't stay there, 
you give me the shivers" (24,26,43). His fear is not 
unfounded, for Clov is muttering under his breath: "If I 
could kill him I'd die happy" (24). And on one occasion 
C1ov, to Hamm's utter amazement, demonstrates his self- 
wvill by hitting his nagging master hard on the head with 
his toy dog, crying: "You drive me mad, I'm mad! " (49). 
Hamm and Clov co-exist of necessity, but there is no 
love, and no pity, lost between them. Hamm can relate 
himself affectionately only to his toy dog, which, being 
a lifeless thing, represents no threat to his selfhood 
and is the very image of faithful subservience, but on 
which, ironically, his affection is wasted. Nor is the 
dog's faithfulness anything but a pose, and a pose, 
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moreover, for a blind master who cannot appreciate its 
performance. 
Nagg and Nell whom Hamm calls father and mother, 
while he also says: "(proudly). But for me (gesture 
towards himself) no father" (29), may represent his own 
procreative function, which he hates and detests. He 
calls Flagg "Accursed progenitor! " (15) for having reck- 
lessly foisted upon him the sin of being born. But the 
procreative function also poses a threat to the self, 
and Hamm has consequently depersonalised it and relegated 
it to the dustbin where it is safely "bottled. " Hamm can 
only contemplate love when it is dissociated from the 
crime of propagating the species. Which means that he 
can only enjoy love-making in his dreams, apart from the 
fact that his body is no longer up to the real thing: 
If I could sleep I might make love. I'd go into the 
woods. My eyes would see... the sky, the earth. I'd 
run, run, they wouldn't catch me. (Pause. ) (l9) 
Hamm's sexual fantasy does, significantly, not include 
another person. Whatever secrets he indulges in in the 
woods, for which he fears he might be caught, concern 
only himself. He cannot even in his dreams contemplate 
a"love affair, for an intimate relationship is not only 
associated with the unforgivable sin of procreation, 
but with the dread of engulfment, of his own vacuous 
self being overwhelmed and obliterated by another 
person's substantial reality. 
Hamm's microcosm is a dying world, and the void 
"within" mirrors the greater void "without. " Striking 
the wall of his cell with his knuckles Hamm confirms: 
"All that's hollow! " and "Beyond is the other... hell" 
(23). A global disaster may have been the cause of the 
universal desolation, but if we see the play from within 
a schizoid mind (I am using the term in an existential 
rather than in a pathological sense) then it is Hamm 
himself who has destroyed the world in order to protect 
his precarious self from being absorbed into its abun- 
dance and complexity--with the inevitable loss of self-- 
21o 
just like his friend in the asylum who, when shown'all 
the loveliness of Nature, quickly withdrew into his 
corner "Appalled. All he had seen was ashes. (Pause. ) 
He alone had been spared" (32). Hamm is himself quite 
disturbed when Clov reports an unusual sight: 
HA101: (anxious). What? A sail? A fin? Smoke? 
CLOV: ( ookin). The light is sunk. 
HA1M: (relieved). Pah: We all knew that. (25) 
The discovery of a (relatively) harmless intruder like 
the flea in Clov's trousers calls for measures appropri- 
ate to forestalling a potential world catastrophe. Hamm 
commands: "(very ? perturbed). But humanity might start 
from there all over again! Catch him, for the love of 
God! " Clov does not seem to appreciate the extent to 
which their existence is threatened by the unexpected 
invader. Hamm: "Use you head, can't you. If he was laying 
we'd be bitched" (27). Hamm's ontological insecurity 
stems ultimately from the fact that God has never 
responded to his prayers: 
CLOV: (abandoning his attitude). What a hope! 
And you? 
HAIM: Sweet damn all! (To Nagg. ) And you? 
NAGG: Wait! (Pause. Abandoning; his attitude. ) 
Nothing doing. 
HA? 1IM: The bastard! He doesn't exist! 
(38) 
Hamm is not a devout worshipper. He prays from habit, 
and the habit has itself become a pose. He does not use 
words. He merely assumes an attitude of prayer. What is 
the good of wasting words when there is no one to pray 
to and nothing to ask for. Hamm does not, like Didi and 
Gogo, entertain even the vaguest hope of salvation. Nor 
is he one of those optimistic existentialists who believe 
in facing up to the absurdity of the human condition and 
accepting the responsibility of creating meaning where 
none exists. A life that ends with death and has no 
transcendent purpose is, as far as Hamm and Clov are 
concerned, meaningless. Hamm is blind to all 
the marvels 
of this world because they are useless to him. 
Seen 
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through his eyes the universe is a dust-bowl, the great 
Nothing, and he "a speck in the void, in the dark, for 
ever" (28). And not only has life in a God-forsaken uni- 
verse no meaning, but Hamm is more disturbed by the fact 
that the universe without God has no centre, which is 
why he is so anxious that his chair should be placed, 
not just more or less, but "Bang in the centre: " (24). 
The Unnamable continues beyond death--which contrary to 
expectation has only increased his ontological perplex- 
ity--to grope for the centre, the fixed point of self- 
identification, for only when he is bang in the centre 
can he determine who is circling aboixt whom: 
I like to think I occupy the centre, but nothing is less 
certain. C ... 3 But I am certainly not at the circumfer- 
ence. For if I were it would follow that Molloy, wheeling 
about me as he does, would issue from the enceinte at 
every revolution, which is manifestly impossible. C... 7 
From centre to circumference in any case it is a far cry 
and I may well be situated somewhere between the two. It 
is equally possible, I do not deny it, that I too am in 
perpetual motion, accompanied by Malone, as the earth by 
its moon. C... ] All is possible, or almost. But the best 
is to think of myself as fixed and at the centre of this 
place, whatever its shape and extent may be. (297) 
Hamm's preoccupation with self can hardly be called 
a'quest. He has reached the end of the road. He is one 
of Beckett's incurious seekers, concerned not with find- 
ing or becoming, but with hanging on to what little is 
left of his human self, not because he fears death, 
although he admits his hesitation to end, but to make 
sure he has a self to die with. Like the Unnamable he is 
anxious to establish that he "was really there" before 
he dies, and he is in considerable doubt on that score. 
Clov, looking out of the window, is giving Hamm a 
comprehensive view of "the whole thing": 
HAMS: I was never there. (Pause. ) Clov! 
CLOV: (turning; towards Hamm exasperated). What 
is it? 
HAMI: I was never there. 
CLOU: Lucky for you. 
He looks out of window. 
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HABRA: Absent, always. It all happened without me. 
I don't know what's happened. (Pause. ) Do 
you know what's happened! (Pause. Clov: 
(47) 
Hamm does not want his life to end in a whimper of 
self-iessness. When Clov protests that there are no more 
coffins, Hams declaims theatrically: "Then let it end! [... ] 
With a bang! L... 3 Of darkness! " (49). He is not content 
merely to have a self left for the endgame. He wants to 
be certain that the universe dies with him, that every 
possibility of a resurrection is eliminated. It was 
precisely because he did not die with a bang that the 
Unnamable found himself resurrected without "as much as 
a brief sick-leave among-the worms" (344). But Hamm's 
case is not a question of a Neant within, longing to be 
united with a Neant without. On the contrary, the micro- 
cosmic Nothing is clinging to its uniqueness, for all it 
is worth, to the bitter end, immuring itself within its 
ever shrinking citadel against the engulfing Nothingness 
of the macrocosm. Rather a speck in the void than no 
speck at all, although its being thrown into the world 
in the first place is to be regretted. If Hamm's self is 
a void, it is still his void, and he vigorously defends 
its superiority over that of Clov: 
CLOV: I see my light dying. 
HAIM: Your light dying! Listen to that! Well, 
it can die just as well here, your light. 
Take a look at me and then come back and 
tell me what you think of your light. (17) 
Nor do Hamm's prophetic words to Clov, pronounced with 
merciless relish, that he will one day share Hamm's 
predicament, testify to a desire to be absorbed into 
the cosmic Void: 
One day you'll be blind, like me. You'll be sitting 
there, a speck in the void, in the dark, for ever, like 
me. C... 7 Infinite emptiness will be all around you, all 
the resurrected dead of all the ages wouldn't fill it, 
and there you'll be like a little bit of grit in the 
middle of the steppe. (Pause. ) Yes, one day you'll know 
what it is, you'll be like me, except that you won't 
have anyone with you, because you won't have had pity 
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on anyone and because there won't be anyone left 
to have pity on. (28-29) 
Hamm's self-congratulatory "sermon" on pity is highly 
ironic in the light of his "chronicle, " in which he 
depicts himself as a Pozzo-like tyrant revelling in 
his pitiless almightiness over a begging father with 
a starving child. It may well be the story of how he 
came to adopt Clov as his son, and Clov has not grown 
up to love his benefactor: 
HAI-Ed: You don't love me. 
CLOV: No. 
HAIrIM: You loved me once. 
CLOV: Once! 
HAMM: I've made you suffer too much. (Pause. ) 
CLOV: It's not that. 
HAMI: (shocked). I haven't made you suffer 
too much? 
CLOV: Yes! 
HAIIIM: (relieved) . Ah you gave me a fright! (Pause. Coldly. ) Forgive me. (Pause. 
Louder. I said, Forgive me. 
CLOV: I heard you. [... 3 (l4) 
Hamm may well consider he has done Clov an invaluable 
service in making him suffer, having thereby enhanced 
his sense of self. In fact, Clov manifests a self-will 
and an independence of mind which show that he is not 
simply the identity-less executor of his master's wishes, 
and Hamm's reiterated demand for pain-killer proves, in 
turn, that his mental self is not, as Murphy would put 
it, "body-tight, " a body-transcendent, "pure" mind. 
The Hamm-Clov relationship is thus a less clear-cut 
mind-body dichotomy than that of Pozzo and Lucky. In 
both cases, however, the Time cancer makes a mockery of 
the pretentious distinction between mind and body, 
master and slave. The masters, representing the higher, 
mental self, go blind, while Lucky goes dumb and Clov 
becomes immobilised. 
Seen as a relationship between separate, but inter- 
dependent characters, rather than as aspects of a single 
self, the Hamm-Clov bond has notable similarities with 
ýg 
that between Hummel and the Student in The Ghost Sonata. ' 
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Indeed, End. ame is itself a ghost sonata, for if we are 
to believe their nostalgic memories of times past, 
Beckett's "creatures" are now no more than shadows of 
their former selves, just as Strindberg's ghosts are 
shown to be nothing but layers of pretence around a 
rotten core. Nagg and Nell prattling in their dustbins, 
" and Nagg repeatedly calling for his pap, reflect, as 
Anthony Swerling has noted, the parrot-like state of the 
Mummy shut up in her closet. 
4o But the physical deterio- 
ration of Beckett's creatures is a measure of their 
existential degradation, not of moral sickness. Beckett 
is not passing an ethical judgement on his characters, 
whereas Strindberg is concerned just as much with the 
moral as with the existential disintegration of fallen 
mankind. 
Hamm and Hummel, apart from having similar names, 
are both old, bespectacled, crippled, impotent tyrants 
confined to wheel-chairs, and completely dependent on a 
servant-companion to attend to their material needs and 
carry out their wishes, but not least to bolster and 
enhance their own dwindling selfhood. Both give their 
proteges to understand that they have a duty to serve 
their patrons in return for some imaginary benefit 
extended to their fathers, thus establishing a master- 
slave relationship between themselves and their adopted 
"sons. " Both indulge in playing gods by surrounding them- 
selves with paupers to whom they pose as benefactors. 
Yet without their proteges-slaves they are nothing. Hamm 
needs Clov as much as Pozzo needs Lucky, and Didi and 
Gogo need each other, to testify to his existence by 
witnessing him. When Clov asks: "Why do you keep me? " 
Hamm replies: "There's no one else. " But then Clov is 
also dependent on Hamm for the same reason. He stays with 
Hamm because "There's nowhere else" (14). At the end of 
the play they agree: "It's we are obliged to each other" 
(51). Hummel, too, is completely dependent on the Student 
to realise his life's ambition for him. Like Hamm he has 
a chronicle to finish before he dies. He plans to unmask 
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and destroy all the people whose destinies are inter- 
twined with his own and who know about his criminal past. 
But this is not the end of his story, for old Hummel, 
unlike Hamm, is preparing for the future, for the 
extension of his self beyond death, and that is why he 
has been searching for a Sunday child to become his heir. 
The Student, however, although he lets himself be 
deceivea by Hummel's promise to secure his future happi- 
ness and worldly esteem, does not depend on his patron 
to endorse his selfhood. On the contrary, the Student is 
not only a complete individual, he is an exceptional 
individual, a Sunday child with visionary powers, and 
that is why the vampire Hummel ties the Student to him. 
The Student is uncomfortably aware of being in the 
presence of a vampire. He shrinks from the touch of 
Hummel's hand, which feels "Like ice! " protesting: "Let 
go of my hand, you are draining my strength, you are 
freezing me. What do you want? " (XLV, 163). To Hummel's 
assurance that he shall have the power to unlock doors 
and hearts if he will be the arm to perform Hummel's 
will, the Student replies apprehensively: "Is this a 
pact? Am I to sell my soul? " (164). It is Pozzo more 
than Hamm who is the Hummel-like vampire among Beckett's 
characters, for he can truly be said to have sucked 
Lucky's soul out of him, so much so that Lucky no longer 
counts as one. But Clov is as reluctant as the Student 
to extend his hand to his oppressor, whose life-blood, 
like Hummel's, is running cold: 
HAI, a, I: Life goes on. (Clov returns to his place 
beside the chair. ) Give me a rug, I'm 
freezing. 
CLOV: There are no more rugs. 
Pause. 
HAT. Md: Kiss me. (Pause. ) Will you not kiss me? 
CLOV : No. 
HAI11T : On the forehead. 
CLOV: I won't kiss you anywhere. 
Pause. 
HMU : holding out his hand). Give me your hand 
at least. Pause. Will you not give me 
your hand? 
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" CLOV: I won't touch you. 
Pause. (44) 
Hamm has inherited Hummel's vampire-quality also in the 
sense of being, niggardly with the food to his dependants. 
He says to Clov: "I'll give you just enough to keep you 
from dying. You'll be hungry all the time. C... ] I'll 
give you one biscuit per day. (Pause. ) One and a half" 
(14). He keeps Clov alive only for the egotistical reason 
that there is no one else to confirm his self-existence. 
Hamm and Hummel are also alike in this, that they are 
incapable of creating anything but unhappiness and 
suffering around them. Hummel tells the Student: "I have 
an interminably long life behind me--interminably long. 
I have made people unhappy, and people have made me 
unhappy. I suppose the one cancels out the other. But 
before I die I want to see you happy" (XLV, 163). Hummel's 
avowedly charitable intentions towards the Student only 
lead to more unhappiness, for like Hamm he does nothing 
for unselfish reasons. It is not the Student's happiness 
he has at heart but the crowning of his own self. 
"The Student, like Clov, " observes Anthony Swerling, 
"is a fastidious idealist tinged with Buddhism who yearns 
for a better world; 'a sun that does not burn, in a home 
without dust, ' 'friends without stain, ' 'love without 
flaw. '" And Clov says: "I love order. It's my dream. A 
world where all would be silent and still and each thing 
in its last place, under the last dust" (39)"41 But 
neither of these two different visions of "paradise" 
resembles the Buddhist Nirvana. Although the Student 
addresses the "wise, gentle Buddha, who are sitting there 
waiting for a heaven to grow out of the earth" (XLV, 21o), 
his own idea of Heaven is distinctly Christian. Cloy is 
dreaming of the void of non being, but not the positive 
Plenum-Void which is the Goal of the Buddhist. But their 
yearnings are alike in this, that they are born of dis- 
illusionment with the whole of creation. After the 
remorseless unmaskings at the Ghost Supper which reveal 
that nobody is what he pretended, or believed himself 
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to be, the Student asks despairingly: 
Where is virginity? I"Ihere is beauty? In nature and in 
my mind when it is dressed in Sunday clothes! Where are 
honour and faith? In fairy tales and children's plays! Where is anything that keeps what it promises? ... In my imagination! 
Even the Young Lady, whom he had seen as the embodiment 
of true beauty, love, and innocence, is tainted at the 
very source of life. We are reminded of TMTr Tyler's 
daughter in All That Fall (1957) who had "the whole ... 
er ... bag of tricks" removed 
(lo), which is Beckett's 
more grotesque image of the cancer at the core of life. 
To Clov, love, friendship, beauty, order are not even 
illusions, but meaningless words that other people have 
taught him: 
They said to me, That's love, yes yes, not a doubt, now 
you see how-- C... ] How easy it is. They said to me, 
That's friendship, yes yes, no question, you've found it. 
They said to me, Here's the place, stop, raise your head 
and look at all that beauty. That order! They said to me, 
Come now, you're not a brute beast, think upon these 
things and you'll see how all becomes clear. And simple! 
They said to me, What skilled attention they get, all 
these dying of their wounds. (5o-51) 
Clov's self is made up of empty phrases: "I ask the 
words that remain--sleeping, waking, morning, evening. 
They have nothing to say" (51). When Clov is free to 
depart from the prison of life, his self will leave 
nothing but "a little trail of black dust" behind, and no 
Button-Moulder will be eager to collect the residue. 
The unrealised Gyntish Self still had the metal value of 
potentiality, since Peer was born for greatness, and from 
the Gyntish "seat of dreams" sprang the most glorious 
illusions, soaring with eagles over the mountains and 
riding high over England's Prince. Clov, however, was 
only born to die, and his self has never risen above 
the "corpsed" earth: "I say to myself. that the earth is 
extinguished, though I never saw it lit" (51). 
Both the Student, who is a Sunday child, and the 
little boy Clov spots through the telescope when Haman is 
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warming up for his last soliloquy, represent ambiguous 
hopes of a new world rising from the ashes, but hopes 
which in either case are negated by the fundamentally 
pessimistic tone of the play. The Student is the only 
one who could stand up to the test of the Ghost Supper. 
He is an individual of exceptional integrity, who is 
sound at the core, and who claims to have seen the 
Hidden One. But his utter disillusionment at the end of 
the play shows that even he has been tainted by the 
vitiated atmosphere of the Ghost Supper. He says to the 
Young Lady, having learnt of the disease her beauty 
conceals: 
Now your flowers have poisoned me, and I have given the 
poison to you C... 7 To think that the most beautiful 
flowers are so poisonous, are the most poisonous--why, 
the curse rests on all creation, all life. (XLV-2o9) 
Exceptional individuals with visionary powers who, like 
the Student, "can't see the ugly as beautiful, or call 
evil good" (209), are neither in Ibsen's nor in Strind- 
berg's world survivors. Nor does Hamm think that the 
little boy--perhaps a saviour figure--spotted on the 
scene will survive. When Clov hastens to the door with 
the gaff, bent on exterminating "a potential procreator" 
as he had done the flea and the rat, for the love of God, 
Hamm restrains him: 
BATE: If he exists he'll die there or he'll come 
here. And if he doesn't ... Pause. 
CLOV: You don't believe me? You think I'm inventing? 
Pause. 
HAIM: It's the end, Clov, we've come to the end. 
I don't need you any more. 
Pause. 
CLOV: Lucky for you. (50) 
Apart from the fact that they have come to the end, 
a clue to Hamm's somewhat ambiguous statement is perhaps 
to be found in his chronicle, in the bit he repeats 
right at the end about the father and the child:. 
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If he could have his child with him ... 
(Pause. ) It was the moment I was waiting for. (Pause. ) You don't want to abandon him? You want him to bloom while you are withering? Be there to solace your last million last 
moments? (Parse. ) He doesn't realize, all he knows is hunger, and Cold, and death to crown it all. But you! You ought to know what the earth is like, nowadays. Oh, I put him before his responsibilities. (50) 
If the child survives it will only be to grow up to a 
life of protracted misery and waiting for death to crown 
it all. Clov is perhaps the child who has thus "survived" 
in Hamm's sei-vice. The Student expresses an equally 
pessimistic view of the world in his last speech, over 
the death of the Young Lady: 
Unhappy child, child of this world of delusion, guilt, 
suffering and death; the world of eternal change, disappointment, and pain! May the Lord of Heaven be 
merciful to you on your journey ... (XLV, 211) 
But the Student's world, for all its deceptiveness, 
corruption, guilt, and misery, is not, like Hamms, 
"corpsed. " It does not look as hopeless and void as the 
bleak and blasted steppe of futility which surrounds the 
little speck of blind dust that is Hamm. For in the 
Student's world it still makes sense to talk about good 
and evil, and suffering can still generate compassion 
and a yearning for, if not faith in, a merciful Lord of 
Heaven. To that extent, at least, suffering is meaning- 
ful. But in Hamm's world suffering produces no noble 
emotions, and least of all pious sighs to a benevolent 
God. Even the curses uttered against him for his 
non-existence are merely part of a meaningless ritual. 
Clov's introductory speech: "Finished, it's finished, 
nearly finished, it must be nearly finished" (12), 
echoes Christ's last words from the cross: "It is 
finished" (John 19: 3o, Authorised Version), meaning: 
"It is accomplished! " (The New English Bible). 1, Jhen 
Hamm and Clov have reached the end nothing has been 
accomplished. Clov's "Finished" as interpreted by Hamm 
in his last soliloquy means "have done with losing" (51) 
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because there is nothing more to lose. All human ideals 
and longings and sense of self-importance have been lost. 
Only the "old stancher" remains, symbol of the suffering 
of existence (suggesting the cloth used by St Veronica 
to wipe the sweat from Christ's brow), and hidden under- 
neath it is "the suffering nothing" which is Man. 
But having delved to the nothingness at the core of 
existence, the artist for his part can accomplish no more. 
Beckett writes in Proust (almost as if he had Ibsen and 
Strindberg in mind) that "the heart of the cauliflower 
or the ideal core of the onion would represent a more 
appropriate tribute to the labours of poetical excavation 
than the crown of bay" (29). 
Chapter 4 
John Osborne 
and "the texture of. ordinary despair" 
While it is as true of Jimmy Porter as of Strind- 
berg's Unknown that he would be lost without his suffering, 
the Unknown's claim to selfhood: I suffer, therefore I am, 
cannot with equal justification be applied to Jimmy. The 
agony of Strindberg's and Beckett's pilgrims on the road 
to calvary is intensely physical as well as spiritual. 
Jimmy Porter has no physical cross to carry. His most 
painful experiences have been as a witness to other 
people's suffering. Twice he has watched someone dear to 
him go through "the sordid process of dying" (73). His 
most acute feeling on both occasions is not one of grief, 
but of anger and helplessness. For in death, because it 
happens to the wrong people, Jimmy has seen the funda- 
mental injustice of life, against which his protest is in 
vain and his anger impotent. Yet Jimmy continues to care, 
unlike his unresponsive audience who "all want to escape 
from the pain of being alive. And, most of all, from love" 
(93). No one seems prepared to share with Jimmy the burden 
of life. He says about his visit to the deathbed of Hugh's 
mother: "She was alone, and I was the only one with her. 
And when I have to walk behind that coffin on Thursday, 
I'll be on my own again. Because that bitch won't even 
send her a bunch of flowers--I know! " (73). Thus Jimmy's 
solitary despair becomes his most substantial claim to 
selfhood: I despair, therefore I am. 
Exasperated by reviewers and critics who seized on 
Jimmy's claim that "There aren't any good, brave causes 
left" (84), Osborne complains: 
They believed him [... ] They were incapable of recognising 
the texture of ordinary despair, the way it expresses 
itself in rhetoric and gestures that may perhaps look 
shabby, but are seldom simple. It is too simple to say 
that Jimmy Porter himself believed that there were no 
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good, brave causes left, any more than Archie didn't 
feel a thing. l 
Osborne neither can nor will offer "trimmed-off explana- 
tions. " If the critics feel cheated it is because "we 
are still suffering from an Ibsenite hangover that leads 
everyone to search frantically for a message. "3 While 
G. B. Shaw in The Quintessence of Ibsenism (1891) declared 
that "the play in which there is no argument and no case 
no longer counts as serious drama, "4 and that the serious 
playwright regards the "discussion"--introduced into mod- 
ern drama with Ibsen's A Doll's House (1879)--not only as 
"the main test of his highest powers, " but as "the real 
centre of his play's interest, "5 Osborne protests that 
the theatre is not a place where ideas are discussed. "It 
is a place where people spend much of their time respond- 
ing nakedly--or failing--to the burden of trying to live, 
and preparing to die. "6 "1, " he proclaims, "want to make 
people feel, to give them lessons in feeling. They can 
think afterwards. "7 Look Back in Anger, we are told in 
the Foreword, "above all is a play about people. "8 
Ibsen might have said the same of his plays. And he 
did. When someone complimented him on his having written 
"splendid parts, " he replied with majestic indignation 
that he did not write "parts"--he "created (diktet) 
human beings and human fates. "9 His preliminary notes 
for A Doll's House, which he called "Notes for the 
Tragedy of Modern Times" (nutids-tragedien), admittedly 
open like "a case to be argued": 
lo 
There are two kinds of moral law, two kinds of 
conscience, one in man and one quite different in woman. 
They do not understand each other; but in practical life 
woman is judged by man's law, as though she were not a 
woman but a man. 
In the next paragraph, however, Ibsen's "case" turns 
into a "human fate": 
The wife in the play ends up quite bewildered and not 
knowing right from wrong. Natural instincts on the one 
hand and belief in authority on the other lead her to 
utter distraction. C... 3 Mental conflict. Weighed down 
and confused by her trust in authority, she loses faith 
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in her moral right and fitness to bring up her children. 
Bitterness. C... 3 Now and then, woman-like, she shrugs off 
her thoughts. Sudden return of anguish and fear. Every- 
thing must be borne alone. The catastrophe approaches, 
mercilessly, inevitably. Despair, resistance, defeat. 
(VIII9 368-69) 
The "wife" is as yet without name and human form. But one 
day Ibsen suddenly surprised his wife by saying: "Now I 
have seen Nora. She came right up to me and put her hand 
on my shoulder. " When Suzannah asked: "How was she dres- 
sed? " he replied with great earnestness: "She was wearing 
a plain blue woollen dress. "11 Out of a "case" grew a 
"human fate" and out of a human fate sprang a live woman. 
Ibsen disclaimed the honour of having consciously 
worked for the Women's Rights movement. "I have been more 
of a poet and less of a social. philosopher than people 
generally tend to suppose. [... 3 I am not even very sure 
what women's rights actually are. [... 3 My task has been 
the portrayal of human beings (Menneskeskildring)" (XV, 
417). Nor does Ibsen allow his living Nora to think of 
her problems as a "case, " or to advocate a "cause. " She 
has no thoughts whatever for the emancipation of her sex. 
When the dumbfounded Helmer reminds Nora of her sacred 
duty to her husband and children, she replies: "I have 
another duty equally sacred. [... 3 My duty to my self" 
(VIII9 359). She no longer accepts that the role a male- 
dominated society has cast her in, that of "wife and. 
mother, " is her most sacred self. "I believe that first 
and foremost I am a human being (et Menneske), just as 
much as you are--or at least I am going to try to be" 
(359). It is not just that Nora has never been allowed 
to be her real self. She has not even been accorded the 
dignity, least of all by those who profess to love her 
most, -of being recognised as a human being. From being 
her father's "baby doll" she has been passed on as a 
plaything to become Helmer'. s "doll. wife. " His favourite 
endearments are telling of Nora's sub-human status: "my 
little skylark, " "my little squirrel, " "little squander- 
ing bird, " "my sweet little singing bird, " etc. When 
little Nora appears irresistibly helpless she becomes 
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"you little helpless thing" (333), or endearingly obsti- 
nate, "the sweet little thing" (343). (Ibsen uses the word 
tingest, which even more than ting, has the connotation 
of an object, a thing'of possession. ) When Nora, having 
been whisked away from the party against her will, submits 
to her husband's better judgement: "Oh, everything you do 
is right, " the flattered Helmer replies: "Now there's my 
little sky-lark talking as if she were a human being" (Nu 
taler Lmrkefuglen, som om den var et Menneske) (345). 
Nora has played the animal game with Helmer and 
believed herself happy. "If your little squirrel were to 
ask you ever so nicely--? [ ... 3 If you would be kind and 
let it have its way, your little squirrel should skip 
about and do marvellous tricks. [... ] Your sky-lark should 
sing in every room, high and low--" (315). But the great 
"miracle" (det vidunderlige) (361) did not happen. Nora's 
illusions were finally and irreparably shattered when the 
brave and protective man who had told her he would "risk 
life and blood, everything, everything, for your sake" 
(35o) reveals in the hour of real crisis that he is only 
concerned with saving his own respectability: "I am saved! 
Nora, I am saved! " (353). Helmer is ready to resume the 
animal game as if nothing had changed, except that he now 
has the added satisfaction of having forgiven his wife, 
which makes her "his property in a double sense" (355). 
But little Nora has grown up. She has had her eyes opened 
to the fact that not only is she married to a stranger, 
but she is a stranger to her own self. She must leave her 
cosy doll's house and go out into the world to find out 
who she really is. 
Nora's duty to her self is twofold. First she must 
set about becoming a human being. She must prove to her- 
self that she can face reality alone, without succumbing 
to the temptation to retreat into the snug world of 
fantasy. She tells the bewildered Helmer: "If I am to gain 
any understanding of myself and the things around me I 
must stand alone" (358-59). And having become a human 
being the ultimate aim of her quest is to become her own 
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individual self. Until now her "self" has been nothing 
but a set of unquestioned cliches. She has been what 
society expected her to be: an obedient and loving 
daughter growing into an obedient and loving wife and 
mother, submissive, honest, pure. Helmer admonishes her: 
"A song"-bird must have a pure beak to sing with; no false 
notes" (3o5). But Nora's inner, undiscovered self rebels 
against this false image that society has imposed upon 
her. She shows it in lying to Helmer about the macaroons, 
and more consciously in the little secret she confides 
to Mrs Linde and Dr Rank: "There's something I long to 
say in front of Thorvald, " only she daren't because "it 
isn't nice, " "I would so love to say: Damn! --Damn it all! " 
(293). But now that Nora has woken up to the falsity of 
her position she can no longer be content with "what most 
people say, and what is written in books. I must think 
things out for myself and get them clear in my own mind" 
(36o). Confounded by her rebellious attitude, Helmer 
reaches for the supreme cliche: "Have you not an infall- 
ible guide in these questions? Have you not religion? " 
(36o). To which Nora replies: "0h, Thorvald, I don't 
really know what religion is. C... 3 Pastor Hansen told me 
religion was this and that. [... ] I want to find out 
whether what Pastor Hansen said was right--or at least 
whether it is right for me" (36o). Nora's speech sounds 
like a distant echo of Kierkegaard when he said: "The 
thing is to understand my purpose in life (min Bestemmelse), 
to see what the Deity really wishes me to do. The thing 
is to find a truth which is true for me, to find the idea 
for which I can live and die. "12 Nora is going out into 
the world to find a truth which is true for her. But she 
does not go out armed with a philosophy of the Individual, 
like Kierkegaard, nor inspired by a divine vision, like 
Brand. Nora takes the leap into the unknown with no idea 
of what she expects to find, nor what will become of her. 
"I cannot tell, " she explains to Helmer who clings to the 
hope of her return "some day, " "what I might turn out 
to be" (363). But if the destinies of the minor 
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characters, who have all had to face reality alone, are 
a clue to Nora's fate, she is not heading for a rosy 
future. To her, Mrs Linde's independence seems enviable: 
"How light and free you must feel--. " But Mrs Linde testi- 
fies to the contrary: "Oh no, only unspeakable empty. No 
one to live for any more" (283). Mrs Linde has not found 
her true self in aloneness, she has merely found herself 
lonely, unfulfilled, empty. She does not share Nora's 
naively romantic image of the lone individual defying the 
laws and morality of "your dull society" (292). "The 
records of the play's other characters, " writes Patricia 
Meyer Spacks, "strongly suggests the extreme painfulness 
and difficulty of the course Nora plans for herself. [... 3 
Perhaps she will survive, but the action of the play does 
not encourage us to think so. The nature of reality is 
such that it encourages retreat; to stand alone is to 
suffer and to yearn for companionship. It is difficult to 
feel that A Doll's House brings a message of hope. "13 
John Northam agrees that the ending of the play in the 
light of the important parallel between Nora and Mrs Linde 
is not "a triumphant act of self-assertion[ ... ] it is a 
tragic doom. "14 But these critics seem to have missed an 
important point. The other characters have not chosen to 
face reality, and face it alone. Bitter reality and lone- 
liness have been thrust upon them. But when Nora leaves 
her doll's house to embark upon a solitary quest for self, 
she has made an existential choice, and the bleak picture 
of reality represented by the fates of the minor charac- 
ters serves to underline the enormity of her decision. 
She may leap to her destruction, like Brand. The triumph 
lies in the leap. 
But Nora is not of a size with Brand. She has no 
divine image to model herself on. She has only "your dull 
society" to define herself against, a society made up of 
people like Helmer, Mrs Linde, Krogstad, and Dr Rank, 
whose primary instinct is to huddle together in order to 
escape reality, most of all the reality of the self, and 
whose highest ideal is not selfhood but respectability. 
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It is a society that cannot produce the "miracle. " Nora 
only knows that she cannot accept the ideals, the laws, 
and the morality of this society, but she has no vision, 
no great- ideal of her own that can take her beyond this 
crippling society. That is Nora's real despair, and may 
well forebode her defeat. 
Jimmy Porter shares Nora's problem. If, as I 
believe, a line of descent can be traced from Ibsen's 
Brand to Osborne's rebel individualist, that line goes 
through Nora of A Doll's House. We also recognise in 
Jimmy Porter traits from Dr Stockmann and Gregers Werle, 
those lesser descendants of Brand who have been cut to 
size to fit the drama of "modern times, " in which 
society, not the universe, is man's frame of reference. 
And the "boredom" which is so intrinsic to Jimmy's 
character without doubt owes something io Hedda Gabler. 
Strindberg's influence, if any, on Osborne's play is not 
as direct and as obvious as that of Ibsen, but Jimmy has 
significant features in common with the Unknown: his 
capacity for vicarious suffering which places Jimmy among 
the elect, the neurotic strain in his nature which is 
characteristic of the "seer, " and his attitude to woman, 
from whom he demands the impossible, that she should be 
virgin, mother, and mistress in one person. The relation- 
ship between Jimmy and Alison is in several respects a 
remarkable parallel to that between Jean and Miss Julie. 
Osborne blamed his critics for not recognising "the 
texture of ordinary despair. " But how "ordinary" is - 
Jimmy Porter's despair? Is his malaise meant to be typi- 
cal of the frustrated, cause-less, disillusioned, post- 
war generation in whose idiom he expressed himself with 
such convincing authenticity that Kenneth Tynan, for one, 
declared: "Look Back in Anger presents post-war youth as 
it really is[ ... 1"? 
15 Does Jimmy think of himself as 
being "ordinary" and "typical"? Do the other characters? 
Indeed, does Osborne himself see his hero as the spokes- 
man of a generation, or as an individual speaking mainly 
for himself? 
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We learn already from the introductory description 
of Jimmy's character that he is destined to be a soli- 
tary figure. Osborne sums him up as a "disconcerting 
mixture of sincerity and cheerful malice, of tenderness 
and freebooting cruelty; restless, importunate, full of 
pride, a combination which alienates the sensitive and 
insensitive alike. Blistering honesty, or apparent 
honesty, line his, makes few friends" (9-1o). Within the 
first couple of pages Jimmy has proclaimed his superior 
intelligence and education, indeed his greater capability 
in all things: "I'm the only one who knows how to treat 
a paper, or anything else, in this house" (12). And in 
his longing for "a little ordinary human enthusiasm" 
Jimmy feels himself decidedly a being apart: 
Why do I spend ninepence on that damned paper every week? 
Nobody reads it except me. Nobody can be bothered. No 
one can raise themselves out of their delicious sloth. 
You two will drive me round the bend soon--I know it, as 
sure as I'm sitting here. I know you're going to drive 
me mad. Oh heavens, how I long for a little ordinary 
human enthusiasm. Just enthusiasm--that's all. I want to 
hear a warm, thrilling voice cry out Hallelujah! (He 
bangs his breast theatricall .) Hallelujah! I'm alive: I've an idea. (15) 
Despairing of the impregnable inertia of "people"--he 
refers to Alison and Cliff under that label: "I'm sick 
of doing things for people. And all for what? [... ] 
Nobody thinks, nobody cares. No beliefs, no convictions 
and no enthusiasm. Just another Sunday evening" (16-17)-- 
Jimmy clearly does not include himself among the slothful 
herd. And he makes quite a point of demonstrating his 
superior sensitivity--which in reality is nothing but a 
morbid sensitivity to other people's noises, especially 
to "the eternal flaming racket of the female" (25)-- 
another rare quality that distinguishes him from his 
impervious environment. But the finer feelings Jimmy 
prides himself on do not prevent him from continually 
assailing other people's sensibilities with his incessant 
talk--only broken by the blowing of his trumpet--and his 
persistent prodding for response. If Jimmy is over- 
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sensitive to other people's racket he is at the same 
time unnerved by silence, as if he were afraid that his 
self would cease to exist if his voice ceased to sound, 
or worse, ceased to elicit a response. Jimmy needs to 
hear his own noises continually to prove to himself that 
he exists. But shouting in the void is no guarantee of 
selfhood. He must hear the echo of his own self reverbe- 
rated from the people around him. Jimmy Porter, like 
Beckett's tramps, needs outside witnesses to his self- 
existence. He wants the guarantee of recognition by the 
Other, and like the Unknown, he wants it most of all 
from woman. He taunts Alison who "wasn't listening 
properly, " not bothering to conceal how desperately hurt 
he is: "You bet you weren't listening. Old Porter talks, 
and everyone turns over and goes to sleep. And Mrs. 
Porter gets 'em all going with the first yawn" (ii). He 
is not asking for sympathy. As Walter Kerr observes: 
"Jimmy wants a response--2Ey response, any living and 
breathing and even flaming reaction that will show him 
back his own image, that will give him a clue as to who 
and what he is. ßr16 Jimmy's dread of silence suggests, 
moreover, that he dare not stop to hear himself think 
and look into his own self for fear he might be looking 
into a -vacuum. "I too was afraid to strip down to my 
soul, " he confides to Helena, "but now everyone looks at 
my superb physique in envy. I can perform any kind of 
press there is without betraying the least sign of 
passion or kindliness" (79). The reconciliation scene at 
the end proves to what extent the "physique" of Jimmy's 
self can stand up to the burden of life-and love. 
But apart from his talking more than anybody else 
in the play, the quality that singles Jimmy out as the 
exceptional individual is his capacity for vicarious 
suffering. He was the only one who cared about his father 
dying. Not only did he suffer with "that feverish failure 
of a man" (58), but he shared the despair and loneliness 
of the outsider who "seemed to be on the wrong side in 
all things" (57). Jimmy has ever since identified himself 
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with those who are on the wrong side, because they are 
essentially right. He feels as strongly as Dr Stockmann 
that "the minority is always right, " while the majority, 
"the damned compact majority, " has "the might--and more's 
the pity" (IX, 28o). It is also Jimmy alone who visits 
Hugh's mother in hospital and alone attends her funeral. 
He begs Alison: "I ... need you ... to come with me" (62). 
But she does not even send flowers: "You had to deny me 
that too, didn't you? " (94). Jimmy's feelings for the 
old woman are very sincere and very touching, and are 
meant to show us his superiority over the people around 
him who all want to escape from the sordid reality of 
life. "Anyone who's never watched somebody die is suffer- 
ing from a pretty bad case of virginity" (57), he tells 
Helena. Jimmy seems to be the only one capable of respond- 
ing to "the pain of being alive" (93), and as such he is 
the true aristocrat among them. Again we are reminded of 
Strindberg's suffering heroes, who consider their capa- 
city for suffering a sign of the elect. The Lawyer in 
A Dream Play suffers with and for pitiful mankind to the 
extent that their misery and crimes have affected his 
very physiognomy: "Look, my hands are black, and can 
never be washed clean, do you see how they are cracked 
and bleeding [... ] And do you think I could win a woman's 
love with this criminal's visage? " (XXXVTI, 245-46). But 
Indra's Daughter is willing to share with the Lawyer 
"the sweetest which is also the most bitter E... ] the 
highest and the lowest, " and learns through the test of 
love what "the pain of being alive" really means. Jimmy 
warns Helena, who has decided to quit because, she says: 
"I can't take part--in all this suffering, I can't! " 
(93): 
It's no good trying to fool yourself about love. You 
can't fall into it like a soft job, without dirtying up 
your hands. [... ] It takes muscle and guts. And if you 
can't bear the thought [... ] of messing up your nice, 
clean soul, C... ] you'd better give up the whole idea 
of life, and become a saint. [... ] Because you'll never 
make it as a human being. It's either this world or the 
next. 
(93-94) 
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Jimmy has settled for this world and is prepared to 
dirty up his hands. His suffering has not literally made 
his hands black and bleeding like the Lawyer's, but it 
has left deep marks on the physiognomy of his soul. His 
deathbed experiences have made him bitter and angry, not 
with society, but with-existence itself, because they 
have revealed to him the fundamental injustice of life, 
which no social or political revolution can remedy. He 
reflects upon the unmourned death of the old woman, 
unable to believe that his own sorrow is of no conse- 
quence to the world at large, not even to the people 
with whom he shares his life: "The injustice of it is 
almost perfect! The wrong people going hungry, the wrong 
people being loved, the wrong people dying! " (94). Jimmy 
has posed a problem which it is not in the power of 
society to solve. His deepest quarrel is with the unknown 
and unassailable enemy responsible for the absurdity of 
existence. That is why he hits out at society in all 
directions without an apparent "cause" to fight for, and 
going nowhere with such vehemence as to be "almost non- 
committal'' (lo). Jimmy is fighting a battle against the 
meaninglessness of life, a battle in which he knows him- 
self to be "on the wrong side in all things, " and which 
he must fight single-handed. But does the loser in this 
battle necessarily have to be a weakling? He addresses 
the question to Alison: 
Was I really wrong to believe that there's a--a kind of-- 
burning virility of mind and spirit that looks for some- 
thing as powerful as itself? The heaviest, strongest 
creatures in this world seem to be the loneliest. Like 
the old bear, following his own breath in the dark 
forest. There's no warm pack, no herd to comfort him. 
That voice that cries out doesn't have to be a weakling's, 
does it? (94) 
Dr Stockmann's proclamation that "the strongest man in 
the world is he who stands most alone" (IX, 313) resounds 
with the triumph of personal victory. Jimmy's turning 
Dr Stockmann's self-assertive statement into a whining 
cry for recognition is a despairing admission of 
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existential defeat. Dr Stockmann is too innocent and too 
naively self-confident to be troubled by existential 
despair. His is the strength of one who has found a great 
cause to fight for, and an eminently assailable enemy to 
fight against. He is vindicating the rights and the 
freedom of the individual, that is to say, the superior 
individual. who stands in the forefront of human advance, 
against the tyranny of mediocrity, "the damned, compact, 
liberal majority" (IX, 279). Dr Stockmann begins as a 
small-town social rebel and ends up as a self-appointed 
Messiah, declaring that a-people who lives by. lies 
and deceit ought to be wiped off the face of the earth. 
Nora's strength is likewise that she has discovered her 
most sacred duty at last, and has recognised her enemy. 
She is rebelling against the social. conventions that 
will not grant her status as a human being, much less 
admit her rights as an individual. But Nora's weakness 
is that she has no well-defined ideals and values of her 
own to put in place of the social conventions she 
rejects. In this respect Nora and Jimmy Porter are birds 
of a feather. But Jimmy's protest, which never materia- 
lises into meaningful action, has a deeper source. Jimmy 
is a social rebel only in gesture, while his fundamental 
quarrel is with existence itself. And on the existential 
level his enemy remains undefined and unassailable. So 
where can Jimmy vent his anger except against society 
and whoever is closest for attack? Of course Jimmy has 
very real grievances against society too. He holds 
society responsible for having educated him out of his 
own class but denied him the opportunity to make use of 
his education and gain a foothold on the social ladder 
to which his education entitles him. His marriage to 
Alison is both a conquest and an act of revenge against 
his pet enemies, the upper classes and the entire 
Establishment erected for their defence. 
Jimmy's relationship with Alison has a lot in common 
with that between Jean and Miss Julie, although in 
Strindberg's play it is, as we might expect, the woman 
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who takes the initiative. In both plays the conqueror 
represents the vitality and vigour of the lower classes 
proving its strength against the effeteness of the upper 
classes embodied in Alison and Miss Julie. Both our 
lower-class heroes have educated themselves beyond the 
class of their birth and nourish ambitions to better 
their social status. Both lay claims to being aristo- 
crats, not by birth, but by virtue of their superior 
personal qualities. Both reveal an ambivalent attitude 
to the upper classes in that they hate them for the 
privileges they enjoy, yet at the same time covet their 
position. And both our heroes, despite their general 
grudge against their social superiors, have respect for 
the fathers on whom they have taken revenge by conquer- 
ing their daughters. Jean respects the Count for his 
commanding authority. Jimmy respects the Colonel, or at 
least speaks sympathetically of him, as a representative 
of the "old-fashioned, grand design" (85) when people 
had firm values and believed in them. Both conquests are 
made from a similar dual motive, on the one hand the 
desire to drag the upper class idols down to their own 
social level and divest them of whatever mystique they 
may have for the less privileged, and on the other the 
desire to reach up to their level and gain recognition 
among their set. But neither conqueror has the courage 
to take the full consequence of his conquest. Jean, a 
less complicated character than Jimmy, admits that his 
slave-mentality has made a coward of him, and Miss Julie 
proves her truly aristocratic character by making the 
supreme sacrifice. When Jimmy is faced with the ultimate 
sacrifice he has demanded of Alison--to see her grovel- 
ling in the mud and her baby dead--he does not know what 
to do with it. Instead of accepting it as the basis of a 
more meaningful and constructive relationship between 
them, he reverts to the old escapist game of bears and 
squirrels. For all his "blazing vitality"17 Jimmy lacks 
the essential quality needed to stand the strain of the 
burden of life, a healthy physique of self. Not only 
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does he lack a social identity, but he is so desperately 
conscious of an existential vacuum that needs to be 
filled that he even goes searching in Alison's handbag 
for the self to fill it. He confesses to Cliff: "When 
she goes out, I go through everything--trunks, cases, 
drawers, bookcase, everything. Why? To see if there is 
something of me somewhere, a reference to me. I want to 
know if I'm being betrayed" (36). Jimmy is not concerned 
with such a trivial matter as sexual infidelity, but 
with the awful betrayal of not being "mentioned at all 
because my name is a dirty word" (36). 
The question of Self as related to Brand, Peer Gynt, 
the Unknown, the Dreamer of A Dream Play, and Beckett's 
characters, is a question of an existential and meta- 
physical quest for selfhood, not a problem of establish- 
ing a social identity. These characters are not concerned 
with defining themselves in relation to society, but in 
relation to God or some super-human image that serves as 
a God-substitute. To Beckett's destitutes even the petty 
bourgeois Godot appears super-human. Brand's aspirations 
are Messianic. He does not lend a thought to such trivi- 
alities as a person's social status and social identity. 
He is not concerned with persons and personality, but 
with individuals and man's supreme duty to realise his 
divine potential. Peer Gynt's Emperor dream, and the 
Unknown's dream of becoming a world-famous scientist, are 
expressions of metaphysical aspirations, not of social 
ambitions. Peer changes social identities with the ease 
of an actor changing costume. It is the permanent core 
of existential self inside the onion of social identities 
that he is searching for. The Unknown's yearning for 
godhead is even more expressly pronounced than that of 
Brand: "I am the Universe, and I feel the whole power of 
the Creator within me, for I am He" (XXIX, 54). When in 
the banquet scene he is stripped of his newly won honour 
of being acclaimed "king in the realm of the Intellect" 
(188) his nightmare is not that he has lost his social 
status, but that he has been divested of "the greatest 
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thing any man can possess, the belief in himself" (187). 
For Beckett's destitutes the word "society" has no 
meaning. Alone in a vast emptiness they cry for recogni- 
tion of their dwindling selfhood, if only to be assured 
that they "wore actually there, " a distinguishable speck 
in the void, before they flicker to extinction. 
The non--naturalistic form of these plays which, 
with the exception of Brand, may all be described as 
"dream plays, " underlines their concern with man's exist- 
ence beyond the confines of his social reality. Brand 
and Peer Gynt, which Ibsen calls "dramatic poems, " were 
clearly not written with the technical limitations of 
the theatre in mind. Ibsen needed unlimited imaginative 
scope for the expression of his cosmic vision of man's 
striving to define himself and his place and purpose in 
the universe. Strindberg chose the dream play--which he 
claimed was his invention--in order to escape the limita- 
tions of time and space and the constriction of probabil- 
ity. In his dreamscapes he could reach outwards towards 
the infinite extension of the human spirit, and look 
inwards into the deepest recesses of the soul. Beckett 
has chosen the dream play because for him human existence 
in a senseless universe has the character of, or simply 
is, an absurd and nightmarish dream, with no hope of 
waking up to the relief of a comforting social reality 
where things make sense. 
With Look Back in Anger, however, we are firmly 
within the familiar convention of fourth-wall realism. 
If Ibsen's bourgeois parlour appears "drab, " Osborne's 
working-class bed-sitter is ostentatiously shabby. In 
this unpropitious and uninspiring setting Jimmy Porter 
is struggling to make sense of himself both as a social 
being and as an individual despairingly conscious of an 
existential vacuum that needs to be filled with something 
that society plainly cannot provide. The critics who com- 
plained that Jimmy's protest, anger, and despair lacked 
sufficient motivation may have been betrayed by the 
naturalistic form of the play into scanning only the 
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surface of Jimmy's identity problem and seeing him merely 
as a social rebel whose grievances ought to be motivated 
accordingly. T. C. Worsley does seem to have a point when 
he suggests that Osborne's choice of the naturalistic 
form for his play was perhaps a mistake, because it 
invites us to ask questions that are not answered. 
l$ 
Osborne himself must have felt that Jimmy's fundamental 
problem, which is not social but existential, not a 
problem of identity but of selfhood, could not be 
adequately dealt with on the surface level of drawing- 
room realism, as Ibsen obviously felt it when he turned 
to symbolism, and Strindberg when he turned to the dream 
play. In his later plays The Entertainer and Inadmissible 
Evidence where the emphasis is clearly on the protagonist's 
existential malaise, the disintegration of self, even 
with an "updated Gyntian button-moulder, waiting in the 
wings with his hook, "19 Osborne makes attempts to break 
out of the restricting conventions of naturalism by 
employing stylised "dream" sequences to counterpoint the 
realistic scenes, in order to achieve greater emotional 
depth, since the dramatist's principal task, as he sees 
it, is to give lessons in feeling. Jimmy's most harrowing 
experience happened in the past, and the audience cannot 
partake of his agony in the way they can actually feel 
Peer Gynt's terror in the madhouse scene, or Archie Rice's 
anguished despair when as a solitary figure in a merci- 
less spotlight he hurls out his unfunny jokes in self- 
defence against the dark void out front. Jimmy's anger 
cannot be adequately explained by seeking its origin in 
external causes, and its inner, root cause, Jimmy's 
childhood discovery of life's injustice, which permanent- 
ly scarred his soul, is recounted to the audience rather 
than emotionally experienced by them. Hence the critics' 
not entirely unjustified complaint about the lack of 
motivation for Jimmy's discontent. 
For all our heroes the quest for self is closely 
bound up with the search for the real meaning of exist- 
ence. Why am I here? What am I for? Jimmy's quest began 
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in anger and helplessness. What is the real meaning of 
a life that must inevitably end with the injustice of 
death, such as that of his father, who believed he 
fought for the truth and was rewarded with a lonely and 
inglorious death? What "cause" can make sense of the 
senselessness of existence? And if *there is no worthwhile 
cause with which he can identify himself, where does 
Jimmy start looking for his real self, if there is a real 
self? For all his social protest and venomous attacks on 
Alison's set and the Establishment, Jimmy never puts 
forward a single proposal, positive or negative, for 
social reform. Jimmy Porter might well say with Ibsen 
that he is not a citizen but an individual. He does not 
identify himself with the masses and would think it a 
greater honour to be called "an enemy of the people" 
than "a friend of the people. " Jimmy is an individualist 
who, like Nora Helmer, is searching for the truth "which 
is true for me, " and like Brand demands that his truth 
must also be the truth for everybody else. But unlike 
Brand, Jimmy has no divine vision to put before the 
poeple, nor indeed to define himself by. He shares Nora's 
dilemma of having nowhere else to look for his identity, 
nothing else to define himself against, than the society 
whose values and ideals he rejects. 
While Brand and Peer Gynt, Indra's Daughter and the 
Hunter in The Great Highway come down from the heights 
and return to the heights, Nora Helmer and Jimmy Porter 
start in the valley--and remain in the valley. They live 
in a world where man has lost all sense of his divine 
dimension, and where religion has degenerated into a 
social cliche, without therefore being harmless. If no 
longer a spiritual force, religion still retains its 
hold as the supreme sanction of tyrannical social con- 
ventions. In Nora's world it has become the pillar of a 
male-dominated society, in Jimmy's of a class-dominated 
society. Jimmy reads out the Bishop of Bromley's reply, 
in one of the posh Sunday papers, to the allegation that 
he supports the rich against the poor: "He says he denies 
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the difference of class distinctions. 'This idea has 
been persistently and wickedly fostered by--the working 
classes! ' Well! " (13-14). Jimmy screams at the sound of 
church bells and rails against Helena's "Economics of 
the Supernatural. It's all a simple matter of payments 
and penalties. [... ] Tell me, what could be more gilt- 
edged than the next world! " (55-56). But Jimmy's plea 
for "a little ordinary enthusiasm, " his longing to hear 
"a warm, thrilling voice cry out Hallelujah! " betrays 
his yearning for a spiritual dimension to his life, of 
which the world around him is hopelessly devoid. "0h, 
brother, it's such a long time since I was with anyone 
who got enthusiastic about anything" (15). Helena offers 
Alison her diagnosis of "what is wrong with Jimmy": 
It's very simple really. He was born out of his time. 
[... ] There's no place for people like that any longer-- 
in sex, or politics, or anything. That's why he's so 
futile. E... ] he thinks he's still in the middle of the 
French Revolution. And that's where he ought to be, of 
course. He doesn't know where he is, or where he's going. 
He'll never do anything, and he'll never amount to 
anything. (9o) 
Helena is right about Jimmy's futility, his lack of 
direction, his inactivity, his lack of future. But she 
does not probe into the reasons why Jimmy is so unfit 
for the present time. Jimmy is the sort of person who 
would be "out of his time" in any century, because his 
whole approach to life is negative. He protests and 
rejects without being able to offer positive alterna- 
tives. All he can see for the future is "the Brave-New- 
nothing-very-much-thank-you" of a lack-lustre welfare 
state in which everybody is provided for and unable to 
die for good causes any more, and of which Jimmy has no 
desire to be a part. Even in love and friendship Jimmy_ 
is negative, because he offers himself negatively, by 
demanding so much more in return. Harold Ferrar suggests 
that Jimmy functions according to "the 'neurotic's loo% 
principle': he exacts total allegiance, impossible 
tokens of love and commitment, utter sensitivity which 
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precludes the needs of others. 1? 2o In this respect jimmy 
has much in common with Strindberg's Unknown, who demands 
total allegiance from the Lady, as Jimmy does of Alison, 
but in return undertakes to carry the burden of suffering 
for both of them. Like the Unknown, Jimmy's most positive 
quality is his capacity for vicarious suffering. Only as 
a partaker of suffering has Jimmy really felt himself 
wanted and needed. It is the one "cause" which has given 
him some sense of purpose. It has also become his most 
substantial claim to distinction and superiority over the 
common herd, since no one seems willing or able to share 
his suffering. Nor, if anyone had offered to, would Jimmy 
have wanted, any more than the Unknown, to be relieved of 
his precious burden. Alison advises Helena not to waste 
her sympathy on Jimmy: "Oh, don't try and take his 
suffering away from him--he'd be lost without it" (54). 
Alison conies closer than Helena to pinpointing Jimmy's 
essential weakness. Without his suffering Jimmy would 
have nothing that was truly his own. For Jimmy is 
constantly looking outside himself for causes and values 
that can give his life meaning and lend content to his 
self. And that is why Jimmy is so singularly unfit for 
the age he unhappily is born in, which more than any 
previous period in history has witnessed the toppling of 
eternal verities. and the shattering of unshakable values. 
Jimmy accuses Helena and her kind of being "a romantic 
lot" who "spend their time mostly looking forward to the 
past. The only place they can see the light is the Dark 
Ages" (56). But it is equally true of Jimmy himself that 
his future lies in the past, and the only place he can 
see light is th3 Edwardian era, "All home-made cakes and 
croquet, bright ideas, bright uniforms" (17), a well- 
ordered world where people were secure in their beliefs 
in lasting values and indisputable ideals. But the H-bomb 
has destroyed all that, and the "old-fashioned, grand 
design" has given way to a,. "Brave-New-nothing" for which 
any sacrifice would be "About as pointless and inglorious 
as stepping in front of a bus" (85). 
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Jimmy lives in "a world to which chaos has come, "21 
and for which the only positive message seems to be that 
of the existentialists, who believe in facing chaos as a 
challenge. For them a value-less world, that is to say a 
world devoid of universal and absolute certainties, means 
the unlimited freedom of the individual, not to do what 
he likes, but to choose his own values and create meaning 
where none exists. It means furthermore that man himself 
is not an absolute entity, created in God's image with a 
fixed and permanent identity, but a being of infinite 
possibilities who alone carries the responsibility for 
the content of his self. If Jimmy continues to insist 
that the world provide him with values and causes, instead 
of creating his owe, he is doomed to futility. Commenting 
on Jimmy's running a sweet-stall and choosing to live in 
more squalid surroundings than the economics of his trade 
could possibly dictate, Simon Trussler suggests that 
Jimmy "chooses his squalor existentially: he is created 
and identified by it. "22 But the play fails to convince 
us that the sweet-stall has anything to do with Jimmy. 
We are told twice that it was Hugh's mother who' started 
him off in the business (pp. 42 and 64), and Alison's 
remark that "He seems to have been as happy doing this 
as anything else" (64), does not testify to an active 
existential choice on Jimmy's part. In fact, his reading 
of the posh Sunday papers, his trying to listen to 
classical music, and his marriage to Alison, rather indi- 
cate a longing to get away from the squalor of his 
present life and establish a social identity beyond his 
working-class background. But he is always waiting for 
someone else to start him off. Helena suggests that Jimmy 
ought to have been in the French Revolution. She clearly 
recognises his need to have brave causes provided for him 
from outside. In their youthful, party-crashing rebellion 
against Dame Alison's Mob it was Hugh who went in the 
forefront and furnished Jimmy with his revolutionary fire 
and uncompromising ideals. When Hugh opted out and went 
abroad, leaving Jimmy alone with their hostage, Jimmy 
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knew neither what to do with himself nor with the girl 
he had captured. Unable to face the challenge of growing 
up to a more responsible attitude to life, to society, 
and to his marriage to Alison, Jimmy took refuge in the 
game of bears and squirrels, which Alison frankly 
describes as "A silly symphony for people who couldn't 
bear the pain of being human beings any longer" (47). 
Alison "thought she married an idealist and found 
she had a paranoiac on her hands, " one reviewer observed. 23 
But Alison really did marry an idealist, although an 
inarticulate one, despite his deluge of words. Jimmy's 
idealism is born of frustration rather than of vision, 
and manifests itself as a longing for ideals rather than 
as a set of formulated precepts. But Jimmy's visionless 
idealism is every bit as uncompromising as Brand's 
committal "all or nothing. " Jimmy puts his own "either-or" 
before Helena when he tells her: "It's either this world 
or the next" (94). You must either be a saint or a human 
being. There is no both-and. And if you choose this world 
you must be prepared not only to dirty your hands but to 
mess up your nice, clean soul. From Alison he demands 
total allegiance, but for more obviously selfish reasons 
than did Brand of Agnes, for Jimmy demands her allegiance 
to his own person rather than to a higher common cause, 
and out of no concern for her "salvation. " He demands her 
loyalty for precisely the same reason as the Unknown did 
of the Lady, to bolster his own precarious sense of self. 
Helena is astonished to learn that Jimmy expects Alison 
to be loyal not only to "himself and all the things he 
believes in, his present and his future, but his past as 
well. All the people he admires and loves, and has loved. 
[... ] Even the other women he's loved" (42). Jimmy, like 
Brand, demands individual commitment, and condemns 
Helena's conformist adherence to "the book of rules, " 
but Jimmy, unlike Brand, is not concerned with the duty 
of every individual to realise himself, but with other 
people's undivided allegiance to Jimmy's all-important 
self. The other characters are more aware of the fact 
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that Jimmy has demands on them than that they want 
anything from him, and so is Jimmy: "I think ... I must 
have a lot of--old stock.... Nobody wants it.... " (33). 
The supporting characters are never allowed to think of 
themselves except in relation to Jimmy, and whether 
their testimony to his character is positive or negative 
they all accept his uniqueness and never dispute his 
claim to superiority. By thus having the other characters 
focus their attention entirely on the protagonist and not 
allowing any of them a comparable individuality, Osborne 
can make a very ordinary, frustrated adolescent--Jimmy is 
an adolescent in attitude and behaviour, if not in age-- 
look an exceptional, even superior being. Ibsen gives the 
same preferential treatment to Brand, but Osborne's angry 
young man looks irredeemably puny when put beside Ibsen's 
Promethean rebel-idealist. The one aspires to godhead, 
the other to the heights of the posh Sunday papers. 
Jimmy Porter is more of a size with Gregers Verle, 
and his frustrated and futile idealism is more like the 
"acute rectitudinitis"24 Gregers is suffering from than 
the positively self-assertive and self-liberating idea- 
lism of those other comparable rebels, Dr Stockmann and 
Nora Helmer. Like Gregers, Jimmy imposes his ideal 
demands---which for him, as for Gregers, are substitutes 
for a failing sense of self--on average people who cannot 
exist without a life-lie, most of all on Alison whom he 
stabs at mercilessly for her unwillingness to face the 
pain of life: "If you could have a child, and it would 
die" (37). When Alison chooses to go to church with 
Helena rather than stay at home and nurse Jimmy's self- 
pity, he goes into tantrums "like an hysterical girl": 
Perhaps, one day, you may want to come back. I shall 
wait for that day. I want to stand up in your tears, 
and splash about in them, and sing. I want to be there 
when you grovel. I want to be there, I want to watch 
it, I want the front seat. (59) 
Jimmy Porter and Gregers Werle are both characters who 
repel pity, Gregers because of his fanatical and bungling 
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ideal-mongering and obstinately myopic hero-worship of a 
worthless idler, and Jimmy--although a more infectious 
and vividly individualised personality--because of his 
whining self-pity, his vicious selfishness, and his 
savage craving to be worshipped, by women above all. 
Neither Jimmy nor Gregers is seen to sacrifice anything 
for his ideals, but make inordinate claims upon other 
people to do so--for Jimmy's and Gregers' own ideals, 
that is. But when they are presented with the sacrifices 
they have demriand. ed, and got in a measure they had not 
anticipated, neither of them knows what to do with it. 
Reminded by the sarcastic Dr Relling of the utter 
futility of Hedvig's sacrifice, that it would not change 
Hjaimar Bkdal one whit, but merely give him a superb 
excuse for wallowing in sentimentality and self-pity, 
Gregers replies: "If you are right, and I am wrong, life 
is no longer worth living" (X, 16o). Gregers is himself 
the clinching testimony to the futility of Hedvig's 
death. He proclaims unrepentantly that he is glad his 
destiny is what it is: "To be thirteenth at table" (16o). 
When Jimmy's cruel wish comes true and Alison comes 
crawling back, having lost her baby and any others she 
might have had, Jimmy's inflated ego shrinks to a help- 
less whimper: "Don' t., Please don't.... I can't-- [... ] 
You're all right. You're all right now. Please, I--I.... 
Not any more.... " (96). Immediately before Alison's final 
monologue Jimmy, still absorbed in self-pity, moans: "I 
may be a lost cause, but I thought if you loved me, it 
needn't matter" (95). Jimmy in his consummate selfishness 
never reflects on the monstrosity of asking anyone to 
suffer, as he wanted Alison to suffer, pointlessly for a 
lost cause. 
Osborne has Luther say: 
Seems to me there are three ways out of despair. One is 
faith in Christ, the second is to become enraged by the 
world and make its nose bleed for it, and the third is 
the love of a woman. (95-96) 
Jimmy seeks "salvation" in the love of a woman only when 
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he knows he is a "lost cause, " which by Alison's account 
happens when Hugh betrays their common cause and Jimmy 
finds he has neither the courage nor the conviction to 
face the challenge alone. Katharine J. Worth points out 
that "Lilk: e so many of Strindberg's characters, Jimmy 
seeks from women far more than he could ever hope to get 
from them, and when he is disappointed turns on them 
with savage resentment. Release from his tormenting 
consciousness is what he is after. "25 Jimmy wants more 
from his women than "release from his tormenting 
consciousness. " Like Strindberg's Unknown and like Peer 
Gynt, Jimmy seeks in a woman's love the self-fulfilment 
he has failed to find elsewhere. And because, like 
Strindberg's heroes, Jimmy looks to woman to infuse his 
empty self with content, he becomes as jealous and 
possessive as any Strindbergian marriage partner. He 
demands of Alison, in a much more ruthless tone, what 
Peer demands of Anitra that "All of you, every inch and 
fibre [... ] Shall be filled with none but me. " But Peer 
added: "Without will, or yea, or nay" (VI, 163). Peer 
sought in the possession of Anitra an extension of his 
self, and believed, in his self-delusion, that what he 
needed was another empty vessel into which he could pour 
the overflow of his own expansive personality. Jimmy, 
however, knows that he is an empty vessel, which cannot 
be filled by the possession of another vacuous self. He 
wants Alison's active and willing and complete allegiance 
to everything he believes in. Having lost his faith in 
himself and his cause, if he ever had one, Jimmy needs to 
be assured of Alison's total faith in his own person. He 
feels betrayed in not being "mentioned at all" in the 
letters that pass between Alison and her parents. Alison 
confides to her father that Jimmy "thought it was high 
treason of me to write to you at all! " (65) and is 
astonished when her father takes Jimmy''s side and criti- 
cises her for preferring to sit. on the fence. A. E. Dyson 
puts it like this: "She has responded to physical love, 
but not offered it; listened to ideals, but withheld 
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enthusiasm; submitted to the attraction of Jimmy as a 
knight, but clung obstinately to the security of well- 
bred indifference in the face of his onslaughts. "26 But 
while Jimmy needs to possess a woman's love completely, 
he is also, like the Unknown, afraid of the vampire side 
of woman. He accuses Alison of having "the passion of a 
python": 
She just devours me whole every time, as if I were some 
over-large rabbit. That's me. That bulge around her 
navel--if you're wondering what it is--it's me. ? ie, 
buried alive down there, and going mad, smothered in 
that peaceful looking coil [... ] She'll go on sleeping 
and devouring until there's nothing left of me. (37-38) 
Jimmy's myth about Alison's devouring passion is an 
obsession unfounded in fact. Alison's vampire side is 
certainly not borne out by the play. She has nothing of 
the ferocity and aggressiveness of Strindberg's vampire 
women, such as Laura in The Father or Alice in The Dance 
of Death. In fact, she is no match for Jimmy at all, and 
Jimmy needs to be fought as well as loved. He feels that 
she devours him simply because he wastes so much energy 
in trying to elicit response, without her giving him as 
much as a slap in the face in return. Perhaps that is 
why he succumbs so readily to Helena's devouring appetite. 
Jimmy also has the same ambivalent love-hate relationship 
to women as has the Unknown, because like Strindberg's 
hero Jimmy seeks in the woman he loves both the virgin- 
mother and the mistress, and the two cannot be reconciled. 
Alison remarks to Helena: "He wants something quite 
different from us. What it is exactly I don't know--a 
kind of cross between a mother and a Greek courtesan, a 
henchwoman, a mixture of Cleopatra and Boswell" (91). 
Jimmy's ideal partner is a person in whom a woman's love 
is combined with a man's loyalty. But since such a person 
does not exist, Jimmy must settle for a woman's love. He 
tells Cliff that he is quite prepared to see him wander 
off, "And all because of something I want from that girl 
downstairs, something I know in my heart she's incapable 
of giving" (84). Apart from the obvious reason of seeking 
246 
self-fulfilment in a sexual union, Jimmy, like the 
Unknown and like Peer Gynt, has a secret longing for the 
innocence of the womb. His diatribe on Alison's pythonic 
passion does not suggest that Jimmy resents being "buried 
alive down there. " What he resents is Alison's complete 
unawareness, or lack of demonstrated awareness--"Not a 
sound, not a flicker from her--she doesn't even rumble a 
little" (38)--of his existence inside her. The bear-and- 
squirrel game is another indication of his nostalgia for 
the womb. Alison describes it as "the one way of escaping 
from everything--a sort of unholy priest-hole of being 
animals to one another [... ý Playful, careless creatures 
in their own cosy zoo for two" (47). Alison is afraid 
to tell Jimmy that she is pregnant. She knows how much 
he will resent the idea of having a competitor for her 
affection, "he'd feel hoaxed, as if I were trying to kill 
him in the worst way of all" (29). In the bear-and- 
squirrel game at the end Jimmy again takes the place of 
the baby she has lost. He uses a similar womb imagery to 
that of Alison: "We'll be together in our bear's cave, 
and our squirrel's drey [... ] And we'll sing songs about 
ourselves--about warm trees and snug caves, and lying in 
the sun" (96). Confronted with the grovelling, suffering 
proof of love he had wanted to splash about in, Jimmy 
shrivels helplessly under the burden of responsibility 
it places upon him to prove himself deserving of it. 
Unable to face the pain of being human Jimmy abdicates 
his humanity and escapes into the dumb, uncomplicated 
affection of animal existence. 
When Nora woke up to the fact that her life had been 
more play-acting and that nobody had taken her seriously 
as an individual in her own right, she realised that she 
had never been happy in her squirrel existence, only 
merry. She could no longer be content to surrender her 
humanity and forfeit her selfhood for the comfort and 
merriment of playing animals with Thorvald Helmer. Rather 
than rot in the passive despair of respectability, she 
chose the active despair of trying to become a human 
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being and an individual. And in a society where the 
common desire is to huddle together in the security of 
social respectability rather than face the challenge of 
individual freedom, and where "to live" is considered 
"terribly important" (VIII9 291), but to be an individual, 
of no consequence at all, Nora, for all her folly and 
inexperience, is an exceptional being. 
Jimmy Porter refuses to take the leap into active 
despair. He will go on talking, endlessly. But as Helena 
says: "He'll never do anything, and he'll never amount 
to anything" (go). Jimmy is a paradox of energy spent in 
inaction. He will continue to lash out at shadows, but 
he will never conquer the Boyg, for as the ending indi- 
cates, nothing will ever shake Jimmy into active decision. 
The very structure of the play demonstrates the stagnant 
sameness of Jimmy's existence. Commenting on the similar 
opening scenes of Act I and Act III, Mary McCarthy sums 
up the situation rather neatly: "'Different books---same 
reviews' [... ] Same scene--different girl. Nothing really 
changes; nothing can change. "27 Alison remarks to her 
father: "You're hurt because everything is changed. Jimmy 
is hurt because everything is the same. And neither of 
you can face it" (68). But something has changed by the 
end of the play, for the action of Look Back in Anger, 
like that of all the other plays discussed in this study, 
is both progressive and circular. Alison has woken up 
from what Jimmy calls her "beauty sleep" (37). She has 
experienced suffering as Jimmy has never experienced it, 
and she returns with the complete commitment of love he 
had asked for. Jimmy, however, does not change. But the 
change in Alison serves to underline the depth and 
futility of Jimmy's despair. Her new and deeply sincere 
proof of love promises Jimmy's "salvation. " Yet when 
salvation is offered him Jimmy proves unequal to it. 
Alison's suffering for Jimmy's sake has been totally 
pointless. Jimmy is both unable and unwilling to change. 
Unable because, as T. 0 Vlorsley observes: "He has seen 
through all the tricks of self-deception by which we 
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people persuade ourselves that life is worth living, "28 
and unwilling because he cherishes his despair, for the 
same reason that the Unknown cherished his suffering, as 
a last guarantee of selfhood. Jimmy's conception of "self, " 
of what it takes to become a "recognisable human being, " 
is a combination of Ibsen's philosophy of individual 
commitment and Strindberg's emphasis on self-definition 
through suffering, and exaltation of the capacity to 
suffer as a mark of the elect, to which Jimmy adds for 
his own part, the consciousness of despair. If Jimmy's 
malaise is of "the texture of ordinary despair, " and he 
can claim no superiority on the grounds that he knows 
better than other people how to live, he is at least 
exceptional in being conscious of his despair. In an 
existential sense all the characters in the play live in 
despair because they refuse to face the pain of being 
alive, but only Jimmy sees through their self-protecting 
life-lies: Alison's well-bred indifference, Helena's 
"book of rules, " and Cliff's myth of his own ignorance, 
which Jimmy has helped to foster. However, even Jimmy's 
pre-eminent claim to uniqueness becomes untenable when 
Alison returns after her purgatorial experience to share 
his despair. In the end commonplace Jimmy Porter has 
only his compelling personality to commend him, a perso- 
nality which manifests itself in powerful rhetoric rather 
than in illustrious action. Jimmy distinguishes himself 
not by what he does, but by what he says, and the way he 
says it. 
In the introductory note to his adaptation of Hedda 
Gabler Osborne tells us of his long-standing fascination 
with Ibsen's play, 
29 
and the most fascinating thing about 
it in his opinion is the fact that Ibsen has chosen for 
his heroine a commonplace person (Osborne describes Nora 
as "stronger and less distracted and commonplace" than 
Hedda3o), a "victim, " a "loser, " "petty, puny, frigid, " 
and "indolently evil, " and out of this unheroic material 
has created a compelling, complex, and unforgettable 
character. Osborne's portrait of Hedda Gabler needs 
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little more than a change of name to fit Jimmy Porter: 
Hedda is a victim. She is not tragic but desperately 
needs to get ýhe minimal rewards of life. She is petty, puny, frigid and clearly unable to carry through any relationship. [... 7 
She is indolently evil and lives off her own fantasies, 
absorbing from people better than herself. L... I 
Her tragedy, if it can be called ore, is that of being born bored and that is what is fascinating about her in 
the arena s of dramatic literature. The very concept was 
unique at the Time. She is a loser, whereas Mrs. Elvsted 
is an odds-on favourite. C... ) 
Hedda is a born victim but she does have the gift of 
energy C... ] 
As I see it, Hedda Gabler has her fun at the expense 
of others. She has a sharp wit but no authentic sense of 
humour. She is a bourgeois snob and a walking waste of 
human personality. 'C ... ] 
Like many frigid people, her only true feelings are 
expressed in jealousy, possessiveness and acquisitive 
yearnings. 
For instance, she is completely unable to initiate 
situations in her life. C... ] 
She always has to be the centre of attention, would 
like to be a great lady and would be bored whatever she 
did or whatever happened to her. A great, largely 
misused play. 31 
Hedda is a victim of an authoritarian and emotion- 
ally crippling aristocratic upbringing, and a slave of 
restricting social conventions which condemn her to a 
life of leisured boredom. Jimmy is a victim of a trau- 
matic childhood experience which has fostered in him a 
deep-seated bitterness against life in general and a 
profound distrust of love, and Jimmy, like Hedda, albeit 
at the other end of the social scale, is, or feels him- 
self to be, condemned to futile boredom by a class- 
structured society which denies him the opportunity to 
make use of his talents. 
Hedda is frigid. Jimmy is described in the intro- 
ductory stage direction as a person who "alienates love. " 
He can only carry through a relationship, if at all, on 
the sub-human level of bears and squirrels. 
Hedda is too cowardly and shallow a creature by 
Ibsen's standard to be capable of "evil. " Nor does Hedda 
think in the ethical terms of good and evil. She is an 
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aesthete for whom life is either beautiful or ugly. But 
she is malicious, sadistic, destructive, and ruthlessly 
self-centred. Jimmy is too puny for evil. His frame of 
reference is social, not metaphysical. Hence he is not 
concerned with good and evil, but with right and wrong. 
But like Hedda he is sadistic and cruelly self-centred. 
Jimmy is not, like Hedda, born bored. But he strikes 
the attitude of boredom in his very first speech: "Why do 
I do this every Sunday? " and a few pages later: 
God, how I hate Sundays! It's always so depressing, 
always the same. We never seem to get any further, do we? 
Always the same ritual. Reading the papers, drinking tea, 
ironing. A few more hours, and another week gone. Our 
youth is slipping away. Do you know that? (14-15) 
At the opening of Act III Jimmy's youth is still slipping 
away in boredom: "Why do I spend half of Sunday reading 
the papers? " (75). And Helena's ironing bores him no less 
than Alison's. But boredom has become so much of a way of 
life with Jimmy that it would take greater courage than 
he can muster to break the habit. He would be lost with- 
out the familiar ritual of Sunday boredom perusing the 
papers and establishing with reassurance that "The dirty 
ones get more and more wet round the mouth, and the posh 
ones are more pompous than ever" (75). Osborne suggests 
that Hedda "also chose to be bored. "32 While Hedda's bore- 
dom is a deep-seated malaise, she also cultivates the 
myth of her boredom as a self-protecting life-lie by 
which she defends herself against any demands being made 
upon her, and from becoming involved with life, physi- 
cally and emotionally. When Judge Brack suggests that 
she may soon have a real vocation to fill her empty days, 
hinting at motherhood, "what most people would insist-- 
the most tying and demanding of responsibilities, " Hedda 
rebuffs him angrily: "0h, be quiet! That's not going to 
happen to me! [... ] I've no yearnings in that way, Judge 
Brack. I don't look for those demands. [... 1 I often think 
that there's only one thing in this world I have any 
talent for at all. C... ] Boring myself to death. So, there 
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it is. ""33 Jimmy porter likewise seeks in boredom a means 
of escaping from the pain of being human, from active, 
responsible, urflinching involvement in life, and love. 
Jimmy and Hedda suffer from the kind of boredom Beckett 
calls Habit, and which he defines as "a compromise 
effected between the individual and his environment 
[Jimmy], or between the individual and his own organic 
eccentricities EHedda], the guarantee of a dull inviol- 
ability, the lightening-conductor of his existence. "+34 
Suffering and boredom are the polar principles of Jimmy's 
existence, just as Hedda's are courage and boredom. 
Beckett's observation, paraphrasing Proust, is apposite 
to Jimmy's situation: 
The pendulum oscillates between these two terms: 
Suffering--that opens a window on the real and is the 
main condition of the artistic experience, and Boredom--- 
with its host of top-hatted and hygenic ministers, 
Boredom that must be considered as the most tolerable 
because the most durable of human evils. 35 
A more optimistic view of boredom as regards Jimmy 
Porter is expressed by Mary McCarthy who argues that 
Jimmy Porter's boredom is a badge of freedom, and he 
will not be passive about it; for him, boredom is a 
positive activity, a proclamation. To be actively, 
angrily, militantly bored is one of the few forms of 
protest open to him that do not compromise his 
independence and honesty. 36 
It is difficult to reconcile Mary McCarthy's vindication 
of boredom as Jimmy's "badge of freedom" with Jimmy's 
despondent cry: "We never seem to get any further, do we? 
Always the same ritual. [... ] Our youth is slipping 
away" (15), which expresses his acute awareness of being 
enslaved in dull, self-destroying stagnation. Jimmy does 
not regard boredom as a positive activity, much less as 
a self-defining activity, since everybody is capable of 
being bored. In Jimmy's household boredom is a communal 
occupation. Jimmy, like Beckett, opposes the "suffering 
of being" to the "boredom of living. "37 Suffering, not 
boredom, is the mark of the elect. 
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Both Jimmy and Hedda are "losers" because they have 
recognised the fundamental meaninglessness of life but 
lack the inner resources to create meaning and initiate 
causes to fill the void of their empty existence. They 
are not, like Brand, self-creative, but are constantly 
looking outside themselves for ideals and idols. Osborne 
says about Hedda that "she is completely unable to initi- 
ate situations in her life. " When Hedda learns that Lov- 
borg has shot himself, if not through the temples, at 
least through the breast, the second noblest way, she 
exclaims: "0h, Judge--what a relief it is: this final 
business of Lovborg's! C... ] To know that someone can 
initiate--create--something brave and free that's all 
their own. Something perfect, uncompromising. Beautiful. "38 
Both Jinuny and Hedda are betrayed by their idols. Hedda 
receives the news of Lovborg's ignoble death--an acciden- 
tal shot "lower down" than the breast--with unconcealed 
displeasure ar. d revulsion: "That as well! Everything low 
and absurd and commonplace--why does it cloud over every- 
thing I do and touch.: "39 Jimmy, like Hedda, looks to 
other people to initiate "causes" in his life. When Hugh, 
his youthful idol, decided to quit the revolutionary 
game, Jimmy lost conviction in their common ideals and 
retreated to playing bears and squirrels. But Hedda, an 
altogether more impressive character than Jimmy Porter, 
turns her defeat to victory by performing the only noble 
and authenticating act of her. life--seeing that Tesman and 
Mrs Elvsted have no use for her, and that Judge Brack is 
not above sexual blackmail. If Hedda did not have the 
courage of beautiful living, at least she can prove to 
herself that she has the courage to die beautifully. Her 
death is an entirely futile gesture. It vindicates her 
wildly unrealistic ideal of Dionysian nobility to no one 
but herself, as Judge Brack's response to her extravagant 
act of self-assertion shows: "God have mercy! People 
don't--do that kind of thing. "4o Hedda's suicide is as 
much an escape from the responsibilities of life and the 
sordidness of human reality as is Jimmy's retreat to the 
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animal game. Yet there is an air of triumph and nobility 
about Hedda's death, which cannot be said of the recon- 
ciliation scet. e at the end of Look Back in Anger. Hedda 
dies in order to gain her freedom. Jimmy abdicates his 
humanity in order to go on living. 
Osborne says of Hedda that she is "a born victim 
but she does have the gift of energy. " Hedda's energy, 
however, is an entirely destructive force because it is 
spent in the realisation of borrowed, half-digested, 
never-experienced, and totally unrealistic values. Jimmy 
Porter has the gift of energy in abundance, but while 
his energy is a redeeming quality when seen against the 
spiritual inertia that surrounds him, it spends itself 
entirely in negative protest, because Jimmy lacks 
conviciton in his borrowed ideals, and because the 
deeper reason for his anger remains undefined. 
Last, but not least, Jimmy shares Hedda's fate of 
being "a walking waste of human personality. " But while 
Hedda is negative to the very core of her personality-- 
even her noblest ideals are ultimately life-denying--and 
seems doomed to futility from birth, Jimmy leaves the 
impression of a positive and promising talent, the knight 
in shining armour, regrettably going to waste because he 
cannot find a worthy outlet for his "blazing vitality. " 
It is not that Jimmy lacks opportunities, but he lacks 
the creative vision of a truly original mind which, like 
Brand's, creates its own values and initiates its own 
causes, a quality all the more essential in a world devoid 
of absolute and universal truths. Jimmy might have enjoyed 
a happier'fate at the time of the French Revolution, when 
the world could still provide "good, brave causes, " but 
in the twentieth century, as Jimmy's fate implies, the 
intelligent but unoriginal mind is doomed to despair. 
In The Entertainer (1957) Osborne presents the 
plight of the unoriginal "seer"/ artist who was born to 
despair. Archie Rice is a latter-day Peer Gynt who, 
despite his having been "a pretty little boy" (23) and 
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having had "thousands of pounds [spent] on his education" 
(19), was not "designed to be a button/ On the waistcoat 
of the world" (VI, 219). His untalented and uninspired 
music-hall career has not been a vocation, but a 
desperate playing for time against the certainty that 
"the man with the hook" would get him in the end. 
Just as Brand's uncompromising idealism led inevi- 
tably to the compromising opportunism of Peer. Gynt, so 
Jimmy Porter's uncompromising anger leads--in an advanced 
stage of despair--to the compromising cynicism of Archie 
Rice. Katharine J. Worth observes that Osborne in The 
Entertainer "studies the feeling of despair in a more 
advanced phase. [... J Archie has passed to a stage beyond 
anger; that relief is only permitted to the younger gene- 
ration in this play. His form of self-protection is an 
ironic detachment, a 'comedian's technique that absolves 
him from seeming committed to anyone or anything' sLS].,, 
41 
Archie, like Jimmy, has never found a worthwhile cause 
to commit himself to, and for the same reason. He shares 
Jimmy's crippling predicament of being a "seer" without 
a vision. Archie has recognised the ultimate meaningless- 
ness of life and is painfully aware of his own failure 
both as an artist and a human being, but can see no cure 
for his existential malaise. He once had a "religious" 
experience which opened his eyes to a spiritual reality 
he had never known. It happened in an American bar where 
he heard an old negress sing her heart out to the whole 
world "about Jesus or something": 
[... ] you knew somehow in your heart that it didn't 
matter how much you kick people, the real people, how 
much you despise them, if they can stand up and make 
a pure, just natural noise like that, there's nothing 
wrong with them, only with everybody else. (71) 
The faith and enthusiasm she communicated through her 
song are beyond Archie's reach, but the experience has 
left him all the more disillusioned with his own 
insincere and hollow "art. " Hearing the old negress pour 
her soul into her song made Archie realise that suffering 
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alone does not produce art. She was a genuine artist 
because she had the faith and vision to transcend her 
suffering. She had something beyond herself, sbiething 
of universal significance to communicate. Archie has 
neither vision nor talent. He has only got his suffering. 
The rest is mere pretence. 
Archie pretends to entertain an. audience with whom 
he has nothing in common and to whom he has nothing of 
universal importance to convey. And when the audience 
fail to respond to his self-advertising, he blames their 
cheap tastes, or-rather Phoebe does: "He's too good for 
them, that's his trouble. People don't appreciate you 
properly. £... ] No, all they're out for is a cheap 
thrill" (45). Archie has been forced to "compromise" his 
art. But Phoebe, who is always ready to leap to his 
defence, without sounding very convinced herself, will 
not concede defeat on Archie's part: "It's not giving 
in--or I suppose it is. It's just being sensible" (45). 
Archie's worst compromise is not that he gives the audi- 
ence what he thinks they want, but that he goes on pre- 
tending to entertain an audience he hates and despises, 
and who pays him little respect in return. Jean is not 
prepared to gloss over her father's artistic insincerity: 
"You haven't got the nous. You've been too busy hating 
all those feckless moochers out there in the great dark- 
ness, haven'u you? You've been really smart" (77). Old 
Billy, a "real old timer" of the music-hall, is a con- 
stant reminder to Archie that he lacks the prime pre- 
requisite of a "real pro, " artistic integrity, and that 
without it he is little better than a "common prostitute" 
(22). Billy recalls the days when music-hall artists 
had style and dignity: 
We all had our own style, our own songs--and we were all 
English. What's more, we spoke English. It was different. 
We all knew what the rules were, and even if we spent 
half our time making people laugh at 'em we never 
seriously suggested that anyone should break them. A real 
pro is a real. man [... ] He's like the general run of 
people, only he's a lot more like them than they are 
themselves, if you understand me. (81) 
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In Billy's time the music-hall was still a living art, 
and the source of its vitality, as Billy proudly recalls 
for Archie's benefit, was the whole-hearted communication 
between artist and audience because they shared the same 
moral values and respected each other. T. S. Eliot spoke 
in praise of the music-hall for the same reason. He 
maintained that the lower classes found in their music- 
hall comedians "the expression and dignity of their own 
lives. "42 Of Marie Lloyd he wrote that her superiority 
over other music-hall performers was "in a way a moral 
superiority. " Her unique hold on popular affection was 
due not merely to her artistic accomplishments, but to 
her "understanding of the people and sympathy with them, 
and the people's recognition of the fact that she 
embodied the virtues which they genuinely most respected 
in private life. "43 As Old Billy would have put it, she 
was a lot more like them than they were themselves. "No 
other comedian, " says Eliot, "succeeded so well in giving 
expression to the life of that audience, in raising it to 
a kind of art. It was, I think, this capacity for express- 
ing the soul of the people that made Marie Lloyd unique, 
and that made her audiences, even when they joined in 
the chorus, not so much hilarious as happy. "44 Between 
Archie Rice and his audience, however, there are no 
shared values and no rapport across the foot-lights. "His 
humour, " observes Martin Banham, "is that if insult, sneer, 
and innuendo--the dirty joke, the sly smile, the complete 
prostitution of both personal and professional standards 
for the sake of some response from the audience. '"45 
"A real pro, " said Billy, "is a real man, all he needs is 
an old backcloth behind him and he can hold them on his 
own for half an hour" (81). Archie can only "hold" his 
audience by keeping them in expectation of a titillating 
reward in the form of a third-class nude show: "I know 
what you're waiting for and who isn't? Just keep your 
peckers up--they'll be on in a minute. You've got to put 
up with me first" (24). Nor would a real pro need to 
apologise for his presence on the stage as Archie does: 
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"I've taken my glasses off. I don't want to see you 
suffering. C... 3 I'll bet you thought I was a rotten act 
before I come on, didn't you? " (31-32). His lame apolo- 
getic rattles into a dead void. Old Billy has told him 
often enough that he will never be a real pro. In front 
of that unresponsive, ghostly audience Archie is assailed 
by a worse fear, that he has never been a real anything: 
"Look at me---it's all real, you know. Me--all real, 
nothing shoddy. You don't think I'm real, do you? Well, 
I'm not" (59). 
Whereas Peer Gynt is abhorred at the thought of his 
unique Gyntish Self being melted down with Tom, Dick, and 
Harry into a featureless mass, Archie Rice aspires to 
nothing more distinguished than being "normal": 
Thank God I'm normal, normal, normal. 
Thank God I'm normal, 
I'm just like the rest of you chaps. (6o) 
Behind the comedian's mask Archie's brassy refrain is a 
desperate cry in the wilderness to reassure himself that 
he is not a ghost or a fiction but just as real as the 
next man. Billy said that a real pro is "like the general 
run of people, only he's a lot more like them than they 
are themselves" (Si). Archie does not feel one with his 
audience. That is why he fails to get a response. A come- 
dian's "salvation"--and Archie is nothing apart from his 
"art"--is to be like the general run of people. Not to be 
like Tom, Dick, and Harry is to be unreal, a chimera: 
[... ] we're dead beat and down and outs. We're drunks, 
maniacs, we're crazy, we're honkers, the whole flaming 
bunch of us. Why, we have problems that nobody's ever 
heard of, we're characters out of something that nobody 
believes in. We're something that people make jokes 
about, because we're so remote from the rest of ordinary 
everyday, human experience. But we're not really funny. 
We're too boring. Simply because we're not like anybody 
who ever lived. We don't get on with anything. We don't 
ever succeed in anything. (54) 
Archie's claim to be a fabulous something that nobody 
believes in, unlike anybody that ever lived, is one of 
his personal myths, and like that other myth about being 
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"dead behind these eyes" (72) is both an expression of 
existential Angst--a chronic sense of unreality and on- 
coming nothingness--and a fiction clutched at as an 
excuse for his failure on the artistic as well as on the 
human level. But Archie has the redeeming humility to 
admit that his imagined difference from other people is 
not a mark of distinction. On the contrary, his kind are 
a boring, pathetic, unimpressive lot, with "nasty, sordid, 
unlikely ]. ittlo problems" to which they are all the time 
trying to draw other people's attention. The real cause 
of Archie's failure is not that he is unlike his audi- 
ence, but that he is too like them, too common, in a 
negative sense. He is all too much a part of the general 
degradation of moral standards and loss of values which, 
according to Billy, are destroying the art of the music- 
hall. The happy and genuine rapport between the performer 
and the pit that Billy knew in the good old days stemmed 
from the fact that they all "knew what the rules were" 
and had something to be proud of together. By pandering 
to the baser instincts of his audience Archie merely 
earns their hostility and disdain, at best indifference. 
"These nudes, " Billy warns, "They're killing the busi- 
ness" (18). Not that it makes any difference in a 
business that is already dead: 
Has been for years. It was all over, finished, dead when 
I got out of it. I saw it coming. I saw it coming, and I 
got out. They don't want real people any more. C... 3 (hey 
don't want human-beings. Not any more. l$) 
Billy has no sympathy to waste on a "fool" who will not 
see that he is behind the times. Phoebe has resigned her- 
self to, the fact that Archie will never be a success be- 
cause he is always too late with everything he attempts: 
He's a fool to himself. Always some big idea he's got to 
make money. A while back it was female impersonators. 
We 
were going to make a packet. That's what Archie said any- 
way. But by the time Archie got started with it it had 
all petered out. Now it's rock and roll. 
(46-47) 
Archie is doomed to be a loser because, like Jimmy, he 
is born out of his time, that is to say, because he 
1 
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insists on looking back to a nostalgic past rather than 
face an uncharted future. But Phoebe is ever ready to 
make excuses Tor Archie's lack of success: f"I was just 
saying [... 3 that Archie wasn't very lucky that's all" 
(47). To Archie, however, her loyalty matters little. He 
has no respect for Phoebe's "pretty unimpressive self" 
(55), only pity. And to be pitied by her in return, and 
defended out of habit rather than from conviction, does 
little to bolster Archie's self-respect. From the rest 
of the family Archie can expect no unmerited encourage- 
ment, and he knows it. He says to Jean who remains cold 
to his maudlin self-confessions: "All. my children think 
I'm a bum. I've never bothered to hide it, I suppose-- 
that's the answer" (70). Archie, like Jimmy, makes his 
selfhood dependent upon other people's demonstrated 
belief in him. He does not possess the inner resources 
and the spiritual independence of a Brand or a Dr Stock- 
mann to demonstrate to all the world that he is the 
strongest who stands most alone. Archie both admires and 
fears his daughter Jean. She represents the true self- 
defining qualities, the idealism, the intellectual 
honesty, and the emotional responsiveness which Archie-- 
who has so signally failed to build his selfhood on the 
sham substitutes of sex and alcohol--despises himself 
all the more for not possessing, but which his negative 
and cynical attitude to life does nothing to encourage: 
You carry all your responses about with you, instead of 
leaving them at home. While everyone else is sitting on 
their hands you're the Joe at the back cheering and 
making his hands hurt. But you'll have to sit on your 
hands like everyone else. [... ] You know when you're up 
there you think you love all those people around you 
out there, but you don't. You don't love them, you're 
not going to stand up and malte a beautiful fuss. If you 
learn it properly you'll get yourself a technique. You 
can smile, darn you, smile, and look the friendliest 
jolliest thing in the world, but you'll be just as dead 
and smug and used up, and sitting on your hands ust 
liko everybody else. 
(71-72) 
But he also fears Jean because he knows he cannot hide 
anything from her. She has seen through all his life-lies 
26o 
and is pitiless in her condemnation of his selfish and 
cowardly schemes to escape the pain of life: 
You're like everybody else, but you're worse--you think 
you can cover yourself by simply not bothering. C... 3 
You think if you don't bother you can't be humiliated, 
so you just roar your life out in four-letter words and just hope that somehow the perks will turn up. (77) 
Jean is not impressed by Archie, 's profession of true 
humility. He insists: "I am humble: I am very humble, in 
fact. I still have a little dried pea of humility ratt- 
ling around inside me. I don't think you have. " To which 
Jean replies: "And that's just about all" (77). She does 
not consider humility a great achievement in one who has 
nothing to be proud of. The only member of the family 
who has anything to be proud of, according to Jean, is 
Old Billy. "He's the only one of us who has any dignity 
and respect for himself, he's the only one of us who has 
anything at all" (82). She is right to wonder what has 
happened to Billy's "sense of self preservation" when 
she learns that Archie is planning to put the old man 
back on the stage, which is equal to signing his "death 
certificate, " just to save "that no-good, washed-up, 
tatty show of yours'!. (82). It is not in keeping with 
Billy's character that he should consent to the prosti- 
tution of his professional pride in supporting a show 
which he knows is doomed to fail, not only because it is 
morally corrupt and artistically third-rate, but because 
Archie is engaged in an atrophying endeavour to perpetu- 
ate the past. Billy is reconciled to the passing of his 
era, as Archie is not, because he can look back with an 
obvious sense of achievement. He has fulfilled his 
ambition, he has known the genuine feeling of the music- 
hall when artists and audience were real people and knew 
what the rules were, and he envies no one: 
I feel sorry for you people. You don't know what it's 
really like. You haven't lived, most of you. You've 
never known what it was lilce, you're all miserable 
really. You don't know what life can be like. (23) 
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Simon Trussler divides the characters of Osborne's 
plays into two main categories: the interesting and 
"exceptional" people, and the unfortunate rest. He places 
Billy Rice in the "interesting" category of "those who 
are wrong but sympathetic, " and Archie in the "exceptio- 
nal" grouping of "those who are wrong and unsympathetic 
to boot, but who are redeemed by their nonconformity. "46 
Osborne's portrayal of Billy Rice is not unreservedly 
sympathetic. Billy may, as Ronald Hayman suggests, be 
"an affectionate elegy on the vanished graces of the 
Edwardian era, "47 but as the symbol of an age he embodies 
the prejudices as well as the graces of that age. On the 
positive side, notes Harold Ferrar, Billy has "all the 
arrogant self-confidence stemming from the possession of 
an unquestioned place in a predictable world order. " On 
the negative side, along with his secure identity, he 
also has "all the vicious prejudices--racist, jingoist, 
puritanical--that go with his self-righteous morality, a 
morality as inadequate in the modern world as the colonial 
policies of the government. L... ] And Billy himself never 
suspects that his values have anything to do with Mick's 
death, that his government sent Mick to Suez. "48 Osborne 
does not condone Billy's self-righteousness and blind 
prejudices, but he laments the passing of an era when 
people still had fixed values to identify themselves by, 
and enjoyed the security of knowing their place in a 
stable world order. 
Archie has substituted the vanished Edwardian graces 
with sex and alcohol. Peer Gynt went into the world in 
search of an Empire. The Unknown had been waiting all his 
life for something indefinable called "happiness, or per- 
haps it is just the end of unhappiness" (XXIX, 7-8). 
Archie tells Jean: "--all my life I've been searching for 
something. " And that fabulous, never-to-be-had something 
is "a draught Bass you can drink all the evening without 
running off every ten minutes, that you can get drunk on 
without feeling sick, and all for fourpence" (76). Jean 
is disgusted by Archie's cheap cynicism. She has seen 
262 
through his self-evasive masks, but does not recognise 
the depth of his disenchantment with his own empty self, 
and with a world he has so signally failed to adapt him- 
self to and make sense of. Archie is no longer searching 
for happiness but for a draught Bass that can quench his 
unhappiness. "Listen, kiddie, you're going to find out 
that in the end nobody really gives a damn about anything 
except som little animal something. And for me that 
little animal something is draught Bass" (76). Archie's 
nostalgic memory of his "religious" experience in that 
American bar listening to the old negress "singing her 
heart out to the whole world" (71), and his wishing to 
God that he could feel as strongly as she did, and that 
he had something real to believe in and feel strongly 
about, show that Archie is not content to settle for a 
mere "little animal something. " His cynical eulogy on 
draught Bass is a rationalisation of his permanent sense 
of failure and acute presentiment of not being able to 
"notch up twenty-one against the income-tax man" and 
achieve his life's ambition "to get the key of the door" 
(85). Jean condemns Archie for his unscrupulously selfish 
stratagems to save that "no-good, washed-up, tatty show" 
of his, and himself from going to jail. But she does not 
see the desperate soul behind the desperate means. Nor 
does she recognise that Archie's real fear is not the 
income-tax man and jail, but "the man with the hook" and 
annihilation. Archie's tatty show is his last lease from 
the Button-Moulder's ladle. Without his show Archie is 
nothing. His comedian's mask is his identity. That is why 
he dare not drop it, on-stage or off. Archie, like Peer 
Gynt, is all disguise and no authentic core. But he lacks 
Peer's chameleon talent and sparkling vitality--and 
whereas Peer is a natural comedian unaware that he is 
funny, Archie is an artificial comedian all too conscious 
that he is not funny--which, tragically in one who has 
made the comedian's mask his profession, means that Archie 
is practically non-existent as an actor and entertainer 
too. Billy, speaking of the good old days, strips Archie 
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of any illusion of his ever becoming an "old pro": "You 
had to have personality to be a comedian then. You had 
to really be somebody: " (38). Archie does not need to be 
reminded that technique is no substitute for personality. 
He has attempted it for twenty years and has failed 
abysmally, but tries to persuade himself that "It doesn't 
matter because--look at my eyes.. I'm dead behind these 
eyes. I'm dead, just like the whole inert, shoddy lot out 
there. It doesn't matter because I don't feel a thing, 
and neither do they. We're just as dead as each other"(72). 
Archie is a nobody, and a sentimental, self-pitying, and 
shamelessly selfish nobody to boot, but he is not "dead 
behind these eyes. " He suffers acutely from the awareness 
that he will never "really be somebody. " Archie, like 
Strindberg's Dreamer and Beckett's tramps, is a suffering 
nothing, and his suffering--rather than his nonconformity, 
as Trussler argued--is his redeeming quality. But Archie's 
suffering is not, like the Dreamer's, ennobling. Archie 
suffers only for himself, and to no higher purpose, where- 
as the Dreamer suffers with and through his dream charac- 
ters and is mankind's spokesman before the gods. Archie 
is unable to translate his suffering into art, because 
he does not, as did the old negress, have a faith or a 
vision in the light of which his suffering would become 
meaningful. Archie wins our sympathy because he suffers 
pointlessly, hopelessly, despairingly. 
Archie, like Jimmy Porter, is "exceptional" by 
virtue of the intensity of his suffering rather than by 
virtue of his nonconformity. Archie cannot claim the dis- 
tinction of being a nonconformist since he has chosen to 
sit on his hands like everybody else. The true noncon- 
formists in Archie's family are Jean and Frank, whose 
bewildered idealism expresses a genuine will to realise 
their individual selves, until they too are infected by 
Archie's cynicism. Archie's immoderate consumption of 
women and draught Bass is not an expression of noncon- 
formism, not a means of asserting individual values and 
individual freedom, but on the contrary a way of proving 
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to himself, and to the world, that he is "normal": "I've 
always been a seven day a week man myself, haven't I, 
Phoebe? " (73). Phoebe has resigned herself to the fact 
that Archie needs his women and draught Bass as anodynes 
against the pain of life, but Jean is less tolerant of 
Archie's escapist schemes. She believes in facing the 
absurdity of life as a challenge: 
Here we are, we're alone in the universe, there's no God, 
it just seems that it all began by something as simple 
as sunlight striking on a piece of rock. And here we are. 
We've only got ourselves. Somehow, we've just got to 
make a go of it. We've only ourselves. (85) 
Harold Ferrar has found Jean's speech sufficiently 
embarrassing to leap to Osborne's defence: "This may 
sound like anthology-culled existentialism, but it is 
really a true cry in the wilderness, deeply felt philo- 
sophy. In its bleak resignation lies the birth of affir- 
mation, for we are lonely but not alone. "49 Ferrar's 
apology notwithstanding, this is Osborne speaking in his 
own voice, and the author's voice is jarringly out of 
tune with that of his character. The strained rhetoric 
of the speech is not the tone of a "true cry in the 
wilderness. " Nor has Jean earlier in the play shown any 
signs of existential anguish that might have prepared us 
for her metaphysical discourse on man's aloneness in the 
universe. But the real emotional obstacle to accepting 
the speech as the expression of a "deeply felt philosophy, " 
is the fact that Jean as a character exists entirely on 
the realistic level. It is hard to imagine, or to accept 
emotionally, that a character belonging so exclusively 
on the surface level*of mundane, everyday reality should 
seriously worry about, or concern herself with, the 
existence or non-existence of God. Jean's idealism is of 
the kind that supports rallies in Trafalgar Square, not 
of the kind that challenges the universe. Ferrar finds 
The Entertainer rich in "metaphysical overtone. "50 But 
the metaphysical overtone belongs exclusively to Archie's 
character. What Osborne has achieved by the introduction 
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of the dream-like music-hall sequences in which he spot- 
lights the lonely Archie against a dark background is 
precisely the addition of a metaphysical dimension to 
Archie's existence, which makes his existential anguish 
ring true. We believe in Archie's despair because we are 
made to feel it. It is not simply delivered to us in a 
set speech. Archie's solo spots are concrete visual 
images which convey to our emotions man's absolute alone- 
ness in the universe. Archie, as Ferrar remarks, 
"inhabits that void Jean has looked out at. "51 
Archie is not just lonely, he is fundamentally and 
utterly alone, as every human being is in his fight 
against the man with the hook. Nobody can save him from 
the fate that awaits him. Archie does not, as does Peer 
Gynt, find salvation in the love of a woman. Nobody 
wants to share his anguish, at least nobody that matters. 
It is the anguish of one who feels himself engulfed by 
the void that Archie projects across the footlights, not 
the confidence of one who like Billy "knew what the 
rules were" (81). Consequently he can only alienate his 
audience, who want their values confirmed, not challenged. 
And the lack of response fron the audience makes his 
existence seem all the more nightmarishly unreal. 
Osborne said of Hedda Gabler that "like most great plays, 
the apparent central character exists only by favour of 
the other characters in the play, however small.. "52 And 
to Writer's Theatre he contributed a scene from The 
Entertainer to prove that "my work does not consist 
entirely of dramatic monologues delivered by a central 
character striding a vague context inhabited by dramatic 
nonentities. "5) The solid substantiality of the support- 
ing characters- Billy, the self-fulfilled has-been; Jean, 
the self-assertive will-be; and Phoebe, the self-preserv- 
ing faithful--has the effect of showing up that much more 
the flitting insubstantiality of the protagonist, the 
self-evasive never-was. 
Archie's last turn on the bill is a most evocative 
and touching lesson in despair, the despair of a soul 
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staring into its own nothingness. Archie's life and art 
belong to the past, and always have done. He never caught 
up with the present. For the last time he tries the old 
self-boosting cliche: "You wouldn't think I was sexy to 
look at me, would you? No, honestly, you wouldn't, would 
you lady. I always reckon you feel stronger after it? " 
(87). But it works no miracle, for "normality" cannot 
save him from the man with the hook: 
There's a bloke at the side here with a hook, you know 
that, don't you? He is, he's standing there. I can see 
him. TtIust be the income-tax man. Life's funny though, 
isn't it? It is--life's funny. It's like sucking a 
sweet with the wrapper on. Oh, well, we're all in the 
fertilizer business now, I suppose. (87) 
Archie is no more reconciled to the idea. of having to 
give up his unrealised self to the fertilizer business 
than Peer Gynt is to the thought of his precious Gyntish 
Self vanishing without a trace in the Button-Moulder's 
ladle. But unlike Peer, who pleaded with the Button- 
Illoulder to grant him respite to prove his selfhood, 
Archie offers no resistance to the man with the hook 
because he knows he is a "never-was, " and that neither 
his audience, nor his family, nor his women would offer 
testimonials to the contrary: "You think. I'm gone, don't 
you? Go on, say it, you think I'm gone. You think I'm 
gone, don't you. Well, I am" (87). But before he goes he 
tells them his last and most sincere joke, the parable 
about the little man who cursed in Heaven and gained his 
crown of glory by so doing. The little man really was 
somebody. He caused a stir in Paradise because he was 
himself to the last. But Archie has never been somebody, 
either in a positive or a negative way. He has, like 
Peer Gynt, been an unscrupulously self-seeking opportu- 
nist, but he has not, in the Button-Moulder's words, been 
"A sinner on any heroic scale, / Not really even mediocre--" 
(VI, 218). He had neither the courage nor the talent to 
be anything but a bungler. Archie recalls with pride the 
occasion when two nuns paid him the biggest compliment 
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of his life: "they took one look at me, and, together, 
at the same time, quite, quite spontaneously, they 
crossed themselves. They crossed themselves" (69). It is 
the only time Archie has been accorded the recognition 
of really boing somebody, if only in a negative sense. 
The nuns behaved as if they had seen the Devil himself, 
a sinner beyond redemption. But they were mistaken. 
Archie is an irredeemable nonentity, destined neither 
for Heaven nor Hell: The audience watch him vanish into 
nothingness when he walks into the darkness upstage for 
the last time,. with only the empty spotlight hitting the 
apron for a moment before it snaps out, leaving a dark, 
bare stage to indicate that the man with the hook got 
him in the end. 
Archie Rice lived in constant fear of being caught 
by the income-tax man. Bill Maitland, the protagonist of 
Inadmissible Evidence. (1965), confesses to a permanent 
fear of being "found out" by the Law Society. The dream 
trial with which the play begins is a projection of his 
recurrent nightmare premonition of being found out for 
some crime of which he knows himself guilty but cannot 
define. Maitland is on the brink of a nervous breakdown. 
He can no longer distinguish between dream and reality, 
or between the subjective reality of his neurosis and 
the objective reality of the outside world. Whereas the 
dream trial appears so real that he searches for his 
pills to clear his head in order, as he hopes, to acquit 
himself better, the workaday world of the office has 
become increasingly unreal and nonsensical. He cannot 
get a taxi and is ignored by the caretaker, and can no 
longer rely on any of his employees to turn up the next 
day. During the last two days of what Trussler calls 
Idaitland's "personal endgame"54 we watch him live out the 
trial of his nightmare until he finally collapses into 
spiritual annihilation at the end of a dead telephone. 
Maitland, writes Harold Ferrar, "is on trial before 
an arbitrary court, like a Strindberg or Kafka or Pinter 
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character, for the very crime of being. "55 The Unknown 
experiences a similar nightmare trial in the crucial 
banquet scene in To Damascus II, in which he is being 
crowned "king in the realm of the Intellect, " only to be 
uncro'med fcr his failure to reveal ' the formula of his 
scientific discovery and thus defend his claim to fame. 
The lunatic Caesar will not even allow the accused to 
explain himself, but declares him a mystery man, a char- 
latent and an arch-swindler. The Unknown's nightmare, 
like Maitland's, attests to a deep-seated sense of guilt 
for a personal failure he is unable to define, but of 
which he is most acutely aware in his relationship with 
Woman. Maitland is, like the Unknown, afraid of being 
caught out as an arch-swindler, not just for "cooking up 
evidence on occasion or risking collusive agreements" (26), 
not oven, as Simon Trussler suggests, for "some deeper, 
more personal incapacity, some gigantic confidence trick 
which his very existence seems to be perpetrating on his 
fellow mortalsy"56 for Maitland does not really deceive 
other people, but for having deceived himself, by pre- 
tending to be what he is not. In fact, the dream trial 
is an unmasking of all the life-lies on which Maitland 
has built up his bourgeois, middle-of-the-road, materi- 
ally comfortable, and spiritually unaspiring self. He 
pleads not guilty to the charge of obscenity in the 
superficial sexual sense, but in his confessions to the 
court arraigns himself of a grosser obscenity, the 
obscenity of his very existence: his failure to be. 
Maitland's defence is one long failure report, beginning 
with his failure to believe in anything. He declines to 
swear by the Almighty God. Nor, as Trussler notes, does 
he believe in the values, or anti-values, of the techno- 
logical revolution enumerated in the rambling Lucky-like 
speech which constitutes his substitute oat-h. 
57 Maitland 
professes himself well equipped to conduct his own case: 
"I have always expected this, and, consequently, I have 
done my best to prepare myself as well as I can" (16). 
But before the learned Judge, Maitland suffers the night- 
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mare of a schoolboy who has not done his homework. 
Producing his curriculum vitae to the court becomes a 
painful attempt to pin down his own identity. Having 
established his name, age, address, length of office in 
the service of the law, the names of his clerks, he 
becomes increasingly uncertain of his facts. He can 
think of no reason why he took up the law. He had always 
considered himself "tolerably bright, " but finds that he 
can no longer defend that assumption: "Bright. Only tole- 
rably bright, my lord. But, to start with, and potenti- 
ally and finally, that is to say, irredeemably mediocre" 
(17). He used to think, because other people told him so, 
that he had a fairly quick mind for memorising things. 
Now he is disturbed to discover that his mind is slipping: 
"I seem to retain very little. Very little indeed, hardly 
anything at all, in fact" (18). While he enjoyed the 
reputation among clients and colleagues of having "a sort 
of dashing flair for making decisions" (18), the truth of 
the matter is that he has never made a really significant 
or distinguished decision in all his life. He owes his 
life, his career, everything to other people: "I have to 
confess that: that I have depended almost entirely on 
other people's efforts. C... ] that it was that kept me 
alive and functioning at all, let alone. making decisions 
or being quick minded and all that nonsense about me.... 
(19). It is for this reason, he concludes, that he has 
been summoned before the court. He is on trial not for 
professional misconduct so much as for his failure to 
be himself, to become a self by his own efforts. Like 
Peer Gynt he has all his life been avoiding the signi- 
ficant decisions. Maitland has settled for comfort rather 
than for selfhood: "I never hoped or wished for anything 
more than to have the good fortune of friendship and the 
excitement and comfort of love and the love of women in 
particular" (2o). But in love and friendship Bill Mait- 
land has been a signal failure: "With the first with 
friendship, I hardly succeeded at all. Not really. No. 
Not at all. With the second, with love, I succeeded, I 
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succeeded in inflicting, quite certainly inflicting, 
more pain than pleasure. I am not equal to any of it. 
But I can't escape it. I can't forget it. And I can't 
begin again. You see? " (2o). 
Maitland recognises, like the Unknown, that his 
failure to be is essentially his failure to love: "I want 
to feel tender, I want to be comforting and encouraging 
and full of fun and future things and things like that. 
But all I feel is as if my head were bigger and bigger, 
spiked and falling off, like a mace [... ] It's not worth 
the candle is it? " (35). Hudson voices Bill's own feel- 
ings of guilt when he points out that "some people seem 
to use things like sex, for instance, as a, a place of, 
of escape, instead of objects, well--in themselves" (35). 
But if it is not Bill's immoderate sex-life Hudson finds 
objectionable so much as the fact that he seeks sex as a 
means of escape, is not their common passion for work 
equally obscene when indulged in for the same escapist 
reason? Is work, Bill asks, "an enjoyment, a duty, an 
obligation, a necessity or just the effort of fighting, 
of fighting off the end, whatever is to come to you" (35). 
Bill is guilty of the obscenity of evasion, in sex and 
work alike. He confesses in the interview with Mrs Ander- 
son, taking the part of the husband: "I love you. He 
never said, he hardly ever said, he stopped saying, he 
found it difficult to say I love you" (84). Bill's love- 
less sex-life is a fraud. But he is not really deceiving 
anybody but himself. His mistresses accept his prote- 
stations of love as little more than bribery. He begs 
Shirley, the first girl to leave the office, not to think 
their love affair was fraudulent: "You can't disown it. 
If you do that, you are helping, you are conspiring to 
kill me" (49). Bill is pitied by his mistresses, who 
recognise that he is incapable of loving anybody, but 
desperately needs the physical confirmation of his exist- 
ence that sex can give him. Joy tells him plainly: "You 
don't love me. And I don't love you. But it's all right. 
Isn't it? (She kisses him lightly. ) You're a funny old 
,, _.. _, _. -. - ." 
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thing. You're scared aren't you? " (72). Bill has every 
reason to be scared. He cannot rely on the allegiance of 
any of his mistresses. His employees leave him one by 
one. His wife outshines him in any company and can do 
very well without him. His own father will neither see 
him nor acknowledge their common past. His parents-in- 
law have not mentioned him in their letters to his wife 
for the last ten years. His children are strangers to 
him, and if the last human bond were to snap and his 
wife were to leave him, as he is certain she will, his 
illusory self will dissolve into nothing. He"describes to 
Liz the typical "Anna situation": 
It was strange, as if I were there on tolerance.... Sure, 
they're sorry for Anna and think I'm a boorish old ram 
but it was more, there was more to it than that.... I 
don't know.... Liz.... Liz.... Hullo, Liz.... I'm 
frightened.... It was as if I only existed because of 
her, because she allowed me to, but if she turned off 
the switch ... turned off the switch ... who knows? But if she'd turned off I'd have been dead.... (62) 
He carries on the story in the same vein to Anna: 
Sometimes I think you're my only grip left, if you let 
me go, I'll disappear, I'll be made to disappear, nothing 
will work, I'll be like something in a capsule in space, 
weightless, unable to touch anything or do anything, like 
a groping baby in a removed, putrefying womb.... No, I'll 
not leave you.... I've told you. I'll not leave you ... 
you are leaving me ... 
(64) 
As Trussler observes, Bill "exists for himself [... ] only 
so long as he remains an object in the existence of 
others: and when he ceases to sense this objectivity, it 
is time to sit back and await the end. "' 
Bill Maitland is as contemptuous of the masses as a 
Brand or a Dr Stockmann and regards himself superior to 
"those flatulent, purblind, mating weasels [... ] who go 
out on Bank holidays in the car! And have mascots in the 
rear window" (24), and "go up every year like it was 
holy communion to have a look at the Christmas decora- 
tions in Regent Street" (25). Bill takes no pride in his 
own frantic sex-life, but considers himself an exceptional 
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being in that, unlike those "purblind, mating weasels, " 
he is racked with shame and guilt for the irredeemable 
mediocrity of his existence. In his long monologue of 
self-justification before the mute Jane, whose carefree 
youth he on vies, while deprecating her insensibility, 
Bill is at pains to remind her: 
But, and this is the but, I'still don't think what you're 
doing vri'll ever, even, even, even approach the fibbing, 
mumping, pinched little worm of energy eating away in 
this me, of mine, I mean. That is: which is that of being 
slowly munched and then diminished altogether. That worm, 
thank heaven, is not in your little cherry rose. You are 
unselfconscious, which I am not. You are without ilt, 
which I am not. 
(1o5-o6) 
Bill clings to his guilt as Jimmy did to his suffering, 
because it is his one tenuous claim to distinction, the 
only noble feature in an irredeemably mediocre personal- 
ity. He advances his consciousness of guilt as proof of 
his superiority over the masses, and insists on its 
nobility in order to bolster his self-esteem in the face 
of an enviably cool and conscience-less and self-reliant 
youth with whom he can no longer keep pace. But Liz 
strips him of his only proof of authenticity, the one 
meritorious quality which for Bill defines "this me, " 
when she declares: "I'. ve always managed to avoid guilt. 
It's a real peasant's pleasure, you know. For people 
without a sliver of self-knowledge or courage. " Bill. pro- 
tests: "There are other qualities besides courage. C... ] 
Cowardice for instance" (llo). But there is little 
comfort in establishing that the pleasure of guilt is a 
coward's laurel crown. 
Bill Maitland is not like Peer Gynt or the Unknown 
or Jimmy Porter engaged in a quest for self in the sense 
of searching for his true identity, or seeking to become, 
as Billy Rice would put it, a real somebody. Bill has, 
like Hamm and Clov in Beckett's Endgame, reached a stage 
of self-recognition where life has lost all meaning, and 
his middle-aged, well-established self is found to be 
hollow at the core. Bill Maitland has this in common with 
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Strindberg's dreamers that his dreams are no escapist 
fancies but nightmare revelations of the desperate 
nothingness of his existence. In the dream trial Bill is 
forced to face the fact that he cannot give a proper 
account of himself, that his career has been aimless, 
that he has been keeping himself busy merely in order to 
avoid having to make uncomfortable existential decisions, 
that his illusory self, made up of other people's 
opinions and upheld by other people's efforts, has no 
authentic core, and that when the world disowns him, he 
has nothing of his own making to hold on to. However, it 
is not the world that disowns Bill, but Bill who disowns 
the world, because he is empty inside, because he has 
lost interest in life and in other people, and is incap- 
able of responding to other people's needs, and conse- 
quently of sustaining any human relationships. Bill 
unburdens himself to Hudson: 
I've always managed to keep everything in place, in 
place enough to get on with it, do my work, enjoy things, 
enjoy other people, take an interest in all kinds of 
things. I've tried to read, not just my own subject. I 
keep trying and the circle just seems to get smaller. (33) 
Bill's world, like that of the madman in Endgame, has 
turned to ashes and he is withdrawing into the void of 
his barren subjectivity, to die a spiritual, if not a 
physical, death. By the end of the trial scene Bill has 
resigned himself to the fact that the game is up, that 
he can no longer fool himself nor anyone else, and that 
the next call will be the summons from the Law Society. 
Bill has pretended at love and been "found out, " and has 
been deserted by wives and mistresses alike. He has pre- 
tended at friendship and failed because he has "never 
really been able to tell the difference between a friend 
and an enemy" (19). Without love and friendship he will 
cease to exist, for Bill depends for his self-identifi- 
cation not merely on other people's recognition of his 
unique qualities, but needs the self-assurance of feel- 
ing himself needed and wanted. Bill, like Jimmy Porter, 
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expects the world to make sense, and looks to other 
people to-fill his life with content and sustain his 
belief in himself. When at the settled age of thirty- 
nine he discovers, as did the Unknown, that he has been 
fooled by life, or rather, that he has fooled himself, 
he has neither the courage nor the will to embark upon 
a lonely quest for selfhood in an alien world he cannot 
make sense of, and relying entirely on his own resources, 
as Nora Helmer did, but takes refuge in the excuse that 
it is too late to begin again, and that the Law Society 
will catch up with him in the end whatever he does. But 
his personal endgame, like that of Hamm and Clov, shows 
his hesitation to end, and his clinging to his illusory 
self until the telephone finally goes dead on him and 
his last tenuous link with the world is broken. 
Inadmissible Evidence is not a dream play in the 
sense that the whole action takes place within the 
dreamer's consciousness, as in Strindberg's A Dream Play. 
It is not even a dream play in the sense that To Damascus 
and The Ghost Sonata are dream plays, where the action, 
although on the surface purporting to portray waking life 
experience, is suffused with the eerie atmosphere of a 
dream. The Unknown can move in and out of explicit dream 
states without breaking the convention of the dream. And 
so indeed can Peer Gynt, whose "real life" experiences 
are as fantastic as his dreams. But when Bill Maitland 
is walking out of his nightmare trial and into the 
workaday world of the office, he is walking out of one 
dramatic convention into another. Strindberg's dream 
plays are non-naturalistic in conception. For Strindberg, 
the basic structure is the dream, which he then proceeds 
to fill in with realistic detail, but without breaking 
the spell of the dream. Osborne works the other way 
round. His is an essentially realistic play, on which he 
imposes, somewhat arbitrarily and not altogether success- 
fully, non-naturalistic elements, in order to tap levels 
of emotional responsiveness to which surface realism 
cannot penetrate. Michael Anderson argues that the dream 
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element could be removed from the play "and the portrait 
of Maitland's character would remain virtually undimin- 
ished, " but concedes that the author has "nudged the 
audience closer to his hero's phobias and hallucinations 
by malting them share these to some extent themselves. "59 
Ronald Hayman finds the mixture of styles and conventions 
in the play "very messy. " He feels that the "confusing, 
unrealistic nightmare sequence C... J has very little 
connection, stylistically and thematically, with the play 
that follows, " and that it "comes nowhere near to being 
justified by the little that the subsequent story gains 
from it. "60 But is the creation of character "all (or 
almost all) there is to Inadmissible Evidence, " as Mr 
Anderson seems to think, and which he suggests Osborne 
does far more effectively through the language than 
through the structural devices employed? 
61 The dream 
trial is hardly thrown in merely for the sake of experi- 
mental novelty, although it has very much the character 
of a separate Vorspiel, even more so than the prologue 
of A Dream Play, which Strindberg calls "Förspel, " for 
Osborne's Vorspiel is in a different stylistic convention 
to that of the rest of the play, an expressionistic pro- 
logue to an essentially realistic play. While Strindberg's 
"Fdrspel" is part of the dream, Osborne's is a dream 
apart. And while Strindberg has actually written a dream 
play, has put before us on the page a distorting mirror 
of reality in the inconsequential dialogue, the strange 
events, the disconnected scenes, the dissolving scenery, 
the moving backwards and forwards in time, and the 
unlikely conglomeration of symbolic characters, there is 
in fact little on the printed page of Inadmissible Evi- 
dence to make the reader feel that he is in the strange 
half-world of a dream. Osborne relies heavily on the 
contribution of the actors, especially the actor playing 
the main part, to the creation of the intended dream 
effect. The actor is asked to indicate the blurred, semi- 
conscious, helpless reality of the dream, which is only 
partially and intermittently suggested by the text itself. 
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Osborne's use of the dream prologue, and his subse- 
quent stage directions dictating that Maitland's reality 
should be shown to become progressively more ambiguous 
and dream-like, indicate that Osborne is not primarily 
concerned with character creation, but like Strindberg 
is interested in the "psychological process, " and is 
trying to convey in dramatic terms a state of mind. He 
employs expressionistic techniques in order to involve 
the audience more intensely in the "texture of ordinary 
despair, " a logical development perhaps from his success- 
ful use of stylised music-hall turns in The Entertainer, 
which from the point of view of emotional involvement 
are far more effective than Jimmy Porter's aggressive 
rhetoric. But Osborne is not just charting the process 
of a nervous breakdown. He is grappling with an existen- 
tial crisis. The dream element serves to heighten the 
audience's illusion of participating in the strange and 
distorted movements of a mind, and makes us feel that we 
are sharing in an existential experience and not just 
studying a psychological process. And Osborne wanted his 
plays above all to be lessons in feeling. But Maitland's 
existential plight, unlike that of Peer Gynt, and the 
Unknown, and Beckett's derelicts, and even Archie Rice, 
has no "metaphysical overtone, " at least not in the 
sense that his self is defined in relation to God, or 
the universe, or even the void. Maitland's illusory self 
remains as firmly bound within the social dimension as 
does that of Nora Helmer, circumscribed by the solicitor's 
office. Maitland's self is quite as identical with his 
solicitor's practice as Brand's is with his priesthood. 
But Brand's vocation is one of committed choice and is 
therefore genuinely self-defining. Maitland's profession 
is simply one of chance, and fails to prove his self- 
identity before the court. Maitland is what the office 
has made of him. Outside it he is lost. At dinner parties. 
he is simply a pendant to his wife and would be complete- 
ly ignored, would cease to exist, if she "turned off the 
switch" and no longer acknowledged him as her husband. 
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Maitland does not even enjoy his mistresses except in a 
professional capacity. He either seduces them on the 
office floor, or if outside the office, always, accord- 
ing to Shirley, "on client's business" (49). The dreamt- 
of long weekend away from it all with Liz never materia- 
lises, because Bill cannot face what she calls "travel- 
ling, " venturing into the unknown. His flights to New 
York or Amsterdam or Geneva are "just business men's bus 
rides. " Liz complains: "When you're anywhere, you're 
always desperately miserable. You want to get back. C... ] 
Oh, to your clients. Or something" (113). 
Llaitland's illusory self is not like Peer Gynt's an 
onion self. He is not an actor of many parts. Nor is he 
like Strindberg's Dreamer a poet, rich in the multipli- 
city of his fictional selves. Maitland has only got the 
one self, his solicitor's self, to which the Law Society 
is the ultimate threat. It is very appropriate, therefore, 
that the dream trial should take place in his solicitor's 
office, apart from the fact that it makes for a fluid 
transition from the dream state to the actual reality of 
the office. The court room dissolves into a solicitor's 
office rather as one scene dissolves into another in 
A Dream Play, by the same scenery serving different 
functions. But the transformation of a court room into a 
solicitor's office is less radical and strange and dream- 
like than say, the transformation of the opera corridor 
into a lawyer's office, and the lawyer's office into a 
church interior in A Dream Play. In Osborne's play the 
coat stand remains a coat stand, while in A Dream Play 
it changes from a tree into a coat stand into a cande- 
labrum. Ronald Hayman argues that the opening nightmare 
sequence of Inadmissible Evidence cannot be justified by 
the little that the subsequent story gains from it. 
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I would argue to the contrary that the trial scene lends 
content to the rest of the play, or differently put, 
that the play derives its deeper meaning from the night- 
mare scene. Maitland is on trial for his failure to be, 
and as Harold Ferrar observes, "for the rest of the play 
278 
we. watch him live his defense and, with the demonic 
logic of the damned, sabotage his case (in which he is 
defendant, judge, and jailer) as he moves toward a 
self-imposed sentence of isolation. "'63 
The fact that Maitland can only identify himself 
with one role, his solicitor's self, does not, however, 
mean that he is a one-sided character, a type like the 
symbolic characters of A Dream Play. Maitland is what 
Strindberg preferred to call a "soul, " a fully rounded 
human being with a complex personality. And he is complex 
precisely because he is so painfully aware of all the 
roles he might have played, but has failed to perform, 
or has performed only half-heartedly. He might have been 
a devoted husband, a caring father, a true lover, a 
respected lawyer, an admired boss, an example to the 
young. He has been none of these things. The last straw 
is the recognition that even his solicitor's practice 
has been carried on largely through other people's devo- 
tion and hard work, and that without Hudson he would s 
have been nothing in a professional capacity either. He 
has minsed every opportunity, it seems, to achieve 
authentic selfhood. And when he realises that his 
established, middle-aged self is a "never-was, " he has 
neither the will nor the vision to embark upon a new 
course, but withdraws into paranoic self-isolation to 
await the end. "For we are, " says Perrar, commenting on 
Maitland's "paranoid depressiveness, " "in the territory 
of the absolute nil, where being is meaningless and an 
echoing laugh greets our last-ditch proclamation of 
selfhood: I despair, therefore I am., 
64 
The thematic and stylistic significance of the open- 
ing dream sequence does not, however, mean that it is an 
entirely successful piece of drama. Osborne has succumbed 
to the temptation to cram too much expository detail into 
Maitland's speeches of defence, and long discursive 
speeches do not suggest the ethorial, fleeting character 
of a dream, especially when they proceed with an argu- 
mentative logicality that make them sound premeditated. 
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As of course they are if we accept Maitland's claim that 
he is well prepared for his defence. Strindberg achieves 
the unreal, transient, dream-like effect by using rapid- 
ly changing : scenes and short speeches linked by the most 
tenuous logic, the flitting logic of free association. 
Even in the longer speeches the train of thought proceeds 
by unexpected twists and turns from sentence to sentence. 
The strangest things are said and credited as if they 
were self-evident. In A Dream Play it is accepted as a 
matter of course that a castle grows out of the earth 
and that it will soon flower since it is past midsummer. 
Maitland's monologues are too realistic, too prosaic and 
unsurprising to evoke the sense of someone being in the 
grip of an awful nightmare. They sound more like thinking 
aloud than dreaming, perhaps intentionally so, to empha- 
sise the inescapable reality of the dream. In the one 
instance when Osborne ventures into non-naturalistic 
speech, in Bill's rambling substitute oath, his writing 
is disappointingly uninspired and derivative. Strindberg's 
dialogue is immensely suggestive. He can sketch a charac- 
ter and evoke a situation in a few words. Osborne, on the 
other hand, is not satisfied until he has said all, and 
said it more than once. The three divorce clients, Mrs 
Garnsey, Mrs Tonks, and Mrs Anderson--who are played by 
the same actress, and are clearly figments of Bill's 
imagination rather than real persons--level the same 
charge against Bill in tiresomely similar cases. Their 
thrice-told tale is obviously meant to evoke, by its 
cumulative ef-Cect and progressive stylisation, the horror 
of a nightmare. It also reflects the distressing sameness 
of Maitland's life. But Strindberg, in To Damascus 
I and 
A Dream P1, manages to convey life's awful repetitive- 
ness without making the plays themselves seem repetitive. 
He does it by having the protagonist retrace his steps 
through the same "stages" of his journey, but investing 
the reverse scenes with new content. 
Whereas the different characters that the Unknown 
meets on his journey: the Beggar, the lunatic Caesar, 
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the Werewolf, represent various aspects of the Unknown's 
self, the three women clients in Maitland's office embody 
attitudes towards Maitland, or rather, are different 
embodiments of the same attitude that all his women seem 
to end up with: that he makes excessive sexual demands 
on them for reasons which can only arouse their pity. 
But the convention established for the three female 
clients, of having them represent hallucinatory creatures 
of Bill's own imagination, is broken by the introduction 
of the male client, the homosexual Maples, whom, as 
Ronald Hayman points out, we see as he sees himself, 
rather than through Bill's distorted vision. The change 
of style is perhaps justified by the fact that Maples is 
meant to represent an aspect of Bill's self. Their common 
identity is indicated by statements like: 
I was terrified of getting into trouble or being found 
out even in little things [... i. (95) 
I think I believe in God. Still, I seem to let things 
happen to me. I have always let the others make the 
first advances [... ]. (96) 
Sometimes I would think I was unique, of course. You 
know, years ago. I hoped I was. But I'm not. I'm 
ordinary. But I wish I wasn't. (97) 
But if the homosexual Maples is meant to embody a hidden 
or suppressed aspect of Bill's own self, it is less than 
helpful to double him with Jones, as. Osborne dictates. 
Osborne's most successful and convincing "dream" 
device in Inadmissible Evidence are the telephone conver- 
sations, because they glide naturally into the natura- 
listic context without appearing mannered, and moreover 
provide an ideal medium for the author to exploit his 
strong point: the monologue. Nowhere does Osborne more 
. effectively 
evoke the hallucinatory sense of a mind 
losing its grip'on reality than in the chopped-up, dis- 
connected, repetitive, gasping, uncertain, nervy 
sentences of Bill's telephone monologues. Nor could he 
have dreamt up a more convenient device for disconnecting 
Bill from the world. The telephone monologues convey 
ý, ... _.. w. _.... ý ý ,.. 
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very convincingly the increasing uncertainty in Bill's 
mind as to whether there is anyone at the other end of 
the line or not. It must be an error of judgement, 
therefore, when Osborne brings Jane and Liz on stage in 
person, for our seeing them in the flesh destroys the 
illusion that has so carefully been built up during the 
telephone conversations of the characters at the other 
end being merely fictional. To have the mute Jane appear 
on stage is merely a clumsy excuse for the author to 
deliver a sermon on a topic dear to his heart but which 
has little or nothing. to do with Bill Maitland's 
disintegrating self. Osborne has clearly not yet fully 
absorbed the lesson which Look Back in Anger ought to 
have taught him: that you cannot give the audience a 
lesson in feeling simply by having the characters talk 
at the audience. The hero must not merely be heard to 
talk about his plight, he must be seen to live it, and 
the audience must be made to live it with him. It is 
precisely to make the audience experience the crisis 
together with the hero that Osborne has ventured into 
the dream play, but unlike Ibsen and Strindberg, Osborne 
relies very heavily on the contribution of the main 
actor to the success of the experiment. 
Chapter 5 
Harold Pinter 
Testing toward Discovery 
"Harold Pinter, " writes Walter Kerr, "seems to me 
the only man working in the theatre today who writes 
existentialist plays existentially. By this I mean that 
he does not simply content himself with restating a 
handful of existentialist themes inside familiar forms 
of play-making. He remakes the play altogether so that 
it will function according to existentialist principle. "' 
Existentialism, Kerr reminds us, rejects the Platonic 
concept of essence Man--the notion that somewhere in 
the mind of the universe there exists an idea of man, 
an immaterial archetype, to which individual men in the 
concrete conform--and proposes that there are only indi- 
vidual men; born undefined. If man is not predefined, 
if he does not conform to an essence prior to himself, 
but "spends his time on the planet arriving at an 
identity, "2 it follows that the playwright who writes 
existentially must proceed from man's non-identity and 
allow his characters to form themselves--to arrive at 
their individual essence--in the course of the play. 
"If existence does indeed precede essence, if an actual 
thing precedes an abstract concept of that thing, then 
it should also do so on the stage. Exploratory movement 
in the void, without preconception or precommitment, 
should come first. Conceptualization should come later, 
if at all. "3 Dozens of playwrights have made use of 
existentialist themes, but only Pinter, Kerr argues, 
"has taken the fundamental proposition seriously enough 
to present his plays in the new existentialist sequence. " 
Samuel Beckett "has been most influential in imposing 
upon contemporary theatergoers an awareness of existen- 
tial loneliness, homelessness, facelessness; our strong- 
est image of the void comes from the careful emptiness 
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of his plays. " But "he builds plays as a Platonist. He 
forms an abstract concept of man's nature and role and 
presents it to us in its original conceptual form, indi- 
vidualizing it only very slightly. We are not concerned 
with person-,, forming themselves; we are concerned with 
persons inhabiting set forms they cannot escape. " When 
the curtain goes up on Didi and Gogo "immobilized, 
already waiting, " we are immediately offered a statement 
of essence. Tho image of Winnie, buried waist-deep in 
sand, at once tells us "that man is essentially earth- 
bound. " Nagg and Nell in their dustbins are "essentially 
discards. " Pozzo and Lucky are "essential master" and 
"essential slave. "4 In fact, Beckett's method of compo- 
sition is not radically different from that of Everyman. 
"A symbol--which is the sign of an essence--is hung up 
in plain view.! ' Behind the individualising detail we are 
5 
always consc;. ous of the concept. Watching a Beckett 
play, we immediately engage in a game of abstracting the 
concept, because we know that it was abstract to begin 
with. Watching a Pinter play, on the other hand, we 
quickly give up the search for ideas, because we realise 
that "we have been promised no terminal point. " We 
refrain from demanding answers to our questions. We grant 
existence the "mystery of not yet having named itself. "6 
Many Pinter characters are not more individualised 
in the naturalistic sense than are Didi and Gogo, and 
the familiar. Pinter room is as much a symbol "hung up in 
plain view" as is the room in Endgame. Nevertheless, Kerr's 
argument that Beckett begins from the concept, while 
Pinter's method is a "testing toward discovery"7 seems a 
valid one, and worth pursuing. 
Replying to the question: "Do you outline plays 
before you start to write them? " Pinter said: 
Not at all. I don't know what kind of characters my 
plays will have until they ... well, until they are. Until they indicate to me what they are. I don't 
conceptualize in any way. Once I've got the clues I 
follow them--that's my job, really, to follow the 
clues. 8 
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On another occasion Pinter referred to the presumption 
of the omniscient author to know all about his 
characters, as "cheating": 
The playwright assumes that we have a 
information about all his characters, 
selves to the audience. In fact, what 
most of the time is conforming to the 
logy. They don't create themselves as 
they arc being fixed on the stage for 
speak for the author who has a point 
great deal of 
who explain them- 
they are doing 
author's own ideo- 
they go along, 
one purpose, to 
if view to put over. 
9 
While Pinter's method is to follow the clues and let the 
characters create themselves, Ibsen, by comparison, 
proceeds from the fully formed individual: 
Before I write down one word, I must know the character 
through and through, I must penetrate into the last 
wrinkle of his soul. I always proceed from the individual; 
the stage setting, the dramatic ensemble, all of that 
comes naturally and does not cause me any worry, as soon 
as I am certain of the individual in every aspect of his 
humanity. But I have to have the exterior in mind also, 
down to the last button, how he stands and walks, how he 
conducts himself, what his voice sounds like. Then I do 
not let him go until his fate is fulfilled. lo 
Ibsen is not quite accurate in suggesting that he does. 
not write down one word until he knows his characters 
through and through. He has revealed in another account 
of his method of procedure that his characters go through 
a long process of forming themselves before he approaches 
the final working out of his play: 
As a rule, I make three drafts of my plays, which differ 
greatly from each other in characterisation, not in plot. 
When I begin the first sketch of my material, I feel I 
know my characters as if from a railway journey; one has 
met and chatted about this and that. With the next draft 
I already see everything more clearly, I know the char- 
acters roughly as one would after a month's stay in a 
spa; I have learned the fundamental traits of their 
characters and their little peculiarities; yet I might 
still be wrong about certain essentials. Finally, in the 
last draft, I stand at the limit of my knowledge; I know 
my characters from long and close acquaintance--they are 
my intimate friends, who will no longer disappoint me; 
as I see them now, I shall always see them. 11 
Thus, whereas Pinter explores the nature and fate of his 
characters together with the audience, Ibsen has completed 
285 
his "testing toward discovery" before he composes his 
final play, and presents the audience with the conclu- 
sion of his findings. Hedda Gabler's actions, once Ibsen 
has learnt to know her down to the last button, are 
entirely predictable, and the pistol shot at the end 
unavoidable. In his realistic plays Ibsen has abandoned 
the discovery he made in Peer Gynt of the discontinuous 
self--at least as far as his method of characterisation 
is concerned---and works on the age-old principle of 
fixed identities. This, however, does not mean that his 
characters are types, the kind of "theatrical characters" 
based on a single dominant feature which Strindberg in 
the Preface to Miss Julie said ought to be rejected by 
the naturalists who know "how richly complex the human 
soul is. "12 The first critics of Hedda Gabler complained 
that Hedda's character was too complex to be adequately 
dealt with in. a play. Gerhard Gran wrote: "Everything 
that should make this curious being intelligible to us 
[... 3 the dramatist can no more than indicate. For that 
reason, I think a novel about Hedda Gabler could be 
extremely interesting, while the play leaves us with a 
sense of emptiness and betrayal. "13 But in comparison 
with Hedda, what are Jorgen Tesman and Eilert Levborg, 
or for that matter Hjalmar Ekdal, Gregers 4Verle, and 
Pastor Manders, if not types? They neither change nor 
develop. Nor do they have any psychological depths to 
plumb. Yet for all his predictability and shallowness of 
soul Hjalmar Ekdal is an exceedingly human character. 
There is nothing about him of the abstract, conceptual 
quality that Walter Kerr ascribes to Beckett's characters. 
But then Ibsen also said that he proceeded from the 
individual, not from a concept. 
In his censorious review of Peer Gynt Clemens 
Petersen objected that 
Hr. Ibsen's representation of reality lacks life. There 
is liveliness enough, but it is the liveliness of 
concept and dialectic rather than of mood and character. 
[... ] He has more feeling for the laws of reality than 
for real life, more feeling for situation than for 
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people, and one will also always find that he uses the 
characters to explain the situations rather than the 
situations to explain the characters. 14 
Nothing in Clemens Petersen's long enumeration of nega- 
tives angered Ibsen more than the imputation that his 
characters were lifeless illustrations of abstract con- 
cepts, such as the suggestion that the Strange Passenger 
personifies the concept of Angst. "Is not Peer Gynt, " he 
protested, "a personality, complete and individual? I 
know that he is. And the mother, is she not? "15 If Ibsen 
in Peer Gynt set out to illustrate the concept of the 
discontinuous self, he is nevertheless adamant that Peer 
is, and is meant to be, a-fully rounded real life person. 
He would have claimed the same for Brand, even though 
the play, in Ibsen's own words, illustrates a "syllogism. " 
One of Clemens Petersen's points of criticism was the 
"lack of a strict and clear consequentiality in the 
action. " He objected that the whole of Act IV "falls com- 
pletely outside the real theme and mood of the poem, " and 
is only connected to the three preceding and the final 
Act by strained and utterly ineffective allusions. 
16 But 
the discontinuity in the action that Petersen complains 
of reflects Peer's discontinuous self, and proves that 
Ibsen's play is a "testing toward discovery. " "Peer Gynt, " 
claims Ronald Gaskell, "inaugurates the drama of the 
modern mind. "17 It is "the first, and so far the finest, 
of those plays that make it possible to speak of modern 
drama in the way we find it natural to speak of modern 
poetry or fiction: as an adventure of consciousness. 
J8 
Ibsen explored the discontinuous personality in 
Peer Gynt, but in terms closer to the naturalistic than 
to the expressionistic drama, since he insisted that 
Peer, despite his lacking a self in the existential sense, 
is still as a dramatic character conceived as a complete, 
unified, fully rounded personality. It needed Strindberg's 
original genius to translate the modern concept of the 
"dissolved self" into stage terms. Although Strindberg 
was undoubtedly influenced by Ibsen's discovery of the 
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onion self, it was not primarily Ibsen's finding which 
Strindberg projected on the stage, but his own "charac- 
terless" personality, which was a source of suffering 
as well as of pride. He says in his Note to A Dream Play 
that : raking reality, however painful, is still a mercy 
compared to the agony of the dream. But the Dreamer takes 
pride in his multiple self, for in it lies the poet's 
real wealth--which is eminently true in Strindberg's 
case, since hi3 own self was the main, not to say the 
sole, fountain of all his creative work. Ronald Gaskell 
feels that the translation of the dream action from the 
mind to the stage in A Dream Play "is just the trouble, " 
for we are "immersed in a private world, in which other 
persons exist, if at all, not as men and women with 
lives of their own, but as functions of a single con- 
sciousness, that of the dreamer. "19 In order to project 
the Dreamer's identity-less, dissolved self on the stage, 
Strindberg employs what he himself calls "abstract" 
characters, single-feature types--which as a naturalist 
he had rejected--to represent the various aspects of the 
Dreamer's many-faceted personality. The Officer in 
A Dream Play, the faithful lover who brings his bouquet 
of roses to the elusive Victoria, year in, year out, is 
as much a symbolic embodiment of the concept of waiting 
as are Didi and Gogo, who equally faithfully and hope- 
lessly await the arrival of the elusive Godot. 
Whereas Beckett's characters, like Strindberg's 
dream characters, are essentially embodiments of concepts, 
such as "waiting" and "suffering, " Pinter's method of 
characterisation is closer to that of Ibsen in that 
Pinter is concerned with individual people, first and 
foremost. But Pinter does not presume that he can ever 
know his characters so intimately that they will, as 
Ibsen said, never "disappoint" him. For it is precisely 
Pinter's theory that human beings are, like Davies in 
The Caretaker, "completely unpredictable. " And if human 
character is not a fixed entity, but a question, of ex- 
plored--or unexplored--possibilities, then the dramatist 
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can do nothing more than follow the clues. The early 
critics who were so baffled by the "obscurity, " the 
"eccentricity, " and the "abnormality" of Hedda Gabler's 
psychology demanded that a character, in a play as well 
as in a novel, should be "intelligible. , 2o In a program 
note to The Room and The Dumb Waiter Pinter defends. the 
obscurity of the characters and their fate on the 
following grounds: 
The desire for verification is understandable but cannot 
always be satisfied. There are no hard distinctions 
between what is real and what is unreal, nor between 
what is true and what is false. The thing is not neces- 
sarily either true or false; it can be both true and 
false. The assumption that to verify what has happened 
and what is happening presents few problems I take to be 
inaccurate. A character on the stage who can present no 
convincing argument or information as to his past 
experience, his present behaviour or his aspirations, 
nor give a comprehensive analysis of his motives is as 
legitimate and as worthy of attention as one who, alarm-- 
ingly, can do all these things. The more acute the 
experience the less articulate its expression. 21 
Pinter's observation that there is no hard distinction 
between what is real and unreal, true and false, is not 
an original one, but faced with an audience who have 
grown accustomed to the demand for verisimilitude Pinter 
clearly felt that the point needed to be restated. 
Strindberg based his dream-play technique on the belief 
that there is no clear distinction between dream and 
reality. Indra's Daughter reveals that this world is the 
reverse copy of the real world, which means that our 
earthly existence is an illusion and that reality can 
only be known in the next life. Peer Gynt discovers on 
entering the Dovre Hall that the fairy-tale world has a 
fearful reality. Indeed, his experience in the Dovre 
determines the fate of his life. Yet even in their dream 
plays Ibsen and Strindberg go a long way towards meeting 
the demand for "verification. " Peer Gynt is provided 
with a family history and a social background which "ex- 
plain" his psychological make-up, and we are never left 
in doubt about the motives for Peer's actions. But all 
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the symbolic characters, especially the Boyg and the 
Strange Passenger, are a recognition of the fact that 
the deepest truths about reality and the self cannot be 
verified. At the beginning of The Ghost Sonata Hummel 
seems a very obscure and ambiguous character, being at 
the same time a benefactor and a tyrant. But little by 
little, as in a detective story, the facts which explain 
why he behaves as he does are unravelled. And as the 
various characters are stripped of their illusory identi-- 
ties we learn to know their "case" histories, although 
Strindberg is not concerned with the psychological credi- 
bility of his characters. The Ghost Sonata is a morality 
play, not a naturalistic character study. The characters 
in A Dream Play are so overtly symbolic as to be beyond 
the demand for verification. 
Whereas Ibsen's, Strindbergs, and Beckett's dream 
plays immediately transport us into an "unreal" world-- 
where we may find ourselves among trolls in the Dovre 
Hall, or in a summer landscape with snow on the trees, 
or deposited in ashbins or urns--Pinter, in his first 
full-length play The Birthday Party (1958), achieves the 
nightmare effect by proceeding from an apparently "real" 
and perfectly "verifiable" situation, which he turns into 
an alarmingly "unreal" one, precisely by not meeting the 
audience's demand for verification. In The Birthday Party 
we find ourselves in a perfectly ordinary seaside board- 
inghouse, in the company of perfectly ordinary people, 
at least until the new guests arrive. But what we learn 
about these seemingly ordinary people as the play pro- 
gresses does not help us to know them or understand them 
better. It only makes us more conscious of, and curious 
about, all that we do not know about them, all the 
important facts that would make them intelligible. Not 
all the characters in The Birthday Party are unverifiable. 
The play has two different sets of characters. Meg, Petey, 
and Lulu make up the verifiable set. Their characters 
contain no mystery that needs explaining, perhaps because 
they themselves are so unconscious of, or imperceptive to, 
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the mystery of existence. They are the innocent, or just 
simply obtuse, people who never suspect that there is 
anything unverifiable about their familiar everyday real- 
ity--and are in for a shock. Stanley, Goldberg, and 
McCann make up the other set. They represent the mystery 
of the unverifiable, which alarmingly intrudes upon the 
safe, or thought-to-be safe, daylight world which the 
audience share with Meg, Petey, and Lulu. 
When George Wellwarth compares Pinter's characters 
to those of Genet--to whom "reality" is like Peer Gynt's 
onion22--he finds that 
To Genet human beings are composed of layer upon layer 
of illusion draped around a nonexistent core; to Pinter 
human beings are simply inscrutable, to themselves as 
well as to others. They may be emptiness surrounded by 
illusion, but they may also, without knowing it, possess 
a solid center of reality. The point is that they do not 
know and are too frightened to find out. 23 
Stanley Webber--for a year Meg's only lodger--is clearly 
too frightened to find out, since he apparently never 
ventures outside the boarding-house. In the company of 
the docile Petey who never asks any questions, and the 
motherly Meg who pampers him as a son cum lover and 
readily accepts his story about his once having been a 
promising concert pianist, Stanley feels safe. Indeed he 
has established himself so securely in his new-found 
identity that he imagines himself the centre around which 
the little boarding-house world revolves. But the little 
world of predictable reality immediately collapses about 
him when Meg announces the expected arrival of two new 
visitors. Disturbed and unbelieving Stanley tries to per- 
suade himself that the news is just false alarm, and 
attempts to ward off the threat by asserting his supre- 
macy in the house: "Tell me, Mrs. Boles, when you address 
yourself to me, do you ever ask yourself who exactly you 
are talking to? Eh? Silence. He groans, his trunk falls 
forward, his head falls into his hands" (21). Stanley's 
illusory identity is so frail that it immediately dis- 
solves under the threat of him being deprived of Meg's 
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exclusive attention. Moreover, he may already suspect 
that the announced visitors are ghosts from his dubious 
past, who have come to destroy the frail cocoon of his 
tenuously fabricated "retired artist" identity, by bring- 
ing back the sordid reality he had tried to escape from. 
The ghosts from the past destroying an illusory new-found 
identity is a familiar Ibsen theme. It happened to Peer 
Gynt when she Greenclad Woman reappeared outside his hut 
and demanded her place beside Solveig, and it happened 
again when he met the down-at-heel King of Dovre who 
refused to give him testimonials to prove his selfhood. 
But Stanley's ghosts are more sinister than Peer's 
because they are real people, not fairy-tale figures, 
yet turn out to be entirely unverifiable. Meg tries to 
comfort the shattered Stanley by showing him that she 
believes in his artistic talent: "Stan? When are you 
going to play the piano again? (STANLEY grunts. ) Like 
you used to? (STANLEY grunts. ) I used to like watching 
you play the piano. When are you going to play it again? " 
(21). But the old trick does not seem to work any longer. 
When Stanley tries to recapture the glory of his promis- 
ing career as a concert pianist the dream quickly dwind- 
les to nothing:. "Played the piano? 'I've played the piano 
all over the world. All over the country. (Pause. ) I once 
gave a concert. [... ) They were all there that night. 
Every single one of them. It was a great success. Yes. 
A concert. At Lower Edmonton" (22). Lower Edmonton does 
not sound like the most propitious start to a world- 
famous career, but if Stanley lacked the talent to reach 
world fame, he was spared the disappointment of finding 
out, for his career was brutally cut short by some 
hostile force he must have in some way offended: "They 
carved me up. Carved me up. " When he came to give his 
next concert, somewhere else, he found the hall closed: 
"They'd locked it up. G... 3 They pulled a fast one. I'd 
like to know who was responsible for that. (Bitterly. ) 
All right, Jack, I can take a tip. They want me to crawl 
down on my bonded knees. Well I can take a tip ... any 
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day of the week" (23). Stanley did take the tip, by with- 
drawing into the illusion of thwarted greatness: "I had 
a unique touch. Absolutely unique" (22). Meg insists on 
cheering Stardey up by pretending it is his birthday and 
making it the excuse for a celebration. But instead of 
cheering hire up and restoring his fragile belief in 
himself, Meg unwittingly deals the death-blow to his 
artistic dream by presenting him with a toy drum as a 
replacement for his non-existent piano. Stanley's immedi- 
ate response is stupefaction. He sees the toy drum not 
only as a mockery of his talent, but as a denial of his 
manhood. To Meg, who is the sole guarantor of his self- 
hood because she is the only person to whom Stanley 
means anything at all, he will always remain an infant. 
The toy drum thus becomes a symbol not only of his sub- 
human status, but of his dependence on, and subjection 
to, a poceessive, dominating mother. Stanley's "savage 
and possessed" beating of the toy drum, which concludes 
Act I, indicates his despairing acceptance of his sub- 
human status. Peer Gynt was prepared to give up his 
human selfhood and assume subhuman status in the troll 
world in order to attain royal power and glory. Stanley, 
like Lucky in Waiting for Godot, relinquishes his self- 
hood in return for security. He would rather be a slave 
to Meg than face the risks and pitfalls of an unverifi- 
able reality. But Pinter is no more than Beckett con- 
cerned with the merit of selfhood. He does not, like 
Ibsen, put forward positive and negative existential 
alternatives. Nor does he suggest that the solution to 
the problem of selfhood in an unverifiable world lies in 
existential choice. He observes the disintegration of 
Stanley's identity without passing any judgement or 
pronouncing any "oughts. " 
At the beginning of Act II Stanley is attempting 
unsuccessfully to establish what the connection is between 
McCann and Goldberg, whose name he appeared to recognise 
when Meg mentioned it, and to find out what McCann may 
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know about his past. When his improbable story about 
his having a private income on which he plans to retire, 
fails to impress the uncommunicative McCann, Stanley 
pleads anxio';. sly: 
You know what? To look at me, I bet you wouldn't think 
I'd led such a quiet life. The lines on my face, eh? 
It's the drink. Been drinking a bit down here. But what 
I mean is ... you know how it is ... away from your 
own ... all wrong, of course ... I'll be all right when I get back ... but what I mean is, the way some people look at me you'd think I was a different person. I 
suppose I have changed, but I'm still the same man that 
I always was. I mean, you wouldn't think, to look at me, 
really ... I mean, not really, that I was the sort of bloke to--to cause any trouble, would you? (MCCANN looks 
at him. ) Do you know what I mean? 4o 
McCann's unencouraging "No" does nothing to allay Stan- 
ley's unease. His claim that he is still the same as he 
always was, may prove the least verifiable fact of all. 
The morose and unresponsive McCann is a reflection-less 
mirror that confirms nothing about Stanley's uncertain 
identity. With Goldberg he tries the aggressive approach: 
"Don't mess me about! " (44) and gives out that he is the 
manager of the boarding house and that there is no avail- 
able accomodation. But when McCann and Goldberg begin to 
interrogate him with a crossfire of savage accusations, 
some blatantly unfounded, some directly contradictory, 
the serious and the frivolous in a frenzied mixture, 
Stanley's reality disintegrates completely: 
GOLDBERG: What have you done with your wife? 
14CCANN: He's killed his wife! 
GOLDBERG: Why did you kill your wife? 
STANLEY (sitting, his back to the audience). 
What wife? 
14CCANN: How did he kill her? 
GOLDBERG: How did you kill her? 
I1SCCANN: You throttled her. 
GOLDBERG: Why did you never get married? 
1rCCAINN : She was waiting at the porch. 
GOLDBERG: You skedaddled from the wedding. 
1CCANN: He left her in the lurch. 
GOLDBERG: You left her in the pudding club. 
I1SCCANN: She was waiting at the church. 
GOLDBERG: Webber! Why did you change your name? 
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STANLEY: I forgot the other one. 
GOLDBERG: What's your name nocw? 
STANLEY: Joe Soap. (49-50) 
TCCANN: Who are you, Webber? 
GOLDBERG: What makes you think you exist? 
1CCANN; You're dead. 
GOLDBERG: You're dead. You can't live, you can't think, you can't love. You're dead. You're a 
plague gone bad. There's no juice in you. 
You're nothing but an odour: (52) 
Stanley is reduced to speechlessness under their merci- 
less invective, and unable to defend himself with words 
he hits out at the enemy by kicking Goldberg in the 
stomach. The scene is about to erupt into violence when 
Meg enters, dressed for the party and beating Stanley's 
toy drum. Stanley does not participate in the birthday 
celebration, having protested several times that it is 
not his birthday. But he is drawn into the merriment 
when Lulu suggests a game-of blind man's buff. Blind- 
folded, Stanley loses all rational control of himself. 
Crashing his foot through the toy drum he approaches Meg 
and tries to strangle her. As Goldberg and McCann rush 
to her rescue the light goes out. When McCann manages to 
light a torch Stanley is seen bent over the spread-eagled 
Lulu, giggling, and he continues giggling insanely while 
Goldberg and McCann converge upon him as he backs and 
flattens himself against the wall. 
Without suggesting that there is any direct connec- 
tion between Stanley's birthday party and the madhouse 
scene in Peer Gynt one may nevertheless note some inte- 
resting similarities. Stanley, like Peer Gynt, is driven 
insane by his dogged attempt to enclose himself in his 
subjectivity and be to himself enough. Beckett's Murphy 
is another case in point, but he enjoyed the bliss of 
self-seclusion without going insane. He actually found 
the work among madmen therapeutic. Stanley is taking 
refuge in his subjectivity--what Murphy called "the 
little world, " and Peer Gynt pictured as the toad in the 
sandstone--in order to protect his illusions, because he 
cannot make sense of reality and is afraid to expose 
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himself to the threat of the unverifiable. However, Stan- 
ley's subjectivity differs from Peer's in that Stanley 
withdraws fro;;; the world, whereas Peer aims to subject 
the whole wide world to the Gyntish Self. "I must be 
Myself on bloc, / Gynt of the entire globe" (VI, 141). 
But Stanley and Peer alike refuse to explore the real 
possibilities of the self. They prefer to build their 
identities on illusions rather than strive, as Brand did, 
to achieve selfhood by braving the storms of real life. 
Peer lives on the illusion of future greatness, Stanley 
on the illusion of greatness frustrated. When the illu- 
sion is broken, and Stanley is confronted with all the 
possibilities he has failed to explore, and the responsi- 
bilities he has dodged, he loses his wits, assailed like 
Peer Gynt with fear and guilt. The most persistent charge 
levelled against him by the agents from the past is that 
of betrayal. He has betrayed the organisation. He has 
betrayed his bride by running away from the wedding (as 
Peer ran away from his bride). He has betrayed the "ex- 
ternal force" (perhaps God) by not recognising that some- 
one out there is suffering for him. He has betrayed his 
country, and his breed (a typically Jewish charge), and 
of the shirker and traitor Stanley Webber there is 
nothing but a bad odour left. The accusations against 
Stanley cannot be verified. Their only verification lies 
in Stanley's feeling of guilt. It is tempting, but per- 
haps pretentious, to suggest that Stanley in the game of 
blind man's buff experiences the fearful nothingness of 
his existence, as Peer experienced it when he stared into 
the abyss of his empty self in the madhouse scene. 
Stanley's final appearance in the play, after his "ner- 
vous breakdown, " also has parallels with the ending of 
the madhouse scene in Peer Gynt. After his "breakdown" 
at the end of that scene Peer sinks unconscious to the 
ground. When Begriffenfeldt crowns him "Emperor of Self" 
and the madmen celebrate their victory, Peer is "beside 
himself, " powerless to act, and defenceless. When Stanley 
is brought downstairs, after having been "treated" by 
296 
his tormentors, he is in a state of dumb stupor. His 
exterior is transformed. He is clean-shaven, dressed in 
a dark suit, and holding his broken glasses in his hand 
--perhaps a symbol of his broken identity. When McCann 
and Goldberg celebrate their conquest by wooing Stanley 
with a litany of promises of how he is going to be 
transformed into a perfect bourgeois, Stanley hears 
nothing. He is, like Peer, "beside himself": 
GOLDBERG: You'll be re-orientated. 
MCCANN: You'll be rich, 
GOLDBERG: You'll be adjusted.. 
LICCANIS: You'll be our pride and joy. 
GOLDBERG: You'll be a mensch. 
MCCANN: You'll be a success. 
GOLDBERG: You'll be integrated. 
MCCANN: You'll give orders. 
GOLDBERG: You'll make decisions. 
MCCANN: You'll be a magnate. 
GOLDBERG: A statesman. 
MCCANN: You'll own yacts. 
GOLDBERG: Animals. 
MCCANN: Animals. (83-84) 
Stanley can only respond with inarticulate gurgles. Like 
Peer Gynt lying in the mire, the dumb Stanley has been 
reduced to an animal. As they lead him out to the van 
Goldberg places a bowler hat on his head. Whereas in 
Beckett's play the bowler hat is a symbol of human iden- 
tity, Stanley's bowler hat, like Peer's crown of straw, 
is a symbol of conformity, and hence of non-identity. 
Stanley is going to be made to conform to the bourgeois 
ideals of Goldberg and McCann and the organisation they 
represent. Peer Gynt is crowned in the madhouse because 
he has practised the madmen's philosophy of self-suffi- 
ciency all his life. For Stanley, as for Peer, conformity 
leads to the Button-Iäoulder's ladle. Stanley is going to 
be taken to Monty, and it is certain that when he has 
been treated by Monty he will, if he is not killed, 
return to the organisation, completely re-melted, a con- 
forming, identity-less member with no will of his own. 
Petey's impotent plea: "Stan, don't let them tell you 
what to do! " (86) cannot save Stanley from the annihi- 
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lation that awaits him. 
Stanley's retreat to the boarding house has been an 
attempt to ru. i away from his past, and to break away 
from an organisation that was crushing his selfhood. But 
his revolt has been too feeble. Like Peer Gynt he has 
taken the "round about" road to selfhood and retreated 
into a world of dreams rather than face the challenge of 
committed action in the real world. On a sudden impulse 
Stanley proposes to Lulu: "How would you like to go away 
with me? " But when she asks where they could go, Stanley 
replies: "Nowhere. There's nowhere to go. So we could 
just go. It wouldn't matter" (26). Stanley's sudden urge 
for action is an empty gesture. In the event he does not 
even have the courage to leave the house for a walk with 
Lulu. Stanley's boarding-house existence is the closest 
he can come to establishing an identity. He has invented 
a past for himself about a promising career being des- 
troyed by "them, " and is living on the illusion of great 
talents untapped. And he has a definable role in the 
household because Petey, Meg, and Lulu are all definable 
and predictable people. Stanley, like Hjalmar Ekdal, 
would be quite content to live his life on a life-lie, 
and to be pampered by the credulous Meg, as Hjalmar is 
pampered by his not so credulous wife and daughter. But 
then Meg, too, is prehaps only pretending to believe 
Stanley's story in order to keep him. When his life-lie 
is shattered, by the news of the arrival of the new 
visitors, and Meg giving him the toy drum, Stanley is 
destroyed with it. The-arrival of the two agents suggests 
that Stanley is already, ripe for the Button-Moulder's 
ladle. But Pinter does not propose any solution to Stan- 
ley's predicament. The play contains no hopeful message 
of how Stanley could have avoided his fate. But nor in 
the end does Peer Gvnt. Peer has the existential alter- 
natives put clearly before him: either to be himself, or 
be to himself enough; either to fulfil the Master's in- 
tention, or ignore it and pander to the desires of the 
Gyntish Self. Yet when he asks the Button-Moulder how 
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one finds out what the Master intended he is told that 
one must rely on one's intuition, and as Peer remarks, 
intuitions may often prove wrong and then you are lost 
before you axe halfway. Peer's redemption through a 
faithful woman's love may be an optimistic ending from 
a religious and a romantic point of view, but existcen- 
tially it is no solution at all, since selfhood is seen 
in the play as something achieved through self-activity. 
In Stanley case (as in that of Archie Rice) the faithful 
woman is unable to save him, because she is blind to his 
real troubles, his existential insolvency. At the end of 
the play Meg is the only person who has not yet dis- 
covered what the birthday party was really about: 
MEG: I was the belle of the ball. 
PF'TEY: Were you? 
TOM : Oh yes. They all said I was. 
PETEY: I bet you were, too. 
MEG: Ohs it's true. I was. 
Pause. 
I know I was. (87) 
In his review of the first performance of The Birth- 
day Part Irving Wardle notes about Stanley's enemies 
that "when they arrive--in the persons of a suspiciously 
fluent Jew and his Irish henchman--they seem as much 
furies emerging from Stanley's night thoughts as physical 
creatures. 1124 And it is clear from the poem Pinter wrote 
shortly after the play (it is dated 1958) called "A View 
of the Party, " that he conceived the intruders as 
essentially figments of Stanley's mind: 
The thought that Goldberg was 
Sat in the centre of the room, 
A man of weight and time, 
To supervise the game. 
The thought that was McCann 
Walked in upon this feast, 
A man of skin and bone, 
Wlith a green stain on his chest. 25 
But in the play the two agents have been given too much 
naturalistic reality to be entirely abstracted into 
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dream figures. Whereas such obvious figments of Peer's 
imagination as the Strange Passenger, the Button-Moulder, 
and the Lean Oiie are entirely onesided allegorical dream 
characters, Goldberg and McCann are real people first 
and dream figures second. The dream characters in Peer 
Gynt are not likely to frighten anyone because they are 
so obviously abstract, but the intruders in The Birthday 
Party carry with them a frightening and sinister atmos- 
phere precisely because they are so human, and because 
they defy our expectation of the verifiability of human 
beings. No one is seriously worried about the obscure 
identity of the Master who has sent the Button-Moulder 
to fetch Peer's soul. Peer himself takes the Master for 
granted and never enquires into his identity. But when 
two agents, who are very real people, arrive at a guest 
house to catch a defenceless person for some undefined 
crime he may or may not have committed, and we are able 
to find out nothing about the organisation they are 
supposed to represent, and which they appear to know 
very little about themselves, then the situation becomes 
truly alarming. Pinter's nightmare world generates an 
atmosphere of undefined fear which is more reminiscent 
of Kafka than of anything found in either Ibsen or 
Strindberg. But then Pinter has also said that Kafka and 
Beckett are the two writers who have made the greatest 
impression on him, 
26 
while he has never acknowledged any 
influence from Ibsen or Strindberg. This is not to say, 
however, that unconscious and unacknowledged influence 
may not be as great, or greater, than the acknowledged. 
Whereas the dream characters in Peer Gynt are types. 
with fixed, single-feature identities and, except for 
the schizophrenic madmen in the Cairo madhouse, have no 
human identity-problems, Stanley's persecutors have 
fears and doubts and obsessions about their identity and 
the nature of their mission similar to, and perhaps re- 
flecting, those of their victim. The two agents are them- 
selves conscious of being victims of an inscrutable ex- 
ternal force in whose dark schemes they are mere pawns, 
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and may be destroyed when they have completed their 
allotted task. Their cruel baiting of Stanley is a pro- 
jection of that fear, just as Stanley's game of frighten- 
ing Meg with the van and the wheelbarrow reflects his 
own fear of being carted away and annihilated. Stanley's 
retreat to the homely security of the motherly Meg is an 
attempt to immure himself in the secure identity of 
childhood. Goldberg's sentimental recollections of Uncle 
Barney (27) and maudlin memories of "mum" (43) are 
similarly an attempt to establish his identity in a nos- 
talgically happy and secure childhood. "Childhood. Hot 
water bottles. Hot milk. Pancakes. Soap suds. What a 
life" (43). But his varying pet names--his father calls 
him "Benny, " to his mother he is "Simey, " while McCann 
knows him as "Nat"--testify to his fluid identity. Gold- 
berg's nostalgic picture of the past is unverifiable. 
His tenuous identity is, like Stanley's, very likely 
founded on a life-lie. In order to bridge the gulf between 
his Jewish origin and his desire to be accepted in a 
Christian society, Goldberg needs to construct a past 
and project an image which is "cosmopolitan. " Uncle 
Barney, from whom he has his "culture, " was "One of the 
old school. C... ] Respected by the whole community. C... 3 
He was a cosmopolitan" (27-28). Goldberg identifies him- 
self with such enlightened middle-class pursuits as 
taking an interest in "how the M. C. C. was getting on 
overseas" (28), and his first romance, with a "Sunday 
school teacher, " is remembered as an idyll of bourgeois 
respectability: "i'd leave her with. a little kiss on the 
cheek G... J and I'd bowl back home" (43). His desire to 
assimilate into the Christian community is also reflected 
in his choice of partner, an Irish priest, who repays 
the honour by calling Goldberg "a true Christian" (29). 
But his association with McCann is not much of a creden- 
tial in the Christian world, for McCann, we learn, has 
been "unfrocked six months" (81). Goldberg is always con- 
scious of being an outsider who does not properly belong 
anywhere. When McCann refers to him as "Simey, " thus 
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reminding him of his inescapable Jewishness, Goldberg 
reacts violently: "NEVER CALL ME THAT! " (76). Goldberg 
is himself guilty of the crime of which he accuses Stan-- 
ley, that of betraying the "breed, " and his asking McCann 
to give him a kiss of life treatment to brace him up for 
the job is perhaps an indication of his fear that he will 
one day be punished like Stanley for having betrayed his 
true identity. Trying to reassure himself of his belief 
in the world, he stammers to a halt: 
Because I believe that the world ... 
(Vacant. ).... 
Because I believe that the world ... 
(Desperate. ).... 
BECAUSE I BELIEVE THAT THE WORLD ... 
(Lost. 
.... (78) 
But we feel no pity for Goldberg and McCann in their 
obvious unease about their job, and their ill-concealed 
distrust of each other, for they are themselves pitiless 
in carrying out their orders. Walter Kerr, discussing 
Pinter's "existential" method of characterisation, argues 
that Stanley, Goldberg, and McCann "do not act out of 
prior definition" but are "free to do whatever they will 
do [... J They are finding out what they are by what they 
do and by what is done to them. "27 Pinter's characters 
may be free to "discover themselves" in the dramatic- 
technical sense that their fate is not predetermined by 
the author. It does not follow, however, that they are 
existentially free as people to choose their-identity. 
Neither Stanley nor his persecutors are free agents in 
an existential sense. They are all victims of external 
forces which they can neither comprehend nor put a name 
to. Stanley's "quest" is not like Peer's an attempt to 
"discover himself, " not a journey in search of his "real" 
self, but a frightened retreat into a diminishing cita- 
del of verifiable fact, as the inscrutable "they" are 
relentlessly closing in upon him. 
The Caretaker (196o) is Pinter's most naturalistic 
play, and Davies his most fully individualised character. 
While the tramps in Waiting for Godot are immediately 
recognisable as embodiments of Everyman because the 
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setting and the language are unlocalised, Davies is a 
very particular tramp defined by a very particular loca- 
tion and idiom. Like Didi and Gogo, Davies is a tramp on 
the journey of life, but whereas Beckett's tramps are 
waiting in a nondescript void for an elusive master who 
might be God, Davies has a very definite and down-to- 
earth goal for his journey. He is waiting for the weather 
to break and for a decent pair of shoes so that he can 
get down to Sidcup to collect his "papers" that will 
prove who he is. Shoes are important to Estragon too, but 
he will make a metaphysical conceit of his shoelessness 
and compare himself to Christ. Davies' most urgent needs 
are not metaphysical. His visit to the "monastery" at 
Luton is prompted solely by the fact that he had heard 
"they give away shoes. " Shoes are the very hub of his 
existence. "Shoes? It's life and death to me" (13). The 
tramp's narrow world of minimal survival is vividly 
sized up in Davies' indignant account of his uncharitable 
reception at the monastery: 
Now look here, I said, now wait a minute, all I'm asking 
for is a pair of shoes, you don't want to start taking 
liberties with me, it's taken me three days to get here, 
I said to him, three days without a bite, I'm worth a 
bite to eat, en I? [... ] Right, they said to me, you've 
had your meal, get off out of it. Meal? I said, what do 
you think I am, a dog? Nothing better than a dog. What 
do you think I am, a wild animal? C... 3 I cleared out. I 
took a short cut to Watford and picked up a pair there. 
Got on to the North Circular, just past Hendon, the sole 
come off, right where I was walking. Lucky I had my old 
ones wrapped up, still carrying them, otherwise I'd have 
been finished, man. (14-15) 
Brand and Peer Gynt needed place in the whole wide 
world to be themselves. Davies is proud to claim the 
best convenience in Shepherd's Bush as the fixed point 
of his existence. That is, until he is picked up by the 
simple-minded and kind-hearted Aston and offered a bed 
in his lumber-filled room. For Davies, as for Didi and 
Gogo, the problem of identity is twofold. Living at the 
very bottom of the social scale Davies must struggle not 
only to assert and preserve his individual identity, but 
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to defend his dignity as a human being. Not that this is 
a problem exclusive to tramps and outcasts. We have 
earlier seen hnw Nora Helmer, a pampered middle-class 
doll-wife, had to fight to be recognised as a human being 
before she could begin to realise herself as an indi- 
vidual. Davies' papers at Sidcup that will prove his 
identity remain a secondary matter until Mick requires 
them for his employment as a caretaker. Davies' first 
concern is to malte the brothers recognise his humanity, 
his "rights" as a human being: "I got my rights. I told 
him that. I might have been on the road but nobody's got 
more rights than T have" (lo). Mick knows exactly how to 
strip Davies of his "rights" when he wants to get rid of 
him. He begins by disputing Davies' identity: 
14ICK: What is your name? 
DAVIES: Don't start that-- 
MICK : No, what's your real name? 
DAVIES: My real name's Davies. 
19ICK: % hat' s the name you go under? 
DAVIES: Jenkins! 
IM1ICK: You got two names. What about the rest? Eh? 
(72-73) 
He then goes on to challenge Davies' very humanity: 
"You're nothing else but a wild animal, when you come 
down to : i. t. You're a barbarian" (73-74). Davies's life 
revolves around the problem of proving his humanity-- 
rather than his identity--and convincing society of his 
rights as a human being to belong. And he will use every 
petty, poverty-stricken means available to him to bolster 
his sense of human dignity, and defend his claims to a 
place in the society that has rejected him. "All them 
aliens" become a convenient scapegoat for all his troub- 
les. Being "foreigners" and thus in Davies' eyes right- 
less, they provide a social layer over which even the 
tramp can enjoy a feeling of superiority. But when asked 
about his name, birth, and nationality, the basic ques- 
tions of social identification, Davies finds it hard to 
prove that he belongs anywhere and that he has any 
ethnic rights above "them Blacks": 
ASTON: What did you say your name was? 
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DAVIES: Bernard Jenkins is my assumed one. ASTON: No, your other one? 
DAVIES: Davies. Mac Davies. 
ASTON: Welsh, are you? 
DAVIES: Eh? 
ASTON: You Welsh? 
Pause, 
DAVIES: Well, I been around, you know ... what I mean ... I been about.... ASTON: Where were you born then? 
DAVIES: (darkly). What do you mean? 
ASTON: Whe; e were you born? 
DAVIES: I was ... uh ... oh, it's a bi t hard, like, to se t your mind back ... see what I mean ... going back ... a good way ... lose a bit of track, like ... you know.... (25) 
Aston's invitation to Davies to stay in the room until he 
has got himself "fixed up, " and later the offer of a job 
as caretaker of the place, provide a chance for the tramp 
to gain a foothold on the social ladder, and Davies, as 
the animal blick has accused him of being, will defend his 
new-won territorial rights with teeth and claws. He quick- 
ly proves that when a finger is extended to him he will 
take the whole hand, and the victim will become the 
exploiter. But Davies cannot trust his good fortune, nor 
can he trust people, for he knows that if he were asked 
to identify himself, to prove that he had rights to his 
new-won position, he would be lost. That is why he is so 
wary about having a front door bell with. "Caretaker" on it: 
They might be there after my card, I mean look at it, 
here I am, I only got four stamps, on this card C... I 
that's all I got, they ring the bell called Caretaker, 
they'd have me in, that's what they'd do, I wouldn't 
stand a chance. Of course I got plenty of other cards 
lying about, but they don't know that, and I can't 
tell them, because then they'd find out I was going 
about under an assumed name. [... ] You see, the name 
I go under now ain't my real one. It's assumed. (44) 
When Davies learns that it is Mick who owns the place, 
and not Aston, he quickly changes his allegiance from 
the charitable brother to the unpredictable one, who so 
far has done nothing but scare the tramp out of his wits 
with his brutal practical jokes. It is ironic when Davies, 
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having found himself quite out of his depths with Mick, 
says: "I mean, with a bloke like you, you know where you 
are" (61). Davies is a poor judge of human nature and he 
is flattered by Mick's apparent willingness to take him 
into his confidence and seek his advice as "a man of the 
world" (48). But he makes the mistake of not listening 
to Mick's conditions. Mick's sham-veneer penthouse dream 
palace is so completely beyond Davies' conception that 
he cannot imagine who would live there. Mick's reply 
does not promise well for Davies' future: "I would. My 
brother and me. " After a pause, when he realises that 
his own "rights" have not been taken into consideration, 
Davies demands, as if the world owed him a home and a 
living: "What about me? " (61). It is not Davies' lack of 
identifying papers that ruins his chances with Mick, but 
the fact that he proves himself incapable of sharing 
Mick's penthouse dream, denying that he ever pretended 
to be "an experienced first-class professional interior 
and exterior decorator" (72). Furthermore, he makes the 
fateful mistake of attempting to wedge himself into a 
family relationship by playing one brother off against 
the other. Davies experiences the strength of the family 
bond when he tries to displace Aston by denigrating him, 
calling him "nutty" and suggesting that "he should go 
back where he come from! " (71). In the family circle the 
tramp can never be anything but an intruder. Mick smashes 
the statue of the Buddha in demonstrative rejection of 
the barbarian, and when Aston shortly after enters the 
room the two brothers look at each other "smiling, faint- 
" (75). Davies is driven out into the dark, and no re- 
versal of tactics can bring him back into the light, for 
he has bitten the hand that fed him. While thinking 
himself definitely employed by Mick and firmly settled 
in the lair, Davies could not resist exploiting his new- 
won position to elevate himself further by claiming the 
superiority of the sane over the lunatic, and hence that 
he had a better right to stay than Aston and owed his 
benefactor no gratitude. But it is Davies' desecration 
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of Aston's most sacred dream that seals his fate: "You 
build your shed first! A few bob! When I can earn a 
steady rage here: You build your stinking shed first. $ 
That's , hat: " (68). After this malicious stab at Aston's 
sustaining life-lie there is no way in which Davies can 
ingratiate himself with his Buddha-like benefactor again. 
It does not help that he offers to stay in the same bed 
and suffer the draught, which Davies considers the ulti- 
mate sacrifice. Aston's "No" is final. He is deaf to 
Davies' plea: "Listen ... if I ... got down ... if I was 
to ... get my papers ... would you ... would you let ... 
would you ... if 1 got down ... and got my.... " (78). At 
the beginning, when a hand was stretched out to help him, 
Davies presumed to insist on his "rights" and demanded 
preferential treatment vis-a-vis "them Blacks. " At the 
end he no longer invokes his rights, and it is useless 
to ask for pity. Nobody listens. Davies is at last forced 
to acknowledge that his existence in the world is com- 
pletely redundant. He can save himself the journey to 
Sidcup. 
Davies is not like Stanley punished by mysterious 
agents for unverifiable crimes. He has been offered a 
real chance to make himself a home and achieve a social 
identity, and he has spoilt his chances by his own greed, 
selfishness, and ingratitude. Davies has followed the 
Gyntian principle of "to thyself be enough, " and his 
trollish ego is his undoing. In Peer's case it is the 
irresponsible, self-evasive non-commitment of the troll 
motto, the failure to choose between the aesthetic and 
the ethical way of life, that leads to the Button- 
Moulder's ladle. It is similarly an error of choice that 
leads to Davies' expulsion from paradise, but Pinter does 
not thereby propose that identity is a matter of exis- 
tential choice. Nor is Davies' quest for identity, like 
that of Peer Gynt, or the Unknown, or the tramps in 
Godot, a search for selfhood in a metaphysical sense. 
Selfhood is a remote problem for one who is not even re- 
cognised as a human being. Davies must begin, like Nora, 
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by establishing his humanity before he can claim his 
"rights" as an individual. But being a social outcast 
Davies fights to gain a foothold in the bourgeois society 
that Nora. rejects. Davies, like Didi and Gogo, is incap- 
able of projecting a self-image beyond a bourgeois scale 
of values, but while Beckett's tramps are clearly waiting 
for a "salvation" which is indefinable in social terms, 
pinning their hopes on the elusive Godot, Davies is con- 
tent to equate identity with bourgeois respectability. 
But Davies' chance of acquiring a social identity depends 
on a choice between two sets of values, which are not 
unlike the alternatives put before Peer Gynt, charity 
and compassion on the one hand, greed and lust for power 
on the other. Davies, like Peer, chooses the latter 
alternative and is expelled from human society with the 
permanent loss of his "rights" to be recognised as a 
human being. Peer is similarly forced to acknowledge the 
loss of his human status and the reduction of his 
emperorship to "Emperor of all the other animals" (VI, 21o). 
But Davies cannot like Peer appeal for redemption through 
the love of a woman. His faltering plea for another 
chance to stay, trailing off into vacuity before the 
demonstratively intransigent Aston, signifies the anni- 
hilation of Davies' identity. 
Davies has played his cards fatefully badly, but 
the suspicion remains that his efforts, by whatever 
method, to gain acceptance within the brother-relation- 
ship are foredoomed to failure, for he can never enter 
into the bond of mutual recognition that exists between 
the two brothers. They have a common past which Davies 
cannot share, and know each other's idiosyncracies, each 
thus providing a predictable reality in relation to 
which the other can define himself. Relying on each 
other's recognition the two brothers have a mutual feel- 
ing of responsibility for each other. They are each 
other's caretaker. Davies is alien to the concept of 
sharing, never having had anything to share, and feels 
only a grasping need to care for himself. Aston comes 
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close to a brotherly acceptance of Davies in sharing 
with him the secret of his life. But Davies, being an 
incurable opportunist unable to transcend the rapacious 
desires of his trollish ego, betrays Aston's brotherly 
confidence. Mick is too jealous of his brother's recogni- 
tion to allow the tramp to come between them. The alien 
and unpredictable Davies will never serve as a substitute 
for the placid and reliable Aston, and Mick applies his 
cunning from the start to getting. rid of the impostor: 
Ever since you come'into this house there's been nothing 
but trouble. Honest. I can take nothing you say at face 
value. Every word you speak is open to any number of 
different interpretations. Most of what you say is lies. 
You're violent, you're erratic, you're just completely 
unpredictable. (73) 
But the greatest impediment to Davies' admittance into 
the brother-relationship is his complete incapability of 
entering into and sharing their individual life-lies--for 
which both brothers, not least Mick, seek the nourishment 
of outside approval. Unable to listen to other people's 
dreams, Davies feels outrageously ignored when he dis- 
covers that Aston has quietly slipped out of the room 
during his own ramblings-on about his journey to Sidcup: 
"Christ: That bastard, he ain't even listening to me! " (66). 
The lumber-filled room in The Caretaker serves a 
function not unlike that of the attic in The Wild Duck. 
All three characters in the play live, like Hjalmar Ekdal, 
on a life-lie. For Aston all the useless rubble are things 
that might come in handy for when he gets his shed built. 
For Mick the room serves as a possibility of conversion 
into a dream of a penthouse palace. And for Davies it 
represents the world of material possession and social 
respectability he longs to enter, and which makes the 
journey to Sidcup seem eminently worth while. But all 
these dreams, like Hjalmar's prospective "invention, " are 
merely the carrot before the donkey, the make-believe 
"purpose" by which incurable idlers try to mask their 
redundancy. The lumber-room,. like the attic, is the 
visual symbol of the never-to-be-realised life-lies of 
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crippled selves. But precisely because these crippled 
creatures are capable of inventing life-lies for them- 
selves they are destined for living. Pinter reveals that 
he had originally thought of ending the play with the 
violent death of the tramp at the hand of one of the 
brothers, "But then I realised, when I got to the point, 
that the characters as they had groom could never act in 
this way. "28 They are all unheroic dreamers for whom 
such an act of courage or desperation would be quite out 
of character. Like Hjalmar Ekdal, the crippled dreamers 
in The Caretaker would not only lack the courage to put 
a pistol to their head, they would not even see the point 
of such an action, for none of them demands with Hedda 
Gabler that life should be lived heroically and beauti- 
fully. For Hedda the purpose and quality of life are more 
important than staying alive, and being a barren tree 
unable to invest her life with significance, she faces 
death as the only option. Pinter's dreamers accept, like 
Hjalmar Ekdal. that life is for living, and proceed to 
invent "purposes" to justify their continued existence. 
Peer Gynt believed he was destined for greatness, but 
went "round about" because he was a dreamer who expected 
to gain all for nothing, and discovered at the end of his 
quest that the Gyntish Self was a non-self. Davies knows 
full well that there are no papers at Sidcup to prove his 
identity, and he therefore makes endless detours in order 
not to arrive, for he dare not destroy the precious illu- 
sion that keeps him alive. Peer Gynt finds a spurious 
"salvation" in returning to his origin, to his native 
valley and to Solveig, the virgin-mother. Davies, when 
irrevocably rejected by the only person who might have 
saved him, has nowhere and no one to return to. His 
origin belongs to a nebulous past beyond recall. Coming 
from nowhere and with nowhere to go Pinter's tramp is 
condemned to circle forever round a non-existent Sidcup. 
The Caretaker has an all-male cast. Only in Aston's 
case are we aware of woman in the background. She is 
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present as the dominating mother figure who betrayed him, 
and the whore who wanted to have a look at his body. In 
The Homecoming, however, Pinter has made woman in the 
person of Ruth, the centre around which the play revolves. 
The Homecoming (1965) is on the surface a natura- 
listic play, presenting what seems a totally realistic 
situation. No unverifiable mystery surrounds any of the 
characters. Their individual and family background is 
substantially accounted for. Pinter has used the familiar 
Ibsen method of revealing the past retrospectively, not 
merely for the sake of naturalistic verisimilitude, but 
because, like Ibsen, he sees the past as an inevitable 
part of the present. In The Homecoming the ghosts of the 
past are as powerfully present in the lives of the living 
as in Ghosts or Rosmershoim. Jessie, the dominating 
mother of the family, has been dead some years, but still 
exerts her dominance in the memory, the attitudes, and 
the reactions of each of the male members of the family. 
Whereas Osborne's indebtedness to Ibsen seems an 
established fact, most critics of Pinter have been so 
preoccupied with his relationship to Beckett and the 
Absurdists that they have not yet got round to discover- 
ing his similarities to Ibsen and Strindberg. One of the 
few who have is Arthur Ganz. He argues that Pinter, of 
all the major modern playwrights, is the one most closely 
allied to Ibsen "in certain essentials": 
Pinter shares with Ibsen a kind of grim humor, but more 
significantly, an essentially ambiguous view of the human 
condition. Both have given us figures possessed by a 
desire for self-aggrandizement, dominance, fulfillment, 
yet forever held back in a state of psychic paralysis. 
If he were not still trailing some clouds of Faustian 
glory, the Laster Builder might find a place in a Pinter 
play; Hilda \Vangel, the embodiment of feminine power, 
would probably not object to making certain contractual 
arrangements with Lenny and his family in The Homecoming. 
For the creators of Solness and Davies, of Hid a and Ruth, 
are both attracted by the power of the vital inner self 
and repelled by its ruthlessness. 29 
Ganz's comparison of Pinter and Ibsen as regards their 
ambiguous view of the human condition, and their being 
311 
both attracted and repelled by. the dark forces of the 
subconscious, the vital inner self--or what Ibsen would 
call the troll-self--is a valid and interesting one. It 
does not follow, however, that any of Ibsen's characters 
might find a place in a Pinter play, or vice versa. The 
Master Builder, if stripped of his vestiges of "Faustian 
glory, " might well fit a Pinter play, but the argument is 
irrelevant, since such a character would not be Ibsen's 
Master Builder. The comparison of Hilde Wangel with 
Pinter's Ruth as "the embodiment of feminine power, " and 
the suggestion that she might not be averse to making 
certain contractual arrangements with Lenny and family, 
are fallacious for the same reason. Hilde Wangel is not 
only a very different character from Ruth, but she exists 
on a different level altogether. Ruth is the embodiment 
of Woman in all her traditional roles, and she is to each 
male in the family what he desires her to be. Ruth repre- 
sents the basic, primitive life-force, the earth-mother. 
Hilde Wangel is the embodiment of Youth rather than of 
feminine power, neither of which are important in them- 
selves. It is through youth and femininity combined with 
an indomitable will-power that Hilde exercises an inexor- 
able influence over the Master Builder. As an individual 
Hilde has sprung from the same mould as Brand. She is an 
uncompromising idealist whose "all or nothing" proves 
just as destructive as Brand's--not to herself, but to 
the Master Builder whom she entices to attempt "the 
impossible" on her behalf. When Solness plunges to his 
death Hilde cries in "desperate triumph": "But he reached 
quite to the top. And I heard harps in the air. C"". J 
I --my Master Builder! " (XII, 122). Hilde has realised 
"the impossible" through Solness's triumphant feat, and 
she has gained the victory that was denied to Hedda 
Gabler of seeing her hero die. beautifully. Hilde regards 
herself as a liberator. She has come to free Solness 
from his sickly conscience and his self-reproach which 
have crippled his artistic creativity. She invites him 
to seek freedom in that conscience-less pagan joy of 
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life which she represents, and under her spell he reaches 
the t. op, to voice his rebellion against the Almighty. 
His fall from the -tower signifies that the Galilean has 
won, as he inevitably must with Ibsen, because the urge 
for self-torment and self-sacrifice is greater than the 
demand for self-liberation. Ibsen was too much of a Puri- 
tan at heart ever to be convinced that true selfhood 
could be achieved other than through suffering and self- 
denial. But to suggest, as Arthur Ganz does, that Hilde 
might take the place of Ruth in Pinter's play is to mis- 
interpret her role and character altogether. Hilde's 
proud sexuality is not of the kind that would stoop to 
satisfying the lusts of a crippled humanity like that of 
The Homecoming. Hilde is the Poet's muse, and as such 
she is both his liberator and destroyer, for in Ibsen's 
pattern the liberation of the artist means the inevitable 
destruction of the man, since life and art cannot be 
reconciled. But Hilde is also very much an individual in 
her own right who tries, like Hedda Gabler, to realise 
herself vicariously through her hero. Indeed she comes 
to Solness not to give but to demand, to claim her castle 
and her kingdom. In that sense she is not unlike Ruth, 
who turns out to be more demanding than the family had 
bargained for. But Hilde would not fit into any of the 
roles Ruth embodies. She is neither mother, wife, nor 
whore. Ruth belongs entirely to the earth. Hilde builds 
castles in the air. She demands from her Master Builder 
a castle that stands on a high hill and has a fright- 
fully high tower with a balcony on the top: "I shall 
stand up there and look at all the others--at those who 
build churches. And homes for mother and father and 
their whole troop of children. And you shall come up 
and look down at them too" (XII, l09). 
In their attitude to, and treatment of, women Ibsen 
and Pinter could hardly be further apart. Pinter's view 
of woman is much closer to that of Beckett and Strind- 
berg. Ibsen's women are individuals, and in comparison 
with the men who surround them, exceptional individuals. 
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Strindbergs, Becketts, and Pinter's women, while more 
or less individualised, are essentially embodiments of 
the female sex. In To Damascus I the Lady's mother asks 
the Unknown: "Why do you call Ingeborg Eve? " To which 
the Unknown replies: "By inventing a name for her I made 
her mine, just as I mean to recreate her as I wish her 
to be" (XXIX, 72). But the Mother, who can read his 
thoughts, discerns a darker purpose: "In your own image. ' 
(Laughing. ) I have heard that country witches carve 
images of their victims and give them the names of those 
they want to bewitch. Thus you intend through this self- 
created Eve of yours to destroy her whole sex" (72-73). 
Strindberg's Lady, like Pinter's Ruth, embodies all the 
traditional roles of mother, wife, mistress, although 
not degraded like Ruth to a common prostitute. As the 
virgin-mother the Lady is a saviour figure. As the demand- 
ing mistress asserting a will of her own, she becomes a 
dangerous vampire. Being woman, rather than an individual, 
the Lady shares with Ruth woman's chameleon changeability 
in being what the man wants her to be. Nor as woman is 
she the exclusive possession of one man. Before she met 
the Unknown, she had been the Doctor's wife, and the Un- 
known fears that she will in due, course leave him for 
someone else. As woman the Lady, like Ruth, is amoral. 
The Mother says of the Lady that "she has no scruples, 
no conscience" (72): "Have you ever known her to be 
ashamed of anything she has done, or suffer from a correc- 
tion? I never have. Yet she is not without shame, quite 
the reverse. And everything she does, however question- 
able, seems right for her" (69). The Lady is amoral 
because she has not yet eaten of the tree of knowledge. 
"One cannot be angry with her, " the Old Man says, because 
"she does not feel herself responsible [... 3 she seems 
self-less (s: jälvlö s) , or as if she were two persons, one 
who does nothing but ill, whilst the other gives absolu- 
tion ... " 
(69). It is only when she has read the Unknown's 
forbidden book and had her eyes opened to the existence 
of evil that she acquires an independent self and becomes 
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a threat to the Unknown's selfhood. But the threat is 
only felt by the Unknown himself. To the audience, the 
Lady remains impersonal, s, jälvlös. Everything she says 
and does reflects the Unknown's idea of woman. That is 
why he is never surprised by what she does. He has anti- 
cipated it all. Nora Helmer, on the other hand, acts as 
an individual, and Thorvald is dumbfounded because his 
prejudices about woman have been devastatingly shattered. 
Pinter's characters do not rise to the level of 
good and evil. Whereas Strindberg's Lady is amoral in a 
metaphysical sense, in not being conscious of sin, Ruth 
is amoral only in the sense of not identifying with the 
social moral code by which the rest of the family define 
themselves--"every single bit" of which, according to 
Max, "was taught to them by their mother" (46). Max's 
compliment to Jessie is a very doubtful one tinder the 
circumstances, and testifies to her immorality rather 
than her amorality. The distinction between the two is 
an uneasy one. But just as the Unknown, as opposed to 
the Lady, is a "sinner" because he is conscious of good 
and evil and therefore is a responsible individual, so 
the men in The Homecoming, as opposed to Ruth, are 
immoral rather than amoral because they are conscious of, 
or as Max says, "live by" a moral code. When Max a little 
later refers to Jessie as "a slutbitch of a wife" (47) 
he passes a moral judgement. It is the men's attitude to 
woman, rather than her acceptance of the various roles 
she is cast in, that the audience finds "shocking, " or 
"unnatural, " or "incomprehensible, " not least Teddy's 
detached acquiescence to the family taking over his wife 
on such morally reprehensible terms. Ruth is impersonal 
because, like the Lady, she has no scruples. She accepts 
her new role without questioning, qualms, or regrets. 
Like the Lady she is more a figment of the male imagina- 
tion than a person, embodying their prejudices about, and 
expectations of, woman. Our "human" interest is concen- 
trated on the men because their attitudes, reactions, and 
passions are recognisably "human, " albeit those of a 
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degenerate humanity. 
Walter Kerr points out that The Homecoming is an 
extended treatment of the theme of A Slight Ache (1961), 
which he sums up as the contrast between identity as 
movement and identity as category, with the woman repre- 
senting identity as movement and the man being the cate- 
gorist. 
3o Flora and Edward reveal their contrasting 
identities in their different reactions to the dumb 
match-seller. Edward is a philosopher, engaged in cate- 
gorising and conceptualising reality. He devotes all his 
energy to subjecting existence, the whole of it, to the 
laws of logicality. We learn that he has been "engaged 
on the dimensionality and continuity of space ... and 
time ... for years" 
(17). The match-seller poses a-threat 
to Edward because he does not conform to the laws of 
logicality. It is not logical for a match-seller to place 
himself at the back gate in an unused lane where he is 
never likely to sell a single box of matches. Edward 
finally insists on inviting him in, determined to fix 
the uncomfortable intruder within the context of the com- 
prehensible. But the mute match-seller eludes definition 
and categorisation. Edward is forced to confess: "In fact 
every time I have seen you you have looked quite diffe- 
rent to the time before" (37). By his muteness the match- 
seller breaks down Edward's rational identity. Unable to 
elicit any comprehensible response to his self-confessions 
--for he is never sure whether the match-seller is laugh- 
ing at him or weeping in pity--Edward's pompous ego 
shrinks to an impotent whisper: "Who are you? " (39). 
Flora'. s approach is entirely non-rational. She asks no 
questions. She conquers the match-seller and takes posses- 
sion of him simply by embracing him and giving him a name. 
She is, as Kerr says, "open to him and to his possibility. , 
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Placing the match-seller's tray in Edward's hands she 
installs the newcomer in her husband's place. Kerr sums 
up: "She has been one thing; without hesitation, she 
moves forward to become another. Questions of identity-- 
her own, or anyone else's--do not concern her, as they 
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have so concerned her husband. She is what she finds it 
within herself to be, she is the movement she finds 
herself making. "32 
In The Homecoming Ruth challenges the fixed assump- 
tions of the men about the rationality and definability 
of existence--that a table is a table: 
Don't be too sure though. You've forgotten something. 
Look at me. I .. move my leg. That's all it is. But I 
wear ... ttndervear ... which moves with me ... it ... 
captures your attention. Perhaps you misinterpret. The 
action is simple. It's a leg ... moving. My lips move. 
Why don't you restrict ... your observations to that? 
Perhaps the fact that they move is more significant ... 
than the words which come through them. You must bear 
that ... possibility ... in mind. 
(52-53) 
As Walter Kerr observes, Ruth, like Elora, "continues to 
become her identity. "33 Woman's identity is movement. 
Teddy, like Edward in A Slight Ache, is a philosopher 
who cannot cope with reality unless it can be defined 
and objectified. The discovery of Ruth's fluid identity, 
her ability to move out of one role into another without 
any need to rationalise or justify her existence, shocks 
Teddy into paralytic inaction. He has always seen her as 
a wife and mother, and as his exclusive possession. She 
is his wife and the mother of his children. He has fixed 
her in a specific role and believes that he thus posses- 
ses her as a defined and predictable object. When Ruth 
tells the family that she was different before she met 
Teddy, he protests: "No you weren't. You were the same" 
(5o). Teddy is an essentialist. He has based his exist- 
ence on the assumption that reality consists of definable 
essences, that people have fixed identities, and that 
once one has categorised a person he basically stays 
the 
same. Teddy cannot cope with change. He is pleased to 
find that "They haven't changed the lock" (2o), that 
"It's still there. My room. Empty. The bed's there" 
(21), 
and walking about the living-room that "Nothing's changed. 
Still the same" (22). He similarly expects that the 
family are the same, or tries to reassure himself that 
they are, when he assures Ruth, who has already told him 
317 
she is not nervous to meet them, that "They're very warm 
people, really. Very warm. They're my family. They're 
not ogres" (23). The revelation of Ruth's indefinability 
is a threat to Teddy's very existence, and he can only 
preserve his, "intellectual equilibrium" by elevating him- 
self to the position of a detached observer and reducing 
his family to objects lost in the movement of existence: 
You wouldn't understand my works. C... J You'd be lost. 
It's nothing to do with the question of intelligence. 
It's a way of being able to look at the world. It's a 
question of how far you can operate on things and not 
in things. C... ] To see, to be able to see! I'm the one 
who can see. C... I You're just objects. You just ... 
move about. I can observe it. I can see what you do. 
It's the same as I do. But you are lost in it. You won't 
get me being ... I won't be lost in it. (61-62) 
Teddy's impotent abandoning of his wife to the lusts and 
greeds of a bunch of degenerate males, albeit his own 
family,, is not so unnatural, considering how alien Ruth 
must seem after the shattering revelation of her chame- 
leon identity. He pleads with her to return with him to 
the clean, rational America where he had the movement of 
existence firmly under control: "You can help me with my 
lectures when we get back. I'd love that" (55). But to 
Ruth the "clean, " passionless, smug, intellectual world 
of the university campus is a desiccated insect land. 
She has rediscovered her roots in the embrace of Teddy's 
carnal family, and means to stay. The befouled waters of 
crude passions in the old world are her true source of 
life. She accepts the invitation to become communal wife, 
mistress, and mother to the family, not out of charity, 
but because she has a primitive, animal thirst to be 
slaked as great as theirs. 
The father and the two brothers, having discovered 
that Ruth is an available experience to anybody prepared 
to grab his chance, treat her as a possibility to be ex- 
ploited, a commodity to be bought and sold. For Lenny 
who, in his imagination at least, is viciously aggres- 
sive towards women, Ruth is a commercial proposition. 
Max wants her as a replacement wife to relieve him of 
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the household chores, and as mistress to restore his 
youth and masculinity. Joey is not yet as cynical and 
commercial in his attitude towards woman as the other 
two. To him Ruth is both mother and mistress, and he 
objects fiercely to having to share her with "yobs. " Sam, 
the sexless bachelor, is the only member of the family 
who treats Ruth courteously. But he goes to the other 
extreme of denying woman her humanness by putting her on 
a pedestal. He has been stubbornly idolising Jessie 
despite his awareness of her sexual infidelities. When 
his idealised image of woman is debased again by Max's 
outrageous proposal to Ruth, Sam takes revenge on Max 
by blurting our the secret about Jessie and MacGregor. 
Max's angry accusation that Sam has a diseased imagina- 
tion is an ironic comment on the whole bunch of depraved 
humanity that the family of The Homecomin represents. 
Ruth, however, turns out to be more unpredictable than 
the family had bargained for. She emerges as a power not 
to be commanded, but to command. After a roll about on 
the sofa with Joey, Ruth suddenly pushes him away and 
demands: "I'd like something to eat. (To LENNY. ) I'd like 
a drink. Did you get any drink? [... J Well, get it. [... ] 
What's this glass. I can't drink out of this. Haven't you 
got a tumbler? [... ] Well, put it in a tumbler. [... ] 
Rocks? What do you know about rocks? " (6o-61). When it 
comes to negotiating the business agreement with the 
family, Ruth drives a hard bargain. And in the final 
scene she turns out to be choosy and may not consent to 
bestow her favours equally on the various members of the 
family. Max is weakening at the knees when he realises 
that they have a got a new Jessie on their hands, who 
will dominate them completely: "She'll use us, she'll 
make use of us, I can tell you! I can smell it. ' You want 
to bet? Pause. She won't ... be adaptable! " The scene 
ends with Max on his knees before Ruth's chair whimpering 
for recognition: "I'm not an old man. He looks up at her. 
Do you hear me? He raises his face to her. Kiss me" (82- 
83). 
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Prom appearing to be a "wide open" possibility, a 
compliant object for their lusts and greeds, Ruth has 
become a vampire intent on exploiting to her best advan- 
tage this ensemble of starved males grasping for her 
favours. She quickly realises her powerful position, not 
only as the sole female in their midst, but as Jessie's 
successor. This crippled family of males are, for all 
their blustering illusions of male superiority, easily 
broken into submission because it is inbred in them. They 
cannot shake off the ghosts of the past. Jessie's dicta- 
torial power over the family--Max describes her as a 
woman "with a will of iron, a heart of gold and a mind" 
(46)--has destroyed their manhood and crippled their 
egos, and made it easy for Ruth, as the new Jessie, to 
assert her female dominance over the male household. But 
Ruth, despite her independence of will, remains, like 
Strindberg's Lady, essentially Woman. She seems less 
"real" than any of the male characters. Ruth is "human" 
only in the sense that her personality is dominated by 
a powerful sexuality. She is'the creation of male sexual 
fantasy, and as such defines herself not as a person but 
as a sexual object. She draws the men's attention to her 
moving leg, her underwear, her lips: "Why don't you 
restrict ... your observations to that? " 
(53). The role 
of prostitute comes as natural to her as being a mother. 
She has no moral scruples because she does not exist on 
the level of right and wrong. The men are more credible 
as people because they recognise a moral code and react 
with recognisable human emotions. Max tries very hard to 
create a picture of Jessie as a virtuous wife and ideal 
mother, and understandably reacts violently when reminded 
that she was no paragon of virtue. Sam collapses after 
having unburdened himself of the secret about Jessie and 
MacGregor. Yet however much he has suffered from seeing 
his idealised image of womanhood shattered, woman, in 
his eyes, must be exempt from blame. It is the man who is 
the villain. Sam calls MacGregor "a lousy stinking rotten 
loudmouth. A bastard uncouth sodding runt" (18). Teddy 
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reacts in an equally human manner to the bewildering 
revelation of Ruth's "unfaithfulness. " He withdraws into 
the "cleaner" world of the intellect because he cannot 
cope with the unpredictable passions of ordinary mortals. 
Lenny and Joey find an outlet for their understandable 
hatred of women--considering that their mother very 
likely was a prostitute--in boasting about beating and 
raping women, and there would be no revenge in such acts 
if they were not conscious of defying a moral code. 
The men do not seek in Ruth merely the gratification 
of their sexual needs. She becomes the centre of their 
self-identification, just as Jessie was before her. It 
is in relation to woman that the men in The Homecoming 
measure their egos. Max boasts about his association 
with the hated MacGregor. Sam has his myth about being 
the best chauffeur in the firm. Teddy has written learned 
books that nobody else understands. Lenny has flats all 
around Soho, and Joey dreams of becoming a professional 
boxer. But these ego-boosting myths impress no one except 
the myth-maker himself, because they have no. common point 
of reference. It is only in woman that the family have a 
common measure for their egos, and it is in vying with 
each other for her favours that they can assert their 
egos against one another. Teddy attributes his success- 
ful life in America not to his academic achievements but 
to his exemplary wife: "She's a great help to me over 
there. She's a wonderful wife and mother. She's a very 
popular woman. She's got lots of friends" (5o). Sam 
claims recognition for his courteous behaviour towards 
Jessie when she was trusted to his care: "You wouldn't 
have trusted any of your other brothers. You wouldn't 
have trusted Mac, would you? But you trusted me. I want 
to remind you" (18). Max's great moment of glory is the 
night he entered into association with a group of top- 
class butchers and was able to indulge in a demonstration 
of generosity towards Jessie and the boys: "I tell you, 
it was like Christmas" (46). And Ruth's compliment on 
his cooking is a boost to Max's ego that must not pass 
321 
unrecorded: "(To the others. ) Did you hear that? " (45). 
Lenny and Joey indulge in destructive fantasies about 
conquering Wvo, u(; n by violating them in the most degrading 
manner. But a closer look at their relationship with 
women reveals that the family in The Homecoming; are all 
sexual cripples. Sam has remained a bachelor because he 
never got over the shock of Jessie's unfaithfulness. Max 
knows he was outrivalled by MacGregor and refers to his 
own sons as "three bastard sons" (47). The unimpassioned, 
academic Teddy is incapable of satisfying the sexually 
demanding Ruth, and may, like Max, be the father of three 
bastard sons. Lenny is in the business of sex, but proves 
inadequate to meeting Ruth's sexual challenge. She quick- 
ly asserts her female dominance simply by calling him 
Leonard, the name his mother gave him. Joey has Ruth in 
bed for two hours, without success. Yet Joey is content: 
"Sometimes ... you can be happy ... and not go the whole 
hog. Now and again ... you can be happy ... without going 
any hog" (68). The crippled males around Ruth's chair are 
not merely pleading for her sexual favours, but for the 
"salvation" of their emasculated egos. 
The characters in The Homecoming are not concerned 
with identity in the same sense that Ibsen's characters 
are. They are not searching for their "true" selves in a 
metaphysical or an existential sense. Their egos can only 
be defined in terms of the Gyntish Self of "wishes, 
desires, and appetites. " But none of the characters in 
The HomecominE, is, like Peer Gynt, preoccupied with the 
uniqueness of his individual ego. Nor do their desires 
and appetites in any way match those of Peer Gynt in 
range and colourfulness. When Max crawls before Ruth 
whimpering for a kiss, he is not, like Peer in Solveig's 
lap, anxious to prove the uniqueness of his self, but 
only to prove that he is not too old to win a woman's 
favours. To be declared "sexless" in this male household 
is to be annihilated. Ruth ignores his plea. She bestows 
all her favours on the youngest, the son and lover who 
was not prepared to share her with "yobs. " 
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In Old Times (1971) the battle of the sexes assumes 
a pattern more directly reminiscent of Strindberg in 
that the struggle between Dooley and Anna for the posses- 
sion of Kate is not just a struggle for sexual dominance, 
but a battle between two people for the recognition of 
their individual identities--although the exchange of 
possessive reminiscences between Deeley and Anna dwindles 
to a parlour game compared with the savage battle of 
wills in The Father and The Dance of Death. Deeley and 
Anna, like all Pinter characters, are incapable of good 
and evil and consequently of projecting the intense 
hatred that flashes like lightening between Strindberg's 
contesting egos. But they are capable of fear and aggres- 
sion, and behind the strained politeness and the meaning- 
less pleasantries Deeley can barely restrain the brutali- 
ty of the jealous male, and Anna conceal the insidious 
destructiveness of the female. 
Both Dooley and Anna cling to memory as the one in- 
disputable guarantee of identity. Moreover, like other 
Pinter characters, they refuse to face the challenge of 
the hazardous present and seek instead to fix their 
identities in a happier period in the past. For both 
Dooley and Anna this happier era is intimately connected 
with Kate and can only be recaptured through her. She is 
the only one who can verify that past, and with it their 
own identities. But why, if she is part of their common 
past, do Dooley and puma vie with each other for the 
exclusive possession of Kate? The reason is partly that 
in reliving the past they are reliving the battle between 
themselves for the sexual possession of Kate. But they 
also refuse to share Kate because she is the guarantor 
of their individual identities. 
Deeley's suspicion of a lesbian relationship between 
Anna and Kate is not entirely, unfounded, although Kate's 
insistence that Anna borrow her underwear for the boys 
to gaze at need mean no more than that she experienced a 
sexual thrill vicariously through Anna. However, both 
Anna and Dooley speak of Kate in overtly sexual terms, 
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and both want to possess her as an object, will-less and 
completely subservient to their own egos, -for only as an 
object is she compliant with their own wistful memories 
of the past. If they allowed her an independent existence 
she might, as indeed she does, become a threat to their 
own identities by refusing to verify the past as they 
want to remember it. Kate protests: "You talk of me as 
if I were dead" (34). Deeley's "categorical pronounce- 
ment" on Kate's character, when he first met her, testi- 
fies to her independence of mind, although Deeley himself 
attributes her refusal to comply to the fact that she did 
not know her own mind. He describes her as "a slip of a 
girl [... ] who lacked any sense. of fixedness, any sense 
of decisiveness, but was compliant only to the shifting 
winds, with which she went, but not the winds, and 
certainly not my winds, such as they are, but I suppose 
winds that only she understood, and that of course with 
no understanding whatsoever" 
. 
(35-36). Again the man 
reveals himself as the categoriser, unable to cope with 
woman's changeability, and dismissing the problem as "a 
classic female posture, one way or the other long out- 
worn" (36). Both Deeley and Anna cherish the image of 
Kate as a dreamer rapt in her own thoughts and allowing 
herself to be handled, fussed over, pampered, and moulded 
in the image of her possessor, like a doll. But Kate 
refuses to be "owned, " and rejects the image they are 
trying to impose upon her, protesting: "My head is quite 
fixed. I have it on" (24). When it comes to verifying 
the past, Kate proves singularly unhelpful. On Deeley's 
probing into her past relationship with Anna she volun- 
teers only one, unflattering, piece of information: "She 
was a thief. She used to steal things. C... ] Bits and 
pieces. Underwear" (lo). And when he asks whether she 
looks forward to seeing Anna, "she replies decisively "No" 
(11). Their past relationship has, as far as Kate is con- 
cerned, no relevance to the present: "I hardly remember 
her. I've almost totally forgotten her" (12). Anna steps 
into the action from her motionless apartness by the 
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window with a sentimental monologue on the happy time 
she and Kate had as "girls together" in London. But for 
Kate, who has no wish to return to the past, London 
loses in comparison with the countryside where she is 
living at present.. "The only nice thing about a big city 
is that when it rains it blurs everything" (59). Anna is 
a cultural and social snob. She revels in memories of 
how they went to concerts, and "sat up half the night 
reading Yeats" (22). She professes herself doubly 
delighted that Katey has found a husband who shares her 
interest in the arts. But Kate will not be pinned down 
and labelled. She has moved forward to new interests; 
"I was interested once in the arts, but I can't remember 
now which ones they were" (37). Nor, as it turns out, is 
Deeley the most commendable representative of the arts: 
"I have indeed been associated with substantial numbers 
of articulate and sensitive people, mainly prostitutes 
of all kinds" (42). Deeley takes brutal delight in pin- 
pricking Anna's snobbishness, and when he claims to re- 
member her from the Wayfarers Tavern with a whole crowd 
of "poets, stunt men, jockeys, stand-up comedians, that 
kind of setup" (49), Anna refuses to share his memory. 
With his detailed account of his skirt-gazing exploits 
at the Wayfarers Tavern Deeley seeks not only to devalue 
Anna's memories of the past, but to subdue and denigrate 
the female sex in order to prove his male superiority. 
lie does not realise that he is at the same time debasing 
himself in the eyes of the women by revealing that he 
has had to content himself with lecherous gazes. Anna 
has already shown that she is capable of using the same 
weapon of denigration against Deeley, in telling the 
story about "This man crying in our room" (32). She says 
it may never have happened, but she has the power to 
make it happen. As she recalls the story so it takes 
place. She found him crumpled up in an armchair, sobbing, 
because he had been rejected by Kate. But when he came 
over-to Anna's bed for comfort, she "would have nothing 
to do with him, absolutely nothing" (32). When she woke 
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up later in the night she saw him lying across Kate's 
lap on her bed. Kate rejected his demanding masculinity 
but accepted him as a helpless child she could take pity 
on and comfort. Pinter's women will only bestow their 
favours on a man when they have reduced him to a child 
they can mother and dominate. Kate says to Deeley about 
Anna, as if she were talking about herself: "She found 
your face very sensitive, vulnerable. [... ] She wanted 
to comfort it, in the way only a woman can. [... ] She 
was prepared to extend herself to you" (7o). 
Pinter's picture of the dominating, mothering female 
and the humiliated, childlike male sobbing for her recog- 
nition puts us in mind of Strindberg's The Father (1887). 
Laura has broken the Captain's resistance by sowing doubt 
about the paternity of their only child. Fearing for his 
sanity the proud soldier is brought whimpering to his 
knees, begging her to take pity on him and relieve him 
of his misery: "Can't you see I'm as helpless as a child? 
Can't you hear I'm whimpering as to a mother? -Try to 
forget that I am a man, a soldier, who by a single word 
can tame men and beasts. I lay down all tokens of power 
and cry for mercy--cry that you let me live" (XXIII, 65). 
Laura has gained the upper hand and is prepared to extend. 
her motherly affection to the helpless child: "Weep then, 
my child, and you will have your mother with you again" 
(66). She admits that she loved him for his childlike 
dependence on her, while as the lover needing to assert 
his masculine power he only aroused her hatred and revul- 
sion: "You cannot have failed to notice that when your 
feelings changed and you approached me as a lover, I felt 
ashamed, and the joy of being in your embrace turned to 
guilt--as if my very blood felt ashamed" (67). Laura 
rejects the grovýn-up man for two reasons. She resents 
male dominance, but is also unable--as was Strindberg 
himself--to reconcile the mistress with the mother. The 
mother turning mistress cannot overcome the shame and 
guilt of incest. 
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Kate and Laura are alike in being unable to accept 
the passionate side of their selves, and their frigidity 
is imputed to their religious upbringing. Anna ascribes 
young Kate's excessive shyness to the fact that she is 
a parson's daughter, "and indeed there was a good deal. 
of Bronte about her" (64). Laura is a parson's sister 
and fights the free-thinking Captain because she wants a 
religious education for her child. Kate appears to accept 
the role of mistress only when she can enjoy it vicarious- 
ly through Anna. Like Laura, she can only respond to the 
man when she has reduced him to a sobbing child. In the 
role of mother she is his superior. As mistress she is a 
slave to his male ego. That is why Kate, like Laura, 
rejects the lover. She will be nobody's possession. Anna 
explains what she meant by associating Kate with Bronte: 
"I did not think she was Bronte in passion but only in 
secrecy, in being so stubbornly private" (64). 
Laura destroys the Captain by depriving him of his 
only hope of immortality, the extension of his self in 
the child. Seeing the child not as a person in her own 
right but as a continuation of his own self, the Captain 
wants to mould her in his own image: 
THE CAPTAIN: I want you to love me only! You must 
have only one soul, or you wilYnever have peace, 
nor will I. You must have only one mind, you 
child of my mind, only one will, mine. 
BERTHA :I don't want that !I want to be myself 
THE CAPTAIN: I won't let you. I am a cannibal, you 
see, and I shall devour you. Your mother wanted 
to devour me, but I wouldn't let her. C... 3 To 
eat or to be eaten, that is the question. (XXIII, 87) 
Deeley and Anna fight for the exclusive possession of 
Kate, as Laura and the Captain do over Bertha. But Kate 
has Bertha's stubborn will to be herself combined with 
Laura's power to destroy her would-be possessors. 
Whereas the Captain seeks to extend his self into an 
"immortal" future, Deeley and Anna seek their identities 
in the past. By refusing to recognise the past Kate has 
the power to "kill" them, to destroy their identities. 
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Kate "kills" Anna in a long monologue on how she 
remembered Anna dead: 
I remember you lying dead. You didn't know I was watch- ing you. I leaned over you. Your face was dirty. [... ] When you woke my eyes were above you, staring down at 
you. You tried to do my little trick, one of my tricks 
you had borrowed, my little slow smile C... J but it 
didn't work, the grin only split the dirt at the sides 
of your mouth and stuck. You stuck in your grin. [... ] 
There was no suffering. It had all happened elsewhere. 
Last rite^ I did not feel necessary. Or any celebration. 
I felt the time and season appropriate and that by 
dying alone and dirty you had acted with proper decorum. 
It was time for my bath. (71-72) 
For Kate the bath is a symbolic act. She has washed off 
the past and lives purified in the present. But the 
"death" of Anna, and the ritual bath, may also signify 
Kate's rejection of her passionate self, the role of 
mistress she had acted vicariously through Anna. This 
interpretation is substantiated by the fact that when 
Deeley expects her to be sexually forthcoming, Kate 
takes some dirt from the windowbox and plasters his face 
with it. Deeley's "death" denotes her rejection of the 
lover. Kate takes revenge upon her possessors by divest- 
ing herself of the mistress's part, thus depriving them 
of the object of their desire. 
On the naturalistic level Kate and Anna are two 
separate characters with distinctly different personali- 
ties. On a metaphoric level, however, the two characters 
may represent different aspects of the same woman, or 
simply of Woman. Martin Esslin suggests that the play 
might be a dream, a nightmare of Deeley's. 
34 Esslin does 
not see the two women as aspects of one self, or of the 
female character, but in Deeley's mind the two women are 
repeatedly confused. Describing how he first met Kate at 
a cinema where he went to see Odd Man Out, Deeley 
insists: "And there was only one other person in the 
cinema, one other person in the whole of the whole cine- 
ma, and there she is. And there she was, very dim, very 
still, placed more or less I would say at the dead centre 
of the auditorium. I was off centre and have remained so" 
(29-3o). 
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By Anna's account, however, the two girls went together 
"to some totally obscure, some totally unfamiliar dis- 
trict and, almost alone, saw a wonderful film called Odd 
Man Out" (38). The mingling of the two women's identities 
in Deeley's memory is again apparent in the passage where 
he recalls his first meeting with Anna at the Wayfarers 
Tavern: "She looked at me with big eyes, shy, all that 
bit. She was pretending to be you at the time. Did it 
pretty well. Wearing your underwear she was too, at the 
time. Amiably allowed me a gander. Trueblue generosity. 
E... 3 Maybe she was you. Maybe it was you, having coffee 
with me, saying so little, so little" (69). If Anna and 
Kate are to be regarded as different aspects of one 
woman, or as embodiments of the female character, -then 
Deeley is clearly the "odd man out. " Once Kate has eon- 
quered, and rejected, her passionate self--symbolically 
affirmed by Anna's "death"--Deeley becomes irrelevant to 
her life: "He would not let me dirty his face, or smudge 
it, he wouldn't let me. He suggested a wedding instead, 
and a change of environment. Slight pause. Neither 
mattered" (73). 
Strindberg's The Father is not written as a dream 
play, and there is no such overtly allegorical doubling 
of character as in his later dream plays--or indeed as 
in Pinter's play--but in the female menagerie of the 
Captain's household, where all the women stick together, 
the Captain is obsessively conscious of being the odd 
" man out. The Father is, if not a dream play, certainly a 
nightmare play. It is the nightmare of a paranoic, to 
whom all women are embodiments of the devil. Laura 
embodies the Captain's nightmare conception of woman as 
vampire, intent on sucking out of the man whatever she 
wants from him, and destroying him when he is no longer 
useful to her. Laura says to the Captain: "Now you have 
fulfilled your destiny as a father and family supporter, 
a function that unfortunately is a necessary one. You 
are no longer needed, and you must go" (7o-71). She 
"kills" the Captain by having him certified insane and 
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put into a strait-jacket. Kate "kills" the irrelevant 
Deeley by withdrawing into her own "stubbornly private" 
dream world where he no longer matters. But Kate is not 
like Laura a vampire. She does not "kill" in order to 
dominate, but in order not to be dominated. The vampire 
side of woman is represented by Anna, but her hunger for 
possession is directed towards Kate rather than towards 
Deeley. However, Pinter's "classic female" resembles 
Strindberg's in this, that she has power over the man 
not by virtue of her superior qualities but because of 
his weaknesses, the fact that he desires her and cannot 
do without her. Even when his old nurse has betrayed him 
by luring him into the strait-jacket, the Captain wants 
to lean his head on her breast: "Oh, how wonderful to 
fall asleep at a woman's breast, whether mother or 
mistress--but most wonderful at a mother's: " (94). Ruth 
in The Homecoming is needed as both mother and mistressp 
and like Laura plays her role for what she can get out 
of it. As Albert in ANight Out (196o) says when he 
tries to escape from the clutches of a dominating mother 
only to find himself saddled with a mothering prostitute 
who takes an interest in him because "There's something 
childish in your face, almost retarded" (81): "You're 
all the same, you see, you're all the same, you're just 
a dead weight round my neck" (83). 
Pinter's and Strindberg's women are victors in the 
sexual battle not merely because of the men's weaknesses, 
but because they have qualities of survival that the men 
lack, although Strindberg would not admit that these are 
superior qualities. When the old nurse has tricked him 
into the strait-jacket, the Captain cries: "Rude strength 
has given way before weakness fortified by treachery" (94). 
To Laura he says: "I don't care to live any longer. For a 
man cannot live without honour. " To which she replies: 
"But a woman can? " "Yes, " the Captain insists, "for she 
has her children but he hasn't" (68). For Strindberg, 
woman is the conqueror because she is "shameless, " for 
Pinter, because she is the more "adaptable. " The two 
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adjectives describe basically the same quality, but 
Strindberg passes a moral judgement, while Pinter does 
not. Woman is a conqueror and survivor because she can 
change her identity and play whatever role is the most 
advantageous at any time without, in Strindberg's ca. se, 
bothering about the right and wrong of what she is doing, 
or, in Pinter's case, attempting to define or justify 
her action. She instinctively is what the moment requires 
her to be. The man lacks this adaptability because, if 
he is a Strindberg character, he is burdened by doubts 
and guilt, and cannot live without honour, or, if he is 
a Pinter character, because he is so busy trying to con- 
vince the world of his identity that he gets stuck in a 
fixed definition of himself and is unable to cope with 
the unpredictable. Teddy in The Homecoming has defined 
himself as a philosopher, and is nonplussed by anything 
that does not fall within his academic province. Sam 
will never be anything but a chauffeur, or Max a butcher, 
or Lenny a pimp, or Joey a prospective boxer. Nor will 
Stanley in The Birthday Party be anything but a might- 
have-been concert pianist. When their fixed conceptions 
of themselves are challenged the men collapse. Woman's 
identity, on the other hand, is movement. The "classic 
female" does not stop to define herself. She lacks, as 
Deeley said of Kate, "any sense of fixedness, any sense 
of decisiveness, but C is3 compliant only to the shifting 
winds" (35). However, there are exceptions to this neat 
definition of man's and woman's essentially different 
identities. In Miss Julie, for instance, it is Jean, the 
valet, who is the "survivor, " because he has the shame- 
lessness of the slave. Miss Julie, the aristocrat, repre- 
sents the man's "weakness" of not being able to live 
without honour. But this is rather the exception that 
proves the rule, for Strindberg puts women and slaves in 
the same category. And Miss Julie is the "half-woman" 
who was brought up by her man-hating, emancipated mother 
to take the man's place. In Old Times Anna is the excep- 
tion to the rule that woman's identity is movement, for 
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she refuses to move out of the past and into the present. 
Hers is a Proustian attempt to recapture and relive what 
she once was. She has fixed her identity in that happier 
past when she and Kate were "girls together" in London. 
However, if seen not as an independent character but as 
an aspect of Kate's self, Anna represents the past that 
Kate has rejected. Thus she too is the exception that 
proves the Eule. Kate is the survivor because she is 
able to move with time. The play ends with Deeley 
slumped in the armchair, rejected, and Anna lying on the 
divan "dead, " while Kate is sitting upright, free to be 
herself in the present. 
Walter Kerr's argument that Pinter is the only 
existentialist playwright who writes existentially in 
that he does not conceptualise but allows his characters 
to arrive at their identities, begins to look a little 
less convincing when Pinter's "classic female 'figure" is 
compared to Ibsen's individualistic heroines', for what 
is the "classic female figure" if not a concept? It is 
true that Ruth represents identity as movement, but she 
does not represent movement in the existential sense of 
constantly moving into the unknown and undefined. Her 
existential possibilities are limited to the classic 
female roles of wife, mother, mistress. Her next move is 
unpredictable only within this strictly limited range of 
possibilities. Nora's identity may have been predefined 
in Ibsen's mind down to the last button, but the first 
audiences were certainly not prepared for the shock of 
witnessing a woman grow into an individual. Although 
Pinter's method of characterisation may be that of simply 
following the clues, his female characters, while more 
or less successfully detailed, are always recognisable 
as embodiments of Everywoman. Ibsen's method is, by Kerr's 
definition, essentialist because he begins with a syllo- 
gism, a theory, or some essential quality that he wants 
to illustrate. Yet none of Ibsen's heroines is reducible 
to a concept of Woman. Solveig in Peer Gynt is an obvious 
exception., She is the rather bloodless embodiment of 
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Woman as saviour. But Solveig is one with Ibsen's flesh 
and blood heroines in this, that she is concerned with 
realising her selfhood, while Pinter's women are pre- 
occupied with realising their womanhood. 
Three of Pinter's most successful plays have an all- 
male cast, The Dumb Waiter (196o), The Caretaker, and 
his latest play No Man's Land (1975). It is difficult to 
imagine him writing an equally memorable play with an 
all-female cast, for so far in his dramatic career Pinter 
has revealed himself--with Beckett and Osborne--as a more 
convincing delineator of male than of female characters. 
Whereas his male protagonists are remembered as particu- 
lar individuals irreducible to a common denominator, his 
female characters, while not quite interchangeable, never 
properly emerge as persons in their own right, except 
perhaps Rose in The Room (1957) and Meg in The Birthday 
Party, who have none of the inscrutable aloofness of 
Pinter's "classic female. " Meg, however, is very much the 
typical, dominating mother figure, and as such is one with 
the Mother in A Night Out and Jessie in The Homecoming. 
Strindberg has shown in such plays as The Father and 
The Dance of Death that conceptualised characters need 
not lack dramatic vitality. Having stripped his contest- 
ants in the sex battle down to their essential warring 
natures--weich in the case of the husbands is underlined 
by the fact that both are military men--Strindberg has 
created plays that quiver with the intensity of hateful 
passion. It is not as individualists in the Ibsenite 
sense that Laura and the Captain in The Father and 
Alice and Edgar in The Dance of Death impress themselves 
on our memories, but as monolithic egomaniacs. 
Laura and Alice are as closely akin, as interchange- 
able, as Pinter's Flora and Ruth, and are hardly more 
credible as persons in a naturalistic sense, and yet they 
have a flesh and blood reality that Pinter's women lack, 
because--although they are one-sidedly treacherous and 
tyrannical--they are fiercely passionate in their one- 
sidedness. Ruth is neither good nor evil. She commands 
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our attention as the only female in a household of males 
rather than by virtue of having a compelling personality. 
Ruth is neither an individualist nor an egomaniac. The 
fact that she manifests a will of her own does not make 
her an individual--any more than the Lady in To Damascus 
becomes an individual after having read the forbidden 
book. Ruth remains, like the Lady, a dream character, the 
statuesque image. of Woman, undifferentiated and identiti- 
less as she exists in the male imagination. Ruth commands, 
even less than the Lady, our human emotions because she 
herself does not react with ordinary human emotions. She 
neither loves nor hates. She is not jealous. She shows 
neither despair nor a sense of guilt. She is above the 
considerations of human morality. To describe Ruth as 
"inscrutable" would be'to suggest that she has unfathom- 
able depths of soul, while her "inscrutablility" is 
solely due to the fact that she has no soul to plumb. As 
a fiction of the male imagination Ruth has no more soul 
than the men are able to invest her with, which means 
that she is soulless, since they view her almost exclu- 
sively in physical terms, and are themselves a soulless 
humanity. We are reminded of the soulless Peer Gynt of 
Act IV who can promise Anitra only the tiniest soul, but 
after having weighed up the advantages and disadvantages 
of having a soul, decides that she is better off without 
one. "When one has a soul, " Peer muses, "one becomes 
absorbed/ In contemplation of one's self (VI9 164). Peer 
views Anitra entirely as a sexual object and as such she 
must be soulless and identitiless. "I, " he declares, 
"will take the place of your soul" (164). However, the 
fact that a character is soulless does not mean that he 
needs to be dramatically bloodless. Anitra has more flesh 
and blood reality than the soulful Solveig. All the male 
characters in The Homecoming are soulless characters, 
yet they come alive as persons in a sense that Ruth does 
not, because they react with recognisable human feelings, 
and are individualised by the feelings they express. 
A far cry from the eternal striving and metaphysical 
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passion of Brand and the Unknown, the "human" emotions 
of Pinter's crippled humanity are the gut-reactions of 
human animals. Philosophy, religion, morality exist in 
their consciousness merely as broken bits of meaningless 
bourgeois cliches, inapplicable to their animal existence. 
Teddy, the professional philospher, has to admit when 
confronted with the "real" life of his carnal family, 
that the question of "being and not-being" falls alto- 
gether outside his academic province. The entire house- 
hold of The Homecoming are defined in animal terms, and 
the animal imagery is not drawn from the nobler animals. 
Max, a butcher by trade, prides himself on having "an 
instinctive understanding of animals" (lo). "Bitch" 
serves as a term of approval as well as of abuse. Jessie 
"wasn't such a bad bitch" (9), or she was "a slutbitch of 
a wife" (47). By the same token Ruth is a "bitch" (42) 
to Max when he first sees her and believes she is "a 
filthy scrubber off the street" (42). When Joey has spent 
the afternoon upstairs with Ruth, Max tut-tuts: "She'll 
make us all animals" (68), yet he is the first to suggest 
that they should keep her. Lenny calls Max a "dog cook. " 
"Honest. You think you're cooking for a lot of dogs" (11). 
Sam is not even considered worthy of the designation 
"bitch" or "dog. " He is "just an old grub" (18), "a 
maggot" (19). And Teddy, when he refuses to put anything 
"in the kitty" to keep Ruth with the family, becomes 
"you lousy stinkpig" (71). 
Whereas Ruth's is the soullessness of the not quite 
human--because she remains emotionally aloof--Max's is 
the soullessness of the all too human. Max is brutish, 
boastful, vindictive, but also sentimental, despairing 
of growing old, and whimpering like a child for a mother's 
recognition. Maxis soulless not only because his emotions 
are primitive, but because he. is unconscious of man's 
spiritual dimension and ignorant of the concept of a soul. 
The soulless Peer Gynt of Act IV, while indulging the 
baser appetites of the Gyntish Self, is still conscious 
of the existence of the soul as the noble feature that 
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distinguishes man from beast. Peer is not only confident 
that he has a soul, "the spirit's light and knowledge" 
(VI, 161), but, in offering to share it with Anitra, that 
the Gyntian soul is big enough for both of them. The 
Button-Moulder, too, talks about the soul. "I have orders 
from the I-Taster/ To fetch your soul (S 'elen) without 
delay" (216). The Button-Moulder considers that the soul 
Peer was born with at least has scrap metal value and 
can be reused. The distinction between soul (sjel), 
spirit (and), and self (sely) in Peer Gynt is a confusing 
one, but seeing that the soul is something a person is 
born with, while the self is his own responsibility, the 
inference must be that the soul is the metal out of which 
every human being must fashion his personal self. God has, 
as it were, provided the ingredients. Man is responsible 
for the product. The soul is that which distinguishes 
Peer from the beasts; the self that which distinguishes 
Peer from Tom, Dick, and Harry. But Peer has lived like 
a beast because he has ignored the fact that he has been 
given a soul to develop, and has merely pandered to the 
instincts of the troll-ego. Max, on the other hand, is 
not conscious of having a soul, either to develop or 
ignore. Pinter depicts a humanity that has completely 
lost sight of the metaphysical, or even the spiritual 
dimension of existence, a humanity whose only distinction 
from the beasts is the fact that they communicate--or 
fail to--in words. At the end of The Birthday Party Stan- 
ley has even lost this distinction, which means that he 
is not only annihilated as an individual, but as a human 
being. Lenny is baiting Teddy with irrelevant philo- 
sophical questions like "Do you detect a certain logical 
incoherence in the central affirmations of Christian 
theism? " (51) and--with a satirical stab at Absurd 
Existentialism--"What do you make of all this business 
of being and not-being? " (52)" But these are intellectual 
quibbles that have no bearing on the life of any of the 
members of Max's household. By Hinchliffe's definition 
of Absurdity (quoted on page 171 above)-postulating 
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that God must be dead and that there must be no attempt 
to substitute a transcendent Alter Ego--Pinter is un- 
questionably a dramatist of the Absurd, for in Pinter's 
plays God is absolutely dead, and Christ is an empty 
swear-word. And no Pinter character feels the need, as 
do Vladimir and Estragon, to substitute a transcendent 
Alter Ego. 
A Pinter play always ends with the annihilation of 
some person's identity. But what does "identity" mean on 
the level of the barely human at which Pinter's charac- 
ters exist? Beckett's tramps, too, exist on the bottom 
rung of the human scale. Yet Pozzo recognises them, if 
hesitantly, as beings made in the image of God (23). 
Pinter's characters, however, live without the conscious- 
ness of a soul, without the' yearning for a transcendent 
reality, without a higher ideal to strive towards, with- 
out even asking, like Jimmy Porter, for good brave causes 
to identify themselves with.. In Pinter's plays the notion 
of man's essential, God-given self is so thoroughly dis- 
solved that man's identity is nothing but a bundle of 
instinctual drives and irrational fears, or more accu- 
rately, a bundle of memories, fears, and hatreds. In his 
search for identity a Pinter character is driven by un- 
defined fear rather than by an urge for self-assertion, 
and his "quest" is a fleeing from the reality of the 
self, not a seeking to achieve authentic selfhood. What 
is Stanley doing if not fleeing from the frightening 
reality of having to assert his self against the world, 
or society, or "the System"? Stanley's "crime" is funda- 
mentally the "crime" of refusing to grow up. This is not 
to minimise Stanley's terror, which is made very palpable 
to the audience by the menacing intrusion of Stanley's 
unverifiable enemies. Pinter's technique of externalising 
Stanley's primitive fear in the two mysterious and sinis- 
ter pursuers is similar to Ibsen's use in Peer Gynt of 
such mysterious figures as the Strange Passenger, the 
Button-Moulder, and the Lean One to exteriorise Peer's 
existential An st, the most ghoulish being the Strange 
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Passenger with his deathly appearance and "godless talk" 
about wanting to open up Peer's corpse for the purpose 
of uncovering the "seat of dreams. " But Ibsen's mythical 
figures do not have the same menacing emotional impact 
that Pinter's more palpably human furies have, for noz 
only are Stanley's enemies "real" people as well as 
"thoughts, " but they are themselves frightened people, 
haunted by undefined powers, so that the whole atmosphere 
of the play is imbued with fear and menace. And the fact 
that Meg, to whom Stanley has fled for comfort, is so 
completely oblivious of the terrors that are haunting 
him and therefore can do nothing to help him, makes us 
feel all the more strongly how desperate his situation is. 
We are told that Peer was designed to be a shining 
button on the waistcoat of the world, but the precise 
nature of Peer's vocation remains obscure. Perhaps he was 
meant to be a poet. But Peer fled from his true vocation, 
not in fear, but because he was not prepared for the 
sacrifices demanded in the achievement of true greatness. 
Stanley, like Peer, is dreaming of greatness, but we are 
given no assurance that Stanley was designed for great- 
ness. Vie only know that he has fled in fear into the 
fantasy world of a might-have-been concert pianist 
because he could not stand up to the trials and tribula- 
tions involved in achieving his ambition. Some critics 
have read the play as a metaphor for the alienated artist, 
whose need for individual self-expression and desire to 
opt out of society are seen as a threat to the establish- 
ed social pattern, and who must therefore be brought 
back to society and forced into the strait-jacket of 
social conformity. 
35 But Victor E. Amend counters this 
argument by pointing out that we are given no proof that 
Stanley is a genuine artist, nor is there any evidence 
that Stanley as an artist and individualist threatens 
the established social order. 
36 And if Stanley is not a 
genuine artist, in what sense can he be said to be an 
individualist? He has gone into hiding, not in order to 
express himself or to discover his "true" self, but to 
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escape from the facts of the self, because he is afraid 
to discover that he has no talents and is a good-for- 
nothing dreamer. Stanley's identity is a myth, the myth 
of a might-have-been concert pianist, and his annihila- 
tion is the annihilation of a myth. Davies' identity is 
similarly a myth. It is precisely the fear of facing the 
naked truth about his nothingness that prevents Davies 
from ever reaching Sidcup. But Davies does not lay claim 
to being either a might-have-been or a might-be. For hing 
identity is simply a question of name. Until he can 
prove that he is Mac Davies and not Bernard Jenkins, he 
has got no rights. And when Davies harps on his "rights, " 
he means the right to be recognised by society as a 
human being and a respectable citizen. The society which 
Ibsen's rebel individualists fight to liberate themselves 
from, the rightless tramp is only too eager to become 
part of. Davies is very much the opportunist, self-seeking 
troll who, like Peer, expects to gain all for nothing. 
But Davies' situation is bleaker than Peer's, for he was 
not designed for greatness. Davies comes from nothing, 
assumes a false name, and passes into nothing. 
In The Homecoming each member of the family identi- 
fies himself with a profession or a trade and makes 
mythical claims about being "the best, " or "top-class, " 
or "highly, successful. " But none of them is successful 
in the one thing that really matters: to win a woman's 
favours. Identity for the men in The Homecoming is a 
matter of sexual recognition, of proving their manhood 
rather than asserting their individual selfhood. In that 
sense they are not unlike Peer Gynt in the scene with 
Anitra. Peer wants to take possession of Anitra's youth 
because: "Only in full manhood can I be/ What I really 
am, my sweet one! " (VI, 163). But Peer finds himself out- 
witted and exploited by Anitra, just as the men in The 
Homecoming fear they will be dominated and "used" by 
luth. In both cases the male ego must admit defeat to 
soulless womanhood. For Deeley and Anna in Old Times 
identity is likewise primarily a question of sexual 
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recognition. When Anna has told the story about her 
borrowing Kate's underwear and afterwards telling the 
shy Kate all about it in the dark, Deeley remarks: 
"Sounds a perfect marriage" (66). Deeley's happiest memo- 
ries are those of his skirt-gazing treats in the Way- 
farers Tavern, but he is. no longer sure which of the two 
girls willingly and amiably allowed him "a gander" (69). 
Deeley and Anna only "live" in the past when they were 
sexually recognised by Kate, however shyly. In the 
present when she no longer accepts any of them sexually, 
they are "dead, " identitiless. For Kate, identity means 
to be free from the possessive sexual domination that 
Deeley and Anna claim over her, and she can liberate her- 
self only by denying her passionate self, thus depriving 
them of the object of their desire. Kate wants, like 
Ibsen's Nora, to be herself. Nora left Helmer because 
she could no longer be content with her debased status 
as a man's sexual possession. But Nora went out into the 
world not simply to be herself, but to become a self. 
Nora believes like Brand that every human being is born 
with unique talents which constitute his "true" self and 
which it is his prime duty to realise, and she is going 
out into the world to try to discover what her true 
potential is. Kate, on the other hand, is not seeking to 
become anything. A Pinter character is never concerned 
in an existential sense with choice and commitment. All 
we Imow about Kate's stubborn privacy is that she is a 
dreamer who likes taking long walks with her hands deep 
in her raincoat pockets (24). As far as Pinter's other 
women are concerned--Ruth in The Homecoming, Flora in 
A Slight Ache, and for that matter Meg in The Birthday 
Party--identity is not a question of individual identity, 
but of the identity of woman, because they themselves 
are not conscious of the problem of identity. They are 
not concerned with being or becoming individuals, but 
with fulfilling the classic female roles. Ruth could 
only have become an individual if, like Nora, she had 
refused to play any of the traditional roles the male 
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world has cast her in, and insisted on realising her 
selfhood rather than her womanhood. 
When Ibsen talks of self-realisation and a person's 
"true" self, he is referring to the self as a metaphysi- 
cal and existential entity. The self is at once something 
given and something that has to be achieved. Ibsen 
believes with Kierkegaard that every human being is born 
with a unique potential, and that it is in the conscious 
dovelormont of his unique gifts that a person realises 
his self. A self, in other words, is not something one 
automatically is, it is something one becomes, or rather, 
wills oneself into becoming. A person's "true" self is 
also his "ideal" self. Vie never hear of an Ibsen charac- 
ter whose true self is not an ideal to strive after, 
unless it be Emperor Julian, whose "true" self had a 
negative function to fulfil in the evolution of world 
history, like that of Cain and Judas. In Brand man's 
true self is God-given. In Peer Gynt it is "designed" by 
the enigmatic Master. When God disappears from Ibsen's 
universe a person's unique talents are a gift of Nature. 
On one occasion when he was sharply criticised for work- 
ing only to tear down and offering nothing constructive 
--certainly a terrible responsibility to load upon one. - 
self--Ibsen protested: "Different people have different 
duties assigned them by Nature; Nature has given the one 
the power or the desire to do this, the other that. Each 
bird must sing with his own throat and thus fulfil the 
task assigned him by Nature, and his justification must 
be that he can in truth say like Luther: 'I can do no 
other! Here I stand. God help me. Amen: "'37 Not only is 
every human being born with a unique potential, but he 
is born to fulfil a specific task in life, and only in 
the fulfilment of his calling, his Bestemmelse, can he 
realise his true self. The Button-Moulder's charge 
against Peer Gynt is that he has defied his life's pur- 
pose: "Ilan har budt sit Livs Bestemmelse Trods" (VI, 221). 
What the hedonistic Sir Peter proudly calls the Gyntish 
Self is not a self at all by Ibsen's and Kierkegaard's 
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definition of selfhood, but is the troll-ego which must 
be slain if Peer is to gain true selfhood. Peer, however, 
chooses to give rein to the troll-ego so that his self 
is, as Kierkegaard would put it, "volatilised, " and he 
is recognised neither by Heaven nor Hell, for the troll- 
ego has no individuality. The Gyntish wishes, desires, 
and appetites are basically indistinguishable from those 
of Tom, Dick, and Harry, and will blend into the molten 
mass of the ladle leaving no trace of Gynthood. It is 
only on the rational and spiritual level that an Ibsen 
character can acquire authentic selfhood, for selfhood 
is an achievement that involves will, choice, and commit- 
ment. If Peer had committed himself to the aesthetic 
life as a mode of existence and accepted the consequences, 
he might have stood a chance in Hell if not in Heaven, 
but Poor simply drifts into whatever role happens to 
come his way, and still expects his reward in Heaven. 
The troll-ego is, however, not easily slain, as Peer dis- 
covered when he fought with the Boyg, for the troll-ego, 
man's instinctual self, is a creature of the dark, name- 
less, and unfathomable by reason--hence Peer's battle 
with the Boyg in pitch darkness. Indeed, the Boyg proves 
to be unconquerable as far as Peer is concerned. He may 
have shrunk to a whisper at the sound of churchbells. 
But only temporarily. When Peer is out of Solveig's 
angelic presence, he is entirely ruled by the Boyg. 
Whereas Ibsen the moralist presents the troll-ego 
in a wholly negative light as the beast in man that must 
be conquered of man is to become his real self as he was 
"designed" by the Master, Ibsen the artist is continually 
fascinated by the dark forces of the subconscious, which 
are creative as well as destructive, which both attract 
and repel. Ibsen's "troll" is not simply a less sophisti- 
cated term for the Freudian Id. In The blaster Builder 
the "troll" concept has acquired a more positive meaning 
than in Peer Gynt. It no longer refers simply to the 
baser appetites of the Gyntish Self, but is used about 
the artist's demonic urge to attempt "the impossible" 
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(det umu: t it c) . For the Master Builder, therefore, free- 
dom does not lie in the repression of the troll-ego, but 
in having a "robust conscience" (XII, lo8), so that, in 
Hilde's words, "one dared to do what one most wanted to 
do" (1o7), dared to grasp one's happiness with ruthless 
selfishness. Hilde comes to free the Master Builder from 
his sickly, repressive, Galilean conscience which has 
stifled his creativity and killed his happiness. She does 
it, it must be added, for entirely selfish reasons, for 
Hilde has a robust conscience. She is as possessive about 
the Master Builder as Hedda is about Lovborg, and sees 
her hero not as an individual in his own right but as an 
extension of her own self, and ruthlessly goads him to 
attempt the impossible on her behalf, anticipating his 
destruction with a "frightful thrill" ( 99 ). Contemplating 
his life's work the Master Builder declares that it 
amounts to nothing for it has given him neither happiness 
nor a sense of achievement: "What have I ever built? 
What have I ever sacrificed for the sake of building? 
Nothing! It all amounts to nothing! " (118). The longing 
to grasp one's happiness cannot be reconciled with the 
urge for self-sacrifice. Peer is destroyed because he 
allows himself to be ruled by the troll-ego, the Master 
Builder because he lacks the courage to be ruled by it. 
He fears the "retribution" (115). Solness believes that 
God had taken a fancy to his work and wanted him only to 
build ever more glorious churches, and that God was so 
jealous of his wor]c that he would allow the Master Builder 
no earthly happiness in order that nothing might distract 
him from his single-minded devotion to his assigned task. 
But Solness defied his life's purpose, declared his inde- 
pendence, and devoted himself instead to building homes 
for people--only to find that there is no happiness in 
work for which one has sacrificed nothing. The "troll" 
in him demands happiness, the Galilean demands self- 
sacrifice, and the Galilean is the conqueror. 
In The Lady from the Sea (1888) the sea is a meta- 
phor for the unfathomable depths of selfhood. Ellida 
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describes the dark forces of the inner self as "the 
terrible--which attracts and repels" (XI, 131). She is 
afraid to face the terrible abyss of her unknown self, 
yet irresistibly drawn to it. Ellida has not always been 
afraid of the unknown. She was reconciled to her demon 
seli'when she pledged her love to the Stranger. It is 
only after the "mermaid" has been half acclimatised to 
the life of the carp pond that the terror of the Stranger 
-within und without--has grown to an obsession with her. 
After the Stranger has reappeared to claim her back, 
Ellida clings to Wangel for protection: "Oh Wangel--save 
me from my self! " (112). But when Plangel claims his right 
to protect her against the Stranger, she reacts sharply: 
"Protect? What is there to protect me against? There is 
no power or force outside me that threatens me. The 
terrible lies deeper, Wangel! The terrible--is the haunt- 
ing fascination in my own mind. What can you do against 
that? (132). 17angel can insist on his legal right to 
keep Ellida, but he cannot bind her inner self: "But my 
mind-my thoughts--my dreams and longings--those you 
cannot imprison. They will yearn and hunt--out into the 
unknown--which I was born for--and which you have locked 
me away from! " (153). Ellida realises that she can no 
longer evade the terrible reality of the inner self. She 
must face it by being willing and free to choose for her- 
self what her future life is going to be: whether to take 
the plunge into the unknown and follow the Stranger out 
on the open seas, or stay with VWangel in the carp pond 
of conventionality. She is granted her full freedom--and 
chooses to remain in the carp pond. Ellida has conquered 
her demon self simply by being able to choose "In free- 
dom--and on my own responsibility! " (154). The unknown 
neither fascinates nor frightens her any more. She ex- 
plains to VWangel: "I could have seen into it--gone into 
it--if I had wanted to. I was free to choose it; there- 
fore I Evas able to reject it" (155). But Ibsen will not 
easily convince his audience that Ellida's choice is a 
victory. If she was born for the unknown, for the open 
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sea, she has denied her true self by choosing the stale 
and protective life of the conventional carp pond. Ellida 
is another wild duck who has become acclimatised to 
domesticity. Born to roam in the unknown and find her 
grave at the bottom of the sea, she has chosen survival 
in compromise. 
If there are any connections at all between Pinter's 
and Ibsen's conceptions of selfhood, it is on the 
instinctual level of the troll-self that we must look 
for them. For a Pinter character is not concerned with 
achieving selfhood in a metaphysical or existential 
sense, but with vindicating his ego, and a Pinter ego 
has more in common with the Gyntish Self than with the 
aspiring demon self of the artist, which drives the 
Master Builder to attempt the impossible, and draws the 
Lady from the Sea irresistibly towards the unknown. 
Arthur Ganz comments on Pinter's Romantic preoccupation 
with the contradictory aspects of the inner self: 
As a Romantic artist, Pinter has laiown as much as any 
modern playwright the appeal of the liberated self. He 
has sensed, and embodied in the plays, that impulse 
toward the unlimited expansion of the ego, toward 
dominance, luxury, action, possession, sensual grati- 
fication. But as a late and disillusioned Romantic, 
Pinter has also known from the first that such an 
impulse was not to be trusted, that such qualities were 
as destructive as gratifying. I... I Yet so pressed are 
Pinter's characters by the demands of the self that the 
only way they can escape them is through total retreat 
into some state of withdrawal--some room--where they 
will be sheltered. Persons such as Stanley, Aston, 
Teddy, and Kate are not hiding from the I. R. A., or the 
trauma of a mental home, or a coarse family, or a 
lesbian past but from the demands of the inner self. 38 
Pinter, like Ibsen, is fascinated by the unfathomable, 
"unverifiable" inner self, the dark impulses of the sub- 
conscious which defy rational analysis. Stanley is afraid 
to face the unknown forces of. the inner self and goes 
into hiding in Meg's boarding house to seek protection 
from his own self, just as Ellida does in her conventio- 
nal marriage to Wangel. And just as the Stranger con- 
tinues to haunt Ellida, so Stanley is haunted by sub- 
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conscious fears embodied in Goldberg and McCann. But 
whereas Ellida's demon self is her "true" self in an 
idealistic sense, inspirational and creative as well as 
destructive, Stanley's demons are wholly negative and 
destructive, and Stanley, unlike Ellida, seems to have 
no choice but to surrender to his obsessive fears. 
Stanley's demons are not powers that inspire his artistic 
talents, if he has any, but prevent their unfolding. 
Edward in A Slight Ache tries to conquer the dark forces 
of the subconscious by bringing them into the light of 
reason. But grappling with the mute match-seller is like 
fighting the Boyg. He is unconquerable because he is un- 
identifiable. Davies in The Caretaker has no higher self 
than the troll-ego, which, like Peer's, is presented in 
a wholly negative light. Davies is annihilated because 
he is entirely ruled by his selfish greed for power and 
position. Unlike Peer, Davies is not even conscious of 
the existence of a higher self. But what does Davies' 
annihilation mean in comparison with Peer's? In Peer's 
case it is the higher, divine self that is annihilated, 
the self he could have been if he had committed himself 
to the vocation he was born to fulfil. Davies, on the 
other hand, has no higher self to lose. He has not even 
got a social identity to lose. Davies is ousted from a 
human relationship he was prepared to exploit but not 
put anything into. Davies is nothing, he can give nothing, 
and consequently cannot--except in a physical sense--be 
annihilated. In The Homecoming there is a conflict 
between the instinctual and the moral self, the moral 
self being represented by the weakest personalities, Sam 
and Teddy. Both are annihilated in a family ruled by the 
troll-ego. Sam and Teddy make feeble attempts to fight 
the "beast" in man, but fail because their own morality 
is based on a lie. Both know that they have been 
idolising "pure" womanhood in*women who are no paragons 
of virtue, and when their illusions are destroyed, their 
moral identity is destroyed with them. Pinter's quint- 
essential woman is indestructible. She has no selfhood 
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to lose, nor is she conscious like the men that her ego 
needs vindicating. She simply assumes her superiority 
over the men and acts accordingly. Meg in The Birthday 
Party is so superbly unconscious of having anything to 
lose that she is not even aware that Stanley is gone. 
Pinter's soulless woman is always "-the belle of the ball. " 
Pinter may feel himself in tune with Beckett's 
and Kafka's absurd vision of life, but Pinter is funda- 
mentally a Romantic for whom the individual looms 
larger than the universe, and as such he is a true 
descendant of Ibsen. Brand is superhuman because he 
measures himself in relation to the universe. Pinter's 
characters are not superhuman, but nor are they simply 
specks in the void. In Pinter's plays there is neither 
universe nor void. Like Ibsen in his social dramas, 
Pinter is concerned with people in a room, and in that 
confined setting even very ordinary mortals are made 
to seem important. 
Conclusion 
Beckett's description in Proust of man's essential 
self (the self which is not the product of Habit) as 
"the fine essence of a smothered divinity" (31) is one 
which with some justification might be applied to his 
own characters, for Didi and Gogo, Hamm and Clov do not 
only have a residue of humanity left. They retain a 
stubborn remnant of individuality. Their "personalities" 
are not dissolved along with their "selves, " as is the 
case with many of Ionesco's characters, whose personali- 
ties are "interchangeable" or are so fluid that they can 
easily turn into their opposites. Ionesco explains why 
the characters in The Bald Primadonna (195o) are inter-* 
changeable: 
The Smiths and the Martins no longer know how to talk 
because they no longer know how to think, they no longer 
know how to think because they are no longer capable of 
being moved, they have no passions, they no longer know 
how to "be, " they can "become" anyone or anything, for 
as they are no longer themselves, in an impersonal world, ; 
they can only be someone else, they are inter-changeable. ""' 
To "think" means in Ionesco's existential terminology to 
be "capable of being moved" (cf. Kierkegaard who refers 
to the passionately involved, "existent" individual as 
"the subjective thinker"). To be is not a question of 
being rational, but of being passionate. Lucky can no 
longer "think" in the sense of being capable of logical 
reasoning, and in Pozzo's eyes he is therefore little 
more than a beast. But Lucky's disintegrated logic makes 
"poetic" sense. His rambling speech, which he delivers 
with increasing sound and fury, is an anguished expres- 
sion of man's consciousness of his lost--or dwindling-- 
divinity. And if the notion of man's divine origin is no 
longer tenable, what is there . 
to guarantee man's human- 
ity, to prevent his mutation into animal form, as 
happens 
to the characters, except Berenger, in Rhinoceros 
(196o), 
or to Gregor in Kafka's story Metamorphosis 
(1915)? In 
Waiting for Godot it is still possible to speak of man's 
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divine descent. Pozzo recognises the tramps as being of 
the same species as himself, "Made in God's image! (23). 
Didi and Gogo; Hamm and Clov are characters with "perso- 
nalities" in the traditional sense. They are recognisable 
human beings with individual characteristics, ailments 
and temperaments, and they preserve their individuality 
to the end. Beckett's characters still have the memory, 
however faint, of a lost Paradise and are, for that 
reason, still capable of being "moved" in defence of 
their individual uniqueness. When the tramps pray to 
higher powers, each will pray for his own salvation 
rather than for the common good. Hamm and Clov know that 
their prayer is in vain, but they need to'assert their 
individual identity in order to make sure that they have 
a self to die with. Even old Krapp, listening to the 
taped voices who have become strangers to him, shares 
with his former solves the memory of a lost Paradise, 
a lost love, which is his only lasting "possession. " 
Osborne has described Look Back in Anger as "a 
formal, rather old-fashioned play, " and to J. R. Taylor 
it "seems technically anachronistic after Waiting for 
Godot. "3 The young Osborne. who in*1956 initiated a 
"revolution" in the English theatre was not a descendant 
of Beckett (Waiting for Godot was first produced in 
London in 1955. It ran at the Criterion Theatre from 
September 1955 to May 1956. The first performance of 
Look Back in Anger was given at the Royal Court Theatre 
on 8th may 1956). Osborne's play looks back directly to 
Ibsen's middle plays, especially A Doll's House and 
Hedda Gabler. Osborne is concerned with individuality in 
the Ibsenite sense that he defends the value of the indi- 
vidual (or a particular individual) against the levelling 
influence of a mediocre society. He is as contemptuous 
of the mass of "flatulent, purblind, mating weasels" as 
Ibsen is of "the damned, compact majority. " What Osborne 
calls "ordinary despair" is not ordinary at all. It is 
the "superior" anguish of the "single one" who is acutely 
conscious of his self-lessness as the purblind majority 
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is not. Osborne has told us that Look Back in Anger 
"above all is a play about people. "4 He might 
have 
said 
of Jimmy Porter what Ibsen once--in a dismissive mood-- 
said about Brand, that his only object had been "to 
portray an energetic personality. "5 
Whereas Beckett's characters are "worms" in the 
universe--even Hamm and Clov enclosed in their cell 
preserve a "telescopic" view of "the whole thing"-- 
Pinter's characters are egos confronting each other in 
a room, much like the contesting egos in Strindberg's 
naturalistic plays, and the confined setting is a measure 
of the narrow context in which they define themselves. 
Pinter's characters exist on a more primitive and earthy 
level than Strindberg's characters, more primitive even 
than the characters of Beckett and Osborne. Not only are 
God and the metaphysical dimension absent from Pinter's 
plays, but his characters are unconscious even of a 
spiritual reality. They exist on the level of the Gyntish 
Self of "wishes, desires, and appetites. " On this level 
"selfhood" is not a question of individuality, but of 
"manhood" and "womanhood. " In Strindberg's naturalistic 
plays the question of identity is likewise basically a 
question of sexual dominance. It is by depriving the 
Captain of his manhood that Laura destroys his sense of 
self. But the battle between male and female in Strind- 
berg's plays assumes a metaphysical dimension in that it 
is also a battle between the forces of good and evil in 
and beyond man, and the suffering that man and woman 
inflict upon each other is a punishment not just for 
their individual sins, but for the sin which entered 
into the world with love. 
The lowest of Pinter's creatures is Davies the tramp. 
For him the question of identity is even more basic than 
that of proving his manhood. He has first got to prove 
that he has "rights" as a human being. But the fact that 
Davies exists on the level of the barely human does not 
mean that he is also deprived of a personality. Like Peer 
Gynt, Davies is without soul and self in a metaphysical 
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and existential sense, but as a dramatic character he is 
invested with a unique personality, and is Pinter's most 
richly individualised and most memorable character. It 
is in his portrayal of women that Pinter comes closest 
to divesting his characters of personality as well. as of 
self. Flora and Ruth are almost interchangeable because 
they are embodiments of Pinter's concept of the "classic 
female figure. " But then Strindberg's Laura and Alice 
are interchangeable for the same reason. They are no 
more conceived as individuals in the Ibsenite sense than 
are Pinter's women. Ruth retains the shadow of a "perso- 
nality" by virtue of the fact that she is the only female 
in a household of males. Laura and Alice similarly derive 
their "personalities" from the fact of their being the 
female opponents in a male-female battle. If Laura and 
Alice had appeared in the same play there would have 
been little to choose between them. Nora and Hedda, on 
the other hand, are not interchangeable, because each 
has a personality which reflects her unique individuality 
rather than her womanhood. 
From the plays we have dealt with in this study 
we may conclude that while Ibsen, Strindberg, Beckett, 
Osborne, and Pinter all have dissolved the self in a 
metaphysical and existential sense, they are still tradi-- 
tional in adhering to the concept of "character. " All 
portray their characters as distinct, coherent, unified 
personalities, which may be more or less colourful, more 
or less lifelike, but which remain indelibly and recog- 
nisably themselves. When it comes to dissolving the self 
dramatically as well as philosophically, Strindberg is 
still the most modern and adventurous, for the characters 
in A Dream Play "split, double, multiply" and "come 
together" again, and one character may perform several 
functions. But each dream character has the identity of 
the role he plays, and the roles are not interchangeable. 
The Officer is as distinct from the Lawyer as the lover 
is from the husband. Both are facets of one personality, 
but they are different facets. The Officer is identified 
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throughout by his uniform, the Daughter by her refrain: 
"Mankind is to be pitied! " The logical consequence of 
the philosophical dissolution of the self must be the 
dissolution of "character, " for the concept of 
"character" is based, as Strindberg observes in the 
Preface to biss Julie, on the "bourgeois notion of the 
immutability of the soul" (XXIII, lo3). 
Ionesco has called Ibsen "boorish, " and Strindberg 
"clumsy. "6 He has dismissed Osborne's "causeless anger" 
as so much "English humbug. "7 Only Beckett is honoured 
as one who ranks among the distinguished few "relevant" 
playwrights, for Beckett, like Ionesco himself, is 
concerned with. "self in the absolute, "8 that is, with 
essential, universal man rather than with individual men, 
with man as a "mortal" rather than man as a "citizen. "9 
Because it is "self in the absolute" and not bourgeois 
"character" Ionesco wants put across, it is necessary to 
"particularise"lo as little as possible. He has Nicolas 
d'EU in Victims of Duty (1953) proclaim the following 
program for the New Theatre: 
... We'll get rid of 
the principle of identity and unity 
of character and let movement and dynamic psychology 
take its place ... We are not ourselves ... Personality doesn't exist. Within us there are only forces that are 
either contradictory or not contradictory ... 
11 
And yet, when he contemplates the success of Rhinoceros 
and the fact that audiences all over the world identify 
with Berenger, the odd man out, who remains himself and 
refuses to conform, Ionesco wonders: 
Do people understand it properly? Do they see in it 
that monstrous phenomenon-of "massification"? And while 
they are all "massifiable, " are they also, essentially 
and in their heart of hearts, all individualists, 
unique human beings? 12 
Peer Gynt answered that question when he declared: 
"This ladle affair, this cessation of Gynthood, / Nhy, 
it rouses my innermost soul to revolt! " (VI, 22o). 
Precisely because Peer preserves his unique Gynthood, 
he may yet outlive the Smiths and the Martins. 
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physical psychology, ' which conceives of the human 
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contrast, 'naturalistic psychology' assumes that the 
human psyche is an unpredictable complex and not at 
all analogous to an automaton. " "Miss Julie, " Strind- 
berg, Twentieth Century Views, p. l o6.16. 
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with disappointment, disbelief, and baffled indig- 
nation. Gerhard Gran, a perceptive critic and warm 
supporter of Ibsen, regretted the master's attempt to outreach his medium: "It is a law, or anyway has 
until now been a law, that drama, in its present 
state of technical development, can only present 
comparatively simple characters ... Everything that should make this curious being intelligible to us, her development, her secret thoughts, her half-sensed 
misgivings and all that vast region of the human mind 
which lies birtween the conscious and the unconscious-- 
all this the dramatist can no more than indicate. For 
that reason, I think a novel about Hedda Gabler could be extremely interesting, while the play leaves us 
with a sense of emptiness and betrayal. " See Michael 
Meyer, Ibsen: A Biography (Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books, 1974), p. 67o. 
18. Strindberg, Twentieth Century Views, p. 109. 
19. oc. citt. 
2o. While writing The Father Strindberg confided in a 
letter to Axel Lundegard, 12 September 1887, Brev, 
VI, 298: "It seems to me that I am walking about in 
my sleep, as though fiction and life were blended.. 
I don't know if The Father is fiction or if my life 
has actually been so E... Through much writing my 
life has become a shadow life. I no longer seem to 
be treading on earth but rather to be hovering with- 
out weight in an atmosphere not of air but of dark- 
ness. Should any light penetrate this darkness I 
would tumble down crushed! " Quoted by C. E. W. L. 
Dahlström, Strindberg's Dramatic Expressionism (Ann 
Arbor: University of . Iichigan, 1933) , p. loo. 21. Alf Sjöberg, one of Sweden's most eminent Strindberg 
directors, argues that the ending of Miss Julie is 
"clearly existential. " Julie is not hypno; ssedrinto 
committing suicide. She chooses death as the only 
way to, confirm her true identity. Julie has been 
playing a man's part, a part her mother taught her to 
play but which is not her authentic self. Jean simi- 
larly lays Julie's slave, while seeing himself as 
the i Znitely stronger, the master, the demi-god. 
After the sexual encounter their roles are reversed. 
Julie, trying to escape from the terrible conse- 
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the courage to choose death. Her exit into the sunrise 
is a spiritual victory, while the cowardly Jean falls 
back into his pitiable state. Julie goes out as the 
beast of burden. She annihilates herself to give way 
to a new world, which is not Jean's, but whose? 
Perhaps, suggests Sjöberg, a new world without half- 
measures? See "Existentialism och rollbyte i Fröken 
Julie: Ett samtal med Alf Sjöberg, " edited by Ulla- 
Britta Lagerroth, in Ulla Britta Lagerroth and Göran 
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Strindberg the dialectical possibilities in his own being. " Strindberg "frequently acted in the conviction that his being contained possibilities that had not 
yet been exploited. When he was converted to atheism, 
and when he later reverted to belief in God during the 
Inferno period, he did so partly as an experiment: he 
decided to assume one point of view and see where it 
led when put into practice. The 'experimentation with 
points of view' points back to Kierkegaard and his 
'stages on life's way'. " Strindberg in Inferno, pp. 20-21. 
23. Eric 0. Johannesson's translation. The ivovels of 
Auguust Strindberg, p. 8o. 
24. C17. H. Auden s discussion of the artist's self in 
relation to Peer Gynt in "Genius and Apostle, " The 
Dyer's Hand (1963), rpt. in James McFarlane, ed., 
Henrik Ibsen. A Critical Anthology, pp. 331-45. Auden 
maintains that it is the women behind Peer who give 
him the courage to be a poet and live without an 
identity of his own. Ibsen leaves in doubt whether 
there is a real Peer existing in Solveig's faith, 
hope, and love. "It may be that, after all, the poet 
must pay for his vocation by ending in the casting- 
ladle" (p. 337). 
25. Letters to the Intimate Theatre, p. 2o3-4. 
26. From the essay "In the Cemetery" 
(1895), 
quoted by 
Gunnar Brandell, Strindberg in Inferno, p. lol. 
27. E. 0. Johannesson' s translation. The Qovels of August 
Strindberg, p. 22o. 
28. "Konsten att bli författare": Intended under this 
cha ter heading to be included in Han och hon (He and 
She which was to be the first part of his auto i'ý o- 
graphy and containing the correspondence with Siri 
von Essen, 1875-76. See Torsten Eklund, "Strindberg 
och diktarkallet, " in S nunkter ä Strindberg, ed. 
Gunnar Brandell (Stockholm: Aldus Bonniers, 1964), 
p. 47. 
29. Letter to Siri von Essen, 28 June 1875, Brev, I, 2ol. 
30. Letter to Emil Schering, 17 April 19o7, Briefe an 
Emil Schering, Strindbergs Werke. Deutsche Gesamt- 
ausgabe unter Mitwirkung von Emil Schering Triiznchen: 
Georg Müller, 1924), VIII9 3,2oo. 
31. Letter to Emil Schering, 13 June 19o2, B rev, XIV, 192. 
32. Letter to Emil Schering, 13 May 19o2, Brev, XIV, 187. 
33. Dahlström believes that "the Officer is the Poet and 
in the guise of the latter is dreaming of himself as 
the former. " Strindbergs Dramatic Expressionism, p. 183. 
34. Valency, The Flower and The Castle, D. 330. 
35. In the Preface to Miss Julie Strindberg writes about 
his portrayal of the minor characters in that play 
and in The Father: "If these supporting characters 
seem somewhat abstract, it is because ordinary people 
are, to a certain degree, abstract in the performance 
of their daily work, that is to say, conventional, 
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showing only one side of their personality. As long 
as the spectator feels no need to see their other 
sides, my abstract portrayal of them will serve well 
enough. " SS9 XXIII, 1o8. 
36. See A Madman's Manifesto, trans. by Anthony Swerling 
from . 17 e original French version Le Plaidorer d'un Fou 
(Cambridge: Trinity Lane Press, 19by , p. 29. I have 
used Swerling's translation with some adjustments 
based on the Swedish version En dares forsvarstal, SS, 
XXVI, 52-53. See also A Madmax 7s Defence, translation 
based on Ellie Schleussner's version, The Confession 
of a Fool, revised and edited by Evert Sprinc orn 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1968), p. 58. 
37. As has been pointed out by several critics, the name 
Agnes may have been suggested to Strindberg by that 
of Agni, the Vedic god of sacrificial fire and medi- 
ator between gods and men, the name itself meaning 
purity. But Strindberg may also have had in mind 
Agnes in Brand who, like the Daughter, is an offspring 
of the Romantic idea of redemption through the self- 
sacrificial love of a woman. However, the Daughter in 
her earthly guise as Agnes displays none of the faith- 
fulness of Ibsen's Agnes, or Solveig. Indeed her 
running away from husband and child looks more like 
Gyntian opportunism. than Brandian idealism although, 
when reminded of her family obligations, she claims 
with Brand and Kierkegaard: "I have higher duties, " 
meaning duties to her divine self and to mankind. 
Perhaps the Daughter in her marital role is a distant 
relative of the emancipated, door-slamming Nora rather 
than of the submissive Agnes in Brand. 
38. I have based my summary of the draft on Martin Lamm 
August Strindberg (Stockholm: Aldus/ Bonhiers, 1968), 
fiobenhavn: 31- , an Vagn Borge, Strindbergs mystiske Teater Ejnar Munksgaara, 194M , p712_777 
39. Evert Sprinchorn suggests that the idea of the lawyer 
as the embodiment of humanity's miseries may have come 
to Strindberg from Balzac, and quotes the following 
passage from Colonel Chabert: "There are three persons 
in our society, the priest, the doctor, and the man of 
law, who cannot have any respect for humanity. They 
probably wear black robes because they are in mourning 
for all the virtues, all the illusions. The most 
unhappy of the three is the lawyer ... " 
(Oeuvres 
completes [Paris, 1895], IV, 3o78). See "The Logic of 
WDream P1a2T, " Modern Drama, 5 (December 1962), rpt. in 
Strindberg, Twen'1 etri Öentury Views, p. 143, note 5. 
4o. Maurice alency interprets 
the fumigation scene as a 
comic representation of the inner conflict of the 
. 
dreamer in his "trinary capacity as hero, critic, and 
poet. " As hero (lover), he recognises his lost love 
and feels jealousy. As poet, he feels compassion. As 
national watchman, however, it is his duty to prevent 
the spread of the disease of love. The Flower and The 
Castle, p. 334. 
41. Strindberg notes in The Occult Diary on 18 November 
1901, the day he finished Dream ay: "Am reading 
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about the teachings of the Indian religion. The whole 
world is but a semblance (=Humbug or relative nothing- 
ness). The primary Divine Power (Maham-Atma, Tad, Aum, 
Brama) allowed itself to be seduced by Maya, or the 
impulse of procreation. Thereby the Divine Primary 
Element sinned against itself. (Love is sin; therefore 
the pangs of love are the greatest of all hells. ) The 
world has thus come into existence only through a sin 
--if in fact it exists at all--for it is really only 
a dream picture (consequently my Dream Play is a 
picture of life), a phantom, whicH it is the purpose 
of Asceticism to destroy. But this purpose conflicts 
with the sexual instinct, and the result is a cease- 
less wavering between sensual pleasure and the anguish 
of repentance: This would seem to be the solution of the 
riddle of the world! [... 3 Indian religion, therefore, 
showed me the meaning of my Dream Play, and the signi- 
ficance of Indra' s Daughter, an r the Secret of the 
Door=Nothingness. " Ur Ockulta. dagboken: Aktenskapet 
med Harriet Bosse, e d. Torsten Lklun (Stockholm: 
Bonniers, 196 pp. 59-6o, lily translation differs 
slightly from that of Mary Sandbach, Prom an Occult 
Diary: Niarria e with Harriet Bosse (London: Secker & 
ýarý rburg, 1965), pp. 55-56. 
42. Vagn Borge insists on identifying the Daughter's 
mission on earth with that of Christ. As redeemer 
"She. like Jesus lets herself be born and killed for 
the sake of mankind. " Strindberg's mystiske Teater, 
p. 287. However, while the Daughter was sent, in 
Borge's words, "to liberate mankind from the chains 
of earthly existence" (p. 2o2), Christ came to redeem 
mankind from its sins. Strindberg is not concerned 
with mankind's sinfulness but with the suffering 
unjustly inflicted upon it. And whereas the cruci- 
fixion is the ultimate test of human suffering, the 
Dauhtar's entering into the burning castle is rather 
an escape from human misery. Olof Molander, a great 
Strindberg director, underlined the Christian analogy 
by changing the flower on the castle roof into a cross. 
Ingmar Bergman, however, has gone to the other extreme 
and out the final spectacle of the burning castle alto- 
gether. He has separated Agnes, who in his version is 
just an ordinary mortal, from Indra's Daughter, whom 
he has made a more fiction of the Poet's mind. See 
Strindberg: A Dream Play. Adapted by Inrwar Bergman, 
trans. Michael Meyer (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1973). 
43., Raymond Jarvi, "Ett Dromspel: A S, yýphony for the 
Stage, " Scandinavian Studies, 44 (1972), 28. 
44. E. A. Wyller, "Peer Gynt-skikkelsens dramatiske enhet, " 
in Hageberg, ed., Omkrinn "Peer Gynt", pp. 137-39. 
45. Evert Sprinthorn in his explicitly Freudian interpre- 
tation of the play argues that the burning castle 
symbolises death and the end of the conflict of male 
and female principles which is the basis of the strife 
of existence. The union of the Poet and the Daughter 
by fire is death with a double meaning. "The fire 
suggests sexual excitement, dying signifies orgasm, 
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and the bursting chrysanthemum on top of the castle 
is ejaculation poeticized. " "The Logic of A Dream 
Pte, " Strindber. 2, Twentieth Century Views, pp. 147-48. 
Maurice Valency likewise argues that the dream of 
life is essentially erotic. All male characters are 
aspects of the lover, and the Daughter offers herself 
freely, to each in turn, and finally to the burning 
castle, which then bursts into flower. "The suggestion 
is tolerably clear--it is in the moment of orgasm that 
mortality merges with immortality, and pain with peace. 
The moment of flowering is extraordinarily ambiguous. 
It is release and captivity, pain and ecstasy, death 
and resurrection. " The Flower and The Castle, p. 34o. 
46. Valency notes that "Zn the Mahayana scriptures, the 
castle is sometimes used as a symbol for the perso- 
nality, the ego, in which the individual fortifies 
himself against the external world, isolating himself 
in the belief that there is a sacred difference between 
one individual and another, while the truth is that 
there are no individuals; and the external world is 
merely the externalization of mind, which casts its 
shadow, as the French symbolists would say, in order 
to see itself. " Ibid., p. 330. 
47. Letter to Torsten Hedlund, lo November 1895, Brev, 
XI, loo. 
Chapter 3 
References to Beckett's works are to the following 
editions: 
Proust and Three Dialo es with Georges Duthuit (London: 
Calder & Boyars, 197o). 
More Pricks Than Kicks (London: Calder & Boyars, 1970). 
MurDhY (London: John Calder, Jupiter Books, 1963). 
7la t London: John Calder, Jupiter Books, 1963). 
I1-olloy, Malone Dies, The Unnamable (London: Calder & 
Boyars, 30 
, En attendant Godot (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1952). 
Waiting for Üodot (London: Faber & Faber, 1965). 
-'ndgame Lonaon: Faber & Faber, 1964). 
TIiät Fall (London: Faber & Faber, 1965). 
rape s LastTape and Embers (London: Faber & Faber, 1965). 
(pp. -l66-22o) 
1. "Godot has arrived, " Editorial, The Times, London, 
24 October 1969, p. 11. 
2. T. S. Eliot, Selected Essays, 3rd enlarged edition 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1951), p. 14. 
3. Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
4. Eliot's Introduction to Ezra Pound, Selected Poems 
(London: Faber & Gwyer, 1928), pp. x-xi. 
5. Quoted by Arnold P. Hinchliffe, The Absurd, The 
Critical Idiom Series (London: Methuen, 1972), p. 8. 
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6. Patrick ? Murray, The Tragic, Comedian: A Study of 
Samuel Beckett (Cor : The Mercier Press, 197o) , p. 118. 7. The Times, London, 31 December 1964, P. 4. 
8. Esslin, The Theatre of the Absurd, p. 342. 
9. Swerling, Strindberg s Impact in France, p. ill. 
lo. Hinchlif3e, The Absurd, p. vii. 
11. The passage omitted from the English version between 
"At his horse" (last line p. 19) and "(violently). I'm 
hungry" (top of p. 2o) reads: 
ESTRAGON: Allons-nous-en. 
VLADIMIR: Oü? (Un temps. ) Ce soir on couchera peut- etre chez lui., au c aud, au sec, le ventre plein, 
sur la paille. ca vaut la peine qu'on attende. Non? 
ESTRAGON: Pas toute la nuit. 
VLADIMIR: Il fait encore jour. 
Silence. 
Samuel Beckett, En attendant Godot (Paris: Editions 
de IºIinuit, 1952) , p. 25. Ess ins translation, The Theatre of the Absurd, p. 52. 
12. Richard N. Coe, Beckett, Writers and Critics Series 
(Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1968), p. 4. 
13. Sartre claims that man carries nothingness within 
himself and that this is the essence of his freedom, 
since it is precisely man's ability to negate, to 
separate himself from the actual world and envision 
possible, but non-actual worlds, that makes him a 
being of possibilities. But Sartre does not teach 
that because man is nothingness within, he conse- 
quently seeks to become one with a nothingness with- 
out. Quite the contrary. Man seeks to escape from 
the anguish of his nothingness, that is to say, from 
the responsibility of his freedom to choose. Man 
actually wants to be God, for to be God is to be at 
the same time "free" and "complete, " and thus to be 
beyond the possibility of des air. To be God is to 
be both a "being-for-itself" 
F"eour-soi), 
with infinite 
possibilities and expectations, ssý`'ice a "being-in-itself" 
(pen-soi), with no possibilities and expectations, and 
consequently no frustrations and disappointments. But 
this, according to Sartre, is an "ontological contra- 
diction" and an impossible ideal, for freedom and 
completeness are incompatible. To be free is to be 
incomplete, and to be complete is to have no possi- 
bilities. See Robert C. Solomon, From Rationalism to 
Existentialism (New York: Harper & Row, , pp. 265-72. 
14. Coe, Beckett, p. 5. 
15. Nirvana n Christmas Humphreys, Buddhism (Harmonds- 
worth: Penguin Books, 1962) variously defined as "the 
extinction of the limitations of self-hood" 
(p. 75), 
"the dying out, the waning out, the ceasing to be of 
the not-Self" (p. 78), "the extinction of the not-Self 
in the completion of the Self" and as such it is "the 
goal of perfection and not the abyss of annihilation" 
(p. 128), it is the "Plenum-Void" (p. 149). 
16. Coe, Beckett, p. 25. 
17. Ibid., p. 18. 
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18. Ibid., p. 27. 
19. "If you want to find the origins of En attendant 
Godo-t, look at Murphy. " Quoted by Colin Duckworth, ed. 
En attendant Godot London: Harrap, 1966), p. xlvi. 
2o. Coe, Beckett, p. 22. 
21. Humphreys,, __Tuddhism, p. 128. 
22. Loc. cit. 
23. Quoted by T. E. Jessop in his chapter "Berkeley as 
Religious Apologist, " in New Studies in Berkeley's 
Philosophy, ed. Warren E. S einkrsus New York: 
Rolt, RRin hart and Winston, 196E), p. los. 
24. Philosophical Commentaries (or The Commonplace Book) 
entry , 
-4-270 
, The Works of George Berkeley Bisho of 
Cloyne, edited by A... Luce anT. i. Jessop, 9 vols. Con"d"o-n: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1948-57), I, 53. 
25. Berkeley calls things "ideas" because they cannot 
exist except as being perceived by the mind, and the 
mind cannot perceive without having ideas. According 
to Berkeley's "immaterialist hypothesis" it is not 
things that create ideas, but the ideas of the mind 
are things and not just mental copies of material 
archetypes. "We see the Horse it self, the Church it 
self it being an Idea & nothing more. " (Philosophical 
Commentaries, entry //427). In other words, the mind 
issThe cause, and the sensible "ideas" are the effects. 
Berkeley denies the very possibility of mindless, 
unperceivable matter. See A. A. Luce, "Berkeley's New 
Principle Completed, " New Studies in Berkeley's 
Philosophy, p. 5. 
26. inc . 11169 
The Absurd, p. 69. - 
27. Swerling, Strindberg 's Impact in Prance, p. 117. 
28. Eager to prove the extent to which "Fin de Partie 
is a metamorphosis of The Dance of Death, " Swerling 
claims that "the Hamm-Clov tandem" is "virtually a 
masculine-feminine union, " with Hamm representing 
"the sterile dominance of the male protagonist, " and 
Clov the rebellious, dependent female. Ibid., pp. 127 
and 129. 
29. Murray, The Tragic Comedian, pp. 45-46. 
30. Swerling notes a ozzo in the original production 
of Godot wore a white beard (Strindbergs Impact, 
p. 121), but there is no mention of it in the text. 
Clearly Beckett did not want to limit the suggestive 
possibilities of the play by making the identifi- 
cation of Pozzo with Godot too explicit, although a 
note in the manuscript indicates that he originally 
thought of them as one and the same person: "Suggerer 
peut-etre Godot apres tout, venu au rendez-vous, et 
qu'il ne sait pas que Vladimir et Estragon sont 
Vladimir et Estragon. Mais le messager? " See Colin 
Duckworth, ed., En attendant Godot, pp. lx-lxi. 
31. Swerling, Strindberg's Impact, p. 114. 
32. I am basing my summary of egel's thesis on Solomon: 
From Rationalism to Existentialism, pp. 6o-62. See 
also "Lordship and Bondage, " The Phenomenology of Mind 
(Die Phänomenologie des Geistes, ldo7 , trans. J. 
-Bai e, 2nd rev. ed. London: Allen & Unwin, 1931), pp. 
228-40. 
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33. Swerling is quite positive on that score: "The 
Stranger's masochism has been particularly instru- 
mental in engendering Lucky. He wishes he were The 
Lady's father 'whom you used to lead to the market 
place' (p.. 16), and wishes he were somebody's dog 
to be kicked and whipped. " Strindberg's Impact, pp. 
13.9-2o. 
34. More ricks Than Kicks, p. 75. 
35. "Voluntary memory" in Proustian terms, as described 
by Beckett, is the sterile, Habit-forming memory, 
selected and organised by the intellect to uphold the 
false illusion of a continuous personality. "Involun- 
tary memory" on the other hand io spontaneous memory, 
recalling sensations that were never subjected to 
habit, and which therefore restores the past as 
primary experience in the present, and with it the 
very self which it charmed or tortured. It is in the 
deep, subconscious world of "involuntary memory" 
where original sensations remain unadulterated by the 
prejudices of the intellect, and time is obliterated, 
that Proust believes the essence of the self is to be 
found. Proust, 32-33 and 71-75. 
36. Cf. Malone: "You may say it is all in my head, and 
indeed sometimes it seems to me that I am in a head 
and that these eight, no, six, these six planes that 
enclose me are of solid bone. [... ] And in the skull 
is it a vacuum? I ask. " Molloy, Malone Dies, The 
Unnamable, p. 222. 
37. Patrick Murray explains that the endgame of chess 
"proceeds with comparatively few pieces left on the 
board, " and "in endings where forces less than the 
Queen are involved, the golden rule is to bring the 
King to the centre of operations as quickly as possi- 
ble. Hamm, the ruined King on his wheel-chair throne, 
is moved about the stage by Clov. C... 3 If King Hamm 
loses his only mobile piece, the Knight Clov, the 
game must end either in defeat for him or in stale- 
mate. He will finally be in check without hope of 
relief. " The Tragic Comedian, pp. 112-13. 
38. R. D. Laing, The Divided Self: An Existential Stud. 
in Sanity anid ess armondsworth: Penguin books, 
Z65), P. "77. 
39. Beckett went twice to see Roger Blin's production of 
The Ghost Sonata at Theatre de la Gaiete-Montparnasse 
rOctober, 1949), which encouraged him to send the 
typescript of. Godot (written in the winter of 1948-49) 
to Roger Blin, who seemed the ideal person to produce 
the play because, Beckett explained later, he was 
faithful both to the letter and the, _ spirit of 
Strind- 
berg's play, and because the theatre was nearly empty, 
which seemed the ideal condition for a good perfor- 
mance. See Fletcher & Spurling, Beckett: A Study of 
His Plays (London: Eyre Methuen, -1972), p. 121; an 
Sw r ii ng, Strindberg's Impact, pp. 111 and 179-8o. 
Swerling records from an interview with Blin (1966) 
"that there were approximately loo performances with 
between 15-2o people attending each one; that the 
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stage was a mere 3 metres deep; that Camus, like 
Beckett, was delighted by the production. " 40. Ibid., pp. 132-33. 
41. Ibid., p. 134. 
Chapter 4 
References to Osborne's plays are to he following 
editions: 
Look 73a. -k ire Anger (London: Faber and Faber, 196o). 
The Lnterta. irer, London: Faber and Faber, 1961). =u fier (Lon on: Faber and Faber, 1965). 
Inadmissible Fvidence (London: Faber and Faber, 1967). 
he - da Gabler b. y r enrik Ibsen, adapted by John Osborne (London: Faber and Faber, 1972). 
(pp. 221-81) 
1. John Osborne, "They Call it Cricket, " in Declaration, 
ed. Tom Mdaschler (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 19573, . 69. 2. Loc. cit. 
3. "Foreword" to Look'Back in Anger (London: Evans Acting 
Editions, 19577 p. 2. 
4. The Works of Bernard Shaw, XIX, 149. 
5. Ibid., p. 145. 
6. "The Entertainer, " in Writer's Theatre, ed. Keith 
Yacerhouse and ti'illis Hal (London: Heinemann, 1967), 
- p. 51. 
7. "They Call. it Cricket, " p. 65. 
8. "Foreword, " p. 2. 
9. Quoted by Halvdan Koht in his Introduction to A Doll's 
House in The Centenary Edition, VIII, 247. 
lo. Shaw's words in The Quintessence of Ibsenism, The 
Works of Bernard Shaw, , 179. 11. Halvdan oht, The Life of Ibsen, I-II, trans. McMahon 
and Larsen (London: Allen &U in, 1931), II1 104. 
12. Soren Kierkegaards Papirer, I, 53. Journals, trans. 
Dru, p. T5.. ' 
13. Patricia PVeyer Spacks, "Confrontation and Esca e in 
Two Social Dramas, " Modern Drama, 11 (May 1968), pp. 65-66. 
14. John N6rtham, Ibsen's Dramatic Method (Oslo: Universi- 
tetsforlaget, 1971), p. 26. 
15. John Osborne: Look Back in Anger. A Casebook, ed. John 
Russe Taylor (London: Macmillan, 1968), p. 50. 
16. Walter Kerr, The Theatre in Spite of Itself (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, , P. 
"13-6. 
17. Tynan's expression. See Casebook, p. 49. 
18. Ibid., p. 53. 
ig. Simon Trussler, The Plays of John Osborne: An Assess- 
ment (London: Go ancz, , p. 64. 2o. R-arold Perrar, John Osborne, Columbia Essays on Modern 
Writers (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1973), P. 8. 
21. Ibid., p. 7. 
22. Trussler, p. 52. 
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23. Milton Shulman, see Casebook, p. 42. 
24. Otto Heller's translation o en akut retskaffenheds- 
feber, quoted by Hermann J. Weigand, The Modern Ibsen 
ew York: Dutton, 196o), p. lGo. 
25. Casebook, p. 105. 
26. Ibid. , p.. 29. 27. I bid., P. 150. 
28. Ibid., p. 52. 
29. Osborne saw the play for the first time in 1954 at 
the Lyric Theatre, Hammersmith, with Peggy Ashcroft 
as Hedda, one of the most acclaimed performances of 
her career. Osborne dates his long-standing fasci- 
nation with Hedda Gabler from this performance. See 
Hedda Gabler by Henrik Thsen, adapted by John Osborne, 
30. Ibid., p. 8. 
31. Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
32. Ibid., p. 8. 
33. Ibid., p. 45. Ibsen, SV, XI, 338. 
34. Beckett, Proust, pp. I$-19. 
35. Ibid., p. . 
36. Casebook, pp. 151-52. 
37. Beckett, Proust, p. 19. 
38. Osborne, Heddä. Gabler, pp. 84-85. SV, XI, 491. 
39. Ibid., p. 6. SV, XI, 492. 
4a. Ibid., p. 90. V, XI, 495. 
41. Casebook, pp. T07-8. 
42. T. S. Elyot, "Marie Lloyd, " Selected Essays (London: 
Faber and Faber, 1951), P. T5-9. - 
43. Loc. cit. - 
44. Ibid., p. 457. 
45. Martin Banham, Osbý orne, Writers and Critics series 
(Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1969), p. 32. 
46. Trussler, p. 62. 
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series (London: Heinemann, 1969), p. 28. 
48. Ferrar, pp. 17-18. 
49' Ibid., 'p. 2o. 
50. Ibid., p. 16. 
51. Ibid., p. 2o. 
52. Osborne, Hedda Gabler, p. 7. 
53. Writer's Theatre, p. 51. 
54. 'truss er, p. 124. 
55. Ferrar, p. 32. 
56. Trussler, p. 126. 
57. Ibid., p. 123. 
58. Ibid., pp. 124-25. 
59. Michael Anderson, Anger and Detachment: A Study of 
Arden, Osborne and Pinter, Theatre 'oday series 
1ondon: Pitman Pu lishing, 1976), p. 16. 
Go. Hayman, p. 65. 
61. Anderson, pp. 15 and 19. 
62. Hayman, p. 65. 
63. Ferrar, p. 33. 
64. Ibid., p. 32. 
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Chapter 5 
References to Pinter's plays are to the following 
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The Birthday Party (London: Methuen, 1965). 
A Slight Ache and Other Plays (London: Eyre Methuen, 1968). 
Also includes A Night Out. 
The Caretaker London: Eyre Methuen, 1967). 
The Homecour±. ri' (London: Eyre Methuen, 1966). 
Old Times London: Eyre Methuen, 1971). 
(pp. 282-346) 
1. Walter Kerr, Harold Pinter, Columbia Essays on Modern 
Writers (New York: o um is Univ. Press, 1967), p. 3. 
2. Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
3. Ibid., p. 6. 
4. Ibid., p. 7. 
5. Ibid., p. 8. 
6. Ibid., p. 9. 
7. Ibid., p. 8. 
8. "Harold Pinter: An Interview with L. M. Bensky, " origi- 
nally published as "The Art of the Theatre, III, " in 
The Paris Review, 39 (1966), rpt. in Pinter, Twentieth 
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